







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A
HISTORY
OF
THE CAMPAIGNS
OF THE
BRITISH FORCES
IN
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL,
Undertaken to relieve those Countries
FROM THE FRENCH USURPATION;
COMPREHENDING
MEMOIRS OF THE OPERATIONS OF THIS INTERESTING
WAR,
CHARACTERISTIC REPORTS
OF THE
SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE TROOPS,
AND
ILLUSTRATIVE ANECDOTES OF
Distinguished Military Conduct in Individuals,
Whatever their Rank in the Army.

Tros tyriusve mihi nullo discrimine agetur. VIRG.

VOL. II.

FIRST BRITISH CAMPAIGN (1808).
THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA.
RESTORATION OF THE KINGDOM OF PORTUGAL, ON ITS
EVACUATION BY THE FRENCH TROOPS.

LONDON:
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1812.

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Ingram-Court, London.

PREFACE

TO THE

SECOND VOLUME.

THIS volume, like the campaign of which it has endeavoured to exhibit a military view to military men, and a general collection of facts to the public, will require a very great portion of indulgence. Like the campaign itself, the resources of this volume have been derived from a mingled mass drawn from various quarters, no part of which, however, has hitherto appeared in any shape in a collective point of view.

Many parts, nevertheless, have before been treated by others, whose *facts*, where they could inform in any way, have been transfused into the following pages; a variety of force has been thus *brigaded*, though forming often an irregular *line*, and some good *positions* maintained: but, to continue the analogy between the work and its subject, the present is only the outset of the war, which, notwithstanding its impediments, will, it is hoped, progressively, better deserve the public favour.

Many communications, highly favourable to the work, have been received and used with gratitude; but it is feared that, in some instances, there is reason to declare the proprietor will have occasion to be thankful for, and attentive to, the correction of facts, by those having any relation to the subject. As to errors of the press, rendered venial by the embarrassments of periodical publication, it is hoped that, in what relates to public do-

cuments, they will be generally found fewer than in the officially-printed communications themselves.

There are some circumstances arising out of the character of the subject which should be reverted to.—The composition of regular history admits not the smallest disruption in the chain of its narrative, and refers its documents to an appendix ; military history requires the whole *à coup-d'œil*, and will not permit, in its most elegant details, of a smooth flow of uninterrupted eloquence. And this must evidently be found more prevalent, where, from the recentness of facts, notwithstanding other advantages, documents are difficult of collection, and some new incident arises out of every hour.

There is one feature in the present volume which may perhaps claim a small degree of novelty, on a subject of the highest importance,—military diplomacy : this is the ne-

gotiation and execution of the convention of Cintra ; a powerful illustration of an art in which the British army has been deficient, and from which much instruction may be obtained.

No military Tyro can peruse the documents here collected, without important information ; no experienced soldier without perceiving anew the necessity of that promptitude of action, and yet vigilant caution, which should ever characterize every military occurrence.

Whatever the errors of the convention of Cintra, at the same time it cannot fail to be remembered, that under it, in point of fact, the restoration of the legitimate government of Portugal took place, which might be maintained so long as the energies of a loyal people could be preserved, and the alliance with Great Britain be prosecuted with its original spirit.

It is in war as with nations, and indeed the analogy runs through all nature, that there are obvious and distinct periods of rise, progress, and decline. The period of the allied war, described in the present volume, may be justly deemed its *rise*, obscured perhaps by the convention of Cintra, but giving a glorious promise of its future progress, though many impediments were naturally to be expected; its progress will form the interest of the succeeding volumes; and its decline, if so it can be termed, will, it is to be hoped, most gloriously set in the peace of Europe!


Whatever the period, or whatever its difficulties, the campaigns of the armies in the peninsula cannot fail to inspire a perfect respect for the British arms, and a powerful admiration of that political spirit which has enabled the ministers of his majesty's government to prosecute, under so many and such various difficulties, a war so full of glory;—

a war which has at least arrested the most powerful energies that were ever exerted towards the establishment of universal monarchy.

In a work conducted under the numerous difficulties which must be obvious in the present, it will scarcely be necessary to add that occasions may be frequent when it shall be necessary to apologize for misapprehension, or perhaps sometimes misinformation; nor can this be surprising, when, in addition to the facts which it was deemed necessary to mark in the preface to the first volume, a recent instance has occurred of a scholar professionally employed on the spot feeling it necessary to disavow opinions which he had drawn as he conceived from positive facts.* In no instance, however, it is hoped, will any assertion appear in the present or the succeeding volumes, that can operate

* See the Times, of April 25, 1812.

injuriously to any public or private interest, or militate in any way against the service. However humble the present operations of the writer, he is at least anxious that they should be in their spirit innoxious, and in their body useful, as a work of reference for those documents and facts which can nowhere else collectively be found ; and which, but for it, would not have been drawn into existence. And for the rest, purity and propriety of intention must form his claims to the public favour.



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THE
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PUBLISHED WEEKLY
CHICAGO, ILL., U.S.A.

A
HISTORY
OF THE
CAMPAIGNS, &c.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

ARRANGEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT,
AND COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN OF
1808.

Supplies sent to Spain, accompanied by British Officers.—Their Reports.—Movements of General Spencer.—Surrender of the French Fleet.—Commission of a British Force.—Reports of the Forces of the Allies and of the Enemy, opposed to each other at this Period on the Peninsula.

THE simultaneous principle which had evinced itself throughout all Spain, seemed to be more than emulated by the British government, which, whatever its present system of foreign policy, evinced

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June.

at once its determination, with whatever hopes, or however great the difficulties which must be obviously encountered, to aid the Spanish cause by all the means within its power.

While, therefore, its naval and military commanders were watching, with no ordinary degree of diplomatic zeal, every opportunity of forwarding these views on the several coasts of Spain and Portugal, the British ministry, at home, were exercising the utmost vigilance to render those views efficient.

June 9-12.

The Spanish deputies, including some from the Gallicias as well as Asturias, were not only, as has already been observed, received with every mark of respect, but the supplies they solicited for the immediate occasions of their province were, within a few days, despatched, under care of the secretary of don Materosa, chief of the deputation; the supplies consisted entirely of the sinews of war; a sum of money, in dollars, amounting to £300,000 for each province, several thousand muskets, thirty thousand pikes, and sufficiency of powder and ball. To these, with due but liberal consideration, was attached some British officers of rank, whose intelligence could not fail to prove of the highest utility to the cause, and who were instructed to declare the readiness with which the ministers of his Britannic majesty would attend, from time to time, to any claim from the Spanish people.

The sanction of government was also given to those brilliant hospitalities of the capital which generally mark the sense of the nation:—the Spanish authorities were entertained by the city of London, in its corporate capacity, and the chief public bodies.

Of the progress of the British intercourse with Spain several reports were already made, of which, in some instances, the tenor demands attention.

On the 6th of June, major-general Spencer reported a negotiation between his majesty's naval and military commanders off the port of *Cadiz*, and deputies appointed on the part of the provisional government of the province of *Andalusia*, assembled at Seville. Admiral Purvis also reported his being invited by the Spanish officers in command to anchor his fleet at the mouth of the harbour of *Cadiz*, for the perfect assurance of the surrender of the French fleet there. And from a letter of lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple, lieutenant-governor of *Gibraltar*, dated two days anterior, was learned that the Spanish army before that fortress, reinforced by the greater part of the garrison of *Ceuta*, had declared against the French usurpation.*

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Major-general Spencer's report of a friendly understanding, confirmed by documents.

Rear-admiral Purvis's aid to the surrender of the French fleet under M. Rosily.

Lieutenant-gen. sir Hew Dalrymple's from Gibraltar, on the camp of S. Roche.

* Among these communications, a Moorish proclamation, from Tetuan, the busy scene of Morocco, should not be omitted,

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June.

On the 12th of the same month the following

to which the soldier will well know how to attribute a certain utility.

Curious Moorish proclamation against the French.

“ Courage to the Christians, and to shew that *we know all*.”

Unfortunate Christians,

Alla shews his approbation to you in several ways. You were first oppressed by a tyrant, avaricious of money, who robbed my cousin Charles of treasure, and you of your blood. He fell, and you acted very wrong not to treat him with *zarra zarra*, which is as much as to say, not to cut off his head. Why did you not do so? Because you were asleep. Since that time you have met with another tyrant, ambitious of kingdoms, and he deprived my brother Charles of his throne, including in the privation all his race, in order to keep the possession to himself, and to come before much lapse of time, to deprive me also of *my throne*. Arouse, Christians! Ah, French dog, why did you give opium to the Christians, to get possession of the principal persons, and to effect your entry without exciting apprehension? Why did you not enter sword-in-hand, that your objects may be seen, and the Christians may treat you with *zarra zarra*? Christians, you have lost time! desert this tyrant, as you regard yourselves. Let Seville be loyal, brave, and firm, in doing justice! Christians! attack these dogs, and defend the kingdom for the son of my cousin; and let that currish nation be abhorred for ever. Courage, brave Christians! attack them, and let Alla the great assist you. I entreat you to defend the kingdom for my cousin, and for the Englishmen likewise. Let all nations see this, in order that they may know who the French dog is, and that they may rise against him. Sleep no more, Christians! Noble junta of Seville, do strict and severe justice on every traitor towards the son of my cousin, and may Alla reward you.—Alla Mahomet. *Tetuan, June 10, 1808.*

information, from the Portuguese coast, was communicated through the Admiralty :

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Hibernia, off the Tagus, 12th June, 1808.

Sir Charles Cotton to the Honourable W. Wellesley Pole.

[Most Secret.]

June 12.

Sir,

I request you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that, from every account I have been able to procure, there is not more than 4000 French troops in Lisbon, from whom the Spaniards are now completely separated, and against whom the populace are highly incensed ; so that I feel it a duty to state to their lordships my opinion, that five or six thousand British troops might effect a landing, gain possession of the forts on the banks of the Tagus, and, by co-operating with his majesty's fleet, give to our possession the whole of the maritime means now collected in the Tagus.

I farther beg you will please to state to their lordships, that, having some hope a reinforcement may be on its way to Gibraltar, as stated in the despatch contained in their lordships' secret order to me of the 25th ultimo, I have placed the Blossom sloop off the rock of Lisbon, to look out for the same ; and, in the event of falling in with any expedition having troops, directed captain Pigott to request the commander thereof to repair off the Tagus, to confer with me ; a measure I am

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June.

induced to take from the critical state of affairs, and presuming the intelligence correct, as stated in my letter to you of yesterday's date, respecting the fleet of rear-admiral Purvis being already in Cadiz.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) C. CORROU.

To the Hon. William Wellesley Pole,

&c. &c. &c.

June 14.

Lord Collingwood also having taken the command of the English fleet at Cadiz, with near six thousand troops, under the major-general Spencer, had proposed to the governor, don Morla, his aid in reducing the French fleet lying there, but it was deemed expedient that it should be reduced entirely by the Spaniards.

Disembarkation
of general Spen-
cer's troops at
Ayamonte, in
Spain.

A detachment of the French army in Portugal, however, having assembled at Tavira, the capital of the southernmost province of Algarve, in the gulph of Cadiz, with an intention to enter Spain by the Guadiana, that fine river which separates the two kingdoms, general Spencer landed his troops at Ayamonte, the seaport at its mouth, opposite Castro Marino, and eighty miles north-west from Cadiz; a demonstration which drove the French force to retire on Portugal.

In addition to this service, general Spencer had also proposed the important object of assisting to oppose a French army under general Dupont, at that time marching on Andalusia, for the purpose of completing an important geographical chain of posts between Bayonne and Cadiz; but this also was declined, on the grounds of a policy which, in its place, will be explained.

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June.

In furtherance of the idea of sir Charles Cotton in respect to Portugal, the following letter, written on board his ship, will furnish a necessary document, as stating impediments to immediate military operations there.

H.M.S. Hibernia, off Lisbon, 24th June, 1808.

My Lord,

I have the honour to acquaint your lordship, that, on my arrival here this morning, in the Scout brig of war, having preceded the convoy, I immediately conferred with sir Charles Cotton on the present state of affairs in Portugal, and on the advisability of making an attempt on Lisbon, conformably to the vice-admiral's suggestion to that effect.

Major-general
Spencer to lord
viscount Castle-
reagh, June 24,

It appears that the Portuguese are all in a ripe state to throw off the French yoke: but it also clearly appears, from the information received from some intelligent Hanoverian deserters and others,

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June.

which is herewith enclosed, that the French force concentrated at Lisbon and the neighbourhood, is very considerable, and fully capable of resisting a much larger force than could possibly be landed by sir Charles Cotton and myself.

Considering, therefore, that no reasonable hopes of success can be entertained from employing the corps under my orders in this quarter, and that his majesty's government will look to Spain as the primary and principal scene of action at the present time; I have determined, with the advice and concurrence of the vice-admiral, to return instantly to my corps, which I left to follow me, under general Nightingale, but which I have no doubt I shall join to-morrow, to the southward of Cape St. Vincent, the northerly winds that have prevailed having made it impossible for the transports to weather that cape.

I shall return immediately with the troops to Ayamonte, and, upon finding the Spanish and Portuguese frontiers secure and quiet, shall proceed on to Cadiz, there to act according to circumstances and the instructions I may receive.

I have, &c.

(Signed) B. SPENCER.

To the Right Hon. the Viscount Castlereagh,

&c. &c. &c.

Mr. Adair was, however, now sent to the scene of action, and became the bearer of the following note to major-general Spencer.

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1308.

June.

Downing-street, 26th June, 1808.

Sir,

I have lord Castlereagh's directions to en- close, for your information, copies of communica- tions that have been received from the representa- tives of the principality of Asturias by his ma- jesty's government, together with the answer that has been transmitted by his majesty's command.

Hon. Charles
Stewart to ma-
jor-gen. Spen-
cer.
[By Mr. Adair.]
June 26.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES STEWART.

*To Major-general Spencer,
&c. &c. &c.*

And, on the 28th instant, lord Castlereagh thus delivers the first distinct commission to major-general Spencer.

Downing-street, 28th June, 1808.

Sir,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your several letters to the 29th, inclusive, and I have to signify to you his majesty's approbation of the measures pursued by you up to that date.

Lord viscount
Castlereagh to
major-general
Spencer.
June 28.

Mr. Adair will put you in possession of the information received by his majesty's government

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relative to the extension of the insurrection in Spain since I last wrote.

I have now to acquaint you that a corps, under the orders of lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, consisting of about 9000 men, is ordered to proceed from Cork, and to act together with the troops heretofore under your separate command, in such manner as circumstances may point out, in support of the efforts of the Spanish nation.

With a view of facilitating a junction with the corps at present under your command, I have to convey to you the king's pleasure, that, in case you should have returned to Gibraltar, you do proceed with your corps again off Cadiz, there to await such orders as you may receive from lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, availing yourself of any opening that circumstances may present in aid of the common cause, previous to his joining you; and I have to desire that you will communicate with sir Arthur Wellesley, in the manner directed in my despatch, of this date, to rear-admiral Purvis,* of which I enclose you a copy, such information as you may receive, and such opinions as you may be enabled to form as to the practicability of his corps being advantageously employed in that quarter.

* Letters to Admiral Purvis, 28th June, 1808.

I am not aware of the probability of any object having presented itself within the Straits, to which your corps can have been applied. Should, however, such have been the case, his majesty is pleased to entrust you with a discretion of suspending the execution of these orders, under circumstances which may appear to you sufficiently important to justify the same.

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June.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREACH.

*To Major-general Spencer,
&c. &c. &c.*

This document was, two days after, followed by another through colonel Trant, enclosed to sir Charles Cotton; and of the same and immediately succeeding dates were issued the commissions of a regular force to be assembled from different quarters, for the purpose of furnishing troops to the assistance of Spain and Portugal.

June 3d.

Downing-street, 30th June, 1808.

Sir,

The occupation of Spain and Portugal by the troops of France, and the entire usurpation of their respective governments by that power, has determined his majesty to direct a corps of his

Lord Castlereagh to lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B.

[Secret.]

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1808.

June 30.

troops, as stated in the margin,* to be prepared for service, to be employed under your orders in counteracting the designs of the enemy, and in affording the Spanish and Portuguese nations every possible aid in throwing off the yoke of France.

You will receive enclosed the communications† which have been made by the deputies of the principality of Asturias and the kingdom of Galicia, to his majesty's government, together with the reply which his majesty has directed to be made to their demand of assistance.

I also enclose a statement of the supplies which have been already despatched to the port of Gijon, for the use of the people of Asturias.

As the deputies from the above provinces do not desire the employment of any corps of his majesty's

Troops placed
under the com-
mand of lieute-
nant-gen. sir Ar-
thur Wellesley.

* 5th Foot	990
9th	833
38th	957
40th	843
60th	936
71st	903
91st	917
95th, 4 Companies	400
R. V. B. 4 Bn.	737
20th Light Dragoons	300

 7816

† Letter to Major-General Spencer, 26th June.

troops in the quarter of Spain, from whence they are immediately delegated, but have rather pressed, as calculated to operate a powerful diversion in their favour, the importance of directing the efforts of the British troops to the expulsion of the enemy from Portugal, that the insurrection against the French may thereby become general throughout that kingdom as well as in Spain, it is therefore deemed expedient that your attention should be immediately directed to that object.

The difficulty of returning to the northward with a fleet of transports, at this season of the year, renders it expedient that you should, in the first instance, proceed with the armament, under your orders, off Cape Finisterre. You will, yourself, precede them in a fast-sailing frigate to Corunna, where you will have the best means of learning the actual state of things, both in Spain and Portugal, and of judging how far the corps under your immediate orders, either separately or reinforced by major-general Spencer's, can be considered as of sufficient strength to undertake an operation against the Tagus.

If you should be of opinion, from the information you may receive, that the enterprize in question cannot be undertaken without waiting for reinforcements from home, you will communicate, confidentially, to the Provisional Government of

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1808.

June 30.

BOOK II.

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1808.

June 30.

Gallicia, that it is material to the interest of the common cause that your armament should be enabled to take an anchorage to the northward of the Tagus, till it can be supported by a farther force from home; and you will make arrangements with them for having permission to proceed with it to Vigo, where it is conceived it can remain with not less security than in the harbour of Ferrol, and from which it can proceed to the southward with more facility than from the latter port.

In case you should go into Vigo, you will send orders to major-general Spencer to join you at that place, should he have arrived off the Tagus in consequence of the enclosed orders;* and you will also transmit home such information as may enable his majesty's ministers to take measures for supporting your corps from hence.

With a view to the contingency of your force, together with general Spencer's, being deemed unequal to the operation, an additional corps of 10,000 men has been ordered to prepare for service, and which, it is hoped, may be ready to proceed in about three weeks from the present time.

I enclose such information as we are in possession of with respect to the enemy's force in Por-

* Letter to Major-General Spencer, 30th June, 1808.

tugal, a considerable proportion of which is said to have been lately moved to Almeida, on the north-eastern frontier. You will, no doubt, be enabled to obtain more recent information at Corunna, in aid of which lieutenant-colonel Browne has been ordered to proceed to Oporto, and to meet you with such intelligence as he can procure off Cape Finisterre.

An officer of engineers, acquainted with the defences of the Tagus, has also been sent off the Tagus to make observations, and to prepare information, for your consideration, with respect to the execution of the proposed attack on the Tagus. The result of his inquiries he will be directed to transmit, also, to the rendezvous off Cape Finisterre, remaining himself off the Tagus till your arrival.

You are authorised to give the most distinct assurances to the Spanish and Portuguese people, that his majesty, in sending a force to their assistance, has no other object in view than to afford them the most unqualified and disinterested support, and in any arrangements that you may be called on to make with either nation in the prosecution of the common cause, you will act with the utmost liberality and confidence, and upon the principle that his majesty's endeavours are to be directed to aid the people of Spain and Portu-

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1808.

June 30.

Specific object
of Great Britain
in sending an
auxiliary force
to the peninsula
declared.

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June 30.

gal in restoring, and maintaining against France the independence and integrity of their respective monarchies.

In the rapid succession in which events must be expected to follow each other, situated as Spain and Portugal now are, much must be left to your judgement and decision on the spot.

His majesty is graciously pleased to confide to you the fullest discretion to act according to circumstances, for the benefit of his service, and you may rely on your measures being favourably interpreted, and receiving the most cordial support.

Offices of military diplomacy recommended.

Conciliation.

You will facilitate, as much as possible, communications between the respective provinces and colonies of Spain, and reconcile, by your good offices, any differences that may arise between them in the execution of their common purpose.

Interference in temporary politics to be avoided.

Should any serious division of sentiment occur with respect to the nature of the provisional government, which is to act during the present interregnum, or, with respect to the prince, in whose person the legal authority is considered as vested, by the captivity or abdication of certain members of the royal family, you will avoid, as far as possible, taking any part in such discussions, without the express authority of your government.

You will, however, impress upon the minds of persons in authority, that, consistently with the

effectual assertion of their independence, they cannot possibly acknowledge the king or prince of Asturias as at present possessing any authority whatever, or consider any act done by them as valid till they return within the country, and become absolutely free agents; that they never can be considered free agents so long as they shall be prevailed on to acquiesce in the continuance of French troops, either within Spain or Portugal.

The entire and absolute evacuation of the peninsula by the troops of France being, after what has lately passed, the only security for Spanish independence, and the only basis upon which the Spanish nation should be prevailed on to treat, or to lay down their arms.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

*To lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley,
&c. &c. &c.*

By lord Burgherst, about to proceed to the scene of action, the following was quickly after conveyed.

Downing-street, 15th July, 1808.

Sir,

Since my despatches to you of the 30th ultimo, marked secret, Nos. 1 and 2, the inclosed in-

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July 15.

telligence has been received from major-general Spencer, with respect to the state of the enemy's force in Portugal.

The number of French troops immediately in the vicinity of Lisbon (so far as this information can be relied on), appearing much more considerable than it was before reported to be by sir Charles Cotton, his majesty has been pleased to direct a corps of 5000 men, consisting of the regiments stated in the margin,* to be embarked, and to proceed without loss of time to join you off the Tagus.

Army under sir
A. Wellesley to
be increased.

His majesty has been farther pleased to direct, that the troops under lieutenant-general sir John Moore, which are arrived from the Baltic, as soon as they are refreshed, and their transports can be revictualled, should also proceed without delay off the Tagus.

* RAMSGATE.

Reinforcements
under brig.-gen.
Ackland.

9th Foot, 2d bat.	675
43d	861
52d	858
97th	769

HARWICH.

Queen's	813
20th Foot	689
95th 2d bat.	180
2 Companies Artillery	200

5043

The motives which have induced the sending so large a force to that quarter are :

1st. To provide effectually for an attack upon the Tagus ; and

2d. To have such an additional force disposable, beyond what may be indispensably requisite for that operation, as may admit of a detachment being sent to the southward, either with a view to secure Cadiz, if it should be threatened by the French force under general Dupont, or to co-operate with the Spanish troops in reducing that corps, if circumstances should favour such an operation, or any other that may be concerted.

His majesty is pleased to direct, that the attack upon the Tagus should be considered as the first object to be attended to. As the whole force (of which a statement is inclosed) when assembled will amount to not less than 30,000 men, it is conceived that both services may be amply provided for: the precise distribution as between Portugal and Andalusia, both as to time and proportion of force, must depend on circumstances to be judged of on the spot; and should it be deemed adviseable to fulfil the assurance, which lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple appears to have given to the Supreme Junta of Seville, under the authority of my despatch of —————, that it was his majesty's intention to employ a corps of his troops, to the

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A disposable force provided in addition to seizing on the Tagus.

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1808.

July 15.

Regard to be
had to Cadiz.

amount of 10,000 men, to co-operate with the Spaniards in that quarter; a corps of this magnitude may, I should hope, be detached without prejudice to the main operation against the Tagus; and may be reinforced according to circumstances, after the Tagus has been secured. But if, previous to the arrival of the force under orders from England, Cadiz should be seriously threatened, it must rest with the senior officer off the Tagus, at his discretion, to detach, upon receiving a requisition to that effect, such an amount of force as may place this important place out of the reach of immediate danger, even though it should for the time suspend operations against the Tagus.

As the force which may be called for on the side of Cadiz can only require a field-equipment, the ordnance-preparation, which has been sent with a view to the reduction of the Tagus, will remain at that station.

With the exception of the ordnance-preparation sent for the attack of the forts on that river, it has not been deemed necessary to encumber the army at present with any larger detail of artillery than what belongs to a field-equipment, with a proportion of horses.

Exclusive of the period for which the transports are provided, a due proportion of victuallers will accompany the armament, which, with the supplies

which may be expected to be derived from the disposition and resources of the country, it is conceived will remove all difficulty on this head, so long as the army shall continue to act near the coast.

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The great delay and expense that would attend embarking and sending from hence all those means which would be requisite to render the army completely moveable immediately on its landing has determined his majesty's government to trust in a great measure to the resources of the country for these supplies.

There is every reason to believe, from the ardour of the inhabitants both of Spain and Portugal, that so soon as a British army can establish itself on any part of the coast, not only numbers will be anxious to be armed and arrayed in support of the common cause, but that every species of supply which the country produces for subsisting and equipping an army will be procurable. It therefore becomes the first object for consideration (if a direct and immediate attack upon the defences of the Tagus cannot in prudence be attempted), on what part of the coast between Penichè on the north and St. Ubes on the south of that river, a position can be taken up by the British army, in which its intercourse with the interior may be securely opened, and from whence it may afterwards move against the enemy,

Expectations as
to supplies on
the peninsula.

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July 15.

endeavouring, if possible, not only to expel him from Lisbon, but to cut off his retreat towards Spain.

A proportion of cavalry, as far as the means of transport exist, will accompany the troops, which can be hereafter increased, according as circumstances shall point out.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH,

To licut.-gen. sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.

&c. &c. &c.

Importance of
the expedition
increased.

The ensuing commissions to the senior officers deemed necessary to this command took place agreeably to their dates.

Downing-street, 15th July, 1808.

Sir,

Lord viscount
Castlereagh to
lieutenant-gene-
ral sir Arthur
Wellesley, K.B.
July 15.

I am to acquaint you that his majesty has been pleased to entrust the command of his troops serving on the coasts of Spain and Portugal to lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple, with lieutenant-general sir Harry Burrard second in command. The lieutenant-general has been furnished with copies of your instructions up to the present date inclusive. These instructions you will be pleased to carry into execution with every expedition that circumstances will permit, without awaiting the arrival of the lieutenant-general. And should you

be previously joined by a senior officer, you will in that case communicate to him your orders and afford him every assistance in carrying them into execution.

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1808.

July 15.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

To lieut.-gen. sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.

&c. &c. &c.

Downing-street, 21st July, 1808.

Sir,

In the event of your deeming it may be advantageous, that the troops now proceeding from England should be disembarked at any point on the coast of Portugal north of the Tagus, I am to suggest to you the propriety of your requesting sir C. Cotton to station one of his cruizers to the northward of the Berlings, with such information as you may deem material to communicate to the senior officer in command of the troops; and I shall intimate to the officers in charge of the troops proceeding from hence, that they should be prepared at that point to receive an intimation from you of the actual state of things in the Tagus.

Lord viscount
Castlereagh to
lieutenant-general
sir Arthur
Wellesley, K.B.
July 21.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

Lieut.-gen. sir Arthur Wellesley,

&c. &c. &c.

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July.

Both the matter and diction of these several commissions, exclusive of any other orders which would only be necessary to a political view of the subject, sufficiently shew the military idea entertained by the British government of the mode in which an auxiliary force was about to be employed on the peninsula.

On the 5th of July, peace was formally proclaimed with Spain in the usual manner, and the utmost activity was continued on the part of government to obtain supplies of necessaries for the allied army.

July 8.

Proclamation of
admiral sir C.
Cotton to the
Portuguese.

Meanwhile, wherever it was expedient on the coast of Portugal, every demonstration was made of the intentions of his Britannic majesty. Admiral sir Charles Cotton, commanding the naval forces there, receiving deputations for assistance, issued, from on board the *Hibernia*, off the Tagus, a proclamation, in which he said " Agreeably to your desires, I send you ships, troops, arms, and ammunition; and have given orders for hoisting the flag of the prince regent of Portugal, around which the whole Portuguese nation ought instantly to rally and take up arms in a cause at once so just and so glorious. To secure success, unanimity is necessary. Unite yourselves with your brave friends and neighbours, the Spaniards. Suffer not yourselves to be either intimidated by threats or seduced

by promises. From the experience of some months you must have learned how to estimate the friendship of the French. It is to the fidelity and the succours of *the English*, seconded by your own energies, that you are to owe the restoration of your prince and the independence of your country."

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1808.

July 8.

English force
considered pri-
marily in Por-
tugal.

On the 12th of July, don Ignacio Florez, president of the supreme junta of Asturias, issued, from Oviedo, an invitation to the foreigners of the French army in that vicinity in which are the following animated passages.

"*Brave Soldiers!* whom a cruel destiny has placed in the midst of our enemies, who compel you to carry on an unjust war against the Spaniards, and to lend your aid to the tyrant for the promotion of his design to subject us to his intolerable yoke, we conjure you to stop. Surrounded as you are by powerful armies, while Europe sleeps in chain, and is insensible to your misfortunes; you consider yourself no doubt as destitute of all consolation under your heavy load of complicated affliction!—But, dear comrades, you are as yet unacquainted with the theory and the immense resources of true liberty, supported by honour and religion.

Asturian invita-
tion to foreign-
ers in the
French army.

Come amongst us and see what is passing in the small province of Asturias.—Generous friends! we Asturians, accustomed to contemplate our mother,

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1808.

July 12.

Asturian invitation to foreigners in the French army.

(so we call our country,) bounded on the north by the vast ocean, and on the south by the protecting barrier of high mountains, are led to conceive that nature herself, in the caves and fissures of our rocks, has provided an asylum for freedom against the attempts of ambition and criminal passions.—The ideas inspired by the constant view of these magnificent objects from infancy, may well make a profound impression on the Asturians, and strengthen that universal instinct which in every thing that lives pants for liberty.—Come among us, illustrious Poles, Italians, and Portuguese, who fight now on the side of our oppressor. What, descendants of Cato, Brutus, Sobieski, and Vasca De Gama! Shall you, in the sight of the universe, support those who have torn you from your mothers, your wives, and your children, and have led you like cattle to the armies of a Murat and a Grouchy, to destroy in spite of yourselves an innocent nation that loves you, and invites you to unite with them in defending the imprescriptable rights of reason, humanity, and justice, and that burns with a desire to co-operate with you in revenging your own slavery?"

DON IGNACIO FLÓREZ,

President of S. J. of Asturias.

Oviedo,

12th July.

This was succeeded by one to the Spanish nation,

dated also from Oviedo on the 17th of July, and characterized by a similar freedom of expression.

Spaniards!—The tyrant of France temporised with you to increase the number of his slaves. His ambition, his absurd confidence increased by the intrigues of a vizier, and by those of a weak and perfidious court, led to the project of the arrest of our august monarch, that he might obtain possession of these dominions; and what tricks and abominations were not employed to deceive our young prince, and to force him into ignominious slavery! When he sought to promote the prosperity of his people and the happiness of his beloved vassals, he met with opprobrium, sacrilegious treachery, the ruin of his subjects, a criminal compact written in characters of blood by parricides and traitors, a thousand enormities of which Nero was incapable, all which were deliberately concerted with a haughty vandal who meditated our destruction. Oh, atrocious violation of the rights of society! Generous Charles! Thou, who didst dedicate thy best days, those days which thou owed to the well-being of thy people; in pursuing the wild beasts of thy forests, tell us, if amongst this savage race thou hast found any so ferocious as the horrid monster to whom thou hast thoughtlessly sacrificed, an innocent family and a faithful nation, worthy of the best affections of their sovereign? By such infer-

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CHAP. I.

1808.

July 17.
Asturian proclamation.

BOOK II.
CHAP. I.

1808.

July 17.
Asturian proclamation.

nal artifice, Napoleon already reckoned among his treasures the massive gold of Spain and of her Indies, as if it were as easy to vanquish a people as to seduce kings and to corrupt courtiers. But he is deceived, and most effectually is he cheated by those who are conversant in the arts of deception. He has forgotten that we are both freemen and Spaniards since the 19th of March, a day of as much exaltation to Spain as it was of terror and alarm to the black eagles which presumed to fix their talons on the gates of the capital. Happy day which you have converted to the desolation of your enemies ! Look, oh Spain ! down the horrible precipice that perfidy has excavated, and remember the exalted happiness and the immortal renown your enemies have prepared for you. Yes, Spain, with the energies of liberty, has to contend with France debilitated by slavery. If she remain firm and constant, Spain will triumph. A whole people is more powerful than disciplined armies. Those who unite to maintain the independence of their country must triumph over tyranny. Spain will inevitably conquer in a cause the most just that has ever raised the deadly weapon of war, for she fights not for the concerns of a day, but for the serenity and happiness of ages ; not for an insulated privilege, but for all the rights of human nature ; not for temporal blessings, but for eternal happiness ; not for the

benefit of one nation, but for all mankind, and even for France herself.

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1808.

July 17.
Asturian proclamation.

Spaniards elevate your natural courage by such sentiments! Let every tyrant of the earth perish rather than that you should submit to despotism and to impiety. To impiety! merciful God, let not your faithful people be exposed to such disgrace and infamy! Spaniards, let every honest man arise in defence of his country; let your iron and brass be converted into thunderbolts of war. Let all Spain become a camp; let her population become an armed host; above all, let your youths fly to the defence of the state, for the son shall fall before the father appears in the ranks of battle; and you, tender mothers, affectionate wives, fair maidens, do not retain within your embraces the sweet objects of your love, until from victory returned they deserve your affection. They withdraw from your arms not to fight for a tyrant, but for their God; for a monarch worthy the veneration of his people; and not only for these, but for yourselves and for your companions.

Instead of regretting their departure, like the Spartan women sing the song of Jubilee; and, when they return conquerors to your arms, then, and not till then, weave a laurel crown for their reception. The love of religion, of independence, and of glory, those noble passions, the preservers of great em-

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1808.

July 17.
Asturian proclamation.

pires, penetrate into our inmost souls. Let us all swear, by the outrages suffered by our country, by the victims sacrificed on the 2d of May, by our own swords bathed in the parrieidal blood of the ferocious Napoleon, that we will inflict the punishment decreed by the god of vengeance! And you, rich men, rendered selfish, not patriotic, by indulgence, do not continue in ignoble repose, but exert your means, that peace may be secured. If, debilitated by inactivity, you are incapable of enduring the fatigues of war, let your treasure supply the wants of the indigent, and the necessities of the defender of the country. And you, ye venerable orders of religion, do not ye withhold the sums necessary for the common cause! Which is most precious, the gold of the mine or the blood of the man? If your civic virtue should not demand the sacrifice, your mercenary interest will extort it. Your incorporation, sanctified by authority, your political existence, the possession of your property, your individual security, all depend upon the success of this war. Our independence cannot be resigned until these illustrious seminaries of sanctity and wisdom are surrendered; until these solid columns of religion and of the state tumble to the earth; until the public right shall be annihilated and Spain itself subverted. Happy country! you this day receive from your favourite sons the most accept-

able proofs of their tenderness and love, and of their affection and gratitude, for the protection they have received from you through successive ages. To-day they return to you the riches they have received, for the splendour you have conferred, for your pious generosity, for your ardent zeal, in sustaining the religion and the custom of their ancestors; those customs originating in the sublime morality of the gospel, within whose sacred vase is inclosed, and will be for ever inclosed, the preservation of your empire and the power of your monarchy.—Spaniards! we all defend one common cause. We are all passengers on board the ship Independence, which is already launched, and must either swim or sink according as she is navigated by us. There is only one means of salvation for us, and that is that the whole nation armed hasten to exterminate the banditti by whom we are invaded, and to punish them for their atrocities.—Warriors! present yourselves in the field of glory. I do not attempt to excite your valour; you are Spaniards, and therefore you are brave and honourable; but in one respect I may give you advice although you are Spaniards. I recommend to you, in the name of your country, the most severe discipline and the most implicit obedience to your commanders. Without discipline you can neither have an army nor victory. Do you see how these

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Asturian proclamation.

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Asturian procla-
mation.

fierce pretenders outrage, lay waste, and destroy? nothing can satiate their ferocity! But if, in your turn, you should become conquerors, let the martial spirit by which you are animated be restrained within the limits of reason and justice. Let humanity, compassion, and beneficence, be the device of your banners: above all, let not the name of Spaniard be stained by that iniquity and sacrilege which you detest in your enemies, and then your grateful country will confer upon you her abundant benefits, and your names will be engraved on the sublime edifice of Spanish independence. I may address you as conquerors although you have not already vanquished. One province only, the cradle of heroes, the moment war was declared, filled the enemy with terror. Yes, Spaniards, from that happy instant the lion was attacked with a fever from which he will never escape. The victory you are about to establish, an alliance between Spain and the most powerful, the most wise, and the most polished nation of the earth, with the only country which this second Machiavel could not seduce, Great Britain! The alliance that the infamous traitor broke for our misery and ruin; that assassin of our nation, that devouring monster! whose immense rapine provided an assylum for our enemy, that alliance, countrymen, has been generously restored by the only empire which has been able to

maintain its honour and independence, and to which is reserved the lofty distinction of restoring enslaved Europe.—Of what consequence then is the renowned power of Napoleon? The world itself depends upon the union of those two great nations!

While this diffusion of principles, on the theatre of the future war, continued progressive with the operations of the British government, the military officers who had been sent thither were no less vigilant or active, as will appear from the following reports:

In letters of date the 9th, 14th, 21st, and 22d, of July, addressed, though not forwarded till the latter period, to lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, (who put to sea only on the 12th,) colonel Brown thus writes:

Oporto, 9th July, 1803.

Sir,

I have the honour to lay before you the report of my proceedings in the execution of his majesty's commands, communicated to me in lord Castlereagh's letter, 1st July, a copy of which is enclosed, No. 1.

Col. Brown to
lieut.-gen. sir
Arthur Wel-
lesley.
July 9.

I arrived at Oporto in the Peacock brig, on the 7th instant, and found, from the information given to me by captain Galway, of his majesty's ship

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July 9.

Expulsion of
the French from
Oporto,

Antelope, at anchor off the bar, that the French had been expelled from the town, that the place was in complete possession of the Portuguese, governed and commanded by the bishop, and that his majesty's brig Eclipse was moored in the river to protect and cover a bridge of boats, which is the only communication from this town to the southern parts of the kingdom. I lost no time in waiting upon his excellency, accompanied by captain Galway, in which interview I received from the bishop the most satisfactory assurances that the people had taken up arms in defence of their country and religion, and were determined to expel the common enemy from the country. I made known to the bishop that the object of my mission could not fail to forward the undertaking of the people, and that I was desirous of obtaining the best information of the enemy's force in Portugal, and the positions which it at present occupies.

As, from the nature of the service upon which I am employed, the information communicated to me may daily take a new character, I shall endeavour to lay before you a journal of my proceedings, from which you will be able the more accurately to measure the value of each point of intelligence.

On the morning of the 9th instant, marshal de

Campo Bernadin Freire, governor of Oporto, and brigadier-general don Miguel Forgias, waited upon me, by command of his excellency, to lay before me the whole of the information in their possession, and, from notes taken at the time and carefully explained by those officers, the information runs thus:—

“That, from the latest and best intelligence, the whole of the enemy's force in Portugal may be estimated at 14 or 15,000 men, exclusive of the auxiliary troops said to have been disbanded by Junot; 5000 have been stationed at Almeida, and the remainder at Lisbon and in the forts commanding the entrance of the Tagus and northward to Penichè. On the revolution taking place at Oporto the force at Almeida made demonstration to occupy this place, but, having been checked by the patriots at Lamego, they retired to Almeida. On the 2d of July, 4000 men, commanded by general La Borde, marched from Lisbon to Leyria, and 600 men from Penichè to the same place, said to be commanded by colonel Thomas. On the 5th of July, the force at Almeida, commanded by general Loisson, are said to have marched from that place, leaving behind their heavy baggage, artillery, and 200 men, and to have taken the road to Guarda and Fundao.

At Leyria the troops from Lisbon are said to

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1808.

July 2.

Statement of the
French force in
Portugal, and
their move-
ments.

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CHAP. I.

1808.

July 9.

have been checked by the patriots, composed principally of the students of Coimbra, and to have suffered considerable loss. Neither the bishop or the generals appeared to have any apprehension that the French force now on foot is destined against Oporto, or that any attempt of that nature would be attended with success.

The generals laid before me returns of the force organized by the bishop's authority for the security of the country, from which it appears that, in the province of Minho, north of Oporto, there is at this time, —

Returns of Portuguese forces and their description, and want of arms.

At Viana - - -	1,600	} Regular infantry.
Valency - - -	703	
Artillery - -	150	
<hr/>		2,453
And eight regiments of militia, generally		
without arms - - - - -		5,245
In Oporto, &c.—		
Two regiments of infantry -		2,229
Artillery - - - - -		300
A Spanish regiment of infantry - - - - -		255
<hr/>		2,784
A regiment of militia, some arms - - - - -		2,548
<hr/>		
Carried forward - -		13,030

Brought forward - -	13,030
Stationed between Veseu, Francosa, and Guarda, and to the north of those places,—	
Two regiments of infantry -	2,019
Five ditto militia - - - - -	3,750
Not well armed ——— - - -	5,769
In the several districts there are about 1,200 cavalry, about 150 of which are mounted and equipped, and every exertion is making to place the whole upon a respectable footing - - - - -	1,200
Force at Coimbra - - - - -	6,000

Total force - 25,999

I have endeavoured to procure, for your information, the various proclamations which have been issued by the patriots; and I also enclose copies of two letters from the duc D'Abrantes,* which have been intercepted by the patriots.

10th of July, early in the morning, I accompanied the bishop to all the military staff, to reconnoitre the positions taken on the left bank of the river, to cover the approach from Lisbon. The utmost zeal was apparent in every person; the peasants were working cheerfully upon the defences; the troops are encamped at all the

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July 9.

Spirit of the
Portuguese.

* See p. 52, 53, 54, and 55.

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July 9.

commanding points, which are strengthened by ditches, palisadoes, and abbatis, and artillery appears to be judiciously placed. As yet no news whatever has been received from Coimbra or Leyria, since the attack of the students, and the bishop and his military staff, although they are slow to believe that the enemy will attempt any thing upon Oporto, are yet somewhat alarmed at the idea that so many men of the enemy are on foot while they remain in total ignorance of their intentions. I have enforced, as far as I am able, the great necessity of preparations being made for resistance in case of an attack, and the advice which I offered with humility was very graciously received by the bishop and his generals, and, in many instances, it was immediately acted upon.

Amenity of the
Portuguese ge-
nerals.

It appeared to me to be their intention to extend their position to an extent that would require at least 10,000 good troops to defend it, and, consequently, from the narrow means within our power, only parts of the line of defence would be occupied, and numerous practicable intervals be left wholly unguarded; into this error they had been led by the character of the country and the numerous positions which follow each other, and render it difficult to know where to stop. I pointed out these errors to the generals, and received their thanks. A large proportion of the town lies on the left bank of the river, and the

streets, through which are the only approaches to the river in that part, are narrow, with high stone houses on either side. I suggested that barriers should be prepared of the common carriages of the city, and kept in readiness, with bags of sand, to form barricadoes, and close the passage through the town, and persons will be immediately appointed to carry this measure into execution, and fix upon the citizens, who are to occupy the houses adjacent to each barrier, to be armed with such fire-arms as it may be in their power to provide.

A letter was intercepted at Coimbra, dated the 17th of June, wherein Junot directs general Loisson to evacuate Almeida, and retire upon Lisbon as speedily as possible.

The bishop is, notwithstanding, in considerable alarm, and has requested me to impress upon the mind of sir Charles Cotton the advantage to be expected from any threat he may be enabled to make upon Lisbon, which may divert the enemy from Oporto until the force is better organized; and, his excellency having expressed the strongest wish that I should communicate the situation of the country to sir Charles Cotton without delay, I propose sailing this evening for the Tagus, 10th of July; in the mean time I have been assured that the most vigorous exertions shall be made during my absence to narrow the situation and

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1808.

July 9.

Plan for defending
Oporto.

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1808.

July 9.

resources of the enemy, by endeavours to force a communication along the coast towards Lisbon, to be kept open with our fleets.

The bishop has also a gentleman of high consideration whom he is desirous of sending as ambassador to England, and his excellency earnestly solicits that sir Charles Cotton will be pleased to provide an immediate conveyance for him to England suited to the importance of the mission.

Habitual necessity of the modern Portuguese for support, on which to rest their own power.

The bishop has earnestly entreated my return to Oporto, as the presence of English officers has given much animation to the spirits of the people, and is very desirous to have some British artillery and engineer-officers, who speak the language of the country, and will be thankful for any officers. The English colours are hoisted with the Portuguese, and the appearance of the uniform is a general passport.

All these communications have taken place with the able assistance of captain Galway, who has not failed to keep alive the interests of England on all occasions.

10th of July.—At the moment that I was going on board the Peacock I received the enclosed information from senor Picalugo, secretary to the bishop, relating to certain French vessels, which are said to be destined to remove the church-plate from Lisbon to France: the

bishop informed me that it had long been known to him that it was the intention of Junot to avail himself of any opportunity to send his plunder to France, and captain Galway also informed me that his intentions were known to sir Charles Cotton, who has taken measures to intercept the treasure. Under these circumstances it is scarcely possible for any vessel to effect her escape from the Tagus. I suggest for your consideration the possibility that the movement made by the French troops towards Leyria and Coimbra may be with a view to obtain a point on the coast north of the Tagus, to which the treasure might be removed and shipped for France.

It may be proper to mention that the bishop had received intelligence that the inhabitants had been disarmed and no weapons left them but knives and forks; that Junot was taking great precautions to prevent the patriotic flame, which has broken out at Oporto, from spreading to the southward; and that, on his excellency's part, every measure was in force to propagate the feeling throughout the country; and that he had the best ground to know that the people of Lisbon were only intimidated by French coercion from following the example of Oporto.

On the 8th instant, the bishop despatched a schooner to England, soliciting the aid of a Bri-

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1808.

July 9.

Portuguese disarmed by Junot.

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CHAP. I.

1808.

July 9.

Solicitation of
the spirited
bishop of
Oporto, for aid
in troops, arms,
and money,
from Great Bri-
tain.

tish force, arms, and money, and by that opportunity I reported my arrival at Oporto to lord Castlereagh.

In my communication with the bishop I had ventured to assure him that the British government had anticipated his requisition for assistance, which I expected would soon be at hand on the coast of Portugal; but I have confined myself to that general communication, and carefully avoided every allusion to the destination of the force under your command. The hope of co-operation from a British army has certainly increased the vigour of their measures, and I may confidently assure you that any line of operation, which you may be pleased to point out, will be cheerfully executed, under the orders of the bishop.

I have endeavoured, throughout this report, to confine myself to facts which have come within my own knowledge, and, in the statement of the respective forces, have taken the number from the documents upon which the orders of the bishop have been given, and which were most liberally submitted to my perusal. I feel it proper also to report that my inquiries have been readily and satisfactorily answered by the generals, throughout which I have received the most zealous assistance from ensign Wyndham, of the First Guards, who was permitted by the commander-in-chief to

accompany me; and I cannot close my report without apologising for the length of it, and any inaccuracies, which may have arisen under the circumstances in which I have collected and reported my information, and, at the same time, expressing my anxious solicitude to merit your approbation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) S. BROWN,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

To Lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B.

&c. &c. &c.

Peacock, off the Tagus, 14th July, 1808.

Sir,

I have this moment communicated with sir C. Cotton, and do not find that he can add much to the information which I have already obtained, and which I herewith enclose.

I have determined, and with sir Charles's intire approbation, to return to Oporto, and, to the utmost of my power, endeavour to organize the patriot army; and hope, by the period of your arrival, that a force will be on foot, able to afford some assistance to the British army. I take this opportunity to mention, that the bishop of Oporto expressed a wish, that the landing of any British troops might be made to the northward of Lisbon, and, from what I learn here, I conclude you will be disposed to meet his wishes in that respect. I

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CHAP. I.

1808,
July 9.

Col. Brown to
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, July 14.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

1808.

July 14.

have now only to mention that the Peacock has taken on board 100 marines, which it is proposed to land at Figueira, to support that post, where already 300 marines are stationed. I shall afterwards proceed for the Oporto army, and wait your farther commands with much anxiety.

I am, &c. &c.

S. BROWN,

Lieutenant-Colonel.

To sir Arthur Wellesley, &c. &c.

Oporto, 21st July, 1808.

Sir,

July 21.

I now resume my report of the 14th instant, to inform you, that, after leaving the Tagus, I had opportunities to observe the coast to the northward, and from the heavy surf which falls constantly upon it, even in light winds, there is scarcely a point between the Tagus and Mondego, which can be depended upon for the disembarkation of troops, except Penichè, which is occupied by the enemy.

Points of disembarkation.

Penichè.

Mondego.

300 British marines landed at Figueira.

On the afternoon of the 18th instant, I arrived at Mondego, and immediately waited upon captain Bligh, of his majestys ship Antelope, who commands on shore, and reported the reinforcement, which I had brought with me on board the Peacock. I found the 300 marines, which had been

landed, posted at the entrance of the small town of Figueira, situated on the north side of the river, which is a bar harbour, but safe anchorage within, of very easy access for transports, and well suited for the disembarkation of troops.

The river being fordable, about six miles above the town, an armed launch from the Alfred is stationed to cover the pass. I received from captain Bligh a general information of the intelligence respecting the force of the enemy, which I had at Oporto; but the troops, under Loisson, are not yet satisfactorily accounted for. The enemy had made a requisition for 15,000 rations at Pombale; had burned the village of Nazareth, and committed great excesses at Leyria; and his advanced posts were pushed within about fifteen miles of Figueira, in which, besides the marines, there is only a regiment of Portuguese militia, and the armed population. I am decidedly of opinion, that, if the enemy march against Figueira with a superior force, the place cannot be maintained; and captain Bligh, expecting the attack of the enemy every hour, had removed the reinforcement from the Peacock to the Alfred, and made every preparation for bringing off the troops at Figueira, in case of an attack; when it is his intention to blow up a small fort, which commands the entrance of the harbour, but is itself commanded in the rear.

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CHAP. I.

1808.

July 21.

Excesses of the
French under
Loisson.

Plan on their
approach.

BOOK II.
CHAP. I.

1808.

July 21.

Lieutenant-colonel Trant had left Figueira, a few hours before my arrival, for Coimbra, to ascertain the real state of the country; the Portuguese having determined to make a stand at that place; but although there is very good will in the people, their exertions are so short-lived, and with so little combination, that I do not see any hope of their being able to resist the advance of the enemy, even to Oporto, if that place is really the object of general La Borde.

Captain Bligh acquainted me, that in case he found it necessary to evacuate Figueira, he should retire by sea, with the whole of the marines, to Oporto. It is to be observed that the force, under La Borde marched from Lisbon on the 2d instant, and they were still at Leyria on the 18th; and it therefore becomes a question, whether the object of La Borde is to obtain a supply of provisions for Junot, to penetrate to Oporto, or to interrupt the communication between Lisbon and the northern provinces now in arms.

Oporto, 22d July, 1808.

Sir,

Col. Brown to
brigadier-general
the hon. C.
Stewart.
July 22.

Herewith I enclose, for the information of lord Castlereagh, copies of the reports which I have prepared against the arrival of sir Arthur Wellesley, to which I have now only to add that I

am established here, and fully in the confidence of the bishop and his military council. Colonel Trant is also well placed at Coimbra, and, by daily communications with him, I hope to be able to lay before sir Arthur much useful information on his arrival.

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CHAP. I.

1808.

July 22.

Loisson's orders.

By various intercepted letters we know that Loisson was ordered, if he found Oporto too strong for the force at Almeida, to retire upon Lisbon; which orders he proceeded to execute; upon his arrival at Santarem, he received directions to send his sick and wounded men to Lisbon by water, and, with his effective force, to join Laborde at Leyria; since which junction, however, the French have made a retrograde movement towards Lisbon, and the patriots have advanced from Coimbra, and take up a position, their right at Soure, centre at Cartano, and left at Miranda de Corvo: this forward movement has given some uneasiness to the government; for, by colonel Trant's report, the regular and militia force at Coimbra does not exceed 5000, two-thirds of which only are armed, and an armed peasantry of about 12,000; whereas the united force, under Laborde and Loisson, cannot be less than 8000. By desire of the bishop, I have this day despatched a courier to colonel Trant, urging him to restrain the dangerous imprudence of the patriots, which may risk the safety of Oporto.

Comparative
force of France
and Portugal,
near Coimbra,
and their positions.

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CHAP. I.

1808.

July 22.

Preparations
for the army
under sir Arthur
Wellesley, (lord
Wellington.)

It has been my utmost endeavour to forward every measure which could tend to preserve a footing in the country for the British force, and I have urged, with success, the necessity of providing depots of provisions for a large army, to be in readiness to be conveyed from hence by water to the point which may be fixed on by sir Arthur Wellesley.

And I beg that you will assure his lordship, that the force on its arrival will be received with gratitude by the government and the people, who will be ready to co-operate in any measures which sir Arthur may recommend.

Sir Charles Cotton having stationed vessels to look out for sir Arthur Wellesley, and direct him this way, I hope that he will call here before he proceeds to Lisbon.

I have to apologise for the length of the reports which I have sent to you, requesting you to glean from them such information as may be interesting to lord Castlereagh, and I beg you will assure his lordship, that it shall be my study to deserve the confidence he has reposed in me, by devoting myself wholly to the objects of my mission.

I am, sir, &c. &c.

(Signed) S. BROWN,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

*Brigadier-general the hon. Charles Stewart,
&c. &c. &c.*

French musket ball-cartridges, 1,103,800.

Cartridges for fowling-pieces, 751,252.

Powder, paper, and thread, to complete six millions of ball-cartridges, (including the French cartridges and those of fowling-pieces,) and a proportion of lead.

One million of flints for muskets.

Light 3-pounders, on mountain-carriages, 12.

Coehorn-howitzers, ditto, 12.

With 400 rounds for guns, and 200 rounds for howitzers.

Ten brass 3-pounders, light, without carriages; but the same quantity of ammunition as above ordered for 3-pounders.

Twelve thousand new-pattern swords with belts, as far as they can be furnished.

Captain (since brigadier-general) Trant, in a letter to brigadier-general Stewart, also thus communicates the information of his post.

Figueira, Rio de Mondego, 17th July, 1808.

Sir,

I think it my duty to acquaint you, for lord Castlereagh's information, that, having, with captain Préval, associated in the mission entrusted to us on the 2d of this month, communicated with admiralsir Charles Cotton, off the Tagus, on the

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CHAP. I.

1808.

Memoranda of
wants.

[Enclosure.]

Capt. Trant to
brigadier-gen.
Stewart.

BOOK II.
CHAP. I.

1808.

July 17.

14th, and the admiral having, under the present state of affairs in this country, recommended me to join the patriot force collected in the northern provinces, I arrived here in that intention this day. I was farther induced to adopt this measure from a persuasion that it is the admiral's opinion that a disembarkation will take place preferably northward of the rock of Lisbon; and, in such case, I am aware that my services will be more effectually employed with the patriots, in endeavouring to influence an active and concerted co-operation with the lieutenant-general's movements.

Captain Préval remains with the admiral, for the purpose of communication with sir Arthur Wellesley, on the points suggested in our instructions, should he reach the Tagus, which I have reason to suppose will not be the case; at least if fallen in with by some of the cruizers which have been detached, by the admiral, to acquaint him with the commencement of hostilities in this quarter.

I annex a memorandum of the force now assembled at Coimbra, and which may be expected to march from this neighbourhood to meet the attack of the enemy, should they advance from Leyria and Thomar, where 4000 men are now stationed, under general Margarot. A partial affair took place there some days back, in which, as

might be expected, the patriots were compelled to fall back; but you are to observe, that not 1700 are absolutely armed. The enthusiasm of this country is at its height, and, no doubt, will extend to Estremadura, when sir A. Wellesley makes his appearance; indeed it is a general opinion, that, should the resistance of the French be protracted after that period, a general massacre may be the consequence.

I set off for Coimbra to-morrow, and shall remain there until farther orders from sir A. Wellesley; and, if I receive none, shall attach myself to the exertions of the force now organizing there.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. TRANT.

To the honourable Brigadier-General Stewart.

The whole of these were in course enclosed to lieutenant-general sir Harry Burrard, as chief in command, till the arrival of sir Hew Dalrymple, by lord Castlereagh, who, at the same time, announced the appointment of brigadier-general the honourable Charles Stewart, with the 18th Light Dragoons, to that service.

The only additional view of the military state of Portugal at the instant to be derived from these, the only materials expedient to be used, are

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CHAP. I.

1808.

June 7.

to be obtained from the two intercepted letters of the French general (Junot) commanding in Portugal, alluded to in the first letter of colonel Brown, of the 9th of July; and these, not only trifling as they are, afford peculiar information, but are also specimens of the modes of communication, under such circumstances, in the French army.

The first is addressed to the superior in command, according to the modern French nomenclature the grand duke of Berg; the other to the inferior in command, the general Loisson, (*anglicé* LAWSON.)

June 7.

Head-Quarters, Lisbon, 7th June, 1808.

Sir,*

Junot's confession of his difficulties.

I know not if the letter which I had the honour to address to your imperial highness, by Al-

* In the original, Junot addresses his senior as My Lord, (*Monseigneur*,) the present title is more agreeable to the other forms in English. The following are transcripts of the originals:

Au Quartier Général à Lisbonne, le 7 Juin, 1808.

Monseigneur,

J'ignore si la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre altesse impériale, par Almeida, lui est parvenue.—Je lui rendais compte du soulèvement de Badajoz: je pense qu'elle aura pris des mesures contre ces revoltés. J'ai envoyé au général Kellermann, à *Elvas*, la brigade qui devoit se porter sur Cadiz. Si votre altesse a envoyé quelques troupes sur Badajoz, et qu'elles combinent leur mouvement avec le général Kellermann, les revoltés seront bientôt à la raison, mais je ne peux porter qu'un foible secours; les Espagnols qui me restent, m'obligeant de

meida, is come to hand. I therein stated the rising of Badajoz: I think measures must have

les garder, m'affaiblissent considerablement au lieu de me fortifier, et, depuis quelques jours, l'escadre Anglaise fait toutes les nuits quelques tentatives, qui, bien qu'elles ne m'inquiètent pas beaucoup, m'obligent néanmoins à un service fatigant et actif pour le peu de troupes que j'ai.

Les troupes de Gallice sont parties d'Oporto; elles ont commencées leur mouvement le 4me. Les deux escadrons de *Dragons de la Reine* et de Montera sont de même partis pour la Gallice, comme votre altesse l'a désiré.

Le général Caraffa à reçu l'ordre de reprendre le commandement de la province de *l'Estramadure*, et d'y rentrer avec le reste de la cavalerie de sa division; mais cela est-il possible dans ce moment? Je ne le crois pas; il exécutera ces ordres dès qu'il le pourra faire. Vous sentez, monseigneur, combien ma position va devenir difficile. Je prie votre altesse de vouloir bien y prendre intérêt, et, si les circonstances devenoient plus critiques pour moi, je compte à l'avance de la continuation de la bienveillance de votre altesse imperiale, et sur les secours qu'il dépendrait d'elle de me donner.

De votre altesse impériale et royale,

monseigneur,

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

(Signé) LE DUC D'ABRANTES.

Au Quartier Général à Lisbonne, le 7 Juin, 1808.

Monsieur le général Loisson,

Je n'ai point encore reçu de vos lettres: vous devez cependant déjà savoir ce qui se passe du côté de *Ciudad Rodrigo*. Ecrivez moi très souvent, même pour me dire qu'il n'y a rien de nouveau. Si vous pouvez entrer a *Ciudad Rodrigo* sans coup ferir, faites-le.—L'insurrection de Badajoz doit mériter toute votre attention, et vous devez faire tout votre possible pour l'empêcher de se propager de votre côté. Traitez bien les Portugais, et

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been taken against the insurgents. I have sent to general Kellerman the brigade which should have marched on Cadiz. If your highness has sent any troops against Badajoz, and they combine their movements with those of general Kellerman, the insurgents will be soon reduced; but I can give very little assistance: the Spaniards which remain here, being to be guarded, considerably weaken instead of strengthening me; and, for some time, the English squadron have made nightly attempts, which, while they do not much disturb me, nevertheless create a harassing service to the small number of troops which I have.

The Gallician troops have quitted Oporto; they

tachéz de faire rentrer les deserteurs.—Protégez nos courriers autant que possible, et ne les hazardez pas. Si vous pouvez correspondre avec le grand duc de Berg, envoyez lui la lettre ci-jointe.—Vous savez la confiance que j'ai en vous; agissez en consequence, selon que vous le trouverez plus utile au service de sa majesté, mais maintenez une severe discipline; ne souffrez aucune exaction, et ne permettez pas qu'aucun officier, sous quelque prétexte que se soit, se fasse donner une cruzade en Portugal; je serais inflexible contre quiconque s'il serait permis, et je rendrais compte immediatement à l'empereur; mais je compte sur les officiers de mon armée, et j'espere qu'aucun d'eux ne trompera ma confiance.—Votre santé est-elle rétablie?

J'ai l'honneur de vous saluer avec une haute consideration.

(Signé) LE DUC D'ABRANTES.

A Monsr. Le general Loisson, Commandt.

la 2de div. de l'armée.

commenced their movement the 4th. The two squadrons of the Queen's Dragoons and those of Montera have also marched for Gallicia, as your highness desired.

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General Caraffa has received orders to resume the command of the province of Estremadura, and to re-enter it with the other cavalry of his division: but is this possible at the present moment? I do not think it is; but he will execute these orders as far as he can. You perceive, sir, to what a degree my position becomes difficult. I pray your highness to interest yourself in it; and, should circumstances become more critical towards me, I count, in the continuance of your imperial highness's favour to my progress, and whatever succours it is in your power to give me.

I am, sir, your imperial and royal highness's most humble and most obedient servant,

ABRANTES.

Head-Quarters, Lisbon, 7th June, 1808.

Sir,

I have not yet received letters from you. You must nevertheless already know what has passed towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Write to me very often, even to inform me there is nothing new. If you can enter Ciudad Rodrigo without an action, do it. The insurrection of Badajoz

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Affected abstinence of Junot.

should merit your utmost attention, and you ought to do all you can to prevent its propagation on your side. Treat the Portuguese well, and strive to effect the return of deserters. Protect our couriers as much as possible, and do not hazard them. If you can correspond with the grand duke of Berg, send him the enclosed letter. You know the confidence I have in you; act accordingly as you shall find most conducive to his majesty's service; but maintain strict discipline; suffer no exactions; and permit no officer, on any pretext whatever, to cause himself to be presented with a single cruzado in Portugal. I shall be inflexible against whoever shall permit it, and report it immediately to the emperor. But I depend on the officers of my army, and I hope that none of them will deceive my opinion. Is your health re-established?

I have the honour to salute you,

With a high consideration,

ABRANTES.

To General Loisson,

Commanding 2d division of the army.

Statement of the patriotic force in Spain and that of the enemy.

The arrangement of the patriotic force of Spain has already been exposed, to a certain degree, in the precautions issued by the supreme junta of Seville.*

* Vol. I. p. 438.

The country, as far as possible, was divided into military districts. Three generalissimos were appointed, who should act in concert with each other. Of these one commanded in Andalusia,* Murcia, and Lower Estremadura; one in Valencia, Arragon, and Catalonia; the other in Navarre, Biscay, Asturias, and the north of Old Castile. Among these, which did not by any means comprehend the permanent military divisions, (for the military as well as the civil government was a new experiment formed at the moment,) were included Castanos, Palafox, Caro, Blake, and others, who possess the best claims to a respectable immortality.

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Each of these generalissimos, with the generals appointed to command under them, immediately employed himself in forming an army, of whatever regular troops might be within his district, recruited by the peasantry, collected into bodies for that purpose. He then undertook enterprises, and afforded succour wherever it was required, keeping frequent communication with all the other generalissimos, that they might aid the general cause with one accord.

Spanish troops.

May.—June.

* It is deemed unnecessary here to notice the local distinctions. Andalusia, therefore, instead of being considered as comprising four kingdoms or provinces, is mentioned only as a province.

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May.—June.

Madrid and La Mancha alone demanded the particular attention of a general, to constantly harass the troops of the enemy, by hanging on their flanks and rear, and cutting off their provisions, without incurring the necessity of a general action; and the passes on the north and east, as well as the Portuguese frontier, required no less to prevent the reinforcement of the enemy.

The patriotic army was recruited as most expedient in each of the provinces. In some, all the males capable of bearing arms were enrolled from the ages of fifteen to forty-five; in some, sixteen to forty-six; in others, to fifty. Under all the circumstances, it may be easily conceived, that no regular estimate of numbers could be formed.

If all the enrolments were duly made, and every individual brought into the field, they must have exceeded a million, but this could not have been the case, notwithstanding the numerous bands which every where appeared, capable only of evincing hatred against the enemy.* The numbers also naturally fluctuated to a certain degree, as circumstances affected the cause in which they were engaged; and according as local advantages ena-

* Hence the particular desire of arms, which was always prevalent in the solicitations for assistance of the Spaniards.

bled a larger or smaller number of the men who had been raised, to be equipped for, or to keep, the field. Still, in point of numbers, the Spaniards in arms could not fail to be respectable; no cause could be more so; the general sentiment bespoke the most ardent enthusiasm through every rank: but the armies were yet *only* raw levies, and there were certainly not a sufficient number of generals capable of infusing into them such a spirit of discipline as should give to them the consistency and mobility of a military force.

There are not much better means of forming an estimate of the number of French troops employed in the Spanish peninsula at the period of the general insurrection.

Marshals Murat, Moncey, and Bessieres, were, however, employed on that service in the interior of Spain; with these must have been three distinct corps of the grand army; nine divisions, forming, in all probability, a body of seventy-two thousand men.

Of these, one third, under Bessieres, formed a chain of posts, whose chief stations were Pampe-luna and Vittoria, from Bayonne to Madrid; and by detachments bridled the country to a considerable extent through the provinces of Navarre, Biscay, and Old Castile. The remainder under Murat

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and Moncey were stationed at Madrid, or encamped in its vicinity, for the important purpose of preserving the capital, overawing the heart of Spain, or sending detachments, as might be expedient, to the southern provinces; thus extending the chain of communication across the whole kingdom, and particularly to the great national arsenal and port of Cadiz; and, by dividing the peninsula, preclude the co-operation of the eastern with the western provinces, and Portugal.

Marshal Ney rested with another corps, computed at ten thousand men, on the eastern Pyrenees, and occupied the important fortresses of Barcelona and Montjuich.

Junot was in Portugal, where, and on its frontier, he had the remains of an army composed of a corps of twenty thousand French and fifteen thousand Spanish, Hanoverian, and Swiss, auxiliaries.

These would form an army perhaps of one hundred and twenty thousand men; of which a great part were veteran troops, commanded by generals experienced in every variety of the science of war; the whole animated with the expectation of high reward, and a romantic enthusiasm for the universal sway of France over the continent, and accustomed to rapid and easy, though not bloodless, victories.

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June.
Spanish and
French generals
opposed to each
other.

Of the Spanish forces of the four western provinces of Asturias, Galicia, Leon, and Estremadura, besides the adjacent districts of Biscay unsubdued, general Cuesta early received the command, and was therefore opposed to marshal Bessieres, at the head of the northern army, the greatest disposable force of the French, as well as any auxiliary from Portugal; to Cuesta, however, was attached general Blake, with the power of a separate command.

General Castanos commanded in chief in the important provinces of Andalusia, Granada, and Valencia, to which were joined the garrisons of St. Roche and Ceuta. This general had to meet probably no common foe in marshal Moncey.

Murcia was under the controul, as captain-general, of admiral Cisneros.

Arragon, after a time, under that of don Joseph Palafox, the most distinguished of all in its Saragossa, also experienced the arduous task of opposing Moncey and Lefebvre.

And the conde d'Espellata, commanding in Catalonia, whither also the garrison of Majorca and Minorca resorted, was of course opposed to the French marshal Ney.

These were, certainly, when subjected to a view *merely* rational, hopeless prospects; but the student in human nature, he who contemplates humanity under all the various circumstances by which it

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is actuated, the experienced general, knows how to view them differently. On the result of such views must depend the success in whatever degree of that auxiliary force, the conduct of which, in a situation thus arduous and peculiar, is about to be narrated.

CHAP. II.

OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES IN SPAIN PREVIOUS
TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH TROOPS.

Accordance of the Spanish Levies, and Utility of the Veterans distributed amongst them.—First Plans of Operation.—Battle of Baylen, and Surrender of the French under Dupont.—Repulse of Moncey from Valencia.—The French compelled to raise the Siege of Saragossa.—Repulsed from Gerona.—Battles of Cabezon and Medina del Rio Seco.

WHILE the British troops, under the various orders which have been seen, were on their passage to reinforce or confirm the little body under major-general Spencer,—to form the army of the peninsula, the Spanish levies had obtained such a degree of consistency as did not admit of idleness; and their commanders were therefore enabled to exhibit to their British auxiliaries a native army, complete, at least, in its fortunes, having expe-

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rienced, it had almost been said regularly, in every quarter, both victory and defeat.

To the formation of this army, such as it was, it no doubt contributed, that the Spanish soldiery which had been enlisted for limited service and had completed the periods were returned in some degree veterans into the bosom of their native provinces, and were, therefore, useful as exemplars, or in training the recruits to arms, wherever they were not themselves efficient.

Spanish operations.

The Spanish army of Andalusia, from various circumstances already described, was prominent in its advances against the enemy. In a letter from the junta of Seville to the junta of Galicia, dated on the 11th of July, 1808, it is, among other things, stated that:—

Letter from the junta of Seville to the junta of Galicia.

“The kingdom of Algarve has thrown off the French yoke, &c. We have an army on the banks of the Guadiana; and that of Estremadura has been reinforced in all points, with a view of attacking general Junot, who is in Portugal, and totally preventing his joining the French troops in Castile.

“The French squadron which was at anchor in Cadiz surrendered at discretion.

“The supreme junta of Granada, &c. has consented to place its troops at the disposal of our general-in-chief don Fr. Xavier Castanos. It has

likewise engaged to agree to whatever we may settle with the English.

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“Jaen and Cordova* recognize our authority, and have despatched to our army their military commanders.

“Our army, mostly consisting of veteran troops, and provided with all that is required for active operations, is encamped near Andujar, and on the eve of attacking and destroying the French under general Dupont, who has barbarously pillaged *Cordova* and *Jaen*.† We hope to God that we shall be able entirely to annihilate them; and that, freed from these ferocious enemies, we shall be in a condition to combine our troops with those of Gallicia, Valencia, Arragon, Old Castile, and the remaining provinces of Spain, and commence the attack of those French troops that occupy Madrid, and who must be pursued till they are out of the kingdom.

“The Canary Islands have sent hither their de-

* It would be scarcely necessary to mention that in the papers printed by order and for the use only of parliament, on the 25th of May, 1810, from which this extract is quoted, these places erroneously it is conceived, stand Caen and Cordoba, but that it may at the same time be added, that in the use of these papers, or some which have obligingly been furnished from official sources in Portugal, no injurious or improper selection will at any time be made in these volumes.

† See the above note.

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puties, and we are on the most friendly footing, &c."

(Signed) The whole of the Members.

Of the various instances of heroism and ardour displayed by individuals and small parties in a kind of desultory and mountain warfare, however deserving of that distinction which they will doubtless receive from local records, no faithful detail is to be here expected.

Plan of the first
French cam-
paign, &c.
May, June, July

The only general idea, which it seems proper to entertain of the plan of the first French campaign against the insurgents, is that of a simultaneous attack, equally prompt and active as the insurrection itself, upon all the provinces, considered as so many radiating points of a circle, of which the capital, necessarily to be sustained, was the centre, and where the chief force was to be deposited; leaving it to fortune to unite the several radii by a chain of posts, or those which diverged toward the Pyrenees or the Portuguese frontier, with the divisions guarding the principal passes which formed the key to all the operations in Spain.

The army of Dupont, however, left Madrid at the close of May, as is reported, 15,000 strong; but was considerably diminished in its progress, by sickness, desertion, and the constant loss of foraging parties, whom the armed peasants successively destroyed.

Having passed across the Sierra Morena into Andalusia, while the insurgents were yet incapable of opposing such a force, it obtained easy possession of Cordova, which contained but a few Spanish troops joined by a large body of peasants, on the 7th of June.

Pursuing the blind conduct which had taken place at Madrid under Murat, the French general Dupont immediately gave up the city to pillage.—The churches were stripped of their sacred utensils and degraded to the meanest uses, the people were debarred from their possessions, and Cordova, the mother of men of genius, the scene of antient and of modern grandeur, which had experienced the arms of Rome and the conflicts of the Moors, was for the first time to suffer, from a modern French army, destruction.

Rouzed by this barbarous insolence, the people of the vicinity entirely arose to obtain vengeance; and the Spanish general Castanos, with, as it was reported, twenty-one thousand regular troops, certainly the best disciplined in Spain, a vast body of cavalry, and a numerous train of artillery, advanced against the French army.

Dupont had passed some parties beyond Cordova, but finding himself so threatened, he immediately retired to Anduxar, about eight leagues, where he

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took up and intrenched himself in a strong position, having, in his front, the river Guadalquivir.

Castanos wisely forebore to reduce his grand army by attacking Dupont in his entrenchments, strengthened by the natural defence of the country, but instantly set about cutting off his supplies, and separating him from a division of six thousand men, which was at Carolina, under the command of general Wedel, in which he succeeded.

In this situation Dupont sent such pressing entreaties to Madrid that general Belliard, with a division of eight thousand men, were sent, by the mountains, to his relief.

To facilitate a junction with this necessary reinforcement Dupont was tempted to quit his strong position at Anduxar, and fall back (seven leagues farther) on Baylen; and, to prevent it, Castanos, with great judgement, posted divisions of his numerous troops so as not only to succeed, but also to cut off all communication between general Belliard's force and Madrid.

Dupont now, forgetting his character as a French general of the modern school, began to despair: he who had so recently, in all the insolence of power, pillaged Cordova, and enraged every class of its inhabitants by a violation of every feeling,

was about to feel the consequence in a high degree of suffering and the deepest degradation.

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“We have not,” says he, in an intercepted despatch to Belliard, “a moment to lose for quitting a position in which we cannot subsist. The soldier is all day under arms, and cannot, therefore, as he did before, reap the corn and make bread, and the peasants have abandoned their hamlets and their harvests to take arms. I entreat you, therefore, to send us instant reinforcements,—in one word, a body of troops, forming one compacted mass, of which the component parts shall be as near to each other as it is possible. If the enemy is suffered to keep the field all the southern provinces, and the other regular troops spread through them, will join the rebels, while a decisive blow in Andalusia would nearly determine the subjugation of Spain. Send me, without the least delay, medicines and linen for the wounded. For a month past has the enemy intercepted all our ammunition-waggon, and the provision which had been sent us from Toledo.”

Among the insurgents who had joined the grand army of Castanos were a party of smugglers in the mountains, (guerillas,) who formed a separate body, four thousand strong, and had sworn to give no quarter. These men, more prevalent in

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Spain, from its local constitutions, than can be easily conceived in England, possessed a character equally determined, vigilant, and subtle; they allowed no rest to the French; small detachments, sent out by Dupont to reconnoitre, forage, or look out for the division of Belliard, even amounting to several hundreds, were cut off to a man; instead, therefore, of reinforcing Dupont, Belliard was forced to return from the defiles of Morena, with half his force, to Madrid.

There now remained to Dupont only the weakest resource of a general,—to attack with a deteriorated force an overpowering enemy, who had gained every advantage from delay.

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July 20.

On the 20th of July, therefore, at three in the morning, the Spaniards were attacked by the French.—The Spanish divisions, to which the enemy presented himself, were those of lieutenant-general Reding, a Swiss, amounting to 9000 men, general De Coupigny's of 5000, and general La Pena's of 6000; a fourth of 5000, under general Jones, made up a force of 25,000, of which, however, no small number were of the undisciplined peasantry. The remaining force of Dupont is stated at only 8000 men.

The attack, like the necessity from which it arose, was desperate; from the first furious shock

of the French the Spanish suffered greatly, but they repelled it with steadiness and followed up the repulse, well supported by their artillery.

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The assaults of the French were, as usual, repeated with no other cessation than was necessary to re-form the columns by which they were made. They penetrated the lines formed by the Spaniards, advanced to their batteries, and, for nine hours, presented all those active manœuvres by which they had been accustomed to pluck the laurels of victory from the brow of danger, but in vain; the divisions of Reding and Coupigny were not to be shaken.

At length the French gave way at all points. The last attack was led on by Dupont and all his generals, at the heads of columns, under the fire of Spanish artillery, so well served that the enemy acknowledged to have had forty pieces of cannon dismounted. The van of general La Peña's division being brought to bear produced a flag of truce from Dupont proposing capitulation.

While the armistice was taking place general Wedel's division arrived to the support of Dupont, and immediately attacked that of general La Peña; the battalion of Cordova, and some other new levies, were surprised and taken with their artillery.

The negotiation was, however, proceeded in;

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Dupont, with his army, surrendered at discretion. General Wedel was included in the capitulation, but it was agreed that his division should be sent to sea by Rochfort.

The killed and wounded of the French army were computed at 3000; those of the Spaniards were not, there is reason to believe, so many.

The manner in which this defeat affected the French, as well as the principles of their military-school, will appear from the fate of Dupont, who, on his return to France, was tried for his capitulation, found guilty, condemned to death, and shot by torch-light.

Error of Dupont

This error in judgement, for no other it appeared, since his bravery and activity were undoubted, was only to be accounted for by the novelty of the war, and the overweening confidence, sometimes induced by familiarity with conquest. When he retired from his strong position at Arduxar, upon an *expected* reinforcement, he gave confidence to his pursuers, without obtaining any positive advantage; and when, upon the approach of La Pena's advanced guard, he gave up all for lost, he ought to have known that Wedel's division had nothing left to contend with, and would not be idle.

But the greatest error of Dupont was that of sacking Cordova, by which he roused the ven-

geance of the province against him in an extraordinary manner, though in it he only imitated the memorable conduct of Murat, on the 2d of May, in the capital.

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Nothing could be more proudly successful than this commencement of the Spanish campaign, to which its general had been forced, by a system as little calculated to subdue kingdoms as the origin of the war was countenanced by reason or humanity.

Spanish campaign of Andalusia, &c. under Castanos.

The result, as Dupont had foretold, was the general animation of the southern and eastern provinces, who, perceiving the advantage of intermixing new levies with regular troops, formed their patriots upon whatever veterans remained among them, after the affairs in which they were themselves engaged.

Of these, however, there were some which need scarcely give the palm to the field of Baylen. The campaign of Arragon particularly produced an affair of another class in the art of war, which conferred on it an importance and brilliancy fully equal to the former;—this was the siege of Saragossa.

Spanish campaigns of Arragon, under Palafox. May, June, July, &c.

On the insurrection of Arragon, Palafox having been appointed in the place of Guillianah, (who

Siege of Saragossa or Zaragossa.

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gossa, or Zara-
gossa.

shewed an inclination to submit to the enemy,) captain-general, found himself of course, by the disposition of the enemy, surrounded by many divisions of the grand French army.

On mustering the regular troops quartered in the capital, (Saragossa,) he found a return of 220 rank and file, and for their subsistence, in the public treasury, a sum amounting to about £20 sterling! This announced too strongly the necessity of activity to allow time for despair; he, therefore, immediately formed the insurgents upon his small regular force, for the purposes of discipline, and warmed the hearts of the Arragonese for their subsistence, by a proclamation.*

* Having been among the number of those who accompanied Ferdinand VII. to Bayonne, whence he had recently escaped to his own country in the disguise of a peasant, Palafox found it necessary in this proclamation to make some allusions to that circumstance. "Providence has preserved in Arragon a great quantity of muskets, ammunition, and artillery. The unmerited honour you have conferred on me constrains me to draw aside the veil that covers the most detestable villainy. My life, which can have no value in my sight but in as far as it may be subservient to your happiness and the prosperity of my dear country.—My life is the least sacrifice I can make in return for those proofs of confidence and attachment with which you have honoured me. Be assured Arragonians, doubt it not, that my heart is not made for harbouring a thought of crimes, nor associating with them who commit or protect them. Some of those persons in whom the Spanish nation placed confidence, some in whose hands are placed the power of government, are among the foremost to la-

Declaration of
Palafox.

During the organization of the army, however, for the defence of Arragon, the French detached a force, composed, according to the French accounts, of 8000 infantry, and 900 cavalry, from Pampelona, against Saragossa, under the command of the general of division, Le Febvre. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, the marquis de Lazan, the eldest brother of don Joseph Palafox, collected the armed peasantry of his neighbourhood, and met this force near Tudela, on the 13th of June.

The Arragonese were soon compelled to retire to the village of Mallen, where they had again the misfortune to feel the inefficiency of undisciplined bodies, when opposed to regular troops, although an olive-wood between the canal of Arragon, which supported the right, and the village of Mallen on the left could not but be considered as a favourable position for an irregular force.

bour for your ruin, by all the means that baseness can suggest and to form traiterous connexions with the enemy of their country. I will not, however, divulge their names. Perhaps some of the chiefs to whom I allude, now that they are acquainted with your fixed determination, that of your neighbours the Valentians, and of all the provinces of Spain, have changed their mind, embraced the cause of justice, and used their endeavours for shaking off that yoke which they wished to impose on you, by means the most base and infamous! The troops of the enemy, now in Spain, cannot withstand our efforts. Let us defend the most just of causes, and we shall be invincible."

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On the 14th of June the French advanced to Arragon, distant about sixteen miles from Saragossa. The inhabitants of this city immediately assembled with all the arms, of every description which they could collect, and actually compelled their general to lead them against the enemy. They had not advanced far from Saragossa, when they found the French in order of battle in a plain; a position particularly advantageous to them, as they possessed both cavalry and flying artillery.

The ill-armed and undisciplined Arragonese soon felt the superiority of the enemy, and were obliged to retire to Saragossa. Their retreat, however, was covered by the two hundred and twenty regulars (who had been previously joined by some few fusileers of the province) with a steadiness and gallantry which entitled them to the thanks of their general, and excited the admiration of their countrymen.

The French now advanced within a very short distance of Saragossa, where they took up a position in the valley, on the opposite side of the town to that situated on the Ebro, and which was covered by rising ground planted with olive-trees. Having occupied this post, they deferred their general attack upon the city till the morrow; but a small detachment of cavalry that penetrated into

their town on the 14th of June, paid dearly for their rashness.

The Arragonese had hastily planted some cannon before the gates of their city, and also in favourable positions without the town, particularly at the Torrero, a rising ground, and upon the height near to it.

On the 15th of June the French sent a detachment against the out-posts upon the canal, while their main body attempted to storm the city, by the gate called Portillo. The Arragonese attacked almost at the same moment, both in their out-posts, and at the gates of their town, fought with great fury, but without order; they did not load a second time, but rushed upon the French columns with their bayonets and knives, and forced a passage to their very centre, regardless of the native carnage around them.

Their artillery was served by any persons who were disengaged, and chanced to be near it; every one alternately commanded and obeyed; but all were animated by the same spirit, and their efforts, after a most severe conflict, were finally crowned with success. A party of the enemy, that entered the town, were instantly put to death. The French general, convinced that it was fruitless to persevere in his attack, withdrew his troops to a position out of reach of the cannon of the Arra-

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gonese, who captured, during the retreat, a considerable body of cavalry and twenty-seven baggage-waggons.

Saragossa, thus liberated for a time, had now to contemplate a siege, with little more fortification than mud walls, little heavy artillery, and almost without troops that could undertake regular sorties against the enemy's works.

The people, however, as they said, confiding in God, in their own courage, and the justice of their cause, determined to defend every avenue of their town to the last extremity.

General Palafox immediately set out from the scene of action to collect reinforcements and provide other resources, and also to place the rest of the kingdom in a state of defence; he found from twelve to fourteen hundred soldiers who had escaped from Madrid, and he united with them a small division of militia stationed in Calatayud.

With this force, says Mr. Vaughan, who accompanied the general as a volunteer on some occasions,* in compliance with the urgent desire of his soldiers, he resolved to attack the French. He marched immediately to Epila, and it was his

* Charles R. Vaughan, M. B. one of Dr. Radcliffe's travelling fellows, of All Souls, Oxford, author of *A Narrative of the Affairs of Saragossa*, during a Residence in that City, which has much enlivened the military parts of the siege.

intention to have advanced from thence to the village of La Muela, by which manœuvre he hoped to place the French between his little army and the city of Saragossa. Those intentions, however, were frustrated by a sudden attack on the part of the enemy in the night, at Epila, when the Spaniards, after a most obstinate but fruitless resistance, were at length compelled to yield to superior numbers and discipline. The wreck of this little force retired to Calatayud, and afterwards, with great difficulty, threw themselves into Saragossa.

During this time the French received reinforcements of troops and artillery from Pampelona, and began to occupy the several positions in the plain covered with olive-trees that surrounds Saragossa.

The besieged did not allow their enemies to carry on these operations unmolested; however, the French invested nearly one half of the town, and on the 28th of June, took possession of the Torrero.

The neighbouring battery also, which had been entrusted to an artillery-officer, and five hundred men fell into their hands; the officer was declared a traitor to his country for not having defended this important post as he ought to have done, and, on his return into Saragossa, was immediately hanged.

After the surrender of the Torrero, the city could

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communicate only with the country on the side of the Ebro.

During these operations of the enemy, the Arragonese tore down the awnings from their windows and formed them into sacks, which they filled with sand, and piled up before every gate, in the form of a battery, digging round each of them a deep trench. They broke holes in the walls, and intermediate buildings for musketry, and where a position was commanding cannon were stationed: the houses in the environs of the city were pulled down or burned; gardens and olive-grounds, that in better times, had been the support or recreation of their owners, were cheerfully rooted up by the proprietors themselves, wherever they impeded the defence of the city, or covered the approach of the enemy.

The exertions of the men were animated by women of every description, who formed themselves into parties for the relief of the wounded, and for carrying water and provisions to the batteries, at the gates, while the children were employed in conveying cartridges which had been made by the monks.

The French continued to invest the city more closely, and scarcely a day passed without a sanguinary skirmish in the surrounding olive-woods.

In the last few days of the month of June, 400

soldiers of the regiment of Estremadura, small parties from other corps, and a few artillerymen, contrived to reinforce Saragossa. To the artillerymen were added 200 of the militia of Logrono, who soon learned the ordinary duties of the corps. About the same time two pieces of cannon, (24-pounders,) and some shells that were much wanted, were procured from Lerida.

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About the last day of June, a powder-magazine, a very strong building in the heart of the city of Saragossa, blew up, and, in a moment, nearly a whole street was reduced to a heap of ruins; the inhabitants of Saragossa had scarcely recovered from their consternation at this fatal and irreparable loss, and from the labour of extricating their fellow citizens from the ruins of their houses, when the French, who had received mortars, howitzers, and cannon, (12-pounders, of sufficient calibre for the weak walls of Saragossa,) opened a destructive fire upon the city. It has been estimated, that about 1200 shells and grenades fell in Saragossa, which had not one building within it that was bomb-proof, nor had the inhabitants then taken the precaution of placing beams of timber against the houses.

The attack of the enemy seemed to be directed principally against the gate called Portillo, and the castle near it without the walls, and which is no-

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thing more than a large square building, made use of as a prison, and surrounded by a deep ditch.—The sand-bag-battery, before the gate of the Portillo, was several times destroyed, and as often reconstructed under the fire of the enemy. The carnage in this battery throughout the day was terrible.

It was here, as related by Mr. Vaughan, that an act of heroism was performed by a female to which history scarcely affords a parallel. Augustina, of Saragossa, about twenty-two years of age, a handsome woman, of the lower class of the people, whilst performing her duty of carrying refreshments to the gates, arrived at the battery of the Portillo, at the very moment when the French fire had absolutely destroyed every person that was stationed in it.—The citizens and soldiers for the moment hesitated to re-man the guns; Augustina rushed forward over the wounded and slain, snatched a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, and fired off a 26-pounder, then jumping upon the gun, made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during the siege; and having stimulated her fellow-citizens by this daring intrepidity to fresh exertions, they instantly rushed into the battery, and again opened a tremendous fire upon the enemy. When the writer of the narrative saw this heroine at Saragossa, she had a small shield of honour embroidered upon the sleeve of her gown, with “Saragossa” inscribed

upon it, and was receiving a pension from the government and the daily pay of an artilleryman.

The French general Le Febre having received a reinforcement under general Vernier, on the 2d of July, at day-break, a column of the enemy marched almost within musket-shot of the Portillo, and the remaining force was drawn up to second the attack of the advancing column, or to profit by its success, should it penetrate into Saragossa. Without discharging a shot, the column marched towards the battery of the Portillo, but as soon as it approached the castle, a destructive fire of grape and musketry was opened upon its flank, which dispersed it, notwithstanding the most gallant exertions of the officers to rally it.

Another column instantly advanced against the gate of the Carmen, on the left of the Portillo.— This gate was defended by sand-bags and by musketry, which, lining the walls on each side, commanded two out of three approaches to the gate: this column was also repulsed with considerable loss.

These vague attacks proved how mistaken an estimate the besiegers had made of the Arragonese, and, what is more, how confidence in habitual success can destroy the most eminent military character.

Above the city, however, the Ebro was fordable, and below it the French had constructed a bridge

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on the 14th of July. Having by these means transported their cavalry to the opposite bank of the river, they destroyed the mills which supplied the town with flour, levied contributions in the different villages, and cut off the only communication by which the besieged could receive any supplies either of provisions or ammunition. This erroneous use of an antient maxim naturally served only to heighten the resentment of the people, and to call forth the resources of their active and intelligent general. In this critical situation he caused corn-mills, worked by horses, to be established in various parts of the city, and ordered the monks to be employed, under skilful directors, in manufacturing gun-powder. All the sulphur which the place afforded was put into immediate requisition, the earth of the streets was carefully washed in order to furnish saltpetre; and charcoal was made of the stalks of hemp, which in that part of Spain grows to a very unusual size; and on this simple foundation there has been formed since the siege a regular manufactory of gunpowder, which yields thirteen arrobas of Castile per day, or 325 pounds of twelve ounces.

At the close of July, Saragossa was completely invested. The large population* was now but

* Computed by Mr. Vaughan, contrary to the last census, at 60,000, probably from accessions of military and refugees.

scantily supplied with food, and had little or no hope of succour. By the unremitted exertions of forty-six days, their spirits were exhausted and their bodily strength necessarily impaired. Without a single place of security for their sick and their children, their streets filled with wounded from the daily skirmishes, to open a communication with the country a desperate effort was made in vain to recover the important position of the Torrero, after which the Arragonese, convinced of the impossibility of making a sortie with effect, like their ancestors of Numantia, resolved to conquer or perish within the walls of their city.

On the night of the 2d of August, and on the following day, the French bombarded Saragossa from their batteries opposite the gate of the Carmen. A foundling-hospital, which contained also sick and wounded, unfortunately caught fire, and was rapidly consumed; all attention to private property was instantly abandoned, and every body was seen hastening to the relief of the sick and the helpless children who occupied this building; the women persisted in their humane exertions, undaunted by the shot and shells of the enemy, and the flames.

On the 3d of August the French had completed batteries on the right bank of the Guerva, a rivulet that falls into the Ebro, and is separated only from

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the walls of Saragossa by the breadth of a common road. Nearly opposite to the centre of these batteries, and within pistol-shot, was the gate of the Santa Engracia, so called from a splendid convent and church situated on one side of it. On the 4th of August, the French opened a tremendous fire upon this quarter of the city, and in an instant the weakly-opposing walls before them vanished, and the splendid convent was on fire and tottering into ruin.

The French columns rushed into the city, took in reverse the batteries before the adjacent gates, and after a severe and sanguinary conflict, penetrating to the Calle de Cozo nearly in the centre of the town, were in possession, before the day closed, of one half of Saragossa. The French general immediately demanded a capitulation in the following note:

Head Quarters, Santa Engracia.

The Capitulation.

To which Palafox as promptly answered—

Head Quarters, Saragossa.

War to the knife.*

* The original runs thus:—

Quartel General, Santa Engracia.

La Capitulation.

Quartel General, Zaragoza.

Guerra al Cuchillo.

PALAFox.

The knife is a very formidable weapon in the hands of the Ar-

One side of the street Cozo, the breadth of which is about equal to that of Pall-Mall, was now occupied by the French under Vernier, who was in the Franciscan convent. The Arragonese maintained their positions on the opposite side, throwing up batteries at the openings of the streets, within a few paces of similar batteries of the French. The intervening space was soon heaped up with dead either thrown from the windows of the houses in which they had been slain, or killed in the conflicts below.

This enormous accumulation of the dead, and the apprehension of the contagious disorders which must infallibly result from it, was extremely embarrassing to Palafox: an expedient resorted to was to push forward French prisoners, with a rope attached to them, amidst the dead and dying, to remove the bodies of their countrymen, and bring them in for burial. The office in which they were employed, and the pity of their own soldiers, secured them in general from annoyance. The French and the Arragonese, under the cover of darkness, frequently dashed across the street and attacked each other's batteries with the most undaunted courage; the struggle begun at the batteries was

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ragonese in close combat, as the short cut-and-thrust sword was with the Romans.

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often carried into the houses beyond. The batteries of the contending parties were so close to each other, that a Spaniard has crept from his own side, and, insinuating himself under the intermediate bodies of the dead, attached a rope to one of the French cannon.

On the 5th of August ammunition began to fail, when the only cry that assailed the general as he passed amongst the people was, that if ammunition failed, they were ready to attack the enemy with their knives. At this crisis, just before the day closed, a convoy of provisions and ammunition and a reinforcement of three thousand men, composed of Spanish guards, Swiss, and volunteers of Arragon unexpectedly made their entry into the city under the command of the brother of the captain-general, don Francisco Palafox.

A council of war on the 8th resolved 'that those quarters of the city in which the Arragonese yet maintained themselves should continue to be defended with the same firmness which had hitherto been so conspicuous; should the enemy at last prevail, the people were immediately to retire by the bridge over the Ebro into the suburbs, and having destroyed the bridge, to defend the suburbs *'till they perished.'* This resolution of the general and his officers was received by the people with the loudest acclamations.

For eleven successive days the most sanguinary conflict was continued from street to street, from house to house, and from room to room, (the enraged populace always gaining by degrees upon the disciplined troops of the French,) until the space occupied by the enemy was gradually reduced to about one-eighth part of the city.

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Another character, which developed itself during the siege of Saragossa, is thus described by Mr. Vaughan: "In every part of the town, where the danger was most imminent and the French the most numerous, was Padre St. Iago Sass, curate of a parish. As general Palafox made his rounds through the city he often beheld Sass, alternately playing the part of a priest and a soldier;—sometimes administering the sacrament to the dying, and at others fighting in the most determined manner against the enemies of his country.—From his energy of character and uncommon bravery the commander-in-chief reposed the utmost confidence in him during the siege;—wherever any thing difficult or hazardous was to be done Sass was selected for its execution, and the introduction of a supply of powder, so essentially necessary to the defence of the town, was effected, in the most complete manner, by this clergymen, at the head of forty men.—He was found so serviceable, in inspiring the people with

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religious sentiments, and in leading them on to danger, that the general placed him in a situation where both his piety and courage might continue to be useful,—that of captain in the army, and chaplain to the commander-in-chief.

Not only women of ordinary quality also distinguished themselves, but the countess Burita, a lady of great rank in that country, formed a corps of women for the relief of the wounded, and for the purpose of carrying provisions and wine to the soldiers; many persons of the most unquestionable veracity in Saragossa have frequently seen this young, delicate, and beautiful, woman coolly attending to the duties she had prescribed to herself in the midst of the most tremendous fire of shot and shells; nor were they even able to perceive, from the first moment that she entered into these novel scenes, that the idea of personal danger could produce upon her the slightest effect, or bend her from her benevolent and patriotic purpose.

The loss of women and boys during the siege was very great, and fully proportionate to that of men; in fact, they were always the most forward, and the difficulty was to teach them a prudent and proper sense of their danger.

During the night of the 13th of August the French fire was particularly destructive; and, when

their batteries ceased, flames were observed to burst out in many parts of the buildings in their possession; but, on the morning of 14th, to the great surprise of the Arragonese, their columns were seen at a distance retreating over the plain on the road to Pamplona.

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Thus was raised the siege of Saragossa, one of the most extraordinary experiments in modern war, whether from the errors of the besiegers, which it is difficult to believe in such force as has been described by good authority, or from the intrinsic but irregular bravery of the besieged; nor was the termination less extraordinary, whether arising from the weakness of the enemy in this quarter, farther intimidated by intelligence that the junta of Valencia had despatched 6000 men, which, with levies in Arragon, were about to relieve the capital, or that the French generals were rendered, by experience, sensible of the error of driving a people, whom they wished to subdue, to desperation, under the prevalence of an incomplete power; in any way it furnishes a singular picture in this department of the war and of those engaged in it, previous to the active interference of the British army, whose campaigns are the immediate subject of these pages.

To the interesting narrative of Mr. Vaughan is added the fact, that, although he saw in Saragossa

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August.

Siege of Saragossa.

many a parent who had lost his children, and many a man reduced from competence to poverty, he literally did not meet with one human being who uttered the slightest complaint; every feeling seemed to be swallowed up in the memory of what they had recently done, and in a just hatred of the French.

Palafox afterwards, heading a combined force of Valencians, which had begun their march on Saragossa, pursued the retreating French into Navarre.

The raising this siege must, notwithstanding all the painful circumstances attending it, have been a powerful source of inspiration to the patriots.

It is not to the present purpose to enter into any other than the prominent transactions of the Spanish campaign; it may be added, however, that Duhesme, the French governor of Catalonia, whose violence procured him the surname of Cruel, having been ordered to reduce Gerona, a fortified town of that province, on the river Tor, occupied a fortnight in its siege.

Campaign of
Catalonia.

Siege of Gerona.

Gerona at the same moment, as by one consent, emulated the sufferings of Saragossa; four hundred bombs and grenades were thrown into it in a single night, yet such were the vigorous

sallies of the Geronese and the well-timed movements of the Catalonians without, who threatened to take him in flank and rear, that he was compelled to retire to Barcelona, leaving behind his provision, baggage, and ammunition, with several pieces of artillery; nor did they cease here, but so harassed him on his retreat that he suffered considerable loss of men, with a great part of his baggage.

Finding some cannon on the river Lobregate, they fortified positions on its banks and at other places, in a manner, as may be conceived, highly irregular, but which, nevertheless, greatly impeded the enemy. Encouraged by several little adventures, they at length attempted to cut off the communications of Figueras, and to form a cordon for investing and cutting off the supplies of Barcelona.

They then fell into the ordinary error of brave undisciplined men,—temerity;—formed approaches even to Barcelona, and opened some batteries upon that city; this they soon repented, of course; they provoked, however, nothing less than a force under the French generals Goulle and Bessieres, who marched from Barcelona against their main strength on the Lobregate, and surprised them by several active movements without much difficulty.

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1803.

Campaign in
Catalonia.

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1808.

Campaign in
Catalonia.

A division, 1500 strong, under general Leckie, obtained possession of the bridge of Molinos del Rey, with three pieces of cannon that guarded the passage, but not without considerable loss.

Another force, under Reible, marched from Belliard on Figueras, dispersed the patriots with loss, and succoured the garrison.

These events did not, however, dis-spirit them; the same principles that carried them too forward sustained them in their reverses, and taught them, at least, if perfect discipline, in their present heated state, were unattainable, not to attempt operations which could not be effected without it.—They rallied, and the junta of Catalonia established itself at Lerida for better communication with the adjoining provinces.

It was not entirely without military reason that Duhesme laid waste the country around Barcelona, but he accompanied this plan by cold-blooded ravages on the unoffending inhabitants; and, when the English fleet took two vessels loaded with provisions and ammunition, not contented with the ordinary reprisal of an extraordinary demand for rations, wine, and brandy, and enforcing their supply by pointing the cannon of the citadel upon the people till they supplied him, he stooped to the meanness of separating families of the rich, and sending them away, for the sole

purposes of ransom. These, not the results of imperious circumstances, are among the worst errors of war.

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Valencia repelled marshal Monsey in person, with 15,000 men. As he advanced from Madrid, through the mountains, he was retarded by regular troops, by which the passes were guarded till the 21st of June, when he routed them, and marched direct on the capital.

Spanish campaigns of Valencia.

By the 26th, however, they rallied and united with a strong force under the Spanish general Caro, which attacked the French, with good success, at Bunolos, Quarte, and Mislata. Both the French cavalry and infantry suffered severely. He, however, continued his march, and on the 28th sat down before the city of Valencia.

The French general opened a brisk fire of artillery and musketry at noon, which continued several hours, and was returned with equal vigour by cannon, planted at the gates of the city, and musketry from the tops of the houses.

Siege of the city of Valencia.

Caro was, however, close in rear of Monsey, and an impetuous charge compelled him to retire to his camp between Quarte and Mislata, which he had fortified by strong entrenchments and batteries.

He was quickly compelled to retreat on Ma-

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1808.

Siege of the city
of Valencia.

drid, unwilling to risk the fate of Dupont; he, however, escaped no less, in another respect, suffering a diminution of his force,—according to Spanish reports, of sufficient authority, confirmed by other sources, generally admitted, of a third of his army. 150 waggons of wounded accompanied him, and 1500 prisoners were sent to Carthagena by the Spaniards.

This campaign was of a decisive character; it gave confidence and consistency to the Spanish troops; it warned the irregular divisions without the terrible experience of Catalonia; and was altogether a fine trait in the military history of the Spanish campaigns.

Spanish cam-
paigns of the
northern pro-
vinces.

The first northern campaign created a great diminution of the pleasure to be derived from contemplating that of the south, without even excepting Catalonia. If success in a general, as inferred by a late war-minister of Britain, be the best proof of ability, the Spanish general commanding in chief in the northern and north-western provinces certainly did not produce the best evidence of his military skill; for in no instance did the rawest levies of Spain fail so completely in every thing that forms the military character as the troops in those actions which formed the prelude to that denominated the battle of Medina del Rio Seco.

Among the operations left to the French marshal Bessieres, his grand position stretching from the French frontier to Madrid, were those of no less importance than sending columns for the reduction of Santander, (St. Andero,) a chief object in Asturia, Legrono, Segovia, and Valladolid, the great points of Leon, between that part of the Portuguese frontier and the Spanish capital.

Whatever the cause, probably as respects the north-western provinces, the existence of a French army in Portugal, and the mountainous auxiliary of the north, it is still unpleasing to observe the little comparative consideration bestowed on this district in the plan of the French campaign against the insurgents. Even Santander was attacked the last.

Their plan was, however, successful; the troops sent were veterans, and prostrated every thing before them, either in the shape of patriotic levies or civil authorities. The Spaniards exhibited the most erroneous conduct.

The French column under general Freire had penetrated within a quarter of a mile of Segovia, and summoned the magistrates. The insurgents, 5000 strong, with 30 pieces of cannon, fired on the officer as he approached. The place was instantly attacked and carried, though it is true not without loss on the part of the French. But the

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Actions of Legrono, &c.

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1808.

Actions of Logroño, &c.

patriotic army was dispersed, and the city made its submissions.

In consequence, when, on the 8th of June, the French division of La Salle approached Valencia, the bishop, with a deputation, met the general with their submissions, and the people were disarmed.

Valladolid, however, yet remained the seat and rallying point of insurrection against the French power in this quarter. At Duenas, therefore, La Salle formed a junction with general Merle previously to marching on Valladolid.

The Spanish general Cuesta was at Cabezon, three leagues distance, within sight of the town, with seven thousand troops and six pieces of artillery.

The French general (La Salle) having reconnoitred this post, despatched Sabathier to force the position, and Merle to cut off his retreat to Valladolid.

The firing lasted not long; the soldiery were temporarily dispersed; and the clergy, unlike those of Saragossa, supplicated the French to receive them into favour on the most humiliating terms.

It was now only that Merle, the French general to whom was consigned with general Ducos the subjection of Santander, was enabled to proceed against it, in which was involved a number of

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Actions of Logroño, &c.

actions in the mountains of Asturias. The bishop here was also general, but in vain, though the post was by no means cheaply yielded. The French, however, now considered themselves as absolute, not only in Navarre but also Biscay and Guipuscoa.

At Benevento general Cuesta rallied his dispersed forces, and attached them to the Spanish prisoners sent home by the British government. There are those, who, with the present writer, will consider this an unfortunate association under the recent circumstances of this division of Spain, without any prejudice to any part of the brave force thus composed.

With it, however, Cuesta marched on Valladolid, promising himself, perhaps, by these means to counteract the first French plan by a parallel one, cutting off all communication between the French in the north and the capital.

This plan was too unwieldy ; and the more so, because merely conceived upon a body of 35,000 men. When he should have reduced Valladolid, he intended to advance on Burgos. But the French marshal Bessieres determined on maintaining the post of Valladolid, and therefore advanced against *him* with a compact army, stated at 12,000 men, composed of all the requisites, a due proportion of cavalry, artillery, &c.

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CHAP. II.

1808.

June 14.

Battle of Me-
dina du Rio
Seco.

Cuesta had possessed himself of a large extent of good ground on the heights of Medina du Rio Seco. On the 14th of June, Bessieres attacked him on the right; while Monton's and some other divisions carried the town with fixed bayonets, and all the other Spanish positions successively. Forty pieces of cannon were taken; many thousands were either taken prisoners or left on the field of battle; and great quantities of baggage and military stores certainly fell into the hands of the French.

All fell: the remaining Spaniards fled by short marches to Benevento, (where they left a large depot of arms,) Labenara, Leon, and Astorga; whither they were pursued by Bessieres, till he received letters of submission from Zamora, Mayorga, and Leon. These were decisive; still the fugitives rallied; and, whatever the satisfaction of the French in their operations, such a prospect was every where maintained, that the residence of the king was no longer safe, and he therefore quitted it on the evening of the 29th of July, the troops from Madrid and its vicinity taking the route of Segovia to Burgos, the rendezvous of his whole army.

His *soi-disant* majesty removed with him the whole riches of the government, and is therefore said, as he could not put the crown upon his head

to have put it into his pocket. The military followed his example, and that which had been followed in other parts. They spiked the cannon, and destroyed the ammunition, which could not be conveyed with them; and paid little regard to the character or population of the capital.

Madrid immediately, with the prudence and loyalty of the kingdom, proclaimed king Ferdinand VII. and, notwithstanding natural doubts with respect to the supreme council of the capital, the views of the Spanish people were fixed upon a concentration of the political weight of government.

Such, pretty generally, with the exception of the actual abandonment of Saragossa and the evacuation of the capital of Spain by the French, was the situation of affairs in this part of the peninsula on the arrival of sir Arthur Wellesley, unless, indeed, that general Spencer had hitherto, with due caution, considered that a powerful British force would be necessary to aid in the interception of Dupont, which his defeat had now no longer left in doubt.

In general terms, the Spanish armies may now be described as forming a line from east to west, having its right, under Palafox, on the Ebro; its left, under Cuesta, Blake, or subordinate generals, irregularly, on the Guadiana towards Estremadura; its centre, under Castanos, commander-in-chief in La Man-

BOOK
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July 29.

Battle of Ma-
jor du Rio
Seco.

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1808.

July 29.

Battle of Medina du Rio Seco.

cha, with Madrid in his front, the Mediterranean, Gibraltar, and Cadiz, in rear. Of this imaginary line, so long as the French possessed Portugal and its frontier, nothing could be more exposed than the left, or more in danger by being on that wing outflanked and taken in rear. The levies of the northern provinces, western Biscay, Asturias, Galicia, and Leon, under Blake or Cuesta, might indeed form diversions, or from occasional advances, sometimes form a sort of out-posts; but their junction could not be looked for, or even, if that were possible, without creating merely an additional length of extended weakness. The north-eastern parts of Catalonia, with its capital and the Pyrenean passes in that quarter, also remained in possession of the French, and the frontiers of Navarre and Arragon were still obvious to them; while the head-quarters of the enemy, his chief force by no means *hors de combat*, must still be considered at Vittoria, only about 50 leagues north of Madrid.

To the conclusion of this chapter, dedicated to the first independent operations of the allies, with the necessary view of exhibiting exactly the orders for this peculiar and indefinite service, the following despatches remain to be added, the

tendency of which will be perceivable in the course of the present book; for instance, firstly, the following decisive order to major-general Spencer :

BOOK II.
CHAP. II.
1808.

Downing-street, 30th June, 1808.

Sir,

Referring to my despatch of the 28th instant, I am to convey to you the king's pleasure, that you do proceed, on receipt of this, off the Tagus, there to join the corps under sir Arthur Wellesley, and to place yourself under his orders.

You will consider yourself, however, as authorised to suspend the execution of this order, in case your corps should be engaged on any service more to the southward, which, in your judgement, it is of importance to his majesty's interests should not be abandoned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

*To Major-general Spencer,
&c. &c. &c.*

The orders of sir A. Wellesley have already, in their place, been detailed ;—those of his superiors are as follow :

Downing-street, 21st July, 1808.

Sir,

His majesty having been graciously pleased to select you to serve, under lieutenant-general sir

Hew Dalrymple, as second in command of his forces, to be employed in Portugal and Spain, I am to signify to you his majesty's pleasure, that you do forthwith embark in one of his majesty's ships,* prepared for your reception at Portsmouth, and proceed off the Tagus.

I enclose for your information and guidance copies of the instructions which have been given to lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, the execution of which is to devolve upon the senior officer, for the time being, of the troops assembled off the coast of Portugal.

As it is not probable that lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple can arrive for some time from Gibraltar, to take upon himself the command of the troops in person, you will use your endeavours to carry his majesty's commands, without loss of time, into effect.

You will observe that the operations of the army are intended to be directed, in the first instance, to the reduction of the Tagus; and, secondly, to the security of Cadiz, and the destruction of the enemy's force in Andalusia. These important objects being accomplished, it is his majesty's pleasure that the senior officer in command of his troops do act according to circumstances,

* The Audacious.

as the good of his majesty's service and the advancement of the common cause may appear to him to require, till such time as he receives farther instructions from him for the direction of his conduct; which instructions shall be transmitted, without loss of time, so soon as his majesty's government, from the movements of the French armies, are prepared to decide in what manner the services of the British troops can be best directed for the annoyance of the enemy.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

To lieutenant-general Sir Harry Burrard,

&c. &c. &c.

That the necessities of the service were not neglected by the British ministry will appear from the following note, meeting already the want of cavalry in the British army for this service:

Downing-street, 2d August, 1803.

Sir,

I enclose for your information,* intelligence received from lieutenant-colonel Browne and captain Trant, of the state of affairs in the north of Portugal.

I have directed brigadier-general Stewart, with

* See *ante*, p. 33, &c.

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1808.

the 18th light dragoons, to call off Oporto for orders, as it is not impossible, if lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley should have landed and taken a position in the interior, that you may wish to support him with a cavalry.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

To lieutenant-general Sir Harry Burrard,

&c. &c. &c.

To sir John Moore, recently returned from Lisbon with the only remaining disposable force of Britain under his command, the following were the orders:

Downing-street, 21st July, 1808.

Sir,

So soon as the troops under your orders are victualled, and in a fit state to proceed to sea, it is his majesty's pleasure that they do proceed, without delay, off the Tagus.

Lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, who is now off that port, if not in possession of it, has been directed to transfer to any senior officer who may arrive the instructions which he has received, in the execution of which it is his majesty's command that such senior officer should proceed, as far as circumstances will permit, without loss of time.

Lieutenant-general sir Harry Burrard is ordered to embark forthwith for the same destination ; upon joining him you will place yourself under his orders, in the absence of lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple, whom his majesty has been graciously pleased to nominate to the chief command of his troops serving in Portugal and Spain.

I write this to you in case sir Harry Burrard should not arrive in time to proceed by the Audacious.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

To lieutenant-general sir John Moore, K. B.

&c. &c. &c.

BOOK II.
CHAP. II.

1808.

July 29.

CHAP. III.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE FIRST BRITISH CAMPAIGN UNDER SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY (AFTERWARDS LORD VISCOUNT WELLINGTON).

Arrival of the British Troops with Sir Arthur Wellesley.—Examines the North of Spain and Portugal.—Lands in Mondego Bay, North of the Tagus.—Marches on Lisbon.—In contact with the French Army.

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CHAP. III.

1808.
July 20.

Lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Corunna, in the Crocodile, on the 20th of July, where, in addition to the imperfect accounts of the despatches which have been detailed, he was vaguely informed of the transactions of the allies, which were the subject of the last chapter.

The British government having avowedly given the assistance which now approached the peninsula without inclination or opportunity for

weighing terms and conditions, the first duty of the general was to ascertain the only question, how it could be most beneficially applied?

He therefore repaired to those provinces which had been the first to seek the aid of Great Britain, but particularly Galicia, as more appropriate, from local circumstances, exclusive of the approximation of the French armies, with which he was yet unacquainted.

The junta of Galicia did not hesitate to declare at once, in the most explicit manner, that they did not want the assistance of troops, but eventually arms and ammunition, and money immediately.

Money had just arrived, and their requisition for arms was sent home.

The junta, however, expressed the greatest anxiety that the troops under sir Arthur Wellesley's command should be employed in expelling the French from Portugal, and this wish seemed certainly grounded on such cogent reasons, as that, exclusive of the particular interest of Great Britain in that country, would probably have determined the British general to acquiescence.

The principle of the junta was, that the Spaniards of the north and south of the peninsula would never have any decided success independently of each other, and could never make any great effort to remove the French from Spain till they should be

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July.

driven from Portugal, and *the British troops* in that kingdom should connect the operations of the northern and southern Spanish armies.

This principle certainly was every way countenanced by the existing circumstances of Spain, as well as the nature of the country, fenced and intersected by a mountainous district, and which seemed alone to remain unoccupied in any determinate manner, either by the troops or the invaders of Spain.

The junta, with great propriety, also recommended a landing in the north of Portugal, that the British general might bring forward and avail himself of the Portuguese troops which the government of Oporto were collecting in the neighbourhood of that city, as has, by the reports of the British officers on that service, already been described.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, therefore, sailed from Corunna, on the 22d, and joined the fleet off Cape Finisterre next day, quitting it at night to go to Oporto, in order to hold a conference with the bishop and the general officers in the command of the Portuguese troops. On his arrival at Oporto, on the 24th, he received a letter from the admiral, sir Charles Cotton, in which that officer recommended to leave the troops either at Oporto or at the mouth of the Mondego river, and to proceed to Lisbon in a frigate to communicate with him before sir Arthur

should determine upon the plan of operations and the landing-place.

The result of the conference which sir Arthur Wellesley had on the night of the 24th with the bishop and the general officers of the Portuguese army, was an agreement that about 5000 Portuguese troops should be sent forward to co-operate with him against the enemy; that the remainder of the Portuguese troops, amounting to about 1500, and a Spanish corps of about 1500 men, then on its march from Galicia, and another small Spanish corps of about 300 men, and all the Portuguese armed peasantry, should remain in the neighbourhood of Oporto, and in the province of Tralos Montes; a part to be employed in the blockade of Almeida, and a part in the defence of the province of Tralos Montes, which province was supposed to be threatened by an attack from the French corps under marshal Bessieres, since the defeat of the Spanish armies under Blake and Cuesta at Rio Seco, on the 14th of July.

The bishop of Oporto likewise promised to supply the army under his command with mules and other means of carriage, and with slaughter-cattle.

The general sailed from Oporto on the morning of the 25th, and joined the fleet, and settled with captain Malcolm that it should go to Mondego Bay; he left it again the same night, and went to the

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July.

mouth of the Tagus to confer with the admiral. He joined him on the evening of the 26th, and there received letters from general Spencer, at Port St. Mary, stating that he had landed his corps in Andalusia at the request of the junta of Seville, and he did not think it proper to embark it again till he should receive farther orders, and appeared to think that sir Arthur's presence in Andalusia, and the assistance of the troops under his command, were necessary to enable general Castanos to defeat general Dupont.

This idea, however, was soon discovered to be unfounded. It now becomes necessary to state the comparative force which was about to be opposed in Portugal.

English Force, according to the Official Reports.

STATEMENT.

Force under General Spencer.

Artillery	269
Royal Staff Corps	48
6th Regiment, 1st Battalion . .	1,020
29th	863
32d	941
50th	1,019
82d	991
	————— 5,151

Force under Sir A. Wellesley.

July.

5th Foot, 1st Bat.	990	
9th	833	
38th	957	
40th	843	
60th	936	
71st	903	
91st	917	
95th, 4 Companies	400	
Royal Veteran Battalion, 4 Bat.	737	
36th Foot, 1st Bat.	647	
45th	599	
	—	8,762

Also a detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons,
about 300.

With the forces comprised in the preceding state-
ment, and the Portuguese whom he armed, sir A.
Wellesley commenced his march expecting the ar-
rival of the following

*Force about to embark from Ramsgate, forming
General Anstruther's Brigade.*

9th Foot, 2d Bat.	675	
43d	861	
52d	858	
97th	769	
	—	3,163

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*To embark from Harwich, forming chiefly General
Ackland's Brigade.*

Queen's	913	
20th	689	
95th, 2 Companies	180	
	<hr/>	1,672

Force with Sir John Moore.

ENGLISH.

4th Foot, 1st Bat.	1,006	
28th	1,087	
79th	913	
92d	927	
95th, 2 Companies	300	
	<hr/>	4,233

GERMANS.

3d Light Dragoons	597	
1st Bat. Light Infantry	930	
2d	916	
1st Bat. Line	942	
2d	770	
5th	779	
7th	697	
52d, 1st Bat.	1,000	
	<hr/>	6,631

To join Force under Sir John Moore,

18th Light Dragoons	640	
	<hr/>	30,262

To join from Madeira, one regiment under the command of major-general Beresford.

TOTAL.

Infantry	29,025
Cavalry	1,537
20th Light Dragoons	300
	<hr/>
	30,862

317 Artillery, included in Infantry-return of major-general Spencer's corps.

The other Artillery-returns not received.

French Force in Portugal, as stated by three Hanoverian deserters, and chiefly confirmed.

22d June, 1808.

In Lisbon and the neighbourhood.

<i>French Infantry.</i>	Total.
15th Regiment, 2 Battalions . .	800
66th ditto 1 ditto	800
70th Regiment, 4 Battalions . .	3,000
82d ditto 2 ditto	800
86th ditto 3 ditto	2,000
	<hr/>
	7,400

French Cavalry.

3d Regiment	} chasseurs à cheval . . .	2,000
9th ditto		

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CHAP. III.

1808.

Foreign Infantry.

Hanoverian Legion, 1 Bat. . . .	800	
Swiss ditto, ditto	800	
	<hr/>	1,600

In St. Ubes (Setuval) and the forts on the southern side of the Tagus.

31st Reg. } chasseurs, mostly	1 Bat.	800	
32d ditto }	Italian	1 do.	800
	<hr/>		1,600

Troops marched to the eastern frontiers of Portugal.

86th, 1 Battalion	700	
26th, 2 ditto	1,000	
	<hr/>	1,700

Foreign Infantry.

Legion de Neiole	800	
3 Battalions of Swiss	2,400	
	<hr/>	3,200

In some part of Portugal unknown to the deserters.

47th Regiment, 4 Battalions	3,000	
	<hr/>	
Total		20,500

3d Reg. Span. In. } disarmed at Lisbon, and in prison
1st ditto cavalry } on board the Russian ships.

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CHAP. III.

1808.

150 Russians are landed from each ship, and doing duty in Lisbon. Very little French artillery in Portugal.

General Junot strengthening the citadel of Lisbon.

(A true copy.)

(Signed) G. W. TUCKER,

Lieut.-Col.

A short recapitulation of the reports already given being necessary, it will be desirable that they be accompanied by the additional information afforded by the general himself.

As I was of opinion (says sir Arthur Wellesley) that the most essential object for the Spaniards, as well as for us, was to drive the French out of Portugal, and that neither his corps nor mine were sufficiently strong when separate to be of much service any where, and that, when joined, they might effect the object which had been deemed of most importance in England and in Galicia, I immediately despatched orders to general Spencer to embark his troops, unless he should be actually engaged in an operation which he could not relinquish

without loss to the Spaniards, and to join me off the coast of Portugal.

The result of the information which I received from general Spencer of the strength of the French army in Portugal was, that they consisted of more than 20,000 men. The accounts of their numbers which I had received from the admiral, and had received from the Portuguese, did not make their force so large; but, upon the whole, I was induced to believe that they had not less than from 16 to 18,000 men. Of this number they had from 600 to 800 in the fort of Almeida, 600 or 800 in Elvas, 800 in Penichè, 16 or 1800 in Setuval, and the remainder were considered about 14,000 men, disposable for the defence of Lisbon and the forts on the Tagus. The whole of this disposable force was at this time in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, excepting about 2400 men at Alcobaça, under general Thomiere.

I considered, with the admiral, the propriety of carrying into execution any of the proposed plans of attack upon the Tagus, or upon the coast in the neighbourhood of the rock of Lisbon; and it appeared to us both, that all the attacks upon the river, which had been proposed to government, were impracticable; that the attack upon Cascaes Bay was likewise so; that a landing in any of the small

bays in the neighbourhood of the rock was a matter of considerable difficulty at any time; and that there was a risk, that if a part of the army or even the whole army were landed, the state of the surf, which prevails upon the whole coast of Portugal, might prevent the disembarkation of the rear in the one case, and of the stores and provisions which were necessary in the other. At all events the disembarkation would be made in the neighbourhood of the whole disposable force of the French army, and the British troops would be exposed to their attack on their landing, probably in a crippled, and certainly not in a very efficient state.

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CHAP. III.
1808.

By making our disembarkation in one of the bays near the rock of Lisbon, it was certain that we should not have the advantage which at that time we expected to derive from the co-operation of the Portuguese troops.

It appeared to us that the fort of Penichè, which was garrisoned by the enemy, would prevent the disembarkation under the shelter of that peninsula, and, therefore, it appeared to the admiral and to me that it would be most advisable to disembark the troops in the Mondego river.

I quitted the admiral off the Tagus on the 27th, and joined the fleet of transports, off the Mondego, on the 30th.

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July.

I there received information from government, dated the 15th of July, that they intended to reinforce the army under my command with 5000 men, under the command of brigadier-general Ackland, in the first instance, and, eventually, with the corps, consisting of 10,000 men, which had been under the command of sir John Moore in Sweden, and that sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to command the army. I was likewise directed to carry into execution the instructions which I had received, if I conceived that my force was sufficiently strong.

Besides these despatches from government I received information, on my arrival at the Mondego, of the defeat of the French corps under Dupont, by the Spanish general Castanos, on the 30th of July; and I was convinced that general Spencer, if he did not embark immediately upon receiving intelligence of that event, would do so as soon as he should receive my orders of the 26th of July; I, therefore, considered his arrival as certain, and I had reason to expect the arrival of general Ackland's corps every moment, as I had been informed that it was to sail from Harwich and the Downs on the 19th of July.

I also received accounts, at the same time, that general Loisson had been detached from Lisbon, across the Tagus, into Alentejo on the 27th of

July, in order to subdue the insurrection in that province, and open the communications with Elvas.

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The insurgents had lately been joined by about July. 1000 men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and the insurrection had made considerable progress, and was become formidable in Alentejo.

I, therefore, considered that I might commence the disembarkation of the troops without risk of their being attacked by superior numbers before one or both the reinforcements should arrive, and I was induced to disembark immediately, not only because the troops were likely to be better equipped, and more able to march, in proportion as they should have been longer on shore, but because I had reason to believe that the Portuguese had been much discouraged by seeing the troops so long in the ships after the fleet had arrived in Mondego Bay;—and I was certain they would suspect our inclination or our ability to contend with the French if they had not been disembarked as soon as I returned from the Tagus; I, therefore, determined to disembark as soon as the weather and the state of the surf would permit us, and we commenced the disembarkation on the 1st of August.

The difficulties of landing, occasioned by the surf, were so great that the whole of the corps were not disembarked till the 5th, on which day

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general Spencer arrived, and his corps on the 6th; he had embarked at Port St. Mary on the 21st of July, when he had heard of the defeat of Dupont by Castanos, and had not received the despatches addressed to him by me on the 26th of July. General Spencer disembarked on the 7th and 8th, on which night the whole army was in readiness to march forward.

From the 1st of August to that day the time had been usefully spent in procuring the means for moving, with the army, the necessary stores, provisions, and baggage, and in arranging those means in the most advantageous manner to the different departments. The cavalry and artillery received a large remount of horses: means were procured for moving, with the army, a sufficient supply of ammunition and military stores, and a reasonable supply of hospital stores; but I determined to march towards Lisbon, by that road which passes nearest to the sea-coast, in order that I might communicate with captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, who attended the movements of the army with a fleet of victuallers and store-ships; the communication with this fleet, however, it was obvious would be very precarious, as well on account of the state of the surf on the coast, in the different points of rendezvous which had been settled, as because it might happen that it would be more

advantageous to the army to take another line of march, passing farther inland.

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I, therefore, made arrangements for carrying with the army such a supply of the articles of first necessity as should render it independent of the fleet till it should reach the Tagus, if circumstances should prevent the communication with the fleet, or should render it advantageous to relinquish it.

In the same period of time I also armed the Portuguese troops, and ascertained, as far as lay in my power, the degree of their discipline and efficiency, and recommended and superintended their organization. I offered such a sum of money as the funds of the army could afford, to defray any expense which it might be deemed necessary to incur in their equipment for the field, which was declined by the Portuguese general officers, and I met those gentlemen at Montemore Valho, on the 7th, and arranged with them the plan of our operations and march, which was delayed for the main body of the army till the 10th, at their desire, for the convenience of the Portuguese troops.

On the 8th, I wrote a letter to sir Harry Burrard, which I left with captain Malcolm, of the Donegal, to be delivered to him upon his arrival at the Mondego, detailing all the circumstances of

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our situation, and recommending for his consideration a plan of operations for the corps under the command of sir John Moore. The court will find the copy of this letter enclosed in my despatch to lord Castlereagh of the 8th of August.

The advanced guard marched on the 9th, supported by the brigades under general Hill and general Ferguson, as I had heard that general Laborde had collected his own corps, and general Thomiere's, consisting of from 5 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Leyria, which place he threatened, as it contained a magazine formed for the use of the Portuguese army. On the 10th, the main body followed, and the advanced guard arrived at Leyria on the 10th, and the main body on the 11th.

I received a letter from Mr. Stuart and colonel Doyle, at Corunna, on the 10th, detailing the inefficient state of the Gallician army under general Blake; that that general had separated his troops, which consisted of infantry, from the cavalry, under general Cuesta, and that neither were in a condition to act offensively against Bessieres, or even to follow that general if he should march into Portugal, or to attack him if he should make any considerable detachment to that quarter. At the same time I received intelligence of the retreat of Joseph Buonaparte from Madrid, on the

29th of July; and I concluded that Bessieres, instead of moving out, or detaching towards Portugal, would cover the retreat of Joseph Buonaparte towards the French frontier; whether he did so or not, it was obvious to me that I should have time for my operations against Junot, before Bessieres could arrive in Portugal to interrupt them; and it was probable that general Ackland's corps or sir John Moore's would arrive and land in Portugal before Bessieres could come from the north of Spain.

Adverting therefore to the advanced state of the season, the necessity of communicating with the sea-coast, and the certainty that that communication would be nearly impracticable after the month of August, and to the still dispersed state of the French forces in Portugal, I considered it to be important to endeavour to perform those operations to which the army was equal, and for which it was fully equipped, without loss of time.

I communicated, however, the intelligence I had received from Mr. Stewart, and my opinion upon it, to sir Harry Burrard, in a letter which I addressed to him on the 10th of August; a copy of which, and of a private letter to sir Harry Burrard, the court will find in my despatch to the secretary of state, of the 18th of August.

The Portuguese army, consisting of about 6000

men, including 500 cavalry, arrived at Leyria on the 12th, where the whole force was then assembled.

The French general Loisson, who I have informed the court, had been detached across the Tagus into Alentejo, on the 26th or 27th of July, with between 5 and 6000 men, had withdrawn the greatest part of the garrison of St. Ubes, consisting of 1600 men, by which he had been joined, and he had immediately marched towards Evora, where he defeated and dispersed a Spanish detachment, consisting of 1000 men, and the force of the insurrection of Alentejo, collected in that town; he then marched to Elvas, revictualled that place, suppressed the insurrection, and re-established the French authority in Alentejo, and made arrangements for the purchase and collection of the grain of that province.

He crossed the Tagus again at Abrantes, and, marching down that river, he arrived at Thomar, about sixteen miles to the S.E. from Leyria, on the evening of the 11th, on which day the British army arrived at Leyria.

The corps under Laborde was, at the same time, at Alcobaça, about sixteen miles from Leyria to the S.W.: and the object of the French officers had evidently been to join at Leyria, before the British troops could arrive there.

This town is on the high road from Lisbon to the north of Portugal, to the eastward of which, and nearly parallel to the road, there is a chain of high mountains which runs from Leyria nearly to the Tagus; over which chain there is no good passage for carriages. In consequence of the early arrival, therefore, of the British troops at Leyria, general Loisson was obliged to return to the southward before he could effect his junction with general La Borde, who was thus exposed to be attacked when alone; and was attacked on the 17th of August. The court will find in my despatch, to the secretary of state, of the 16th of August, from Caldas, an outline of the operations of Loisson's corps, of which what I have here stated is a more detailed account.

All the arrangements for the march having been made and communicated to the Portuguese officers, the army marched on the 13th, in two columns, to Calveira, and on the 14th, in two columns, to Alcobaça, from whence general Laborde had retreated in the course of the preceding night. The Portuguese troops had not marched from Leyria, as had been arranged, and as I had expected, under the pretence that they had no provisions; and I received, on the 13th, in the evening, a letter from colonel Trant, who was employed by me to communicate with the Portuguese general, in

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which he informed me of the general's intention to halt at Leyria, unless I should consent to supply the Portuguese troops with provisions from the British commissariat, on the march to Lisbon. He also explained a plan of operations which general Freire proposed to carry into execution, by which he would have been left without any communication with the British army, exposed to be attacked by the French army if they should chuse to abandon the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, and proceed to the northward and eastward; or even if they should be compelled to retire after an action with the British troops.

In my reply to this communication, I pointed out the impossibility of my complying with the demand for provisions, and the danger which would result from the adoption of the plan of operations proposed for the Portuguese corps.

I urged the Portuguese general in the most earnest terms to co-operate with me in the deliverance of his country from the French, if he had any regard to his own honour, to the honour of his country, or of his prince; and I pointed out to him the resources of which he could avail himself to feed the army. I then proposed to him, that if he should not march with his whole corps, he should send to join me 1000 regular infantry, all his light troops and his cavalry, which troops I

engaged to feed, as the utmost I could undertake to perform in that way.

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These troops, in number 1000 regular infantry, 400 light troops, and 250 cavalry, joined me at Alcobaça, on the evening of the 14th, with colonel Trant, and remained with me during the remainder of the operations.

The main body of the Portuguese corps, instead of carrying into execution the plan of operations which I had originally proposed, or that which general Freire had substituted, adopted the measure of safety which I had recommended in the event of his determination not to join me, and remained at Leyria, and afterwards at Caldas and Obidos, till the 22d of August.

On the arrival of the army at Alcobaça, I immediately opened a communication with captain Bligh, of the Alfred, who had been for two days waiting with the fleet of victuallers and store-ships, off Nazareth, and a supply of bread and oats was immediately landed; and I appointed Penichè, which place I intended to reconnoitre, as our next point of communication.

The army marched on the 15th, in two columns, to Caldas, where it halted the 16th, to allow the commissariat to come up and receive the supplies which had been landed at Nazareth. On the 15th, in the evening, there was a skirmish between

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the troops of the advanced guard of Laborde's corps and our riflemen, in which the latter sustained some loss. But we kept possession of the post at Obidos, which commands the valley of Caldas.

This narrative, interesting in all its circumstances, conducts us to the first affairs of the campaign, which, notwithstanding their simplicity, may here receive a farther detail.

Leyria.

The brigades under major-general Ferguson and brigadier-general Fane advanced at once upon Leyria, nineteen leagues N.N.E. from Lisbon, and found the town, which had only a few days before been evacuated by the enemy, in great consternation, and nearly abandoned by the inhabitants. Between five and six thousand men, under the French general Laborde, were within a very few leagues and were expected to return.

March of the
British army to
Lisbon, 9th Aug.

The first march of the main column of the army to S. Juan de Rue was completed by two in the afternoon, in good order, without occurrence, and the troops in excellent state. The second concluded in taking a position on the heights of Leyria, in the open air, which offered every necessary advantage; and, having joined the advance, the head-quarters were at the bishop's palace in that town.

A foraging party of the French, at Thomar, having left two of the commissariat, with a slight es-

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August 14,

cort, there, to bring away some cart-loads of bread, a party of Portuguese dragoons galloped into the town and took them prisoners, at which they seemed gratified rather than otherwise, but afforded no intelligence. Advancing to Calveria on the 12th and 13th, repeated information of the proximity of the French was obtained, arising from their reconnoitring parties, which it afterwards appeared had been numerous, and that their reports had induced Laborde to retire upon Lisbon.

In front of this village, and to the right, the troops took up their ground, and the commander-in-chief, at the head of the light troops and a party of cavalry, reconnoitred the French position. A spy was also taken, who, under the threat of death, acknowledged that the French troops, under Laborde, possessed Alcobaça; that they were disposed among the surrounding heights, where they occupied a small Moorish castle; that the valleys were neglected. Opposition was therefore to be expected on the next day's march, which lay through some difficult passes.

Quitting Calveria, sir Arthur Wellesley formed his army into two distinct columns of march, by different routes; the advanced guard comprised all the light infantry, and a party of English and Portuguese cavalry was ordered to feel its way, in full expectation of attack, as well as to protect the

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Alcobaça.

artillery at the heads of columns. The commander-in-chief headed the leading column, except when, with a small party of cavalry and light troops, he occasionally advanced to reconnoitre.

As the British army approached Alcobaça, the French troops had moved off rapidly towards Obidos, leaving, in the most perfect state, a bridge over a ravine otherwise impassable, and two of their waggons laden with stores and surgical instruments; they had, however, taken with them, from the decorations of the church of the rich convent of Alcobaça, not less than two tons of silver, and torn from this magnificent edifice its lamps and ornaments with the most unrelenting rapacity; the consequence of which was a detestation of their memory, and the most exquisite satisfaction at the arrival of the British, who were received with shouts of "Viva l'Inglitera."

August 15.

Caldas.

Baron Tripp observed the enemy closely in his retreat, and Caldas (the Bath of Portugal)* became the British head-quarters, without opposition.

Ground was no sooner marked out for a position for the main body of the army, immediately beyond the town, than generals Spencer and Fane were

* It has also a fine botanical garden and hospital, and may be deemed a royal residence.

ordered to advance with the light infantry till they should discover whether a fortress, two miles distant, was occupied by the enemy.

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August 15.

Eagerness and a small misapprehension led a party of the 95th and 60th regiments too far beyond the post they were ordered to occupy, and they were attacked at disadvantage, not only by the detachment they pursued, but, as is supposed, by the whole rear guard of the enemy, composed of not less than 1200 men.

This skirmish is thus accounted for by the commander-in-chief in his despatch on the occasion : August 15.

The enemy, about 4000 in number, were After of Gen
posted about ten miles hence, at Borica; and they occupied Brilos, about three miles hence, with their advanced posts.

As the possession of this last village was important to our future operations, I determined to occupy it, and, as soon as the British infantry arrived upon the ground, I directed that it might be occupied by a detachment, consisting of four companies of riflemen of the 60th and 95th regiments.

The enemy, consisting of a small picquet of infantry and a few cavalry, made a trifling resistance and retired; but they were followed by a detachment of our riflemen to the distance of three miles from Brilos. The riflemen were then at-

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August 16.

Affair of Lourinha.

tacked by a superior body of the enemy, who attempted to cut them off from the main body of the detachment to which they belonged, which had now advanced to their support; larger bodies of the enemy appeared on both the flanks of the detachment, and it was with difficulty that major-general Spencer, who had gone out to Obidos, when he had heard that the riflemen had advanced in pursuit of the enemy, was enabled to effect their retreat to that village.

They have since remained in possession of it, and the enemy have retired entirely from the neighbourhood. In this little affair of the advanced posts, which was occasioned solely by the eagerness of the troops in pursuit of the enemy, I am concerned to add, that lieutenant Bunbury, of the 2d battalion of the 95th, was killed; and the honourable captain Pakenham wounded, but slightly; and we have lost some men.

The following is the return of killed, wounded, and missing, in the action of Lourinha, August 15, 1808.

60th foot, 5th batt.—1 rank and file, killed; 5 rank and file, wounded; 17 rank and file, missing.

95th foot, 2d batt.—4 rank and file, missing.

Officers killed and wounded, 95th foot—Lieut. Bunbury, killed; captain the honourable H. K. Pakenham, wounded.

1803.

August 16.

*Affair of Lour
ruda.*

This was the first lesson of the campaign, to teach the necessity of restraining impetuosity in troops, chiefly accustomed to the brief operations of conjunct expeditions, and it was not without effect, though it did not damp the spirit necessary to follow up the enemy with an ardour equal to the occasion; but it was at the expense of some excellent troops, including more than a due proportion of officers.

The army halted at Caldas, the whole of the 16th, to receive farther supplies from Nazareth.

The Portuguese force had hitherto moved on the left, extending toward the Tagus; but, difficulties arising with respect to their subsistence and the plan of co-operation which sir Arthur Wellesley thought most advisable, he recommended their remaining here, they agreeing to place 1600 men under his disposal, who were to be furnished by the English with bread.

On the 17th, the army moved forward; but it was not long before the enemy was discovered, apparently in order of battle. General Ferguson's brigade was immediately ordered to form a separate column, and despatched to the right; the main body of the army advancing in a parallel direction.

August 17.

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1808.

August 17.

Action of Roleia.

The French general Laborde having continued in his position at Roleia since my arrival at Caldas on the 15th instant, I determined, said sir Arthur Wellesley, to attack him in it this morning.

Roleia is situated on an eminence, having a plain in its front, at the end of a valley, which commences at Caldas, and is closed to the southward by mountains, which join the hills, forming the valley on the left, looking from Caldas. In the centre of the valley, and about eight miles from Roleia, is the town and old Moorish fort of Obidos, from whence the enemy's picquets had been driven on the 15th, and from that time he had posts on the hills on both sides of the valley, as well as in the plain in the front of his army, which was posted on the heights in front of Roleia, its right resting upon the hills, its left upon the eminence, on which was a windmill, and the whole covering four or five passes into the mountains in his rear.

I have reason to believe that his force consisted of at least 6000 men, of which about 500 were cavalry, with five pieces of cannon; and there was some reason to believe that general Loisson, who was at Rio Major yesterday, would join general Laborde by his right in the course of the night.

The plan of attack was formed accordingly, and the army, having broken up at Caldas this morning, was formed into three columns.

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Action of Roleia.

The right, consisting of twelve hundred Portuguese infantry and fifty Portuguese cavalry, destined to turn the enemy's left, and penetrate into the mountains in his rear.

The left, consisting of major-general Ferguson's and brigadier-general Bowes's brigades of infantry, three companies of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, and twenty British and twenty Portuguese cavalry, was destined, under the command of major-general Ferguson, to ascend the hills at Obidos, to turn all the enemy's posts on the left of the valley, as well as the right of his post at Roleia.

This corps was also destined to watch the motions of general Loisson on the enemy's right, who, I had heard, had moved from Rio Major towards Alceontre last night.

The centre column, consisting of major-general Hill's, brigadier-general Nightingale's, brigadier-general Craufurd's, and brigadier-general Fane's, brigades, (with the exception of the riflemen detached with major-general Ferguson,) and four hundred Portuguese light infantry, the British and Portuguese cavalry, a brigade of nine-pounders, and a brigade of six-pounders, were

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Action of Roleia.

destined to attack general Laborde's position in front.

The columns being formed, the troops moved from Obidos about seven o'clock in the morning.

Brigadier-general Fane's riflemen were immediately detached into the hills, on the left of the valley, to keep up the communication between the centre and the left columns, and to protect the march of the former along the valley; and the enemy's posts were successively driven in.

Major-general Hill's brigade, formed in three columns of battalions, moved on the right of the valley, supported by the cavalry, in order to attack the enemy's left; and brigadier-generals Nightingale and Craufurd moved with the artillery along the high road, until at length the former formed in the plain immediately in the enemy's front, supported by the light-infantry companies, and the 45th regiment of brigadier-general Craufurd's brigade, while the two other regiments of this brigade, (the 50th and 91th,) and half of the nine-pounder brigade, were kept as a reserve in the rear.

Major-general Hill and brigadier-general Nightingale advanced upon the enemy's position, and, at the same moment, brigadier-general Fane's riflemen were in the hills on his right, the Portuguese

infantry in a village upon the left, and major-general Ferguson's column was descending from the heights into the plain. From this situation the enemy retired by the passes into the mountains with the utmost regularity and greatest celerity; and, notwithstanding the rapid advance of the British infantry, the want of a sufficient body of cavalry was the cause of his suffering but little loss in the plain.

It was then necessary to make a disposition to attack the formidable position which he had taken up.

Brigadier-general Fane's riflemen were already in the mountains on his right, and no time was lost in attacking the different passes, as well to support the riflemen as to defeat the enemy completely.—The Portuguese infantry were ordered to move up a pass on the right of the whole; the light companies of major-general Hill's brigade and the 5th regiment moved up a pass next on the right; and the 29th regiment, supported by the 9th, under brigadier-general Nightingale, a third pass; and the 45th and 82d regiments passes on the left.

These passes were all difficult of access, and some of them were well defended by the enemy, particularly that which was attacked by the 29th and 9th regiments. These regiments attacked with the

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Action of Rolcia.

greatest impetuosity, and reached the enemy before those whose attacks were to be made on their flanks; the defence of the enemy was desperate; and it was in this attack principally that we sustained the loss which we have to lament, particularly of that gallant officer the honourable lieutenant-colonel Lake, who distinguished himself upon this occasion.

The enemy was, however, driven from all the positions he had taken in the passes of the mountains, and our troops were advanced in the plains on their tops. For a considerable length of time the 29th and 9th regiments alone were advanced to this point, with brigadier-general Fane's riflemen at a distance on the left, and they were afterwards supported by the 5th regiment, and by the light companies of major-general Hill's brigade, which had come up on the right; and by the other troops ordered to ascend the mountains, who came up by degrees.

The enemy here made three most gallant attacks upon the 29th and 9th regiments, supported as I have above stated, with a view to cover the retreat of his defeated army; in all of which he was, however, repulsed; but he succeeded in effecting his retreat in good order, owing principally to my want of cavalry, and secondly to the difficulty of bring-

ing up the passes of the mountains with celerity a sufficient number of troops and of cannon to support those which had first ascended.

The loss of the enemy has, however, been very great; and he left three pieces of cannon in our hands.

I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of the troops throughout this action. The enemy's positions were formidable, and he took them up with his usual ability and celerity, and defended them most gallantly. But I must observe, that, although we had such a superiority of numbers employed in the operations of this day, the troops actually engaged in the heat of the action were, from unavoidable circumstances, only the 5th, 9th, 29th, the riflemen of the 95th and 60th, and the flank companies of major-general Hill's brigade, being a number by no means equal to that of the enemy; their conduct, therefore, deserves the highest commendation.

To this luminous account sir A. Wellesley adds the following agreeable testimony:—I cannot avoid to take this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgements for the aid and support I received from all the general and other officers of this army. I am particularly indebted to major-general Spencer for the advice and assistance I received from him; to major-general Ferguson for the manner in which

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he led the light column, and to major-general Hill and brigadier-generals Nightingale and Fane for the manner in which they conducted the different attacks which they led. I derived most material assistance also from lieutenant-colonel Tucker and lieutenant-colonel Bathurst in the offices of deputy-adjutant and deputy-quarter-master-general, and from the officers of the staff employed under them. I must also mention that I had every reason to be satisfied with the artillery under lieutenant-colonel Robe.

Returns.

The following is the official return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the army after the affair of the 17th of August.

1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 captains, 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 63 rank and file, 1 horse, killed. 1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 majors, 6 captains, 8 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 1 staff, 20 serjeants, 295 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded. 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 68 rank and file, missing.

Names of officers.—General staff.—Captain K. J. Bradford, 3d regiment of Foot Guards, assistant-deputy-adjutant-general, killed.

Royal Artillery.—Captain H. Geary, killed.
Royal Engineers.—Captain H. Elphinstone, badly wounded.

5th Foot.—Major Emes, slightly wounded; lieutenant Doyle, wounded.

9th Foot.—Lieutenant-colonel Stuart, severely wounded; major Molle, captain Sankey, ensign Nichols, wounded.

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Action of Roleia.
Returus.

29th Foot.—Lieutenant-colonel the honourable G. A. F. Lake, killed. Majors G. Way and T. Eger-son, wounded. Captains P. Hodge and A. Patison, wounded. Lieutenants R. Birmingham, St. John W. Lucas, and Robert Stannus, wounded. Captain George Todd, missing. Lieutenants W. Birmingham, Ambrose Newbold, and Thomas Langton, missing.

6th Foot. — Captain John Currey, slightly wounded.

45th Foot.—Ensign Dawson, killed. Lieute-
nant Burke, slightly wounded.

82d Foot.—Lieutenant R. Reid, dangerously wounded.

60th Foot.—Lieutenant Kiety, slightly wound-
ed. Ensign Fawes, slightly wounded. Adju-
tant De Gilso, slightly wounded.

95th Foot.—Captain Creagh, slightly wounded.
Lieutenants Hill and Cortman, slightly wounded.

Total officers, non-commissioned officers, rank and
file, and horses, killed, wounded, and missing, 482.

In this affair, as usual, the French followed up,
perhaps beyond even their common adherence,
the ordinary plan of their modern school of war, de-

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Action of Roleia.

rived as it is entirely from the antient arrangement of the Roman general, Sextus Julius Frontinus.*

They retreated through passes apparently inaccessible, and led the British army into a complete labyrinth, which occasioned the observation of the commander-in-chief as to the *unequal* celerity of movement of his various corps and divisions of corps; a fault which certainly would otherwise have produced great cause of military censure.—The want of cavalry, also, had it not been for the circumstances of the commencement of the campaign, otherwise sufficiently explained, would have been ridiculous, while it was undoubtedly uncertain whether even that of the Portuguese would be employed, or capable in any way of employment.

The first attack by general Ferguson commenced at nine in the morning, and the firing on both sides entirely ceased before five in the afternoon.

The French, as usual, though frequently compelled to retire from their positions, as frequently returned to the charge.

The principal pass forced by the British on this

* It may be safely said, that nothing could be more useful or interesting than to compare the various conduct of the modern French armies, campaign by campaign and act by act, with the *Strategematicon*. London edition, 1810.

day was named Arumbra, from which, on the 18th, they moved to Lourinha.

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1808.
August 18.

While in order of march, captain Gordon, an aid-de-camp of general Anstruther, brought information of the arrival of his force off Penichè.

At Lourinha also information was obtained not only of the junction of Laborde and Junot, consolidating a body of 16,000 men, in the vicinity of Rio Major, at two leagues distance, but a particular disinclination of the people to facilitate the resources of the army was evident, although they had suffered materially from the ravages of the French.

Sir A. Wellesley observes: The circumstances altogether of the action of the 17th, and, above all, the determined and gallant resistance of the enemy in that action, induced me to be of opinion that I ought to land general Anstruther's brigade, and general Ackland's when it should arrive, and to join those troops to the army.

I therefore marched, on the 18th, to Lourinha, from whence I communicated again with general Anstruther, and on the 19th to Vimiera, which appeared, on the whole, to be the position best calculated to secure the junction of general Anstruther, at the same time that it was a march in advance on our route. On account of the calms, the fleet, which was anchored off the Berlings, could not stand in till late on the 19th; and general Anstru-

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ther did not land till that evening, and he formed a junction with two brigades, detached from our left, on the morning of the 20th, and took his position in the advanced guard.

Sir Arthur Wellesley thus reported the advices he had received :—I have heard from brigadier-general Anstruther, that he is on the coast of Penichè, with the fleet of victuallers and store-ships, in charge of captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, with a part of the force detached from England, under brigadier-general Ackland, in consequence of the receipt of orders which I had left at Mondego-Bay for general Ackland, which he had opened. I have ordered brigadier-general Anstruther to land immediately, and I have moved to this place, in order to protect his landing, and facilitate his junction. General Loisson joined general Laborde, in the course of last night, at Torres Vedras ; and I understand that both began their march towards Lisbon this morning : I also hear that general Junot has arrived this day at Torres Vedras, with a small corps from Lisbon ; and I conclude that the whole of the French army will be assembled between Torres Vedras and the capital in the course of a few days.

Between the 18th and 20th, the French corps had assembled at and about Torres Vedras ; the

troops last arrived under general Junot forming the advanced guard, in a strong position in front of the town, and the divisions of Laborde and Loisson the main body, in another strong position behind it.

Their cavalry was very active throughout the days of the 19th and 20th; they covered the whole country; patrolled frequently up to our position; and, on the 20th, one patrol was pushed into the rear of our right, as far as the landing-place at Maceira.

Under these circumstances we could gain no detailed information of the enemy's position, excepting that it was very strong, and occupied by their whole force.

My intention (continues sir Arthur Wellesley in his narrative) was to march on the morning of the 21st, and orders were issued accordingly: I should have pushed the advanced guard as far as the heights of Mafra, and should have halted the main body about four or five miles from that place. By this movement, the enemy's position at Torres Vedras would have been turned, and I should have brought the army into a country, of which I had an excellent map, and topographical accounts, which had been drawn up for the use of the late sir Charles Stewart; and the battle, which it was

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evident would be fought in a few days, would have had for its field a country of which we had a knowledge, not very distant from Lisbon, into which town, if we had been successful, we might have entered with the retreating enemy.

I was informed, in the middle of the day of the 20th, that general Ackland's brigade was in the offing, and I made arrangements for their disembarkation as soon as they should arrive; and, in the evening of this day, sir Harry Burrard arrived in Maceira roads, in the *Brazen*; he immediately assumed the command of the army.

That these preparatory dispositions were not in vain soon appeared from the farther observations of the previous commander-in-chief, who continued them accordingly.

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In his despatch of the 21st, sir Arthur Wellesley thus states what he had observed, and his consequent dispositions:

The village of Vimiera stands in a valley, through which runs the river of Maceira; at the back, and at the westward and northward of this village, is a mountain, the western point of which touches the sea, and the eastern is separated by a deep ravine from the heights, over which passes the road which leads from Lourinha and the northward to Vimiera.

The greater part of the infantry, the 1st, 2d,

3d, 4th, 5th, and 8th, brigades, were posted on this mountain, with eight pieces of artillery; major-general Hill's brigade being on the right, major-general Ferguson's on the left, having one battalion on the heights separated from the mountain.

On the eastern and southern side of the town is a hill, which is entirely commanded, particularly on its right, by the mountain to the westward of the town, and commanding all the ground in the neighbourhood to the southward and eastward, on which brigadier-general Fane was posted with his riflemen and the 50th regiment, and brigadier-general Anstruther, with his brigade, with half a brigade of six-pounders, which had been ordered to the position in the course of the night.

The ground over which passes the road from Lourinha commanded the left of this height, and it had not been occupied, excepting by a picquet, as the camp had been taken up only for one night, and there was no water in the neighbourhood of this height.

The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the valley, between the hills on which the infantry stood; both flanking and supporting brigadier-general Fane's advanced guard.

The enemy first appeared, at eight o'clock in the morning, in large bodies of cavalry on our left, upon the heights on the road to Lourinha; and it

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was soon obvious that the attack would be made upon our advanced guard and the left of our position; and major-general Ferguson's brigade was immediately moved across the ravine to the heights, on the road to Lourinha, with three pieces of cannon; he was followed successively by brigadier-general Nightingale with his brigade, and three pieces of cannon, brigadier-general Ackland with his brigade, and brigadier-general Bowes with his brigade.

These troops were formed (major-general Ferguson's brigade in the first line, brigadier-general Nightingale's in the second, and brigadier-generals Bowes's and Ackland's in columns in the rear) on those heights, with their right upon the valley which leads into Vimiera, and their left upon the other ravine, which separates these heights from the range which terminates at the landing-place at Maceira.

On these last-mentioned heights the Portuguese troops, which had been in the bottom near Vimiera, were posted in the first instance, and they were supported by brigadier-general Craufurd's brigade.

The troops of the advanced guard on the height, to the southward and eastward of the town, were deemed sufficient for its defence, and major-general Hill was moved to the centre of the mountain on

which the great body of the infantry had been posted, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve to the whole army.

In addition to this support, these troops had that of the cavalry in the rear of their right.

The enemy's attack began in several columns upon the whole of the troops on this height; on the left they advanced, notwithstanding the fire of the riflemen, close to the 50th regiment, and were checked and driven back only by the bayonets of that corps.

The second battalion, 43d regiment, was likewise closely engaged with them in the road which leads into Vimiera; a part of that corps having been ordered into the church-yard, to prevent them from penetrating into the town.

On the right of the position they were repulsed by the bayonets of the 97th regiment, which corps was successfully supported by the 2d battalion, 52d regiment, which, by an advance in column, took the enemy in flank.

Besides this opposition given to the attack of the enemy on our advanced guard, by their own exertions, they were attacked in flank by brigadier-general Ackland's brigade, in its advance to its position on the heights on the left, and a cannonade was kept up on the flank of the enemy's column by the artillery on those heights.

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At length, after a most desperate contest, the enemy was driven back in confusion from this attack, with the loss of seven pieces of cannon, many prisoners, and a great number of officers and soldiers killed and wounded.

He was pursued by the detachment of the 20th light dragoons, but the enemy's cavalry were so much superior in numbers that this detachment has suffered much, and lieutenant-colonel Taylor was unfortunately killed.

Nearly at the same time the enemy's attack commenced upon the heights on the road to Lourinha. This attack was supported by a large body of cavalry, and was made with the usual impetuosity of the French troops.

It was received with steadiness by major-general Ferguson's brigade, consisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st regiments; and these corps charged as soon as the enemy approached them, who gave way, and they continued to advance upon him, supported by the 82d, one of the corps of brigadier-general Nightingale's brigade, which, as the ground extended, afterwards formed a part of the first line, by the 29th regiment, and by brigadier-general Bowes's and Ackland's brigades, while brigadier-general Craufurd's brigade and the Portuguese troops, in two lines, advanced along the height on the left.

In the advance of major-general Ferguson's brigade, six pieces of cannon were taken from the enemy, with many prisoners, and vast numbers were killed and wounded.

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The enemy afterwards made an attempt to recover part of his artillery, by attacking the 71st and 82d regiments, which were halted in a valley, in which it had been taken. These regiments retired from the low grounds in the valley to the heights, where they halted, faced about, fired, and advanced upon the enemy, who had by that time arrived in the low ground, and they thus obliged them again to retire with great loss.

In this action, in which (remarks sir A. Wellesley) *the whole of the French force in Portugal was employed, under the command of the duke d'Abrantes in person, in which the enemy was certainly superior in cavalry and artillery, and in which not more than half of the British army was actually engaged*, he has sustained a signal defeat, and has lost thirteen pieces of cannon, twenty-three ammunition-wagons, with powder, shells, stores of all descriptions, and twenty thousand rounds of musket-ammunition.

Certain inequality of the contest.

One general officer (Beniere) has been wounded and taken prisoner, and a great many officers and soldiers have been killed, wounded, and taken.

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The valour and discipline of his majesty's troops (he adds, addressing himself to sir Harry Burrard) have been conspicuous upon this occasion, as you, who witnessed the greatest part of the action, must have observed; but it is a justice to the following corps to draw your notice to them in a particular manner, viz.—the royal artillery, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Robe; the 20th dragoons, which had been commanded by lieutenant-colonel Taylor; the 50th regiment, commanded by colonel Walker; the 2d battalion, 95th foot, commanded by major Travers; the 5th battalion, 60th regiment, commanded by major Davy; the 2d battalion, 43d, commanded by major Hull; the 2d battalion, 52d, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Ross; the 97th regiment, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Lyon; the 36th regiment, commanded by colonel Burne; the 40th, commanded by colonel Kemmis; the 71st, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Pack; and the 82d regiment, commanded by major Eyre.

In mentioning colonel Burne and the 36th regiment to you upon this occasion, I cannot avoid to add, that the regular and orderly conduct of this corps throughout this service, and their gallantry and discipline in action, have been conspicuous.

I must take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to the general and staff officers of the army.

I was much indebted to major-general Spencer's judgement and experience in the decision which I formed with respect to the number of troops allotted to each point of defence; and for his advice and assistance throughout the action.

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In the position taken up by major-general Ferguson's brigade, and in its advance upon the enemy, that officer shewed equal bravery and judgement; and much praise is due to brigadier-general Fane and brigadier-general Anstruther, for their gallant defence of their position in front of Vimiera, and to brigadier-general Nightingale, for the manner in which he supported the attack upon the enemy made by major-general Ferguson.

Lieutenant-colonel G. Tucker and lieutenant-colonel Bathurst, and the officers in the departments of the adjutant and quarter-master general, and lieutenant-colonel Torrens, and the officers of my personal staff, rendered me the greatest assistance throughout the action.

A French general officer, supposed to be general Thiebault, the chief of the staff, has been found dead upon the field of battle.

The following returns are added here as most properly placed after the official report of the action, though its details will be afterwards extended:

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Return of killed,
wounded, and
missing.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of lieutenant-general the right honourable sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B. on the 21st of August, 1808.

Head-quarters, Vimiera.

General staff.—1 captain, wounded.

Royal Artillery.—2 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded.

Royal Engineers.—1 lieutenant, missing.

20th Light Dragoons.—1 lieutenant-colonel, 19 rank and file, 30 horses, killed; 2 serjeants, 22 rank and file, 10 horses, wounded; 1 captain, 1 drummer, 9 rank and file, 1 horse, missing.

1st Brigade, major-general Hill.—5th foot, none killed or wounded. 9th foot, none killed or wounded. 38th foot, none killed or wounded.

2d Brigade, major-general Ferguson.—36th foot, 7 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 1 staff, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 34 rank and file, wounded; 1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, missing. 40th foot, 6 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 2 serjeants, 28 rank and file, wounded; 6 rank and file, missing. 71st foot, 12 rank and file, killed; 2 captains, 4 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 1 staff, 6 serjeants, 86 rank and file, wounded.

3d Brigade, brigadier-general Nightingale.—29th foot, 2 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 1 serjeant,

10 rank and file, wounded. 82d foot, 1 lieutenant, 7 rank and file, killed; 2 serjeants, 51 rank and file, wounded.

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4th Brigade, brigadier-general Bowes. — 60th foot, none killed or wounded. 32d foot, none killed or wounded.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing.

5th Brigade, brigadier-general Craufurd. — 45th foot, none killed or wounded. 91st foot, none killed or wounded.

6th Brigade, brigadier-general Fane. — 50th foot, 1 captain, 1 serjeant, 18 rank and file, killed; 1 major, 3 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 61 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file missing. 5th battalion, 60th foot, 14 rank and file killed; 2 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 21 rank and file, wounded; 10 rank and file missing. 2d battalion, 95th foot, 1 serjeant, 5 rank and file, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 13 rank and file, wounded; 3 rank and file missing.

7th Brigade, brigadier-general Anstruther. — 2d battalion, 9th foot, 3 rank and file killed; 1 serjeant, 14 rank and file, wounded. 2d battalion, 43d foot, 1 serjeant, 26 rank and file, killed; 1 major, 2 lieutenants, 5 serjeants, 2 drummers, 68 rank and file, wounded; 1 drummer, 12 rank and file, missing. 2d battalion, 52d foot, 3 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant, 2 serjeants, 31 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file missing. 97th foot, 40

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missing.

rank and file killed; 1 major, 1 lieutenant, 2 serjeants, 14 rank and file, wounded.

8th Brigade, brigadier-general Ackland.—2d, or Queens, 1 serjeant, 6 rank and file, wounded. 20th foot, 1 lieutenant killed; 1 lieutenant, 5 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.

Royal staff corps.—None killed or wounded.

Total.—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 128 rank and file, 30 horses, killed; 3 majors, 10 captains, 19 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 2 staff, 27 serjeants, 4 drummers, 466 rank and file, 12 horses, wounded; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 2 drummers, 46 rank and file, 1 horse, missing.

Names of officers killed, wounded, and missing, on the 21st of August, 1808.

General staff.—Captain Hardinge, of the 57th foot, deputy-assistant-quarter-master-general, wounded.

Royal Engineers.—First lieutenant Wells missing.

20th light dragoons.—Lieutenant-colonel Taylor killed; Captain Eustace missing.

20th foot.—Lieutenant Brooke killed; lieutenant Hogg wounded.

29th foot.—Brigadier-general A. Creagh wounded.

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missing.

36th foot.—Captain Herbert slightly wounded; lieutenants Hart, Lought, and Edwards, slightly wounded; ensign Bosell slightly wounded; lieutenant and adjutant Poveah severely wounded.

40th foot.—Captain Smith slightly wounded; lieutenant Frankley slightly wounded.

43d foot.—Major Hearne wounded; captains Ferguson, Brock, and Haverfield, wounded; lieutenant Madden wounded; ensign Wilson wounded.

50th foot.—Captain A. G. Cooke killed; major Charles Hill wounded; lieutenants John Kent, John Wilson, and Robert Way, wounded.

52d foot.—Captain Ewart wounded; lieutenant Bell wounded.

60th foot.—Lieutenant Charles Kirk wounded; Lewis Reith wounded.

71st.—Captain A. Jones slightly wounded; major Mackenzie slightly wounded; lieutenant J. D. Pratt severely wounded; lieutenants William Hartley, R. Dudgeon, and A. S. M'Intyre, slightly wounded; ensign W. Campbell slightly wounded; acting-adjutant R. M'Alpine severely wounded.

82d.—Lieutenant R. Donkin killed.

95th.—Lieutenant Pratt wounded; ensign W. Cox wounded.

97th.—Major J. Wilson wounded; lieutenant E. Kettlewell wounded.

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Return of killed,
wounded, and
missing.*Abstract of the above Return.*

4 officers killed; 37 officers wounded; 2 officers missing; 3 non-commissioned officers and drummers killed; 31 non-commissioned officers and drummers wounded; 3 non-commissioned officers and drummers missing; 128 rank and file killed; 466 rank and file wounded; 46 rank and file missing; 43 horses killed, wounded, and missing.

Total officers, non-commissioned officers, and drummers, rank and file, and horses, killed, wounded, and missing, 783.

G. B. TUCKER, Deputy-adjutant-general.

Return of ordnance and ammunition taken in the action of the 21st instant.

1 six-pounder, 4 four-pounders, 2 three-pounders, 6 five-and-half inch howitzers, 2 ammunition-waggons, 21 Portuguese ammunition-cars, 40 horses, and 4 mules.

The above is only the number already received in the park; but, from several accounts, there are eight more taken from the enemy. The ammunition-waggons and cars contain a portion of powder, shells, and stores of all description, and about twenty thousand pounds of musket-ammunition.

W. ROBE, Lieutenant-colonel,

Commanding Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant-colonel Tucker, &c. &c.

This being the first and last general action of this short campaign, and that of so decisive a nature, and the circumstances of the campaign itself so peculiar, a greater extension of the details of approbation are authorized than would otherwise be warrantable.

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Having, however, duly recognized the first authorities, it becomes necessary to attend to those which, though of a secondary nature, are by no means the less to be regarded, since they particularize, or examine, in different points of view, objects which cannot perhaps be admitted into the grand coup-d'œil of the general.

A number of incidents will also occur under this head, which, in the office of anecdote to general history, may tend to elucidate matters of the highest importance to a campaign commenced under the circumstances of the present.

The general course of the action, as ordinarily conceived, is as follows:

Brigadier-general Anstruther's brigade, and that of brigadier-general Fane, occupied a detached height in front of the village of Vimiera, in which sir Arthur Wellesley's head-quarters were.

The body of the army was upon a commanding hill, about a cannon shot farther back towards the sea, having its left at the ravine in which the rivu-

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let runs, the mouth of which affords a communication with our shipping, the right was thrown back a little, *en potence*, towards the coast, with which our general line of front was nearly parallel.

On the opposite side of the ravine to our left, the ground rises gradually to the north for about two miles, which looks toward Penichè.

The enemy formed two attacks, the one against the left and centre of the height in front of Vimiera, the other conducted from the heights that look towards Penichè, down the long slope, terminating at the ravine on our left, somewhat in the rear of the village of Vimiera.

Their attack on our advanced corps took place first, and was repulsed; indeed a considerable time before the action commenced upon the left.

As the movements of the enemy, in that direction, were observed in the morning sir Arthur Wellesley had ordered the troops destined to act on that side to move out of their original position to meet the enemy; they were engaged when they had advanced about one-third of the way from the summit of the long sloping heights already described, continued to drive them to the top of it, and down thence into the low grounds beyond; the British line halting upon the summit.

The troops engaged in this quarter were the brigades of generals Ferguson and Nightingale, that of general Ackland supporting them.

Their movement was perpendicular to the line of the coast, between which and their left general Craufurd's brigade and a corps of Portuguese advanced at the same time; but, as these troops were somewhat farther back, and the French did not extend their right to the sea, they were not engaged.

The advanced corps had orders to maintain its ground, which it did with the greatest bravery, repulsing the attacks made upon it with a very heavy loss to the enemy of men and of several guns.

On the left, the advance of the troops was firm and regular, driving the enemy from superior ground.

The French lost all the artillery they had with the column that attended them on that side; they made some spirited attempts to recover the guns they were driven from, but which failed to make any impression upon our men.

No attack was made against the right flank of the position, which was occupied by general Hill's brigade.

Our small body of dragoons pursued the enemy on their being repulsed from the attack on our advanced posts, but *their eagerness carried them a little too far.*

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Erroneous impetuosity of too small a party of British dragoons.

The superior cavalry of the French made no very decided efforts during the action, but seemed

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to content themselves with covering the rear of their two columns when driven back. It must be allowed, however, that the ground admitted of cavalry acting only in particular parts. Many of the slopes are extremely abrupt and several of them covered with vines, and there are also many patches of wood.

The following sketch, extracted from one of the numerous memoirs, which derive their principal excellence from having been composed on the spot, will yield a view of the affair differently constituted from the service in which the writer was engaged. It will have its uses in this place, professionally, from the entire novelty of the scene, and generally from its unrestricted narrative.

On the 21st, (says Dr. Neale,*) the troops, as usual, turned out under arms an hour before day-break, and no alarm took place till about eight o'clock, when it was announced that our pickets on the Lourinha road were attacked. However, as no great bustle ensued, I breakfasted quietly with a few friends, and then walked out, with the intention of purchasing a mule, an animal here of

* Physician to the forces.

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some importance. Passing along the streets of the village, I heard several officers assert that the French were approaching, in great force, to attack the position; while others thought that it would prove merely an affair of pickets. Still the noise of the musketry-fire seemed to approach, and several movements to be taking place among the troops on the heights. At length the discharge of artillery commenced, when I determined to get on the heights, where our left wing was posted, and to which they had just removed from the valley the heavy artillery. On crossing the fields, in which were placed the waggons, oxen, and commissariat stores, all was hustle and activity. Having reached the spot where the brigade of guns was posted, I had a complete view of the whole scene; a scene, the grandest and most picturesque you can well imagine.

The valley, village, and the extent of its beautiful and romantic environs, were stretched beneath my eye as on a plan. The atmosphere was serene, the sun blazed forth from a blue and silvery sky, streaked with fleecy clouds, and I could distinctly perceive every motion of the contending armies.

The French were at this moment advancing, in several columns, from the eastward, under cover

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of some pine-woods, driving in our pickets and riflemen, who retreated to a height situated to the southward of Vimiera, on which were posted the centre or advanced guard of our army. It was composed of brigadier-general Fane's brigade of riflemen, brigadier-general Anstruther's brigade, and the fiftieth regiment.

On these columns of French, a tremendous fire was kept up by the artillery belonging to the centre, which was placed in front of two white windmills on the height. The fire was returned by the guns of the enemy with great spirit; but it was evident that our artillery was much better served than theirs, and that the carnage caused by the lately-invented Shrapnell-shells was prodigious. Nevertheless, they continued to advance with great intrepidity, till they were charged in a most gallant manner by the fiftieth regiment, on which they turned their backs, and fled to the woods in all directions.

At this time, another party, who were advancing into the road which enters Vimiera from the northward, were met, and repulsed with great loss, by the second battalion of the forty-third. This battalion had been stationed near the church, in order to prevent the enemy from entering the village; as it appeared to be their design, in attacking our

centre, to penetrate through Vimiera, and possess themselves of our baggage and commissariat stores.

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On the right of the centre, the enemy were checked by the bayonets of the ninety-second regiment, and second battalion of the fifty-second; and, in these operations, brigadier-general Ackland's brigade, which had only landed at Maceira during the night, and was passing along the valley to arrive on the heights, lent a very well-timed effectual assistance; and the heavy artillery, lately brought up from the valley, did immense execution,—the Shrapnell shells making considerable gaps in the enemy's columns.

On giving way, the enemy were pursued by the gallant lieutenant-colonel Taylor, who charged them with his small body of horse in the most daring style, and cut them down in great numbers. Sorry am I to add that, in performing this service, he lost his valuable life. A great proportion of his men fell with him.

While these things were going forward in the centre, I had advanced considerably to the left, and had got in the rear of my old Monte Videan friends, the 40th, who, with the 36th and 71st regiments, composed the brigade commanded by major-general Ferguson, which was the left of our army. Brigadier-general C. Craufurd's brigade, with some Por-

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tuguese troops, covered their left flank, on the opposite side of a deep ravine. Here the enemy came up with great impetuosity. They were first opposed in front by our riflemen, whom they drove in. Coming up, however, with major-general Ferguson's division, they received a tremendous volley, and were shortly after brought to the charge. This was an operation their nerves could not withstand, and they immediately gave way. Our troops pursued them with eagerness, killed and wounded an immense number, and took several pieces of cannon.

The action commenced about half past nine, and terminated a little after twelve o'clock. Close to the spot where major-general Ferguson's brigade received the attack of the French, stood a small farm-house, into which it had been determined to carry the wounded. Thither I repaired, and witnessed a scene the most distressing. Around the building, whose interior was crowded with the wounded, two fig-trees afforded the scanty blessing of a sort of shade to the few who were huddled together beneath their almost leafless branches. Over the surrounding field lay scattered the fragments of war, and in many an awful group, the friend and foe,—men who had drawn their first breaths on the banks of the Thames or the Tiber, the Seine or the Vistula. How unaccountable are those dispensa-

tions of Providence, by which beings, totally unknown to one another, are thus assembled from the remotest regions.

To several, a simple inspection of their wounds, with a few words of consolation, or perhaps a little opium, was all that could be done or recommended. Of these brave men, the balls had pierced organs essentially connected with life; and in such cases, prudence equally forbids the rash interposition of unavailing art and the useless indulgence of delusive hope.

On going over the house, I discovered, that by opening a door which led into a large space appropriated to the operations of the vintage and removing the empty wine-pipes which it contained, many of the unfortunate sufferers might have the advantage of being removed from beneath the burning influence of the sun. I inquired, therefore, for the proprietors of the dwelling, in order to procure the keys, but I soon found that, at the commencement of the battle, they had fled, and abandoned their home to its fate. I was accordingly obliged to have recourse to some of the pioneers, employed in the office of burying the dead, whose hatchets soon forced an entrance; and having caused the contents to be removed, with as little injury as possible to the owners, and a large quantity of heath to be spread over the damp floor, I

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had as many of the wounded brought in as the apartment could contain.

While this was going on, our victorious troops were returning to their lines, from the pursuit of the discomfited foe ; who, after having ineffectually rallied and attempted to retake his guns, had retired to the north-east in great disorder, and was hastening to regain Torres Vedras, by the high road which leads from thence to Lourinha.

The armed Portuguese peasantry, who during the day had been prowling about the field of battle, immolating in secret many of their wounded Gallic oppressors, were now collecting around the cottage. Our fears were awakened for our wounded, but particularly for the prisoners who had fallen into our hands. A representation of the matter was sent to the camp, and the speedy appearance of a subaltern's guard, relieved us from this disagreeable situation.

The night was so dark, that it was necessary to have recourse to a Portuguese guide. By this time the peasantry had assembled, and were carousing around a large fire in the neighbourhood, boasting to each other, in high glee and spirits, the number of Frenchmen they had severally put to death.— From the time of my breakfast till the hour before mentioned, I had been unceasingly engaged in my professional avocations, and the drop of sour wine

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from one of their leathern bottles, which they were circulating among each other with great rapidity, and which they solicited me to partake of, seemed to my palate at that moment more grateful than any Burgundy I had ever tasted. After many entreaties, we prevailed on one of them to shew us the road to Vimiera, two miles distant. We then armed ourselves with one of the long poles of quince-tree wood, which the peasants make use of to assist them in skipping over the ditches and embankments of the vineyards.

On crossing the fields to get into the Lourinha road we found it almost impassable, from the number of tumbrils and artillery-waggon of the enemy, which were broken down in every direction. Our ears were saluted, on passing the church-yard, by the heavy moanings and exclamations of the wounded French, with whom the church and the cemetery were crowded,—*Ah, mon Dieu, mon Dieu, le sang coule, je meurs, je meurs.* At length, with a great deal of difficulty, we reached Vimiera; the streets of the village were choked up by the long line of oxen-wains, bearing in from the fields the wounded, whose haggard countenances appeared more wretched from the glare of the torches which blazed around them, and increased the horrors of the impressive scene.

Having requested the commissary-general to

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send some bread and wine to the cottage on the hill and taken a little refreshment, F—— and I retired to our straw pallets completely exhausted by the duties of the day.

Having discharged my duty at the hospital, and taken a list of the corps and numbers of the wounded, I proceeded to visit a house farther to the left, which was occupied by the French soldiery; in general they appeared to be more desperately wounded than our men, many of them being shot in both legs besides being stabbed in the trunk.

It having been yesterday in orders that the army was to advance, and our wounded to be sent by sea to Oporto, together with the French officers who had been taken prisoners, I was charged with the duty of removing to the beach all those who were in the field-hospital on the hill; the wounded French soldiers were to be left behind at Vimiera, under the care of some officers of the British hospital-staff.

About forty waggons and a subaltern's guard were, therefore, despatched to the hill on the left, and, towards sunset, having collected the wounded and placed them on litters in the cars, we set off for the beach, which we were unable to reach before midnight, owing partly to the stupidity of the Portuguese peasants, who conducted us by a very rugged bad road, but principally to the slow-

ness and caution with which it was necessary to proceed with the poor fellows, many of whom suffered severely from the jolting of the wretched vehicles on which they were placed.

On reaching the shore we found a number of our sailors, with lanterns in their hands, busily employed in removing into the boats the wounded from Vimiera; it was highly gratifying to me to witness the very attentive and humane manner in which this service was performed by these kind honest-hearted tars, who, during the whole of a very cold night, were wading, nearly up to the middle, in the wash of the sea; fortunately the surf was moderate; and, owing to their great exertions, by ten o'clock this morning, I had seen the last of my charge sent off to the hospital-ships appropriated for their reception.

On returning to Vimiera I found the rear and baggage of the army moving off, brigadier-general Craufurd's brigade alone being left to keep up a communication with the shore.

Our march from Vimiera hither led us along an open flat, about a mile in extent, on the banks of the river Maceira, till we reached a small village, the name of which has escaped me.—From thence the ground, for some distance, was unequal and rugged, but then we entered a forest of pines, the opening glades and little valleys of which are

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finely laid out in patches of corn-land and vineyards.

Our position here is taken up among some heights, in the rear of which are two small villages, the greater called Ramalhal, the less Amial. In our front lies Torres Vedras, from which we are distant about three miles; the hills and adjoining country are richly covered with fine woods, with the branches of which our soldiers are erecting huts for their accommodation.

Such are the views, as various as the circumstances of this novel campaign, of the action which forms its most prominent object, none of which are unworthy consideration.

It was certainly a glorious object, under all its circumstances, and would seem to have promised an equally glorious prosecution of more extensive operations; that these did not take place is not, at the same time, entirely to be attributed to a defalcation in either of the commanders, who were ordinarily compelled, under the critical occasions on which they were employed, to supersede and be superseded.

Proposition of
sir A. Wellesley
to pursue the
French after the
action of Vi-
miera.

It was thus that sir Harry Burrard reached the army at the moment when victory declared in its favour at Vimiera.

Having, on the evening before the action and previously, been put in possession of the circumstances of the campaign up to that period, sir Harry was immediately enabled to judge of the measures necessary to its prosecution; with true dignity he ordered sir Arthur Wellesley to continue his chief command during the action he had so well begun.

In an interview of the 20th, on board ship, sir Arthur Wellesley had stated it as his determination to advance against the enemy next morning, notwithstanding the want of cavalry with which the enemy was so well provided, the inefficient state of the artillery-horses, and the defenceless and disordered condition of the commissariat.

These circumstances, with others of a local nature, decided the opinion of sir Harry Burrard, that the army should halt till reinforced by the army under sir John Moore.

Towards the close of the battle of Vimiera, sir Arthur Wellesley found additional reasons for advancing upon the enemy, which are thus stated by himself.

The enemy's left, which was engaged with our right, retired by a road which leads along the heights towards Lourinha on a different side of the valley from that on which our left stood, and it began to retire at much about the same time that the attack began upon the left; consequently the left could

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Critical state of
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not have been immediately employed in pursuit of those troops which had been engaged on our right. Those troops I believe continued in confusion in the woods which were on that side of the valley during a considerable part of the day, and this confusion was considerably increased, and its duration lengthened, by the attack made by our cavalry.—I certainly think that if the left wing of the army had followed up its advantages as I proposed, not only many prisoners would have been taken belonging to the left wing of the French army, but likewise belonging to the right, and that the whole of them were in such confusion, that, giving them full credit for great facility and discipline in forming after having been broken, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to form again.

When the enemy were beaten on the left, I went to sir Harry Burrard, who was on the field of battle, and proposed to him the pursuit of the enemy,—I did it in the way of a continuance, or a renewal of the discussion I had had with him, in the Brazen, on the preceding evening, and I told him that that was his time to advance, that he ought to move the right wing to Torres Vedras, and pursue the beaten enemy with the left;—I also stated to him that we had twelve days provisions in camp, and plenty of ammunition for another battle.—Sir Harry Burrard was of opinion that our advantages ought not to

be followed up, much for the same reasons as he had stated the night before, and he desired that I would halt the troops on the ground which they then occupied;—at this time the 71st and 82d were in a valley, the 40th and 36th immediately in their rear on the side of the valley, and the other troops formed in succession for their support; nearly about the same time the last attack was made by a body of the enemy's infantry upon the 71st and 82d, and was repulsed, as is stated in my report to sir Harry Burrard, and it was after that that general Ferguson sent his aide-de-camp, captain Mellish, to inform me that great advantages might be derived from the continuance of our advance; and I took captain Mellish to sir Harry Burrard to endeavour again to prevail upon him to allow us to continue in the pursuit of our advantages. General Ferguson could in fact have cut off a considerable force.

By the march of the right to Torres Vedras, the enemy would have been cut off from Lisbon by the nearest road to that place,—if they had retired upon Torres Vedras in confusion, they would have been between two bodies of our troops. If they had chosen to go round by the other road to Lisbon by Villa Franca and Allenquer, it is perfectly true that infantry, not formed, would have got faster over the country than infantry, which would

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army under sir
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have been under the necessity of preserving its order, but I conceive that an army in that situation, followed even at a slower rate by a victorious enemy, is absolutely incapable of forming or of appearing again in the shape of an army. There is no doubt but that our infantry must have kept its order and the connection between one corps and another in this proposed pursuit, but by its order I do not mean at all times a formation in line.

To this sir Harry Burrard directly objected, and ordered the army to halt. This was grounded on his former ideas, and an opinion that the movements advised by sir Arthur Wellesley were precarious. He did not at the same time conceive that, as it afterwards appeared, the whole force of the enemy had been in action. The extensive line of the British army was also not in favour of an advance. The distance from right to left appeared to have been not much less than four miles. The centre of the French had been necessarily disengaged an hour and a half, time enough for them to have formed a line near three miles distant in our front, with eight pieces of cannon and a large body of cavalry.

This question of the advance, sir Arthur Wellesley admitted to have been decided on fair military grounds.

In the attack of the action at Roleia, the French

advanced in echelon: in that of Vimiera they advanced in column, their most favourite mode, though the former is more destructive.

The battle of Vimiera afforded a prominent instance of the use of the shells invented by colonel Shrapnell, of the artillery, filled with a hundred musket-balls, scattering havoc far and wide wherever they burst, which takes place at a certain distance.

And on the other side, even up to this period of the campaign, the commissariat evinced a total incapacity for the collection, management, conveyance, or distribution of provisions.* This sir Ar-

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Shrapnell shells.

Deficiency of
the commissariat.

* Some disorder ensued in the park, during the battle of the 21st, as one of the carters was killed, and three wounded; several made their escape with their oxen, others by themselves; and many were prevented. The stores or provisions, which were in the carts deserted by the drivers, who did not return, were added to the other carts so as to have moved, if indispensable, the next day; as that was not the intention, it is difficult for me to say, if that would have been practicable; I believe possible; but it is impossible for me now to ascertain what might have been the difficulties, as many of the carts, in the park, were from Lamos, and very small; with the increased weight, I cannot answer for the consequence thereof.

On the 21st of August, at night, there were, in the depôt;

1080 bags, or 220,960 lbs. of bread:

64,000 lbs. salt meat;

35 puncheons rum.

865 lbs. hay.

30½ Alguiers barley.

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thur Wellesley attributed, however, to want of experience rather than of diligence or exertion.

On the 22d, in the morning, three days issues of bread to the army took place. Thus, completing the army to *three* days bread in the men's havresacks, besides three days bread on mules attending the brigades, except the brigades of brigadier-generals Anstruther and Ackland, which had no mules; thus, there remained in the park, with the moveable depôt, on the 22d, in the morning, after the issues before alluded to,

560 bags, or 61,720 lbs. of bread.

60,000 lbs. salt meat.

24 puncheons of spirits.

The army moved from the first without any forage, which was procured, with the greatest difficulty, at each halting place.

Bullocks attended the army, which were usually issued daily to the assistant commissaries of brigades.

The number of carts, in the depôt, on the 21st, were about 360 loaded, and forty were empty, always kept in reserve, to supply the deficiencies of those which daily broke down on the march.

A great number of carts, besides these, were employed in conveying and removing the wounded, and, even of the number loaded, about 120 were unloaded, for the purpose of giving effect to the service of bringing away the wounded to the hospitals. On the afternoon of the 21st and succeeding days, empty carts were sent to Maceira for provisions.

There was an instance, in this place, of fifty empty carts having deserted together; several others, likewise, were known to follow this example; under the circumstances before described, it is impossible to demonstrate the difficulties, or obstacles, which might have stood in the way, had the army moved the next day, (the 22d.)

(Signed) JAMES PIPON,
Deputy Commissary-general.

And to be sure the same means have not been used to elicit perfection, or rather to weed the establishment from imperfections, which has produced the superior energies of that of France, where a commissary was shot on the first proof of inefficiency !

A country, however, whose commerce is an object of its highest boast, cannot surely be long inferior in a commissariat, particularly with the experience at present to be derived from such various sources.

The disembarkation of troops and horses was very ill conducted and disastrous, arising from the surf. Several boats broached broadside too, and, in an instant, were precipitated head-foremost into the waves. This might be avoided, according to the practice of the Deal boatmen, who never pull their oars quick when in the surf, but use a mere paddling motion, while the action of the waves heaves them on the shore.

In attempting to swim the horses of general Anstruther's division, on shore, a beautiful mare belonging to the general was lost, from the awkwardness of the grooms and sailors in disengaging the slings. So that the animal was exhausted by the length of time it was in the water before it could proceed toward the shore.

To the brigades of general Anstruther, and that

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Hew Dalrymple

of brigadier-general Ackland, (which landed and bore a part in the action,) sir John Moore's only remained to complete the army; which was ordered by sir Harry Burrard to proceed to Maceira.

The army halted. On the 22d sir Hew Dalrymple arrived at Maceira, having landed on the neighbouring beach, and immediately assumed the command; and as that of sir Harry Burrard had produced a striking change in the operations, so this of sir Hew Dalrymple was accompanied by one of infinitely more extraordinary effects.

Orders the
army to march.

Sir Hew Dalrymple almost immediately gave orders to march on the next morning, not with the motive of pursuing the plan of sir Arthur Wellesley, but fears arising from the supposed disadvantages of the ground on which the army rested, as a military position, and, indeed, as he stated from a bad opinion altogether of the movement from Mondego Bay. By this movement he conceived every strong post and every desirable line of communication, as completely left to the enemy, without any prospect of support, or any thing whatever for the British army to fall back upon in case of disaster.

Despairing
principle.

Sir Hew Dalrymple had also formed the hopeless idea, that whenever the enemy became aware of the situation and numbers of the British army, and determined on an attack, the battle on its part would be fought for existence, while the French,

in case of defeat, would only lose what were killed or taken. And this idea sir Hew Dalrymple believed, confirmed by the loss sustained in the small body of English cavalry, compared with the effect produced in the larger one of the French, although the numbers in killed and wounded were much in favour of the British army.

In fact, sir Hew Dalrymple commenced his command with a degree of austerity, (probably induced by the awkward circumstances under which it commenced,) not very favourable to the attainment of a precise knowledge of the army he was about to conduct on an enterprize of the most embarrassing difficulties, and requiring the most consummate judgement. Sir Hew has taken frequent occasion to disavow a communicative disposition, or that affability of command which alone can induce the various intelligence necessary, on all occasions, to a general.

Yet in the private and confidential communication of lord Castlereagh to sir Hew Dalrymple, on his appointment, after complimenting him on the zeal and ability with which he had conducted his intercourse with Spain from Gibraltar, is the following striking intimation :

“ Permit me to recommend to your particular confidence, lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley. His high reputation in the service, as an officer,

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Sir Hew Dalrymple's previous diplomatic merit.

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would, in itself, dispose you, I am persuaded, to select him for any service that required great prudence and temper, combined with much military experience.

“The degree, however, to which he has been, for a length of time past, in the closest habits of communication with his majesty’s ministers, with respect to the affairs of Spain, having been destined to command any operation that circumstances might render necessary for counteracting the views of France against the Spanish dominions in South America, will, I am sure, point him out to you as an officer of whom it is desirable for you, on all accounts, to make the most prominent use which the rules of the service will permit.”

From such a recommendation, the highest respect and strongest cordiality were surely to have been expected.

Flag of truce
from the French
army.

As sir Hew Dalrymple approached the head quarters of the army, an alarm took place in the camp from the appearance of a strong body of French cavalry, the dust occasioned by which magnified its appearance to that of a division of the army; it turned out, however, to be only the escort of general Kellermann, who, with two aides-de-camp, arrived with a flag of truce.

He inquired for sir Arthur Wellesley, who had been hitherto of course recognized as commanding

the army. Sir Arthur Wellesley proposed receiving him at the out-posts; sir Hew Dalrymple answered, No; the general had desired to speak to him,—the commander of the army, and *he* should receive him at sir Arthur's quarters.

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Suspension of
arms.

This little incident must have sufficiently relieved sir Arthur Wellesley, now only third in command, from not only the smallest responsibility on account of any future operations of the campaign, but also have precluded him from any interference in any negotiation other than where that interference might be necessarily solicited, when it must take place to all intents and purposes in the character of obedience to command.

General Kellermann's mission was to negotiate a suspension of arms, to prepare a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. *At this period*, perhaps, under all circumstances, nothing could have been more desirable to the English;*

* There is one point of view in which the convention has not been considered, and in which, nevertheless, it is perhaps the most justifiable; and that even according to the principles of the French, derived, as they are, from the Roman school. This, as described by their great teacher, *Frontinus*, is—the “suffering a powerful enemy to retreat, whom despair might reinforce.”

Antient military
principle for the
evacuation of
Portugal.

Thus:—1. The Gauls, after the battle gained by Camillus, wanting vessels to repass the Tiber, the senate advised them to be furnished, and also with a convoy to accompany them.

2. The same people, afterwards retreating by Pomptinum, obtained a free passage by the way called from thence Gallican.

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erful enemy to
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and all that remained was to conduct so critical a negotiation for the honour of his majesty's arms.

3. L. Marcius, a Roman knight, to whom the command devolved after the death of Scipio, having surrounded the Pœni, and finding that they fought more bravely to avenge their dead, ordered some divisions to withdraw one after the other, that they might take to flight, and when he found them dispersed, with less danger to his own troops, destroyed them.

4. C. Cæsar enclosed the Germans, and when, from desperation, they fought more vigorously, suffered them to escape, and then charged them in their flight.

5. Hannibal, when, at Thrasymenus, he had enclosed the Romans, and found them fight desperately, opened his ranks to let them pass, and then on their retreat, without loss, destroyed them.

6. Antigonis, king of Macedonia, when besieging the Ætolians, who, pressed by famine, determined on a sortie, suffered them to pass; and, when they had recovered themselves, charging their rear, defeated them.

7. Agesilaus, the Lacedemonian, about to engage the Thebans, and perceiving that, enclosed by the nature of the ground, the enemy fought desperately, cleared a passage for them; and, when the Thebans were on the road to escape, rallied his army, and, without loss, destroyed them by the rear.

8. Cn. Manlius, consul, on his return from a battle, found the Heturians had possessed themselves of his camp; he immediately despatched troops to every avenue, when, being enclosed, the enemy fought with such fury that himself was killed in the battle; when this was observed by his lieutenants, they removed the troops from one station, and the Heturians immediately flew in disorder, when they were again attacked by the other consul, Fabius, and destroyed.

9. Themistocles, after the defeat of Xerxes, prevented his bridge from being broken, deeming it better that he should be driven from Europe than compelled in despair to fight; he caused

In all that relates to military diplomacy, the French are unquestionably so superior that no ordinary caution is requisite in those who enter the lists with them on any occasion, particularly with the generous openness of the English character.

On the present, the utmost force of acumen was requisite on the part of those, who, under so many and so various difficulties, had suddenly to receive a powerful enemy as a suppliant,—him against whom every effort was to be made with doubt and fear,—the possessor of Portugal,—soliciting permission to resign it to a conqueror yet diffident of conquest.

The finesse of the enemy was instantly apparent.

While the army is scarcely recovering itself on its ground, the soldiers of the English-out-lying picket appear driven in; an alarm is given that the French, though evidently beaten, are again advancing.

at the same time his danger to be indicated to him, if he did not expedite his flight.

10. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, having made himself master of a town, closed the gates; but, perceiving that the inhabitants, thus reduced to the last necessity, fought courageously, he left them opportunity of retreat.

11. The same, among other memorable precepts which he gave to generals, said:—"Do not be obstinate in the pursuit of an enemy who flies; not only lest necessity should make him more strongly resist, but that afterwards also he may be induced more easily to give way, from knowing that in flight he will not be destructively pursued by the victor."

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cing; a moving cloud of dust in the distance is visible, to the naked eye, on the high road from Torres Vedras to Lourinha, and through a telescope a considerable body of cavalry is perceived on the march; the drums beat to arms, and the troops fall in.

At this moment, a flag of truce is discovered approaching the British lines, and a chief of division, general Kellermann, makes his appearance with a powerful demonstration of the force which the French still sustained in superiority over the British,—a numerous and sufficiently well-appointed cavalry.

Without adverting to the mere matter of formulæ, the results in the instruments as they remained, of the armistice and convention, are added as the first necessary preliminary to any farther observations on the subject.

They are given with the introductory despatch of sir Hew Dalrymple.

Head-Quarters, Cintra, September 3, 1808.

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your lordship, that I landed in Portugal and took the command of the army, on Monday, the 22d of August, the next day after the battle of Vimiera, and where the enemy sustained a signal defeat; where the valour and discipline of British troops, and the talents of British officers, were eminently displayed.

A few hours after my arrival, general Kellermann came in with a flag of truce from the French general-in-chief, in order to propose an agreement for a cessation of hostilities, for the purpose of concluding a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops. The enclosed contains the several articles at first agreed upon and signed by sir Arthur Wellesley and general Kellermann; but as this was done with a reference to the British admiral, who, when the agreement was communicated to him, objected to the seventh article, which had for its object the disposal of the Russian fleet in the Tagus, it was finally concluded that lieutenant-colonel Murray, quarter-master-general to the British army, and general Kellermann, should proceed to the discussion of the remaining articles, and finally to conclude a convention for the evacuation of Portugal, subject to the ratifications of the French general-in-chief, and the British commanders by sea and land.

After considerable discussion, and repeated reference to me, which rendered it necessary for me to avail myself of the limited period latterly prescribed for the suspension of hostilities, in order to move the army forwards, and to place the several columns upon the routes by which they were to advance, the convention was signed, and the ratification exchanged, the 30th of last month.

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arms, &c.

That no time might be lost in obtaining anchorage for the transports and other shipping, which had for some days been exposed to great peril on this dangerous coast, and to insure the communication between the army and the victuallers, which was cut off by the badness of the weather and the surf upon the shore, I sent orders to the buffs and 42d regiments, which were on board of transports with sir Charles Cotton's fleet, to land and take possession of the forts on the Tagus, whenever the admiral thought it proper to do so. This was accordingly carried into execution yesterday morning, when the forts of Cascais, St. Julien, and Bugio, were evacuated by the French troops, and taken possession of by ours.

As I landed in Portugal entirely unacquainted with the actual state of the French army, and many circumstances of a local and incidental nature, which doubtless had great weight in deciding the question, my own opinion in favour of the expediency of expelling the French army from Portugal, by means of the convention the late defeat had induced the French general-in-chief to solicit, instead of doing so by a continuation of hostilities, was principally founded on the great importance of time, which the season of the year rendered peculiarly valuable, and which the enemy could easily have consumed in the protracted defence of the strong places he

occupied, had terms of convention been refused him.

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arms, &c.

When the suspension of arms was agreed upon, the army under the command of sir John Moore had not arrived, and doubts were even entertained whether so large a body of men could be landed on an open and a dangerous beach; and, that being effected, whether the supply of so large an army with provisions from the ships could be provided for, under all the disadvantages to which the shipping were exposed. During the negotiation, the former difficulty was overcome by the activity, zeal, and intelligence, of captain Malcolm, of the Donegal, and the officers and men under his orders, but the possibility of the latter seems to have been at an end, nearly at the moment it was no longer necessary.

Captain Dalrymple, of the 18th dragoons, my military secretary, will have the honour of delivering to your lordship this despatch. He is fully informed of whatever has been done under my orders, relative to the service on which I have been employed, and can give any explanation thereupon that may be required.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) HEW DALRYMPLE, Lieut.-Gen.

the right hon. lord viscount Castlereagh, &c.

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Articles for a
suspension of
arms between
the English and
French armies.

Suspension of Arms agreed upon between Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B. on the one part, and the General of Division, Kellermann, Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour, Commander of the Order of the Iron Crown, and Grand Cross of the Order of the Lion of Bavaria, on the other part, each having powers from the respective Generals of the French and English armies.

Head-Quarters of the English Army, Aug. 22, 1808.

Art. I.—There shall be, from this date, a suspension of arms between the armies of his Britannic Majesty and his imperial and royal Majesty, Napoleon I. for the purpose of negotiating a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army.

II.—The generals-in-chief of the two armies, and the commander-in-chief of the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus, will appoint a day to assemble on such part of the coast as shall be judged convenient, to negotiate and conclude the said convention.

III.—The river of Siraudre shall form the line of demarcation to be established between the two armies; Torres Vedras shall not be occupied by either.

IV.—The general-in-chief of the English army undertakes to include the Portuguese armies in this

suspension of arms, and for them the line of demarcation shall be established from Leyra to Thomar.

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V.—It is agreed provisionally that the French army shall not, in any case, be considered as prisoners of war; that all the individuals who compose it shall be transported to France, with their arms and baggage, and the whole of their private property, from which nothing shall be excepted.*

* The original will not be without its use :

Suspension d'Armes arrêtée entre Monsieur le Chevalier Arthur Wellesley, Lieutenant-General et Chevalier de l'Ordre du Bain, d'une Part, et Monsieur le General de Division, Kellermann, Grand Officier de la Legion d'Honneur, Commandeur de l'Ordre de la Couronne de Fer, Grand Croix de l'Ordre du Lion de Bavière, de l'autre Part; tous deux chargés de Pouvoirs des Généraux respectifs des Armées Françaises et Anglaises.

*Au Quartier-Général de l'Armée Anglaise,
le 22d Aout, 1808.*

Art. I.—Il y aura à dater de ce jour une suspension d'armes entre les armées de sa majesté Britannique, et de sa majesté impériale et royale, Napoleon I. à l'effet de traiter d'une convention pour l'évacuation du Portugal par l'armée Française.

II.—Les généraux-en-chef des deux armées et monsieur le commandant en chef la flotte Britannique à l'entrée du Tage, prendront jour pour se réunir dans tel point de la cote qu'ils jugeront convenable pour traiter et conclure la dite convention.

III.—La rivière de Sirandre formera la ligne de démarcation établie entre les deux armées; Torres Vedras ne sera occupé ni par l'une ni par l'autre.

IV.—Monsieur le général-en-chef de l'armée Anglaise s'obli-

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1808.

August,
Convention of
Cintra.*Copy of the Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of Portugal by the French Army.*

The generals commanding in chief the British and French armies in Portugal having determined

gera à comprendre les Portugais armées dans cette suspension d'armes, et pour eux la ligne de démarcation sera établie de Leiria à Thomar.

V.—Il est convenu provisionnellement que l'armée Française ne pourra dans aucun cas être considéré comme prisonnière de guerre, que tous les individus qui la composent seront transportés en France avec armes et bagages, leurs propriétés particulières quelconques, dont il ne pourra leurs être rien distrait.

VI.—Tout particulier, soit Portugais, soit d'une nation alliée à la France, soit Français, ne pourra être recherché pour sa conduite politique ; il sera protégé, ses propriétés respectées, et il aura la liberté de se retirer du Portugal dans un terme fixé avec ce qu'il lui appartient.

VII.—La neutralité du port de Lisbonne fera reconnue pour la flotte Russe, c'est à dire, que lorsque l'armée ou la flotte Anglaise seront en possession de la ville et du port ; la dite flotte Russe ne pourra être ni inquiétée pendant son séjour, ni arrêtée quand elle voudra sortir, ni poursuivie lorsqu'elle sera sortie, qu'après les délais fixés par les lois maritimes.

VIII.—Tout l'artillerie du calibre Français, ainsi que les chevaux de la cavalerie seront transportés en France.

IX.—Cette suspension d'armes ne pourra être rompue qu'on ne se soit prévenu quarante huit heures d'avance.

Fait et arrêté entre les généraux désignés ci-dessus, au jour et au lieu ci-dessus.

(Signée) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
KELLERMANN, le Général
de Division.

ARTICLE ADDITIONEL.

Les garnisons des places occupées par l'armée Française seront

to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered into on the 22d instant for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the under-mentioned officers to negotiate the same in their names, viz.—on the part of the general-in-chief of the British army lieutenant-colonel Murray, quarter-master-general; and, on the part of the general-in-chief of the French army, Monsieur Kellermann, general of division; to whom they have given authority to negotiate and conclude a convention to that effect, subject to their ratification respectively, and to that of the admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus.

Those two officers, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the articles which follow :

Art. I.—All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal, occupied by the French troops, shall be delivered up to the British army in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present convention.

comprises dans la presente convention, si elle n'ont point capitulé avant le 25 du courant.

(Signée) ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
KELLERMANN, le Général
de Division.

(A true Copy.)

A. J. DALRYMPLE, Capt. Military Secretary.

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II.—The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage; they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and, on their arrival in France, they shall be at liberty to serve.

III.—The English government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France between Rochfort and L'Orient inclusively.

IV.—The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun. All other artillery, arms, and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the convention.

V.—The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; that is to say, its military chest, and carriages attached to the field-commissariat and field-officers, or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its account as the commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.

VI.—The cavalry are to embark their horses, as

also the generals and other officers of all ranks. It is, however, fully understood that means of conveyance for horses, at the disposal of the British commanders, are very limited; some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon. The number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed six hundred, and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed two hundred. At all events, every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.

VII.—In order to facilitate the embarkation it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the places, of the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days of the date of the ratification, or sooner if possible.

VIII.—The garrison of Elvas and its forts, and of Penichè and Palmela, will be embarked at Lisbon; that of Almeida at Oporto, or the nearest harbour; they will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.

IX.—All the sick and wounded, who cannot be embarked with the troops, are entrusted to the British army; they are to be taken care of whilst they remain in this country at the expense of the

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Sintra.

British government, under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France when the final evacuation is effected; the English government will provide for their return to France, which will take place by detachments of about one hundred and fifty or two hundred men at a time; a sufficient number of French medical officers shall be left behind to attend them.

X.—As soon as the vessels, employed to carry the army to France, shall have disembarked it in the harbours specified, or in any other of the ports of France to which stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given them to return to England without delay, and security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port.

XI.—The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.

XII.—The forts St. Julian, the Bugio, and the Cascais, shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries as far as Lazaretto, or Trafuria, on one side; and fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the second division; as shall be also

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the harbour and all armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Penichè, and Palmela, shall be given up as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the mean time the general-in-chief of the British army will give notice of the present convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all farther hostilities.

XIII.—Commissaries shall be named on both sides to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.

XIV.—Should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any article, it will be explained favourably to the French army.

XV.—From the date of the ratification of the present convention, all arrears of contributions, requisition, or claims whatever, of the French government, against subjects of Portugal, or any other individual residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops in the month of December, 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled, and all sequestrations laid upon their property, moveable or immoveable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.

XVI.—All subjects of France, domiciliated in

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Cintra.

Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected. Their property of every kind, moveable or immoveable, shall be respected, and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty of retaining or of disposing of it, and passing the produce of the sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose.

It is fully understood that the shipping is excepted from this arrangement only, however, in so far as regards leaving the port, and that none of the stipulations above-mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculation.

XVII.—No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army; and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders, they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property, it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French government; they are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the 16th article.

XVIII.—The Spanish troops, detained on board ship in the port of Lisbon, shall be given up to the commander-in-chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain, without being taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of last May, and the day immediately following.

XIX.—There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal, since the commencement of the present hostilities.

XX.—Hostages of the rank of field-officers shall be mutually furnished on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present convention. The officer of the British army shall be restored on the completion of the articles which concern the army; and the officer of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army.

XXI.—It shall be allowed to the general-in-chief of the French army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British admiral to convey him to Bordeaux or Rochfort.

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Cintra.

XXII.—The British admiral will be invited to accommodate his excellency the commander-in-chief, and the other principal officers of the French army, on board of ships of war.

Done and concluded at Lisbon, this 30th day of August, 1808.

GEORGE MURRAY, Quarter-Master-General.

KELLERMANN, le General de Division.

We, the duke of Abrantes, general-in-chief of the French army, have ratified, and do ratify, the present definitive convention, in all its articles, to be executed according to its form and tenor.*

(Signed) LE DUC D'ABRANTES.

Head-quarters, Lisbon, August 30, 1808.

*Additional Articles to the Convention of August 30,
1808.*

Art. I.—The individuals in the civil employment of the army, made prisoners, either by the British

* Nous, duc d'Abrantès, général-en-chef de l'armée Française, avons ratifié et ratifions la présente convention définitive, dans tous ses articles, pour être exécutés selon sa forme et teneur.

(Signée) LE DUC D'ABRANTES.

Au quartier-général de Lisbonne le 30 Août, 1808.

troops, or by the Portuguese, in any port of Portugal, will be restored, as is customary, without exchange.

II.—The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines, up to the day of embarkation: the garrisons up to the day of the evacuation of the fortresses.

The remainder of the magazines shall be delivered over in the usual form to the British government, which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses of the army, from the above-mentioned periods, till their arrival in France, under the condition of their being reimbursed by the French government, for the excess of the expense beyond the estimation to be made by both parties, of the value of the magazines delivered up to the British army.

The provisions on board the ships of war, in possession of the French army, will be taken on account by the British government, in like manner with the magazines in the fortresses.

III.—The general commanding the British troops will take the necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the means of subsistence between the country and the capital.

Done and concluded at Lisbon, this 30th day of August, 1808.

GEORGE MURRAY, Quarter-Master-General.

KELLERMANN, le General de Division.

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August.

Convention of
Citra.

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.

1808.

August 22.

Suspension of
hostilities and
convention of
Cintra.

We, duke of Abrantes, general-in-chief of the French army, have ratified, and do ratify, the additional articles of the convention, to be executed according to their form and tenor.*

LE DUC D'ABRANTES.

(A true Copy.)

A. J. DALRYMPLE, Capt. Mil. Secretary.

Such are the whole of the articles, as they permanently continued, first for the suspension of arms, which precluded the pursuit of the French army certainly discomfited, notwithstanding any particular advantages; and ultimately for the evacuation of Portugal under the convention, called, from the place of its conclusion, that of Cintra.

The incidents which arose out of this convention form so completely a matter of military diplomacy, and are altogether so illustrative of its principles, that they will deserve a chapter to be appropriated to themselves, leaving the present to be concluded with the circumstances which took place previous to the embarkation of the French troops.

* Nous, duc d'Abrantes, général-en-chef de l'armée Française, avons ratifié et ratifions les articles additionels à la convention et contre, pour être exécutés suivant leur forme et tenor.

(Signée) LE DUC D'ABRANTES.

(A true Copy.)

A. J. DALRYMPLE, Capt. Military Secretary.

General Junot, after the battle of Vimiera, hastened his retreat to Lisbon, to avert the dangers which might arise from his absence, to the inadequate force left in that capital, at the moment the news of his defeat should arrive; to guard against this peril, the Frenchman, at the head of the police, took care seasonably to publish an inflated account of pretended successes of the French in the action, and by that means preserved tranquillity until the general-in-chief arrived, part of the troops soon followed, and long before general Kellerman came in with the flag of truce, this danger to the enemy was past, and the positions of Cabeça de Montechique and Mafra were occupied.

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August 22.

Suspension of
hostilities and
Convention of
Cintra.

Early on the 23d, lieutenant-colonel Murray, quarter-master-general, set out to communicate the articles of agreement for the cessation of arms to admiral sir Charles Cotton. The army also marched, and, in consequence of the truce, took a position, selected solely for convenience, near the village of Ramalhal, where head-quarters were established. Soon after the arrival of sir Hew Dalrymple, he was visited by the Portuguese general Freire, by appointment.

August 23.

Advance of the
British army.

On Wednesday, the 24th of August, sir Robert Wilson arrived at Ramalhal, and brought an account of sir John Moore's arrival at Mondego, and

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Suspension of
hostilities, and
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Cintra.

having landed part of the troops under his command, but that they were re-embarking. In the afternoon of the same day sir John Moore was off Maceira.

Upon this occasion sir Hew Dalrymple wrote to him, as follows :

Head Quarters, Ramallal, August 24th, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

It was, I understand, sir Harry Burrard's wish, as it certainly is mine, to have your troops on shore ; and, to accomplish that object, I yesterday made every arrangement that occurred to me as necessary to complete that service, for which sir Harry Burrard had previously taken steps.

This morning I have had a long conference with sir Arthur Wellesley upon the subject of the resources of the country, by which I find that they are so exactly suited to the corps, at present here, that very great difficulties may arise from the increase of force.

As the vicinity to the sea affords a considerable resource, and a depôt of provisions from on board ship might easily be established on shore, to eke out the supply to be obtained from the country, I confess I am not impressed with any sense of the difficulties above alluded to, that counterbalance, in my mind, the strong objection to leaving troops

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on board transports, at this, or indeed any, season, upon this dangerous and inhospitable coast. I nevertheless state the case to you, in the first place, that you may decide whether to suspend the disembarkation of the infantry, (the cavalry we cannot well do without,) until you and I can have had personal communication on the subject, or without delay, (should you adopt my feeling,) that you may make such arrangements for the supply of your corps, or rather for the subsistence of the troops, as your ships can afford, and you yourself may deem necessary; and proceed to disembark without any farther notice; in either case, I trust that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you soon."

(Signed)

H. W. DALRYMPLE.

Lieutenant-general sir John Moore, K.B.

&c. &c. &c.

The next day, the 25th, (sir Hew Dalrymple states,) captain Malcolm, of the Donegal, arrived at my head-quarters, and reported the anchorage of sir John Moore's corps, but that the troops could not land because of the heavy swell. In the evening, sir John Moore and general Hope came, but the swell continued too heavy for the disembarkation of the troops.

In this interview, it was arranged between sir John Moore, general Hope, and myself, that, if it

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1808.

August 25.

Suspension of
hostilities, and
convention of
Cintra.Disembarkation
of sir J. Moore's
army.

were possible, the troops should disembark gradually, landing with every separate debarkation of men the necessary supply of provisions, artillery, ammunition, &c.; if the proportion of infantry that could be landed should prove inconsiderable, I directed that the remainder should go to sea, under lieutenant-general Hope's command, and proceed to St. Ubes; but as that was, for many reasons, a very inconvenient alternative, it was resolved to use every possible effort to land the whole, which was, with great exertions, and some loss of men and stores, at last accomplished.

The following statement of sir Hew Dalrymple is also here important.

Arrangement of
rank in the new
command.

When sir John Moore's corps was expected to land, the adjutant-general asked my directions relative to the dislocation of the army, which it would then become necessary to advert to, as sir John Moore, sir Arthur Wellesley, and lord Paget, had no divisions, the former having commanded separate armies, and the latter being lately arrived; upon this occasion I declared my intention not to adopt any arrangements by which sir Arthur Wellesley should, after the services he had rendered in Portugal, and the victory he had recently gained, be placed in a subordinate situation until the French were either expelled or subdued; for this reason I meant to give him the command of the column

1808.

August 26.

Suspension of
hostilities, and
convention of
Cintra.

which would have to march by its left to turn the right of the enemy's position; when I afterwards mentioned the motives of this determination to the lieutenant-generals, senior to sir Arthur Wellesley, whom it most particularly concerned, it was received in a manner that, in my opinion, did them great honour. I also took occasion to mention the arrangements to sir Arthur Wellesley himself, but without, of course, adverting to the reasons; and in order to confute a calumny which prevailed, I understand, in one part of the army in Portugal, as well as in England, as if I had sought an opportunity to remove sir Arthur Wellesley, to be freed from his supposed remonstrances against the convention.

On the 26th, sir Hew Dalrymple reviewed the army.

In the evening, says one of the staff, the whole of the line, consisting of nearly 30,000 men, turned out under arms, for the inspection of sir Hew Dalrymple; the weather was delightful and the *coup d'œil* truly magnificent; our gaily-dressed troops, extending two miles in open column, wheeled in an instant into line, the various bands struck up the favourite national air of "God save the King," and the echos of the pine-clad hills returned the clang of presented arms. Home, in his tragedy of

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August 26.

Suspension of
hostilities, and
convention of
Cintra.

Douglas, has, with great propriety and beauty, described a similar scene in the following lines :—

The setting sun

With yellow radiance lighten'd all the vale,
And, as the warriors moved, each polish'd helm,
Corslet, or spear, glanc'd back his gilded beams.

Every eye seemed to express regret as the gallant sir Arthur Wellesley rode along the ranks and publicly resigned the command of his victorious troops to the lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar.

On the next day were issued the following general orders :

August 27.

Head-quarters, Ramalhal, 27th of Aug. 1808.

PAROLE——PORTUGAL.

The rapid and skilful march performed by the army commanded by lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, marked in its progress by the talent of the general and the gallantry of the troops, and terminated by a victory greatly glorious to both, seemed to have accomplished the immediate object in view without farther operation in the field.

Should that expectation be disappointed the army will again advance, greatly augmented by the arrival of troops much more valuable from their composition than their numbers, and, if by this

means there will remain less opportunity for the army at large to acquire renown, by the encounter of an enemy so greatly inferior in force, there will be greater occasion to display patience and cheerfulness under such privations as the exhausted state of the country and other circumstances must necessarily produce.

(Signed) H. CLINTON, Adjutant-general.

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August 27.

Suspension of hostilities, and convention of Cintra.

On the morning of the 27th, sir Arthur Wellesley with his division occupied the heights near Torres Vedras.

On the 29th, at twelve, the cessation of hostilities terminated, of which sir Hew Dalrymple availed himself to establish his head-quarters at Torres Vedras, in the front of which was at the same time placed major-general Paget's advanced guard.

August 29.

Though the weather was threatening, (and had been such as to render it advisable for sir Charles Cotton's fleet to haul off the land,) and the swell great upon the shore, the transports and victuallers were still at anchor, yet, on the 31st, the weather had rendered it necessary for the whole to go to sea, and the British army had no certain resource but the quantity of provisions actually on shore; the 18th dragoons were also at sea upon the coast, and the battering cannon, without which it would not

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1808.

August 31.

Advance of the
army.

certainly have been prudent to attack Fort St. Julien, a work presenting a counternained front to the land of 530 feet, well flanked, with a revêted scarpe of forty-five feet.

On the 31st, early in the morning, sir Arthur Wellesley's corps moved a little to the left, and the divisions of lieutenant-generals Hope and M'Kenzie Fraser took up the ground in the rear of Torres Vedras which sir Arthur's corps had occupied. At half past seven lieutenant-colonel Murray, with an aid-de-camp of general Kellermann, my aid-de-camp, captain Fanshawe, and lord Fitzroy Somerset, sir Arthur Wellesley's aid-de-camp, arrived with the definitive treaty.

September 1.

On the 30th of August and on the 1st of September the army proceeded.

On the 2d head-quarters were established at Cintra; the same day the 3d and 42d regiments were landed from the fleet and took possession of the forts on the Tagus. An unpleasant occurrence here took place in hoisting, as sir Hew Dalrymple states, without his knowledge, and contrary to his intentions, British colours instead of Portuguese when the French flag was hauled down; and, although, he adds, I sent immediate orders to rectify the error, and am confident that an account of the whole of the transaction must have reached the Portuguese head-quarters nearly at the same time,

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September 2.

I have documents to prove that this circumstance was used to irritate and inflame the public mind at Oporto.

On the same day, the 18th light dragoons arrived in the Tagus.

The 3d in the morning despatches from England Sept. 2. reached the continent, containing instructions for the formation of the regency, and also confidential communications from the secretary of state, in which were included queries relative to certain military operations upon which his sentiments were asked, and also an ample authority to use the full discretion with which he had been invested for the advantage of his majesty's service, and without deeming it necessary to wait for authority or instructions from home. These powers were accompanied by the assurance that he should find in his majesty's ministers the most sincere and cordial disposition to support him in the exercise of a responsibility, from which, it was trusted, he would not shrink, in any instance, where the good of the service might be promoted by his acting without reference to them. Besides the despatches of lesser moment he received from lord Castlereagh a private letter, with some useful instructions relative to any line he might adopt with regard to capitulation or booty; of this he immediately sent a copy to the admiral, lest it should be of use to him.

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1808.

Sept. 5.

in the negotiation he understood him to be then carrying on with the Russian admiral Siniavin.

As the first and most material object, after ratifying the convention, was to pursue the necessary measures to carry its provisions into execution, lord Proby was sent to Lisbon, the day I went to Cintra, to act as commissioner for that purpose; and a few days after, (sir Hew Dalrymple states,) upon hearing accounts, (exaggerated ones I am now persuaded,) of the acts of plunder the French were preparing to commit, I joined major-general Beresford with his lordship in the commission.

Soon after his arrival in Portugal, sir Hew Dalrymple received a private letter from general Castanos, to congratulate him on his appointment to the command of the army. This letter closed with the following expression:

Address of the
Spanish general
Castanos to sir
Hew Dalrymple

“The army of your excellency can advantageously assist our advance, as Portugal once evacuated by the French, we can give each other the hand, combine reciprocally our movements, and proceed with amity and concord in favour of the common cause.”

As the hint thus conveyed, says the commander-in-chief, was entirely in unison with my own opinion as to the most advantageous mode of carrying on the war, I lost no time, after receiving the full powers I have already described, to prepare for the

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Sept. 5.

movement of the army as soon as possible after the embarkation of the French, and the establishment of the regency, both which objects were as good as completed by the 21st of September; but it was necessary first to ascertain what was in fact the disposition of the Spanish people, as to the allowing a British army to enter their country; and it was not merely a cold assent, but a zealous and hearty co-operation, that could enable a British army to act in the interior of Spain, where it is more easy to starve a hostile than to supply an allied force.

To fulfil those important objects, I first wrote to general Castanos, on the 5th of September, the letter before the court, in which I express my anxiety to hear again from him, and to know his opinion in what manner the army of near 30,000 British, (a very small proportion of cavalry,) might most usefully be employed, and expressing my hope (but not the certainty) that no considerable British force need be left in Portugal, which had nothing at that moment to fear from the enemy; and, it was to be hoped, had no other disturbance to apprehend. As I had no absolute knowledge that general Castanos would be at Madrid when this letter reached him, and, as besides, it would be nearly as difficult for him as for me to gather the opinion of the nation before any central body was convened to declare its will, I sent lord Wil-

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September 5.

liam Bentinck to Madrid with the instructions now before the court, dated the 14th of September; and I was long enough in Portugal to know, that after communicating with Don Tomas Morla, at Cadiz, and the supreme junta at Seville, his lordship arrived at the capital in time to have early communication with the central junta at Aranjuez, and to form sanguine hopes of success in every part of his mission.

Sept. 7.

On the 7th of September, brigadier-general Anstruther was sent, avowedly, to superintend the evacuation of Almeida; on his way to that place, he had directions to communicate with the bishop of Oporto; but, besides these, one of the objects of his mission was to make such inquiries as circumstances might suggest to him, preparatory to the movement of the army in the adjoining provinces of Spain.

Sept. 15.

On the 15th of September, orders were issued to the army, relative to the equipment for service, if directed to march into advanced cantonments, and arranging the mode of placing the heavy baggage in suitable places of deposit: and no time was lost after the 24th of September, when every other material object was accomplished, to move a large portion of the army (exclusive of the regiments which had before been sent to Elvas and Almeida) towards the frontier of Spain; of these troops a

sketch of the cantonments taken when I left Portugal, from a memorandum I happened to have in my possession, is now before the court.

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.
1808.

September 15.

The cantonments of the troops were now as follow :

First cantonments of the British army.

- 2 Squadrons, 18th light dragoons, Villa Vicosá.
- 1 Brigade, light artillery . . . Estremos.
- 1 ditto, ditto Santerem.
- 36th Regiment Ditto.
- 5 Companies, 60th regiment . Galegao.
- 71st Regiment Abrantes.
- 91st Ditto Ditto.
- 2d (or Queens) Campo Mayor.
- 20th Regiment Elvas.
- 52d Regiment Ditto.
- 5 Companies, 95th regiment . Villa Vicosá.
- 1st Light battalion, K. G. L. . Evorcea.
- 2d Ditto, ditto Montemoro Novo.

On the 15th of Sept. the French troops commenced their debarkation, after a variety of discussions upon the execution of the convention under which it was effected.

Evacuation of Portugal by the French.

The following are the returns of their embarkation, to which is added that of their staff :

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.

1808.

Sept. 15.

Evacuation of
Portugal by the
French army
under Junot,
duc d'Abantes.*Return of French Troops, on board the First Division of Transports,
under the Directions of Captain Anderson.*

Number or Letters.	Ships' Names.	Tons.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Number or Letters.	Ships' Names.	Tons.	Men.	Women.	Children.
CY	Ruby	207	176	2	0						
V 21	Dasher	167	167	1	1						
OB	Economy	226	226	3	0						
DV	Louisa	166	173	0	0	81	Ardent	238	136	0	0
J Z	Minerva	231	147	0	0	C B	Sisters	157	88	0	0
V	Jenny	215	213	0	0	F O	George	161	80	0	0
K S	Gemini	176	188	2	0	A G	Liberty	156	80	0	0
ES	George	182	190	0	0						
F Y	Tolin	137	147	0	0						
B V	Calypso	150	114	0	0						
J D	Ruby	172	185	1	0						
D K	Three Sisters	193	156	0	0						
C N	Dedalus	221	191	1	0	303	Chelton	227	11	12	4
A R	Mentor	176	181	3	1	47	Lady Sparo	326	71	2	1
H Q	Phoenix	222	232	0	0	237	Apollo	372	38	19	8
F W	Ocean	225	221	0	0						
E T	Albion	199	157	0	0						
E L	Neva	164	182	1	1						
N U	Sarah	143	138	0	0						
C Z	Palladium	248	126	2	1	P W	Britannia	164	20		
B C	Denton	245	251	1	0						
K L	Fortuna	243	231	2	3						
K X	Blacket & Ridley	213	198	3	5						
D B	William & John	238	233	0	0						
K H	Charlotte	222	237	2	1	I O	Milburne	0	30	0	0
M D	Thomas	214	191	0	0	P R	Lord Barham	0	30	0	0
D C	Fanny	216	217	1	0						
H D	Mary	242	255	2	0						
J M	Junio	249	290	2	2						
J B	Triton	203	227	0	0						
A X	Three Brothers	273	273	4	2						
M O	Hazard	178	194	2	2						
A Z	Lapwing	233	260	2	0						

1808.

*Return of French Troops on board the Second Division of Transports,
under the Direction of Lieutenant Paley.*

Sept. 15

Evacuation of
Portugal by the
French army
under Junot,
duc d'Albuquerque.

Number of Letters.	Ships' Names.	Tons.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Number of Letters.	Ships' Names.	Tons.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Horses.
NE	Baltic	230	239	1	3	NI	Agenora	222	226	3	3	
R	Union	181	300			BA	Victory	284	293	2		
CX	Ruby	239	244	1		JH	Elizabeth	237	247			
HC	Jenny	206	206	1		DL	Renown	170	175			
EN	Mary and Susan	192	196			1H	Langley	247	206			
CK	Maria	151	151			EG	Eliza	174	169			
FE	Hebe	211	221			HI	Elizabeth	146	158			
LI	Duke of Clarence	206	219			JE	Howard	209	151			
JJ	Mars	152	241			<i>Sick & Wounded.</i>						
AE	Alice	15	169			MI	Jane	250	89	1		
GL	Commerce	209	208		1	HO	Nancy	237	103	1	1	
CM	Walker	14	223			KV	Lord Nelson	144	63			
CF	Chancellor	204	210	1	1	OV	Four Brothers	144	56	1	1	
AM	Hero	195	201	1	2	IE	Edward	220	83			
LU	Union	190	202	3	1	Lk	Minerva	301	144	2		
KA	Anne	284	233			<i>Horse Ship.</i>						
JP	Oak	193	182	1		DU	Providence	141	29			20
CO	Phyleria	151	154	1		<i>Ordnance Stores.</i>						
LS	Miltbank	192	201	1		KE	Blamorgan	27	51	2		
EZ	Fortune	144	148			RT	Leeds	173	52	1		
AN	John	154	158									
HE	Media	162	172									
EM	Fanny	1	6	178								
HR	Mary	227	238									
DI	Zephyrus	228	242									
DH	Providence	241	245		1							
ME	Argus	228	249									
HM	Argo	153	153									
EH	Eleanor	155	161									
EE	Jay	172	188									
NP	Mary	247	259									
CE	Liberty	258	272									
Q	Carron	239	247	4	3							
IZ	Finely	203	221	2								

CAMPAIGNS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL,

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.

1808.

Sept. 15.

Evacuation of
Portugal by the
French army
under Junot,
duc d'Abrantes.*Return of French Troops, &c. on board the Third Division of Transports, under the Direction of Lieut. Wilbraham.*

Number or Letters.	Ships' Names.	Tons.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Number or Letters.	Ships' Names.	Tons.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Horses.
CD	Eagle - - - -	316	301	8	4	OE	Unity - - - -	425	59	3	2	20
EA	Samaritan - - -	251	258	2	2	PP	Pitt - - - -	291	72	1	1	34
EF	Elizabeth - - -	300	261	3		PK	Shafts - - - -	359	80			40
FL	Brothers - - -	279	274	4		FV	Isabella - - - -	297	92			35
EY	Grace - - - -	164	157	2		PL	Providence - - -	128	34	1		46
ED	Concord - - -	174	174	3	1	PH	Holcombe - - -	118	39			14
AJ	William - - -	302	274	4	3	HY	Nancy - - - -	317	62	1		32
PC	Elizabeth - - -	183	147			IT	Spring - - - -	291	39	1	1	39
FO	Friends - - -	183	191	2	6	JN	Pilhead - - - -	117	28			14
FH	Industry - - -	282	298	2		PO	Good Intent - - -	268	61	3	2	32
FB	Zephyr - - -	307	253	2		PJ	Integrity - - -	289	68			34
S23	Whitby - - -	302	285	1		NE	Trafalgar - - -	263	74			30
EP	Selina - - -	170	134			PL	Success - - - -	322	50			44
DW	May Flower - - -	151	156	3	3	PR	Fleece - - - -	156	44			20
DS	Northumberland	315	301	5	8	JF	Pitt - - - -	330	74			36
96	Mary Anne - - -	387	95	24	20	EX	Isabella - - - -	249	59	1		30
106	Thames - - -	367	73	3	2	HX	Port of Sunderl.	270	81	1	1	32
179	Paragon - - -	394	156	9	6	JV	Commerce - - -	273	45	1		32
11	Whitby - - -	336	69			JG	Adventure - - -	63	76	1		34
271	Prince George -	291	62			IF	Lady's Adventure	268	64	1		30
X	Reliance - - -	293	59	1		PA	Harvey - - - -	250	66			30
146	Minerva - - -	368	189	6		JA	Sisters - - - -	253	48	1		29
358	Phoenix - - -	334	45	2		OF	William & Mary	276	72			34
357	Earl Fitzwilliam	294	82	4	2	FR	Norfolk - - - -	328	73	2	1	36
300	Clarendon - - -	262	13	7	3							

Ships sent to Oporto under the direction of Lieutenant Rickie, A.T. to embark the French garrison of Almeida.						Ships waiting to embark the garrison of Elvas.					
AL	Echo - - - -	192				IC	Juno - - - -	250			
EJ	Trafalgar - - -	198				JI	Industry - - - -	224			
EK	Two Friends - - -	152				GN	Liberty - - - -	219			
ND	Sally - - - -	207				GA	Beatrix - - - -	166			
FN	Roberts - - - -	172				FC	Baltic Trader - -	241			
BO	Good Intent - - -	203									
Y	Friendship - - -	198									
						1000 Total.					

The total number of French troops, &c. embarked, including the garrisons of Almeida and Elvas, viz.

Men.
24,735Women.
215Children.
116Horses.
759

(Signed)

J. HALSTED, R. A. G.

A true copy.
A. J. DALRYMPLE,
Mar. Mil. Sec.

ETAT MAJOR-GENERAL.

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.

1808.

September 15.

Etat major of
the French army
evacuating Por-
tugal.

S. E. Monseigneur de Paris, premier A. D. C. de

S. M. L'Empereur & Roi. General-en-chef.

Aides de Camp { Grand Saigne, colonel.
Chusan, Chef Ers.
Thomasin, capitaine.
De la Graves, capitaine.

General chef de l'etat major, general Thiebalt, 12 ch.

Aid-de-camp, de Trentinian, lieutenant.

Adjut.-com. sous chef de l'etat, major-gen. Bagniere,

Adjointes . . . { Mattal, capitaine, 2 ch.
De Vallabrique, captne. 2 ch.
Valloir, lieutenant, 2 ch.
Dionville, id. 2 ch.
Philippon, capitaine. 2 ch.
Colonel Beaucisioy, id. 2 ch.

Chef d'escadron commandant la gendarmerie de
l'armée, Thomas.

Inspecteurs aux revues { Viennet Vaublanc.
Degey.

Ordonateur-en-chef . . . Troussel.

Commissaires de Guerre { Andira.
Blanchard.
Lallimana.

Secretaries de l'etat major-general.

Puanbe Sarments.

Brument Charles Belly.

Beunifue Dabiduthe.

Divancourt Desconur.

Plus yingt Domestiques.

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.

1808.

Sept. 15.

Returns of the
French army
evacuating Por-
tugal.

Designation des Corps.	No. des bataillons.	Emplacement.	Presens sous les armes.						Absens avec sold.						Absens sans sold.						Total en	
			Officiers.	Troupes.	Chevaux.	Officiers.	Troupes.	Chevaux.	Officiers.	Troupes.	Chevaux.	Officiers.	Troupes.	Chevaux.	Officiers.	Troupes.	Chevaux.	Officiers.	Troupes.	Chevaux.	Hommes.	Chevaux.
1 st division.	12 de ligne		20	968																	1065	
	70 ditto		41	1677																	2311	
	4 Suisse		31	694			8	999													991	
	47 de ligne		29	1272			8	316													1351	
	36 id.		40	1401																	2454	
		Totaux	161	6012		16	538								2	196					8172	
2 ^d division.	Le reg. prov.		23	501																	1110	
	d'inf. legere		15	764		1	268														1201	
	2 id.		10	952		1	118														1240	
	1 reg. prov.		17	1016											4	45					1337	
	d'inf. de ligne		15	641		4	427														1329	
	2 Suisse		12	902		31	727								1	10.					1109	
		Totaux	93	4034		37	1548								5	204					8204	

BOOK II.

CHAP. III.

1808.

Sept. 15.
Returns of the
French army
evacuating Por-
tugal.

3e division.	3 regt. pv. d'infr. { 31 legere - logr. - - - - - } 32 id. - - - - -	3	20	720								23	1	16			1			
	26 de ligne - - - - -	3	25	1024								33	2	92						
	Legion du Midi - - - - -	182	13	514								90	2	179						
	66 de ligne - - - - -	3	30	1003								50	2							
	82 id. - - - - -	3	17	602								224	5	208						
	Legion Hanoverian - - - - -		18	654								121								
			13	654								102								
	Totaux		137	4994								605	10	495			7	6259		
	Cavalerie.	1 regt. pro. de drag. { 1 de drag. 3 id. - - - - - } 3 id. - - - - -	4	8	267	250							29		27				333	253
		4 id. - - - - - { 4 id. - - - - - 5 id. - - - - - } 5 id. - - - - -	4	7	232	243							2	1	20				305	242
5 id. - - - - - { 5 id. - - - - - 6 de - - - - - } 6 de - - - - -		4	13	476	446							16						504	416	
Chasseurs - - - - - { 9 id. - - - - - Gendarmierie imp. - - - - - } 15 id. - - - - -		4	8	236	276							21		8				273	276	
		4	4	217	243							26		11				258	243	
		4	7	236	280							20						263	230	
			1	36	38													38	38	
Artillerie.	Totaux		48	1722	1775							156	1	66				4974	1776	
	1 regt. artillerie - - - - -		3	104								5						112		
	2 - - - - -		7	304								19		6				335		
	6 - - - - -		5	191				6				20		14				230		
	9 comp. d'ouvrier - - - - -		1	29														30		
	12 C. de train - - - - -		5	387	472							22						414	472	
			21	1015	472							59		20				1121	472	
Genie.		14														3		17		

Transport-Office,
Nov. 16, 1808.

Return of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men, embarked and sailed for Portugal, and assembled there under the Orders of Sir Hew Dalrymple: Also of the Transport Tonnage employed on that Service.

TROOPS.

1863.

TRANSPORTS.

	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.		Staff.		TOTAL.		Troopship.		Cavalry Ships.		Victuals.		Forage Ships.		Camp Stores.		Ordn. Stores.		TOTAL.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horse ^s	Men.	Horse ^s	Men.	Horses.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
Force under { Lieut.-Gen. { Sailed from Cork July 12, Sir Arthur { 1808, including 6 store Wellesley. { ships, which sailed same day from the Downs.	9,196	238	693	306	21	34	10,297	578	40	13,565	18	5,063	4	856	4	1,389	4	856	4	453	7	1,526	75	25,237
Ditto under { Major-gen. { Sailed from Gibr. May 14, Spencer. { 6th Regt. and Detachm. Ditto August 14, with 42d Regiment. Third Regt. embarked at Madera.	2,827		83		38	21																		
	2,184		204						7204															
	943								21		46	14,137	2	42	2	459							51	15,352
Ditto under { Brig. Genls { Sailed from Harwich July Anstruther { 20; from the Downs 22d. & Ackland.	4,771		*		46	40	4,817	40			2	5,784			3	431							33	26,728
	11,777	649	1,557	675	241	109	14,718	1,519			57	13,942	18	4,711	2	283	4	876	10	2,122	181	10,853		
Ditto under { Lieut.-Gen. { Sailed August the 9th from Sir J. Moore. { Portsmouth with 13th Stewart. { Light Dragoons.		77	773				775	773			29	6,411					64					32	7,033	
	2,620	1,863	1,963	2,537	984	319	294				204	3,402	108	25,658	27	6,956	9	1,786	7	1,663	17	4,018		
Total Force.....									37,311	2,961	Total Tonnage												374	95,443

N. B. The 4th Vn. Bn. (825 Men.) sailed from Cork July 12, with the Force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, but not having been landed in Portugal, is not included in the above account.

N. B. The 4th Vn. Bn. (825 Men.) sailed from Cork July 12, with the Force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, but not having been landed in Portugal, is not included in the above account.

** The artillery and horses belonging to the force under brigade-general Anstruther and Ackland, were embarked at Portsmouth, but were prevented, by contrary winds, from joining their brigade off that port, and proceeded with Sir John Moore's force.

There is no specification, in the returns made to this office, of the ordnance-stores with general Spencer's brigade.

RUPERT GEORGE.

AMBROSE SERLE.

J. BOWEN.

G. H. TOWRY.

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.

1808.

Artillery report
of the army.*Camp, Benefico, 28th Sept. 1808.*

Sir,

Agreeably to your desire, I transmit the following statement, respecting the royal artillery, attached to lieutenant-general sir A. Wellesley's army.

At Mondego Bay, 26th July, 1808, ordered, in case of landing, to put on shore three brigades of artillery, each with half the usual proportion of ammunition, and also 500,000 rounds of musket-ammunition.

1st, 2d, and 3d of August, landed 2 light six-pounders and 9 one-pounder brigades, with limbers and cars complete, and half the number of waggons, with reserve ammunition, viz.

10 light six-pounders, with limbers, &c. including two waggons with reserve ammunition	6 guns, 177 rounds.
2 light 5½ howitzers, ditto, and one waggon reserve	ditto, 104
5 nine-pounders, ditto, and two reserve waggons	ditto, 135
1 heavy 5 small howitzer, and one reserve waggon	132

Horses received for the above, from those of the Irish commissariat, (very many of them.

old, lame, blind, and cast-off

cavalry) 293

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.

1808.

Artillery report
of the army.

A brigade of four light 6-pounders and two howitzers, arrived with major-general Spencer, were ordered to land the 6th of August at Lavos; expecting there the artillery had been supplied, by order of sir A. Wellesley, with nineteen Portuguese mares, for the riding part of the establishment, and eighty-six mules, of the largest, then brought in for draught. Six of these delivered to the engineers to carry entrenching-tools; these mules were put to the waggons, with horses in the thill, while the guns remained supplied with horses only.

August 9.—Three guns, of the before-mentioned brigade, were brought to camp; sir A. Wellesley seeing them come in, put it strongly to me, whether it would not be better to take the field with fewer guns well-horsed than with more as an incumbrance; in consequence of which, the three pieces not brought up were remanded on board ship, and, with his consent, on my suggestion, those now in camp were carried forward.

After the two first marches, from Lavos to Legria, I waited upon sir Arthur Wellesley, and expressed my strong conviction, that the guns, as then horsed, could not get on. Suggesting the propriety of leaving behind, or sending back, all the waggons, and whatever else could be spared, to enable the

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.

1808.

Artillery report
of the army.

guns going forward to travel light. This was immediately acceded to, and the three guns of the six-pounder brigades, with fourteen waggons and some harness just arrived, were left in charge of a non-commissioned officer and seven gunners, and a conductor of stores. The guns were then supplied with two additional horses each; also the limber-waggons, wheel-cars, and forge-carts, and such of the mules as had not been taken away by their drivers, and were able to carry loads, were appropriated to the carriage of medicines, camp-equipage, &c.

The guns then travelled with,

Light six-pounders	158 rounds each.
Ditto, howitzers	70
Nine pounders	116
Heavy howitzers	68

Every tent but one (for the field-officer) was left behind, and the men carried only a spare shirt and a few small articles made up in the great coat; every league the army marched shewed the necessity of this, and many were the instances where troops were ordered by sir Arthur Wellesley, or given, by my application, to the general-officer of the nearest brigade to assist the guns up the steep faces of the mountains, where not all the horse-draught we could have put to them would have taken them up.—

With these timely helps they could hardly have been said to have detained the army an hour.

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.

1808.

Artillery report
of the army.

After the actions of the 17th and 21st of August the guns had expended four hundred and seventy-three rounds, which, by my going on board ship early on the 22d, were replaced in great measure that day, and they have brought the whole to their present situation.

I have said before that the horses were old, blind, and bad; many of them died of age, some with work, although they were supplied as fully as the army could be, and, by sir Arthur Wellesley's care, had several times additional rations of forage ordered them; on arriving at Benefico forty-six had died or been destroyed, and of the rest a great number are now not worth the forage they consume.

I landed 500,000 rounds of musket-cartridges and 160,000 of rifle-ammunition, which were brought forward on ninety-eight mules and about sixty ox-wains, which had been provided by the commissariat, on sir A. Wellesley's order; this proportion remained with me until the junction of sir John Moore's army at Ramalhal, when the wains were delivered to colonel Harding, and the mules, with about 160,000 rounds, came on to Benefico, and were thence sent to Lisbon.

The expenditure of the 17th and 21st, in small ammunition, was 106,036 rounds, which was re-

BOOK II.
CHAP. III.

1808

Artillery report
of the army.

placed, on the 22d and 23d, from the ships at Maceira.

I have the honour to be
Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) WILLIAM ROBE, Lieut.-Col.
Commanding Royal Artillery,
Detached at Benefico.

*Return of Ordnance-Stores and Musket-Ammu-
nition, landed at Maceira, 1808.*

From the 24th of August to the 26th inclusive.

Light six-pounder-brigades, with horses, complete	3
Light six-pounder-brigade, complete, but with only fourteen horses	1

27th of August.

Carbine-cartridges	21,000
Flints	2000
Musket-ball-cartridges	70,000

28th of August.

Six-pounder round shot, with cartridges . .	72
Six-pounder-case-shot, with cartridges . . .	15
Six-pounder, spherical case	36

Mem.—These ordnance-stores were landed with

a proportion of small stores, and for the purpose of completing the guns attached to sir Arthur Wellesley's division.

(Signed) J. HARDING, Colonel,
Commanding Royal Artillery.

BOOK II.

CHAP. III.

1808.

Artillery report
of the army.

On the embarkation of the French troops the flag of Portugal was hoisted on the citadel; the people rent the air with shouts of joy, rockets were let off, and the rejoicings continued till the close of day, when the whole city was illuminated in a very grand manner.

The Spanish troops made prisoners by Junot were disembarked and joined in the public joy, dancing in the streets in bodies, for in truth they had yet no horses

Some violences were committed upon the houses in the interest of the French, but were soon suppressed.

On the 18th, sir Hew Dalrymple issued the following proclamation for establishing the future government of Portugal: Sept. 18.

Proclamation, by his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple, commanding the British Forces in Portugal, to the Portuguese Nation. Proclamation of
sir H. Dalrym-
ple.

The success with which it has pleased Almighty God to bless the British arms has brought about

BOOK II.

CHAP. III.

1808.

Proclamation of
sir H. Dalrym-
ple.

the moment when it becomes my duty to address the faithful and loyal inhabitants of this country ; I seize the opportunity with eagerness, in order to tranquillize the minds of the timid, to repress the designs of the disaffected, (if any such remain,) and to assure the nation at large that the efforts of the British force under my command have no other object in view than to insure the prosperity of the inhabitants of Portugal by the restoration of that government which has so long and so gloriously presided over them, and the return of which will be welcomed, no doubt, by the united voice of a loyal people.

The presence of a hostile army, in possession of the capital, and master of the principal resources of the kingdom, had in a manner deprived the estimable and loyal subjects of Portugal of the means of liberating their country ; patriotic efforts, however, were made in spite of these disadvantages, and the national spirit was manifested in a manner at once most decided and most honourable.

The efforts which were made by several provinces of the kingdom opened the road for the restoration of the monarchy.

Notwithstanding, however, the energy displayed by these provinces, in arraying and bringing forward an armed force for the liberation of the capital, the aid of the antient and faithful ally of

Portugal was necessary to bring the contest to a successful and speedy issue. The warm interest which his Britannic majesty felt for his ally, and the energy which has ever marked the British character, soon brought a powerful force to the shores of Portugal.

That part of the Portuguese army which local circumstances permitted united itself with the British, whilst the remainder effected a powerful diversion. Measures were taken in concert for the defeat of the common enemy; the steps of that force have been marked by victory, and the expulsion of the enemy has opened the way to the restoration of the Portuguese monarchy, the most gratifying duty which could be imposed by his sovereign on a British commander.

No views of national interest or aggrandisement can be traced in the liberal policy of Britain; but, true to the principles of honour and good faith, that have ever directed her conduct, she sees, in the events now passing in Portugal, only the happy means of re-establishing order, and restoring to the sovereign and the people their just right.

In the execution of these views, as commander of the British forces, I shall best fulfil the intentions of the king my master, and most effectually secure the interests of Portugal, by placing in the exercise of authority that body to which his royal

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highness the prince-regent thought fit to delegate the sovereign power, when he withdrew the royal dignity from the insults of an implacable enemy, and preserved the sovereignty of his dominions beyond the Atlantic.

One respectable nobleman, a member of the body thus left in power by his royal highness, has unfortunately been removed from his country by the authority or arts of its enemy, by which, at this critical period, it is deprived of his services, whilst some of the members, having appeared to unite themselves with the French interest, have rendered their re-establishment in the government at this moment impossible.

Therefore the distinguished persons undermentioned, the remaining members of the regency appointed by his royal highness the prince-regent, and who have incurred no such disability, are called upon to repair to Lisbon to take upon themselves the functions of the government, until such time as the will of his royal highness the prince-regent shall be more fully known, viz.

The count De Castro Marim, monteiro mor of the kingdom, and member of the councils of his royal highness.

Dom Francisco Xavier de Noronha, member of the councils of his royal highness, and grao craz da

ordem de sant Iago, president of the board of conscience, and lieutenant-general in the royal armies.

Franciscodo de Cushæ Menezes, member of the councils of his royal highness and lieutenant-general in the royal armies.

Joao Antonio Salter de Mendonça, desembargador do paeo and procurador of the crown.

Dom Miguel Pereira Furjax Curtinlio, member of the councils of his royal highness and brigadeiro in the royal armies.

To this government the inferior jurisdictions and tribunals, the constituted and legal authorities of the kingdom, and all persons of every description, are required to pay all deference and submission.

As commander of the British forces, I shall hold it to be my first and most urgent duty to maintain the authority of the government thus established, to insure the tranquillity and subsistence of the capital, and to encourage the re-establishment of the former prosperity of the kingdom.

When these objects are attained, and the attainment of them can only be delayed by intrigue or disaffection, the interference of a military force will cease to be necessary ; but until these ends are accomplished, the most vigorous and decided measures will be taken for maintaining the peace and good order of the country, and all offences against the

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tranquillity of any part of the kingdom will be proceeded against with the utmost severity.

Given at the head-quarters of the British army at Prayas, this 18th day of September, 1808.

(Signed)

HEW DALRYMPLE,

Lieut.-gen. and commander of the
British forces in Portugal.

Sept. 20.

On the 20th, sir Arthur Wellesley quitted Portugal for London, ostensibly on account of his health, and was accompanied by major-general Ferguson, who obtained leave of absence. Their staff accompanied them; and it was not to be disguised that dissatisfaction with the measures of the commander-in-chief had its share in their departure from the army.

The following anecdotes will tend to illustrate the minor circumstances of the present period.— Their authority is that of an officer of rank who was with sir Arthur Wellesley when general Kellermann arrived with the flag of truce, on the 22d of August. Kellermann (says he) is hideously ugly, but his countenance is by no means void of sensible expression. He appears not to be a man of an engaging address. He came, accompanied by two aides-de-camp, one of whom had a commission in,

and wore the uniform of, the Portuguese police corps. On our asking one of them to exchange some Napoleons for guineas, he produced a purse, which I should imagine contained at least two hundred, and which he, without hesitation, acknowledged to be plunder taken from the Portuguese. Kellermann dined with us, and did not quit sir Arthur's till late in the evening.

We understand that our division, which sir Arthur commands, being the only one which had engaged the French, are not to be permitted to take possession of Lisbon and its fortresses.

We arrived within three leagues of Lisbon two days ago, and took up our quarters (the same which we at present occupy), at the country seat of a convent of Benedictine monks, whose chief residence is in Lisbon. On the day of our arrival here, two French officers paid us a visit. Through them, sir Arthur sent an invitation for dinner to general Loison, who commanded the advanced posts of the French army between us and Lisbon; but he refused, saying, he every hour expected orders from the duke of Abrantes, and therefore could not leave his lines.

An immense number of German soldiers, who composed a part of Junot's army that had been formed by the French in Hanover, have deserted to us; and so great a horror, they say, exists in the

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minds of their countrymen and comrades, as to returning to France, that they are positive the French, from one of their German regiments, will hardly embark fifty men.

On our arrival at Lisbon, we visited general Beresford, at whose house we met lord Paget, his aides-de-camp, and colonel Graham. We here found that nothing could surpass the audacity of the attempts which had been made by the French to carry off all the articles of value which could be found in Lisbon, whether public or private property. They had actually packed up two state carriages, the property of his royal highness the duke of Sussex.

Junot, who had become exceedingly indignant at the idea of returning to France in a frigate, instead of a line-of-battle ship, was informed that the duke of York was in the habit of sailing in a frigate; to which he made an answer,—‘That he trusted it was not intended to make a comparison between him and the duke of York.’ ‘The duke of York,’ said he, ‘is only commander-in-chief of a king’s army, while I, the duke of Abrantes, am commander-in-chief of an emperor’s army, as well as his imperial majesty’s representative.’

A major of the 29th regiment of infantry, made prisoner on the 17th, had been confined at Lisbon from that period till this morning, when he was

released. The greater part of his imprisonment was on board the Portuguese ships. He told us many anecdotes of the French soldiery, and particularly dwelt upon the detestation that existed between the French and the Portuguese peasantry. He said, that, on his march, on the 17th, to Lisbon, the French guard who conducted him amused themselves by firing at the peasants as they passed along, without any apparent provocation having been given on their part. He added, that the French acknowledged they had received a complete beating on the 21st, and that they had, in the two actions, lost 4,000 men. They allowed they had 20,000 in the field on the 21st.

At two or three different periods during his imprisonment, the Portuguese at Lisbon had attempted to rise upon the French troops. After the battle of the 21st, so certain were the French that we should have entered the town of Lisbon as conquerors, that they had transported all their valuables on board the Portuguese and Russian men of war anchored in the Tagus.

Sir Arthur, and most of his staff, went on the 9th to Lisbon, where he remained some days, and dined with Junot, who gave us a sumptuous repast. The conversation occasionally turned on ourselves, with what took place during the actions of the 17th and 21st. These, with the usual

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fanfaronnade of Frenchmen, they treated as insignificant affairs, not as general actions. They said the 21st was merely a *coup-de-main*, on their part. However, I must say, they did justice to the bravery of our troops, as well as to the skill of our commander-in-chief.

Junot's second aid-de-camp, near whom I was seated at dinner, surprised me much by the light and disrespectful manner with which he spoke of the military talents of his general, who, he said, was a *bon officier de cavalerie, mais rien d'autre*. I was equally amazed at finding that this man, as well as most of the officers who composed Junot's staff, and those of the other French generals, were men of a certain age, much past the flower of youth. My friend, of whom I am about to speak, served in the French army twenty-seven years, and had been at the siege of Gibraltar, where he was wounded. He had the rank of colonel *d'artillerie*, as well as that of the duke d'Abrantes' second aid-de-camp. He acknowledged to me that the fire on the 21st in *parti* was very *v'arm*.

The whole ceremony of this dinner greatly amused me; it consisted chiefly of Junot's family, which amounted to near sixty persons, with the addition of ten English guests. The greater part of the Frenchmen who assisted at this dinner, were anxious to shew us every mark of civility;

but the manners of some did not correspond with their rank. There were among them one or two young men, who had been emigrants, and possessed altogether engaging manners.

The dress and costume of the persons who formed Junot's staff partook more of the appearance of performers on the stage than of soldiers. Many of them were covered with orders of the first and second classes, fastened on fine tinselled coats, of all colours. After dinner, Loisson and Laborde came to pay Junot a visit.

Loisson bears the most horrid character for rapacity, and all kinds of inhuman barbarity; Laborde also is not devoid of a taste for plunder, though he is less inclined that way than Loisson.

I understand, from a very intelligent French emigrant, who resides here as a merchant, that nothing could exceed the jealousy and hatred which existed between the different French general officers, especially Junot and Laborde, which is easily accounted for. Laborde was lieutenant-colonel of the regiment in which Junot served as serjeant, at the commencement of the revolution.

Buonaparte, during his first campaign in Italy, took Junot, at the recommendation of his lieutenant-colonel, to be his secretary, in consequence of the goodness of his hand-writing.

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Previously to sir Arthur Wellesley's quitting Portugal, the following complimentary occurrence took place between that commander and the troops who had so successfully served under him.

Camp at St. Antonio de Tugal, Sept. 6, 1808.

Sir,

The commanding officers of corps, and field officers, who have had the honour of serving in the army under your command, anxiously desirous of expressing the high opinion they entertain of the order, activity, and judgement, with which the whole of that force was so ably and successfully directed, from the time of landing, to the termination of your command in the action of Vimiera, request you will accept from them a piece of plate, as a testimony of that sincere esteem and respect with which your talents and conduct have so justly inspired.

W. W. Blake, major 20th light dragoons.

Wm Robe, lieutenant-colonel commanding royal artillery.

James Viney, major royal artillery.

H. Elphinston, captain commanding royal engineers.

Edward Capson, major 5th regiment, and lieut.-col.

Thomas Eames, major 5th regiment.

Henry Bird, captain 5th regiment, and major.

Thomas Curun, major 6th regiment.

Arthur Miller, major 6th regiment.

J. Cameron, lieut.-colonel commanding 1st battalion
9th foot.

H. Craufurd, major 1st battalion 9th foot, and lieut.-
colonel.

D. White, major 29th regiment foot, and lieut.-
colonel.

G. Way, major 29th regiment.

Thomas Egerton, captain 29th regiment, and major
Andrew Creugh, captain 29th regiment, and major..

Samuel Hinde, lieut.-colonel commanding 32d regi-
ment.

H. Johnson, major 32d regiment.

John Wood, major 32d regiment.

Robert Coote, captain 32d regiment, and major.

Robert Burne, colonel commanding 36th regiment.

Lewis Davis, major 36th regiment.

J. Grevell, lieutenant-colonel commanding 38th re-
giment.

J. W. Deane, major 38th regiment, and lieutenant-
colonel.

E. Miles, major 38th regiment.

David Ross, captain 38th regiment, and major.

James Kemmis, lieutenant-colonel commanding 40th
regiment, and colonel.

Henry Thornton, major 40th regiment.

Richard Archdull, major 40th ditto.

Edward Hull, major 2d battalion 43d.

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- Daniel Heane, major 43d.
- William Greard, lieutenant-colonel commanding 45th regiment.
- Andrew Pattan, major 45th regiment.
- William Gwynn, major 45th regiment.
- D. Leckey, brevet-major 45th regiment.
- A. Coghlan, ditto ditto.
- G. J. Walker, colonel commanding 50th regiment.
- J. Ross, lieutenant-colonel 2d battalion 52d regiment.
- H. Redwood, major 52d regiment.
- W. G. Davy, major 5th battalion 60th regiment.
- W. Woodgate, ditto ditto.
- John Galle, brevet-major 60th regiment.
- D. Pack, lieutenant-colonel commanding 71st regiment.
- D. Campbell, major 71st regiment.
- Harry Eyre, major commanding 82d regiment.
- Chichester M'Donall, major 82d regiment.
- J. Robinson, lieutenant-colonel commanding 91st regiment.
- J. Douglas, major 91st regiment.
- B. H. Otley, major 91st regiment, and lieutenant-colonel.
- D. M'Donnell, captain 91st regiment, and major.
- Robert Travers, major commanding 95th regiment.

Staff.

Henry Torrens, lieutenant-colonel and military secretary.

George Tucker, lieutenant and deputy-adjutant-general.

Thomas Arbuthnot, major and deputy-assistant do.

Andrew Pattan, ditto ditto ditto.

William Gunn, ditto ditto ditto.

D. Leeky, ditto ditto ditto.

A. Coghlan, ditto ditto ditto.

James Bathurst, lieutenant-colonel and deputy-quarter-master-general.

J. Rainy, assistant-deputy-quarter-master-general.

To which, by their particular request, are added the names of lieutenant-colonel Walsh, and the field-officers of the 2d battalion of the 9th regiment, which arrived previous to the 12st of August and served in that action.

To the right honourable lieut.-gen. sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B.

&c. &c. &c.

Camp at St. Anna, near Lisbon, Sept. 18., 1808.

Sir,

It has happily fallen to my lot, as the oldest field-officer in your army, to have the honour of presenting the enclosed address, from the commanding officers of corps, and field-officers serving in it: we have but one sentiment on the occasion,

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admiration of your talents and confidence in your abilities.

JAMES KEMMIS, lieut.-col. 40th, and colonel.

To the right honourable sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B.

&c. &c. &c.

Sir,

Sept. 18, 1808.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of this day's date, in which you have transmitted an address from the officers commanding corps, and the field-officers who served under my command in the late operations in Portugal.

I have had more than one occasion of expressing the satisfaction which I had derived, from the state of discipline and order in which the several corps were kept throughout the service in which we were employed; and my sense of the assistance which I had derived from the officers belonging to the different departments of the army. These advantages rendered our operations easy and certain; and we were enabled to meet the enemy on fair terms in the field of battle.

I beg you to convey to the field-officers of the army, the assurance, that I shall not lose the recollection of their services; that I am fully sensible of their kindness towards me; and that I value highly their good opinion.

I have the honour to be, sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel Kemmis, 40th Regiment.

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Delivery of
arms, &c. to the
Spanish troops
on their release.

The present chapter cannot be better concluded than with the following glorious result of the evacuation of Portugal to the Spanish army.

On the 16th of September, his excellency general Gregory Lagune, chief of the état-major in the army of Estremadura, accompanied by colonels Frederic Moretti and Fernando Solis, as aid-de-camp and secretary, arrived in Lisbon in order to congratulate the governors of Portugal, and their excellencies sir Hew Dalrymple, commander-in-chief of the British army, and admiral sir Charles Cotton, on the victories gained over the common enemy, the happy result of which is already experienced in that kingdom; and at the same time to take the command of the Spanish troops who still remained on board of Portuguese ships in the Tagus, according to one of the articles of the capitulation between the British commander-in-chief and general Junot.

The 22d was the day fixed for the delivery of the arms, horses, and artillery, to the Spanish troops, in order that it might be performed with all the magnificence which such a solemn act required.

At ten o'clock in the morning, a piquet of English troops was posted in Campo Pequeno, opposite the palace of his excellency D. John d'Almeida; at a little distance from those troops was a tent, in

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which were the standards of the regiments of cavalry of Alcantara and of Santiago, which had remained in the possession of their respective colonels, in proof that the French never dared to make the Spanish troops prisoners in Portugal, being solely prevented from fear of their valour and bravery. In the centre of this camp were eight pieces of cannon, with their carriages and horses, under the orders of colonel Martino Logono; the muskets with which 3,600 Spaniards (the remains of 5,800, who were disarmed on the 11th of June; the others had not only fled from prison, but the greater part of them had fought at the battle of Evora, on the 29th of July) were to be armed, lay on the right and left of the camp.

At 11 o'clock, the 1st and 2d division of the provincial grenadiers of Castile, and the soldiers of the regiments of Murcia, entered the camp; the infantry of the line, regiments of Tarragona and Valencia, (light troops,) and of Alcantara and Santiago, (cavalry of the line,) marched in half companies, with their respective officers, the grenadiers forming a division to the right and left of the British troops, leaving the Murcians in the centre; the Tarragonese and Valencians on their right and left, and those of Alcantara and Santiago to the right and left of them. Thus formed, the Spaniards hoisted

their colours on the right of the encampment, the English on the left, and the Portuguese in front; while two English bands of music, placed in the vacant space between the British troops and the camp, played the national air of "God save the King."

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At one o'clock, their excellencies general Lagune and W. C. Beresford, accompanied with a great number of English and Portuguese officers, arrived in the field. At the tent, colonel Moretti, on the part of the army, presented a sword to general Beresford, who delivered it to general Lagune, with the following address in Spanish:

"Seignor general, the scene which this day affords excites in me the most lively pleasure; and, in restoring to these brave soldiers their arms, I have the honour of presenting to your excellency this sword, to be delivered to its owner; placing it in the hand of a Spaniard is giving it to a man of valour, with the assurance that he will use it in the cause of glory and honour. Take it seignor general, and with these brave troops to whom I am now going to restore their arms, of which they were deceitfully deprived by a treacherous enemy, who dared not to seize them openly; go avenge them, and also your country, which the same enemy has treated with a perfidy never before experienced by any people. In the mean time, seignor general,

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go, conduct these troops that they may pursue the gallant actions which your heroic nation has already performed, as they have finally to accomplish the desires of the English people,—of seeing Spain free, it being now our sole wish that the Spanish and English nations may always live united and allied.”

To these observations general Lagune replied :

“ General, it gives me the greatest satisfaction to receive, at the hands of your excellency, the arms of which the Spanish nation were stripped by the deepest perfidy and cunning ; and in the name of my sovereign lord ; don Ferdinand VII. (whom God preserve !) I return you my most grateful thanks.

“ The cause which unites and impels us is a secure pledge of the noble sentiments which animate the two nations, and ought to assure your excellency, that the general wish of my countrymen is solely directed to the total destruction of the common enemy. May the Almighty grant that a durable peace may be the fruit of our labours, and concede to us the happiness that the defenders of their country and their families may enjoy.”

Turning to the brigadier, don Romo y Gamboa, he delivered him his sword, with some observations suitable to the occasion. This commander, seizing it, swore to conquer or die for Ferdinand VII. for his religion, and his country. The drums then beat,

and all the officers and chiefs assembled, when he thus addressed them :

“ Friends and unfortunate companions in arms ! our infamous imprisonment has ceased ; we can now hasten to the defence of our country. Our beloved Ferdinand VII. is proclaimed king of Spain and the Indies by common consent, although he remains in France, his joyful subjects have sworn to die or conquer in defence of so just a cause.— Let us then arm our soldiers, and let it always be our object to defend our king, our religion, and our country, incessantly repeating *Viva Ferdinando VII. vencer o morir !*”

The chiefs and officers, putting their right hands on the hilt of their swords, swore never to repose till they had seen their beloved Ferdinando VII. re-established on his throne ; returning to their posts, they delivered the arms to their respective companies.

The most excellent marquis of Castel dos Rios, brigadier in the royal army, and colonel of the regiment of cavalry of Santiago, with a proper guard of that regiment and that of Alcantara, presented to general Lagune the standards of these two regiments, saying

“ My general, the fortunate moment has arrived of returning to these regiments the arms of which they were robbed by the most subtle enemy. I

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have the honour to present to your excellency the standards which we have preserved as a sacred deposit, in order that they may be worthy of being placed in our squadrons, waving over our ranks.— Let us then all hasten to conquer or die for our august sovereign, Ferdinand VIII, our religion, and our country!”

General Lagune returned him thanks in the name of the king, and, ordering the troops to be presented with their arms, returned the standards with the usual ceremony to their respective regiments, addressing them in the following terms:

“I restore you your standards, which you have preserved as a deposit, that they may be placed in their respective squadrons, which in all times have defended them so nobly. Instigated by the valour of our arms, let us fly to glory, and participate in the bravery which our valiant soldiers have gained every time they were conducted to the field of honour!”

A general roll then called the attention of the troops, and brigadier Romo y Gamboa, in a distinct and elevated voice, spoke as follows:

“Spaniards! the Almighty has deigned to hearken to our calls; we are now free and armed. Our brave compatriots have fought with the greatest success for their religion, their king, and their country. Let us fly to unite with them, that we may

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
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be able to share in the honours with which they are so justly crowned. Soldiers! let us hasten to solicit that we may be placed in the most important and perilous station, to shed the last drop of our blood in the most sacred, most just, and most honourable cause in the world. For Ferdinand VII. to conquer or die is the oath, the wish of the Spaniards, and of the whole nation. Let us repeat then, with the most noble enthusiasm, Long live Ferdinand VII. long live Spain! long live our friend and ally, Great Britain! long live Portugal!"

At this discourse, not only the troops but the innumerable concourse of spectators, joined in repeated vivas, which were followed by a royal salute of artillery. This act of affectionate loyalty in the Spaniards, and the general rejoicing, made almost all the spectators shed tears; but tears very different from those which they had lately shed in abundance.

The troops then filed off before the generals, in the midst of the most lively applause of the spectators; when they had entered, the two generals, with a numerous company of officers, went to the palace of his excellency, don John d'Almeida, where they were received by a brilliant company of the most distinguished persons of both sexes, doing the honours of the house of the most excellent marquis of Castel dos Rios, and seignor D. Lugo, consul-

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general of his catholic majesty in Lisbon. A splendid repast was instantly served to 200 persons, being almost double the number of those who were present on foot; and such joy prevailed as could only flow from hearts full of content, admiring the fraternity of the three nations, whose representatives reciprocally drank to their respective sovereigns and to the happy issue of the good cause.

The magnificent bands of English musicians contributed during the continuance of the repast to enliven the feast; and the poor of Lisbon experienced the effects of Spanish generosity in the alms which general Lagune caused to be distributed among them. The 22d of September therefore will be memorable in Portugal; the spectacle which that day afforded could alone alleviate the miseries which the inhabitants of Lisbon experienced from the 11th of June, when the Spanish troops were disarmed and imprisoned with so much perfidy and vile artifice, evincing the most horrid and unparalleled conduct in the common enemy.

CHAP. IV.

THE NEGOTIATION AND EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

Military Diplomacy.—Objects to be primarily regarded in the Convention.—Their Mode of Treatment.—Opinions of the different Officers in Command.—Various Subjects of Discussion.—Finesse and Cupidity of some of the French Officers.—Embarkation of the French Army and its Followers.

THE promptitude of conception, both general and particular, which forms the coup-d'œil of the general, upon which depends his success in the field, is no less necessary on all occasions of military diplomacy whatever their nature or interest. Without the facilities of negotiation afforded by the splendid intercourse of a cabinet, objects are to be discussed and settled with rapidity which may affect

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Observations of
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sidered.

the fate of nations more powerfully than the most important of civil treaties. There can, however, be none of the intricacies of civil diplomacy in a military treaty, since the coup-d'œil by which a general perceives the relative situation of contending armies, at the same time enables him to comprehend at once the mutual basis of any negotiation.

There is one particular in which a very distinct difference is always to be recognized between the conduct of civil treaties and the rapid operations of civil diplomacy, viz. that the *fortiter in re* must precede the *suaviter in modo*; that although the blandishments of politeness, as well as its ordinary offices, may be entertained, yet, in the most civilized warfare, a *menacing front* is never to be neglected, lest an enemy who has been vanquished in the field may refresh his withering laurels in the cabinet.

War, however civilized and generous, is obviously not a state in which the tender affections can be distinguishingly employed. An enemy is to be conquered in the cabinet as well as in the field; and although there may doubtless be many instances in which it will be *equally* expedient for an enemy to solicit, and for a general to grant, terms of capitulation, evacuation, &c.* by which contend-

(* The Spartan generals were permitted to sacrifice a cock on obtaining a victory by their arms; but on any successful *treaty*.

ing armies are entirely separated. yet the very act of requiring it subjects the army on whose part it is required, to that which either does not feel it necessary, or does not chuse to require it.

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For what may be termed the civil heroism of war, but few, and those critical, occasions offer. Human nature, however modified, is still the same, under all circumstances and in all situations; the principles derived from a knowledge of it will therefore apply upon all occasions. The *nosce teipsum* is, perhaps, the best axiom in military as well as civil diplomacy, and this self-knowledge will generally yield that of the opponent: it may be called the geometry of negotiation. For the rest, the same just grounds on which stratagem is warrantable and laudable in the operations of arms, justify also the use of policy and address (*dolus bonus*) in military negotiation. *Non ausis aciem hostibus vel si ex occulto agmen carpere tantarent, punito dolo.** This is not, however, on any occasion to be understood as descending to mere trick or quibble,† (*dolus malus*) that

their oblation was an ox: so much, says Plutarch, did they prefer the achievements of counsels to those of strength. See also Frontinus, as quoted, p. 185, &c. on the principle of suffering a powerful enemy to retreat whom despair might reinforce.

* Tacitus Annal. l. xii. c. 32.

† As when Cleomines, having agreed for a suspension of arms for seven days, surprised the enemy, who confided in the truce, on

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miserable effort of weak and corrupt minds, by which in vain they attempt to supply the place of judgement and ability.

It seems principally to be regarded in the diction of all articles negotiated between two commanders, that a perspicuous simplicity be adopted, all prolixity avoided, and that no doubtful expression be admitted from its comprehensiveness; and that if possible any thing in the shape of a secret article, or private understanding on matters deemed points of delicacy on either side, be entirely avoided. Two brave and sensible men, commanding powerful armies opposed to each other, in any intercourse, particularly of a diplomatic nature, cannot be too distinct and unequivocal, for the sake of their own character and that of their troops, as well as of those who originally directed the formation of their armies.

The pertinacious adherence to some trifling object, couched in circumlocutory pomp of expression, for the purpose of diverting attention from others of particular importance, hardly noticed, would thus in course be avoided.

And the earlier the negotiators reciprocally convinced each other that unnecessary delay or occu-

the third *night* and defeated him, saying, he had agreed for days, but not for nights, &c.

pation about trifles would not be admitted, the less would be to be undone in their labours.

Whatever the state of either army, means should be used to obtain a few minutes of calm deliberation for any treaty. And all hospitalities not momentarily necessary should be avoided.

Of all ordinary eloquence, a very small part consists of argument; any of its pomp or formality can therefore answer no purpose of military diplomacy. An even tenor of conduct and expression to prevent the disclosure of hopes or fears, is the best. Exclusive of this, the more ingenuousness practised on either side the better. The powers of a military diplomatist are very confined: he must be intensely cautious not to exceed his own powers, or compromise the rights or dignities of his government, nor to admit in any way of the excuses in this respect of others.

A truce, or cessation of arms, defined, is a solemn agreement, whereby, the war still continuing, all acts of hostility are for a while suspended. It is mutually granted for various purposes, its ground only appearing upon the instrument, or at most, the articles forming the basis of a future treaty; but these should necessarily be confined as much as possible.

Previously to granting or soliciting it, the object should be well considered, and more particularly the former. Its results and its relations, and the

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powers to be consulted, are objects of the most important contemplation.

Hostages in all cases of importance between different states are usually given by either party or by both, as a security for the performance of the articles; but this, it would appear, could be rarely done by the mere commanders of armies. The hostages may, by the law of nations, certainly be rendered amenable for any non-performance of a treaty.

Some such particulars were necessary to precede the consideration of a negotiation which has roused the passions and the discussion of the British people in every way, in a greater degree than any of the numerous military transactions that have excited discontent in the late and present wars.

In the greater part of the discussions on this subject, a principal cause is entirely neglected, this is the unfavourable circumstances, of various kinds, under which the campaign, attempted to be described in the last chapter, was commenced, prosecuted, *and arrested*, by the several officers who successively assumed the command.

Of these, the very great degree of uncertainty under which the troops arrived on the coast will be already perceived in the various communications with every part of it, from the south of Spain along

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the shores of Portugal to the Asturias; and the successions of commanders-in-chief, however unfavourable to the campaign, was certainly not an object in itself to excite the censure of a rational people. To the command-in-chief of a great army on so important an expedition, the responsibility of rank and experience was undoubtedly necessary. Distinguished as had been the talents of sir Arthur Wellesley as a general officer, he was yet but young in European service; and genius, however exalted, without experience is not safely trusted to its boundless career. The ardent spirit and high talents of sir Arthur Wellesley were therefore in the first instance to be employed with particular distinction under superiors of such rank and experience as should justify restraint. Sir Hew Dalrymple, holding an important post on the spot, whence he had communicated with the people whose alliance was to be conciliated, and whose country was to become the seat of war, was therefore by no means to be deemed improperly appointed to the chief command, however ill adapted he might afterwards prove himself, from the extension to this active service of that austerity of disposition which he had exercised with less disadvantage in a quiet command. The confidence reposed in sir Harry Burrard, naturally pointed him out to assist in the doubtful war.

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That, having commenced and prosecuted the short campaign so successfully, sir Arthur Wellesley should not have been permitted to conclude it, with the spirit which it had obtained, is much to be lamented; but the critical successions to command were results of accident which perhaps could not be avoided. The convention of Cintra was chiefly to be regretted as evincing almost a total want of conception in military diplomacy, and, from the first principle of his appointment and the circumstances of his succession to command, must necessarily fall with its whole weight upon sir Hew Dalrymple, however it might sully (as it certainly did) all who assisted, or witnessed it, in its fall.

The imposing manner in which general Kellermann approached the British line has been already described. In the familiar intercourse which afterwards took place between the officers of both armies, he described his previous sensations with great freedom. As he approached the British army, he said, his surprise was excited at meeting with no out-posts. When within a mile of the British head quarters, he stopped and reasoned with himself whether he should go back or forward, and decided on the latter, under the impression that the British army must be in a bad state.

He acknowledged that the out-posts which were placed were at sufficient distance to prevent the

army from being surprised; that, nevertheless, the want of those demonstrations of a regular army encouraged him in the proposition of terms which he should not otherwise have contemplated. Whatever occurred to him to propose however, he added, was liberally granted.

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It has also been already observed, that, on desiring to speak to sir Arthur Wellesley at the out-posts, sir Hew Dalrymple determined on seeing him himself* at sir Arthur's quarters. Here general Kellermann wrote down in French, which does not appear to have been even translated into English, (though certainly necessary to a mutual understanding, and the work only of a few minutes,) articles to form the basis of a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army. In the brief consideration of these articles, the hospitalities of dinner intervened; sir Harry Burrard was abstracted in the preparation of despatches for England; and sir Arthur Wellesley was occasionally absent; indeed, *his* attention could not be particularly given to them after the check he had received

Evidence on the
court of inquiry.
London Gazette,
Sept. 16, 1809.

* Yet after the celebrated affair of Moxen, in the seven years war, when "a Prussian general arrived at the most advanced piquet, and desired to speak to the commanding general of the Austrians, marshal Daun sent lieutenant-general count Lascy to him with directions to enter into no other conditions, &c. TIELKE's *Account of Remarkable Events*, &c. vol. ii. 40.

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in sir Hew Dalrymple's abrupt decision to receive general Kellerman himself.

These were circumstances undoubtedly favourable to the French general, and he did not fail to use them. There were, it appears, some discussions on the articles inserted in the instrument of the armistice; but if any thing more favourable to the French army or its cause were proposed, there can be no hesitation in declaring that, upon every principle of military or civil diplomacy, all farther communication with regard to it ought to have been stayed; and for an insult so palpable to the British army, certainly yet victorious, general Kellermann very promptly reconducted to his own camp!

The first five articles only, by an accident of the press, are translated in the preceding chapter, but this is of less importance, since the chief of the remaining articles were either such as did not come within the powers of the negotiators, or what they were themselves unable to perform. And, indeed, the original French document is the only one which can perhaps, under all its circumstances, be duly recognized.

Without the smallest recurrence to ex-post facto reasoning, which must ever be unworthy, a British general would naturally, and in accordance even with the few principles which have been laid down in these pages, look with particular military supe-

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priority on the enemy, who after *scarcely a week's conflict*, notwithstanding their possession of the capital (that most important of all considerations, particularly in Portugal) should sue for permission to evacuate the country!

The first question arises from their inducement; and it must be from an absolute untenability of their post, or a very prevailing interest in being enabled to quit it with impunity. In either case the enemy is suppliant, and therefore, by the laws of war and also that of nations, amenable.

This brings us to the consideration of the articles themselves, a contemplation extremely simple, and one in which it only excites surprise that they should have given rise to so much discussion; though this perhaps, as well as all the other errors of the campaign, is attributable to the nature and circumstances of a service, which may, notwithstanding its outset, hereafter unequivocally boast of preserving the liberties of mankind.

As to the preamble title of the instrument, and the first article, it is really difficult to speak, since they assume a civil and political power which has never yet been admitted by the British government, or of course its armies, to exist—that of recognizing a sovereign power in France under the title

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of “ *His imperial and royal Majesty, NAPOLEON THE FIRST;*” and also a delegation of that regal power in the character of “ *Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour, Commander of the Order of the Iron Crown, and Grand Cross of the Order of the Lion of Bavaria.*”

The introduction to the treaty of these powers was perfectly natural and proper, on the part of general Kellermann, if commissioned to prepare the form of the instrument, and they might not immediately strike the British commanders as important, but they are obviously points stolen into the negotiation, and such therefore as to excite vigilance in the progress of the treaty.

The second article, no doubt from the ignorance of the French general of the distinctions of rank and power in our forces, includes, without his knowledge, an authority, that of the British admiral (commandant-en-chef la flotte Britannique à l'entrée du Tage) which it was unlawful to be thus compromised according to the British military institutes; and the third most extraordinarily includes, without any previous permission or even communication, the army of a foreign power, and that power the country in which the treaty was made, contrary to the laws of all the nations in the world.

The operations of these armies, hitherto entirely

successful, and so admitted by the enemy, being suspended, the purpose then is naturally to be inquired.

Does the French army desire to evacuate with resources? their nature is to be considered. It cannot prolong the war with ultimate promise of success, or the proposition to evacuate could not be made. The Spanish successes on the south of Portugal, and the untouched Spanish army on its eastern frontier, exclusive of the opposing force, render retreat impossible, and extended hostilities only injurious to the French army, which cannot be reinforced. Reinforcements of the British army also are in the offing, and a British fleet at the mouth of the Tagus, which precludes the possibility of any transmission by sea.

Does the French army wish merely to retire from a country which it has unsuccessfully invaded, committed every violation in plundering, and from which it cannot escape? to prevent the enormities of desperation it may be lawfully permitted, and perhaps even with the brief and barren honours of war,—but no more. To an army which cannot use them, arms and ammunition are not necessary. In an army which *cannot hold it*, plunder is not vested, to say nothing of its not being in this instance even obtained from success in war. The means of transport and mere baggage may be allowed.

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The object then, for which a suspension of arms is proposed in the 5th article, is, if not the reverse of every principle of military negotiation, at least a gross insult to the British arms, demanding to be repelled. The French army not to be "*in any way* considered prisoners of war, but to be transported to France, and have *arms* as well as baggage;" are the claims of an army at least in a respectable position, and of respectable deserts; not of one shut up in the streets and suburbs of Lisbon, with two or three solitary out-posts, after a single week's advance against the British army, receding and proposing an entire abandonment of its object! trusting alone to military diplomatic-skill for its fortunes!*

Here was no Saragossa demanding, from its untamed spirit and bleeding sacrifices, a generous consideration even from men grown savage in the wildering enormities of continuous war.†

* It is not to be pretended that Lisbon, and even the out-posts, might not be defended, since Dumourier has long since shewn the contrary; nor that Alentejo might not have led the British army into various troubles; but that all this must obviously have borne hard upon, and ultimately destroyed, the object and power of the French army is certain. How would the *property, of which disposal was deemed necessary in Lisbon*, have been preserved on a movement beyond the Tagus?

† See the account of the 2d capitulation, by don P. M. Rie, (transl.) p. 20. Yet even here, when the president of the junta

Nor was there here applying a hero of Augusta, disdaining till the *very* last effort the acceptance of any form of capitulation, however honourable, from an irregular enemy.*

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proposed to marshal Lannes, in regard to the necessities of agriculture, that the peasants who had been *compelled* to form temporary corps should not be deemed prisoners of war, the French general "flung the paper into the fire!" p. 24, &c.

* In the campaign of 1781, the American troops having invested Fort Cornwallis, the defence of Augusta, a town, then capital of the state of Georgia, lieutenant-colonel Brown, who commanded the king's troops and allies in garrison there, repelled every offer of a capitulation from general Pickens till the last extremity, though the strength of the investing forces, the progress of the works, and the unequal situation of the contending armies, were clearly shewn to him. His whole answer was as follows:

"Gentlemen,

"What progress you have made in your works, I am no stranger to. It is my duty and inclination to defend this place till the last extremity.

"I have the honour, &c."

When after resisting the most generous overtures, and creating a delay highly serviceable to his cause, employed troops which would otherwise have joined general Green, at a more favourable juncture against lord Rawdon, he was at length compelled to surrender the place, he was treated with the utmost attention. The sixth article of the capitulation ran thus,

"ART. VI. The garrison at an hour appointed shall march out, with shouldered arms and drums beating, to a place to be agreed on, where they will pile their arms.

"ANSWER.—Agreed. The *judicious* and gallant defence made by the garrison entitles them to every mark of military respect, &c." Remembrancer, 289. *Annual Reg.* 1781, &c.

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Nor was it a Boufflers at Lisle opposed to a Eugene.*

It was an established force possessing the capital and all the resources of a country submitting, after a *week's* opposition, to an army under circumstances of the most untoward nature.

* After possessing himself of the city, and closely investing the citadel, being in possession of the first covered way, "I wrote as follows," says prince Eugene, "to the brave Boufflers; The French army, M. le Marechal, has retired toward Tournay, the elector of Bavaria to Namur, and the princes to their courts.—Spare yourself and your brave garrison; I will again sign whatever you please." His answer was, "There is yet no occasion to be in a hurry; permit me to defend myself as long as I can.—I have still enough left to do to render myself more worthy of the esteem of the man whom I respect above all others." I gave orders for the assault of the second covered way. The king of France apparently anticipated this, for he wrote to the marshal to surrender. Notwithstanding his repugnance to such a step, he was on the point of obeying, when, in a note which the duke of Burgundy had subjoined to the king's letter, he read, "I know from a certain quarter that they want to make you a prisoner of war." I know not where he picked up this information; but that prince, respectable as he was in peace, could neither say nor do any but foolish things in war. This note, however, produced some impression for a moment. Generals, soldiers, and all, swore rather to perish in the breach. Boufflers wept for joy, as I have been told; and, when on the point of embracing this alternative, he recollected my note, which got the better of the duke of Burgundy's; and after the trenches had been opened four months before the city and citadel, he sent me, on the 8th of December, all the articles that he wished me to sign, which I did without any restriction.—*Memoirs of Eugene*, by himself, &c. 127.

What more could a *triumphant* power have obtained? What more could have been asked, if the British commanders, instead of thus patiently and liberally sustaining the efforts and results of French military diplomacy, had proposed to the French army to resign the scene of conflict?

By the sixth article, the very laws and police of the Portuguese are destroyed, and by the seventh, more particularly, in a declaration of the naval neutrality of Lisbon.

The eighth article is only an extension of the principle of the others, when, through the want of consideration in one commander, the abstracted attention of another, and the disinclination and superseded power of a third, to say nothing of general Ferguson and others, having succeeded in every thing, the negotiant amused himself with the experiment of additionally reversing in detail every ordinary capitulation, by even insuring the *farther* transportation,—(besides that of a well-appointed army with its defenceless plunder, proposing after a poor week's desultory conflict to give way,)—of all the useful artillery and the cavalry horses, lest, forsooth, the French army might be in the smallest iota delayed in completing with due pomp and decorum the parade-change from front to rear!

But the most singular article is certainly the fifth, which secures to every individual of the army his

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private property, as if a soldier on service could be supposed to transport with him a real and personal estate; the army had however extorted both from the country which it had invaded: and plunder and settlement, it will be said, were granted by the Romans; but the Romans maintained their conquests, and did not extend them over *civilized* nations that did not offend. And certainly no law nor principle can give to an invading army a right to that which, even by the laws of force, it cannot make its own.

Nothing can more strongly delineate the character of this negotiation, after what has been pointed out, than the extraordinary embarrassment of its completion.

Sir Hew Dalrymple, who would not permit, to his own exclusion, the third in command to meet general Kellermann at the out-posts, now proposed to sign the brief instrument merely for a suspension of arms, with even a general of division of the enemy! But general Kellermann, as a *man of business* in these matters, submitted, the irregularity of the commander-in-chief of the British army, whose tenacity of rank and power in an imaginary case had been so prominent, condescending to place himself on an equality with (as doubtless without the smallest humiliation he conceived himself in this matter,) a mere emissary of the French army. Sir Arthur

Wellesley, therefore, was desired to sign it, and did so, declaring it, at the same time, an extraordinary paper; and in whatever form, or under whatever circumstances, this duty was executed, the officer so executing it could not possibly in any way incur the smallest degree of real responsibility.

On this unhappy basis, however, (and whoever was to blame,) was formed the definitive treaty, or convention, of the thirtieth of August.

This instrument succeeds the former one in the preceding chapter,* and will, on reference, be found not only to servilely copy its basis, but to extend its objects by increase and division of articles with the most obscure arrangement. In vain, if the simple delivery of the places undestroyed be excepted, does one look for a single advantage on the part of Great Britain or its allies; but not only is the French army, and its artillery and horses and tumbrils to be conveyed by the English government to France, but the tumbrils are to be, at the same time, “supplied with sixty rounds per gun.”† A compliment of this kind may be necessary or expedient; but whence, in the present instance, can *this* necessity or expediency be derived?

Not only all property of the army, but private

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* Page 194.

† Page 196.

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property of individuals of the army is considered necessary to be rendered every way sacred: whence is derived the private property of an army on service?

All doubts to be explained favourably to the FRENCH army!

And also the entire privilege of every *follower* of the French army, whose civil capacity enabled him to claim this concession, with a *sale* of the magazines, &c.

Comparison of
the articles for
the convention
of Cintra with
those of marquis
Cornwallis for
the capitulation
of York town
and Gloucester
in America.

There is a document of which the introduction here may be forgiven, where the circumstances of this case were entirely reversed, which will tend powerfully to shew the manner in which this instrument must be regarded by the very persons in whose favour, even according to the 14th article, should doubts arise as to the meaning of any article, it was to be explained.

This is the report of earl Cornwallis on capitulating the garrisons of York and Gloucester in the American campaign of 1781, which went far towards deciding a conflict the most ungracious and disastrous in which the British arms were ever engaged.

What renders more interesting the application of this instrument to the present convention is the close similarity in many respects of the most prominent articles, and the situations of the same ene-

mies; and the very opposite decisions which took place on the same points in similar instances.

After detailing the circumstances in a narrative, the following papers, in regular succession, are communicated by lord Cornwallis.*

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“ Sir,

“ I propose a cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours, and that two officers may be appointed by each side, to meet at Mr. Moore’s house, to settle terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester.

Earl Cornwallis
to general
Washington,
Oct. 17, 1781.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ CORNWALLIS.”

“ My lord,

“ I have had the honour of receiving your lordship’s letter of this date.

General Wash-
ington to earl
Cornwallis,
Oct. 17, 1781.

“ An ardent desire to save the effusion of human blood will readily incline me to listen to such terms, for the surrender of your posts and garrisons at York and Gloucester, as are admissible.

“ I wish, previous to the meeting of the commissioners, that *your lordship’s proposals, in writing, may be sent* to the American lines; for which pur-

* Tarleton’s (General) History of Campaigns in the southern Provinces of North America, (Note X.) p. 433, &c.

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purpose, a suspension of hostilities during *two hours* from the delivery of this letter will be granted.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ G. WASHINGTON.”

“ Sir,

Earl Cornwallis
to general
Washington,
Oct. 17, 1781,
half past 4, p.m.

“ I have this moment been honoured with your excellency's letter, dated this day.

“ The time limited for sending my answer will not admit of entering into the detail of articles ; but the basis of my proposals will be, that the garrisons of York and Gloucester shall be prisoners of war, with the customary honours ; and, for the conveniency of the individuals which I have the honour to command, that *the British shall be sent to Britain, and the Germans to Germany, under engagement not to serve against France, America, or their allies*, until released, or regularly exchanged : that *all arms and public stores shall be delivered up to you ; but that the usual indulgence of side-arms to officers, and of retaining private property, shall be granted to officers and soldiers : and that the interest of several individuals, in civil capacities and connected with us, shall be attended to.*

“ If your excellency thinks that a continuance of the suspension of hostilities will be necessary to

transmit your answer, I shall have no objection to the hour that you may propose.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ CORNWALLIS.”

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“ My lord,

“ To avoid unnecessary discussions and delays, I shall at once, in answer to your lordship's letter of yesterday, declare the general basis upon which a definitive treaty of capitulation may take place.

General Wash-
ington to earl
Cornwallis,
Oct. 18, 1781.

“ The garrisons of York and Gloucester, including the seamen, as you propose, shall be received prisoners of war. The condition annexed, of sending the British and German troops to the parts of Europe to which they respectively belong, is *inadmissible*: instead of this, they will be marched to such parts of the country as can most conveniently provide for their subsistence; and the benevolent treatment of the prisoners, which is invariably observed by the Americans, will be extended to them. The same honours will be granted to the surrendering army as were granted to the garrison of Charles-town.

“ The shipping and boats in the two harbours, with all their guns, stores, tackling, furniture, and apparel, shall be delivered in their present state to

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an officer of the navy appointed to take possession of them.

“ The *artillery*, arms, accoutrements, military-chest, and public stores of every denomination, *shall be delivered, unimpaired*, to the heads of the departments to which they respectively belong.

“ The officers shall be indulged in retaining their side-arms; and the officers and soldiers may preserve their baggage and effects, with this reserve, that property taken in the country will be reclaimed.

“ With regard to the *individuals in civil capacities* whose interest your lordship wishes may be attended to, until they are more particularly described, *nothing definitive* can be settled.

“ I have to add, that I expect the sick and wounded will be supplied with their own hospital-stores, and be attended by British surgeons, particularly charged with the care of them.

“ Your lordship will be pleased to signify your determination, either to accept or reject the proposals now offered, in the course of two hours from the delivery of this letter, that commissioners may be appointed to digest the articles of capitulation, or a renewal of hostilities may take place.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ G. WASHINGTON.”

“ Sir,

“ I agree to open a treaty of capitulation upon the basis of the garrisons of York and Gloucester, including seamen, being prisoners of war, without annexing the condition of their being sent to Europe; but I expect to receive a compensation in the articles of capitulation for the surrender of Gloucester in its present state of defence.

“ I shall in particular desire, that the Bonetta sloop of war may be left entirely at my disposal, from the hour that the capitulation is signed, to receive an aid-de-camp to carry my despatches to sir Henry Clinton. Such soldiers as I may think proper to send as passengers in her, to be manned with fifty men of her own crew, and to be permitted to sail, without examination, when my despatches are ready; engaging, on my part, that the ship shall be brought back and delivered to you, if she escapes the dangers of the sea; that the crew and soldiers shall be accounted for in future exchanges; that she shall carry off no officer without your consent, *nor public property* of any kind; and I shall likewise desire, that the *traders and inhabitants* may *preserve their property*, and that *no person* may be punished or molested for having *joined the British* troops.

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Earl Cornwallis
to general
Washington,
Oct. 18, 1781.

“ If you chuse to proceed to negotiation on these grounds, I shall appoint two field-officers of my

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army to meet two officers from you, at any time and place that you think proper, to digest the articles of capitulation.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ CORNWALLIS.”

Copy of the Articles of Capitulation, settled between his Excellency General Washington, Commander-in-Chief of the combined Forces of America and France; his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau, Lieutenant-General of the Armies of the King of France, Great Cross of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis, commanding the auxiliary Troops of his most Christian Majesty in America; and his Excellency the Count de Grasse, Lieutenant-General of the Naval Armies of his most Christian Majesty, Commander of the Order of St. Louis, Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Army of France in the Chesapeake, on the one Part: and the Right honourable Earl Cornwallis, Lieutenant-General of his Britannic Majesty's Forces, commanding the Garrisons of York and Gloucester; and Thomas Symonds, Esquire, commanding his Britannic Majesty's Naval Forces in York-River, in Virginia, on the other Part.

Art. I. The garrisons of York and Gloucester, including the officers and seamen of his Britannic

majesty's ships, as well as other mariners, to surrender themselves prisoners of war to the combined forces of America and France. The land-troops to remain prisoners to the United States; the navy to the naval army of his most Christian majesty.

Granted.

Art. II. The *artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public stores* of every denomination, shall be *delivered unimpaired* to the heads of departments appointed to receive them.

Granted.

Art. III. At twelve o'clock this day the two redoubts on the left flank of York to be delivered; the one to a detachment of American infantry, the other to a detachment of French grenadiers.

Granted.

The garrison of York will march out to a place to be appointed in front of the posts at two o'clock precisely, with shouldered arms, colours cased, and drums beating a British or German march. They are then to ground their arms, and return to their encampments, where they will remain until they are despatched to the places of their destination. Two works on the Gloucester side will be delivered, at one o'clock, to a detachment of French and American troops appointed to possess them. The garrison will march out at three o'clock in the afternoon, the cavalry with their swords drawn, trum-

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pets sounding; and the infantry in the manner prescribed for the garrison of York. They are likewise to return to their encampments until they can be finally marched off.

Art. IV. Officers are to retain their side-arms. Both *officers and soldiers to keep their private property* of every kind, and no part of their baggage or papers to be at any time subject to search or inspection. The baggage and papers of officers and soldiers taken during the siege to be likewise preserved for them.

Granted.

It is understood that *any property, obviously belonging to the inhabitants of these states*, in the possession of the garrison, shall be *subject to be reclaimed*.

Art. V. The soldiers to be kept in Virginia, Maryland, or Pennsylvania, and as much by regiments as possible, and supplied with the same rations of provisions as are allowed to soldiers in the service of America. A field-officer from each nation, to wit, British, Anspach and Hessian, and other officers on parole, in the proportion of one to fifty men, to be allowed to reside near their respective regiments, to visit them frequently, and be witnesses of their treatment; and that their officers may receive and deliver clothing and other necessaries for them;

for which passports are to be granted when applied for.

Granted.

Art. VI. The general, staff, and other officers, not employed as mentioned in the above articles, and who chuse it, to be permitted to go on parole to Europe, to New York, or any other American maritime posts at present in the possession of the British forces, at their own option, and proper vessels to be granted by the count de Grasse to carry them under flags of truce to New York, within ten days from this date, if possible, and they to reside in a district to be agreed upon hereafter, until they embark.

The officers of the civil department of the army and navy to be included in this article. Passports to go by land to be granted to those to whom vessels cannot be furnished.

Granted.

Art. VII. Officers to be allowed to keep soldiers as servants, according to the common practice of the service. Servants, not soldiers, are not to be considered as prisoners, and are to be allowed to attend their masters.

Granted.

Art. VIII. The Bonetta sloop of war to be equipped and navigated by its present captain and crew,

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and left entirely at the disposal of lord Cornwallis from the hour that the capitulation is signed, to receive an aid-de-camp to carry despatches to sir Henry Clinton; and such soldiers as he may think proper to send to New York, to be permitted to sail without examination, when his despatches are ready. His lordship engages on his part, that the ship shall be delivered to the order of the count de Grasse, if she escapes the dangers of the sea; that she shall not carry off any public stores. Any part of the crew that may be deficient on her return, and the soldiers passengers, to be accounted for on her delivery.

Art. IX. The *traders* are to *preserve their property*, and to be allowed three months to dispose of or remove them; and those traders are *not* to be considered as prisoners of war.

The traders will be allowed to *dispose* of their effects, the allied army having the right of pre-emption. The traders *to be considered as prisoners of war* upon parole.

Art. X. Natives or inhabitants of different parts of this country, at present in York or Gloucester, are not to be punished on account of *having joined the British army*.

This article *cannot be assented to*, being *altogether of civil resort*.

Art. XI. Proper hospitals to be furnished for the sick and wounded. They are to be attended by their own surgeons on parole; and they are to be furnished with medicines and stores from the American hospitals.

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The hospital-stores now in York and Gloucester shall be delivered for the use of the British sick and wounded. Passports will be granted for procuring them further supplies from New York, as occasion may require; and proper hospitals will be furnished for the reception of the sick and wounded of the two garrisons.

Art. XII. Waggon to be furnished to carry the baggage of the officers attending the soldiers, and to surgeons when travelling on account of the sick, attending the hospitals at public expense.

They are to be furnished if possible.

Art. XIII. The shipping and boats in the two harbours, with all their stores, guns, tackling, and apparel, shall be delivered up in their present state to an officer of the navy appointed to take possession of them, previously unloading the private property, part of which had been on board for security during the siege.

Granted.

Art. XIV. No article of capitulation to be infringed on pretence of reprisals; and, if there be any doubtful expressions in it, they are to be inter-

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of Cintra.*preted according to the common meaning and acceptation of the words.*

Granted.

Done at York-town, in Virginia, October 19, 1781.

CORNWALLIS.

THOMAS SYMONDS.

Done in the trenches before York-town, in Virginia,
October 19, 1781.

G. WASHINGTON.

Le Comte de ROCHAMBEAU.

Le Comte de BARRAS, en mon
nom et celui du Comte de Grasse.

In comparing this treaty of capitulation with that which has already been given* in the last chapter, the circumstances and correspondence which preceded it, will be very striking; the prompt, perspicuous, and decisive, measures of the hostile general, and the liberal candour and ready perception of the commander-in-chief of the British army.

The first article of the present immediately opposes itself to the second of the capitulation of Cintra; as does the second to the fourth and fifth.—The fourth article of the former, however, is distinguishingly opposed to the fifth of the latter, as are articles nine and ten to the sixteenth and

* Page 195, &c.

seventeenth. The fourteenth article of either document no less strongly opposes each other.

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But indeed the whole of this treaty of lord Cornwallis applies in an extraordinary manner to that of the convention of Cintra throughout; and it having been deemed useful to introduce it at length, for the purpose of comparison in detail, it will be no less so to add to it the testimony of the British commander of its correct and elegant execution.

“The treatment,” says lord Cornwallis, in his despatch* containing the capitulation, “that we have received from the enemy, since our surrender, has been perfectly good and proper; but the kindness and attention that has been shewn to us by the French officers in particular, their delicate sensibility of our situation, has really gone beyond what I can possibly describe.”†

Far different indeed was that of the convention of Cintra, which began with the evils arising from neglect of the most obvious principles of military diplomacy, proceeded with the violation of military and even national faith, and ended in general recrimination.

Execution of
the convention
of Cintra.

* See general Tarleton's Campaigns of 1780 and 81, p.

† His lordship adds, by the way, what one would willingly conceive, as sanctioning the present circumstances, that he “hopes it will make an impression on the breast of every officer whenever the fortune of war should put any of them in their power.”

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Portuguese go-
vernment and
people, and its
results.

On the 22d of August, the articles for the suspension of hostilities *were signed* with the enemy against whom the army was sent to aid Portugal, and, *on the 23d only*, the officer holding the chief command in Portugal was made acquainted with what had been done, in the following letter:

Head-quarters, Ramalhãl, 23d of Aug. 1808.

Sir,

Sir Hew Dal-
rymple to
general Friere.

I have the honour to enclose, for your excellency's information, a copy of the suspension of arms agreed upon yesterday, and signed by sir Arthur Wellesley and general Kellermann.

It may be necessary to explain to your excellency that what is mentioned about the Portuguese army, relates to some corps in the part of the country mentioned in the article, but that the army serving under your excellency's immediate command, united with the British troops, is comprised under the same head with them.

(Signed)

H. W. DALRYMPLE.

His excellency general Friere,

§c. §c. §c.

To this, with a military delicacy which cannot be sufficiently praised, general Friere, on the following day, answered by first expressing his obedience, and next sending major Ayres Pinto, a confidential

officer, as his representative, with full powers to assist in the treaty about to be grounded on the armistice.

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Head-quarters at Lourinha, 24th Aug. 1808.

Most illustrious and excellent sir,

In conformity with the armistice stipulated between the English and the French armies, which your excellency communicated to me of yesterday's date, I have this * orders for the suspension of all movement of the troops of the army at Beira, who acted on the right bank of the Tagus, (or Tejo,) and who were encharged with the blockade of Almeida, and are to remain for the purpose of intercepting any communication which might lead to any other project; I trust my proceedings will be satisfactory to your excellency, and I have the honour, by this opportunity, to assure you of my being

General Friere
to sir Hew Dal-
rymple.

Your excellency's

Most attentive and obliged servant,

(Signed) BERNARDIN FRIERE DE ANDRADA.

His excellency-general Dalrymple.

Head-quarters at Lourinha, 24th Aug. 1808.

Most illustrious and excellent sir,

My duty requiring under the circumstances in which I find myself, to offer for your excellency's

General Friere
to sir Hew Dal-
rymple.

* Something omitted in the original.

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consideration some observations on the armistice lately entered into between the French army and that under your excellency's command, I send to your excellency's presence, for that effect, major Ayres Pinto, in whom I have confidence, and who, from his personal qualifications, is worthy of this commission. The remarks which I have encharged him to make to your excellency appear to me to be of the utmost importance, and I hope that your excellency will consider them as such, and will be pleased to act accordingly, as required by the honour and interest of both nations.

God preserve your excellency,

Your excellency's most attentive
and respectful servant,

(Signed) BERNARDIN FRIERE DE ANDRADA.

To the general-in-chief of the British army.

This mission was in vain, as will hereafter appear from the subsequent correspondence; and though it might not perhaps be expedient to entertain, yet the want of affability towards it, is certainly to be regretted.

No sooner, however, was the negotiation for the definitive convention about to commence between general Kellermann and colonel Murray than embarrassments arose in every quarter.

The first objection that demanded attention was

naturally that of admiral sir Charles Cotton, which subjected sir Hew Dalrymple to the awkwardness of the following communication with general Junot.

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Head-quarters, Ramalhal, 25th Aug. 1808.

Sir,

The admiral commanding the British fleet on the coast of Portugal cannot agree to the question respecting the disposal of the Russian fleet in the Tagus being in any manner brought under discussion on the basis of the 7th article of the agreement for the suspension of hostilities entered into with your excellency, with a view to adjusting a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops.

Sir Hew Dal-
rymple to
general Junot.

I feel myself, however, fully authorized to assure your excellency, that the objection on the part of the British admiral does not proceed from any desire to push to the utmost the advantages which the actual state of the war in this quarter might present to the British forces.

Admiral sir Charles Cotton was put in possession of instructions from the British government, respecting the line of conduct to be observed towards the Russian fleet in the Tagus, at a period when circumstances of a nature different from those now existing, induced the expectation that the Russian fleet might be under the necessity of leaving the

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port of Lisbon, and the British admiral is ready now to enter on a direct discussion of the subject with admiral Siniavin on the same grounds.

The intimate connexion which so very lately existed between the British government and that of Russia, as well as the personal regard which the British admiral entertains for admiral Siniavin, leaves little room to doubt of an understanding acceptable to both being the result of a communication between them.

(Signed)

W. H. DALRYMPLE.

Commander of the British
forces in Portugal.

*His excellency the commander-in-chief of
the French army in Portugal.*

At the same time the following letter was sent to colonel Murray, which, with sufficient explicitness, shews the embarrassing nature of the armistice.

Head-quarters, Ramalhãl, 25th Aug. 1808.

Sir,

Sir Hew Dalrymple to lieutenant-colonel Murray.

I have the honour to enclose a letter which you will deliver to the French commander-in-chief, and you will apprise his excellency, that, as general Kellermann appeared to attach much importance to the article relating to the Russians, and as it is

exceedingly inconvenient and disadvantageous to the British army to be LIABLE to the AGREEMENT for an unlimited suspension of hostilities, you will inform his excellency that I shall consider that to which I have agreed to be at an end at 12 o'clock at noon on the 28th.

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In case his excellency should manifest a desire to continue the negotiations for a convention on the basis of the remaining articles of the agreement, I authorize you to enter upon, and conclude it, with such officer as shall be appointed by the commander-in-chief of the French army, upon the terms specified in the enclosed memoranda, subject to the ratification of the admiral and myself; and in case you should find this disposition to exist in his excellency's mind, and if you should enter upon the negotiation under these powers, you are authorized to apprise the commander-in-chief of the French army, that I shall have no objection to a renewal of the agreement for the suspension of hostilities for a definitive period, to enable the officers employed to bring the negotiations to their result.

(Signed) H. W. DALRYMPLE, lieutenant-general.
Commander of the British
forces in Portugal,

Lieut.-col. Murray, quarter-master-general.

The following are the memoranda enclosed, which

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objects of nego-
tiation.*

were proposed by sir Arthur Wellesley, who already perceived the probable results of the armistice, from these supplementary objects of negotiation.

1st, The fort of Peniché to be evacuated in two days. The forts of Elvas and La Lippe, in four days. The fort of Almeida, in five days. The French army to cross the Tagus and evacuate Lisbon, and all the forts on the Tagus, in four days from the signature of the convention, and to be prepared to embark in seven days, or as soon afterwards as the British commander-in-chief may appoint.

The British army, in the mean time, to have the use of the port of Lisbon and the navigation of the Tagus.

2dly, The mode of paying for the hire of the transports to be settled.

3dly, The ports to be settled to which they are to go. Rochefort or l'Orient would answer best, as being the greatest distance from Spain and the Austrian frontier.

4thly, Security to be required for the transports going to the ports appointed, and for the return of the transports; as fifty of those sent with the army of Egypt were detained in France.

5thly, Some mode to be devised to make the French generals disgorge the church-plate which they have stolen.

6thly, An exchange of prisoners to be settled.

7thly, There are no horse-transports; and the French must be permitted to leave commissaries to sell the horses, or to hire vessels to transport them to France: but certainly not the cavalry itself.

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the convention
of Cintra.

Ramalhal, 23d Aug. 1808.

To the letter to general Junot was immediately received the following answer, from which again it appears sir Hew Dalrymple, who had insisted on communicating personally even with a chief of cavalry-staff, now refused to communicate with the general-in-chief himself.

Head-quarters, Lisbon, 26th Aug. 1808.

Sir,

I have received the letter with which your excellency has honoured me through colonel Murray. I immediately communicated my observations to admiral Siniavin; and although it had already been agreed between us, general, that the Russian fleet should be included in the treaty of evacuation, the Russian admiral consents to treat directly with admiral Cotton.

General Junot
to sir Hew Dalrymple.

This basis once adopted by the Russian admiral, who unites his interest with ours, and reciprocally on my part, I do not see any thing to prevent the continuance of our negotiation, taking for its basis

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of Cintra.

the other articles of the suspension of arms. I have in consequence named the general of division, Kellermann, as the depository of my powers; but I shall not conceal from your excellency that *I should have much preferred an interview with you*, which if it could take place would smooth many difficulties. I consider, then, the suspension of arms as prolonged indefinitely till your excellency shall propose a term which I accept. The time which this suspension shall continue is indeed indifferent to me; but nevertheless it must be of sufficient duration to treat of interests of so high an importance.

I have the honour to be,

with the highest consideration,

Sir,

Your excellency's most humble
and obedient servant,

ABRANTES,

General-in-chief of the French
army in Portugal.*

To his excellency sir Hew Dalrymple.

The following communication of colonel Murray will explain itself.

Lisbon, 26th Aug. 1808.

My dear sir,

I went to work with general Kellermann this morning, and got on tolerably well; by twelve

Lieutenant-col.
Murray to sir
Hew Dalrymple

* The original was of course in French.

o'clock to-morrow, I hope we shall have finished.

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Some of the most important of the articles already put down are the evacuation of Peniché, Almeida, Elvas, and Palmela, as soon as our troops can arrive to relieve the French garrisons, and in some measure to protect their retreat.

It was mentioned in my memorandums, that the French troops should be required to cross to the other side of the Tagus. I think their being pushed in this, may lead to our yielding in other points of more real importance, and the very operation itself might tend to delay considerably the business of embarking.

A proposal has been made to take away the Vasco de Gama and some frigates, which I have positively declared I can never agree to. They want to have St. Julien's and the Bougio, till the last division embarks. Of these, St. Julien's, I think, is at least out of the question. A hint has been dropped to-night, of exchanging the Spanish prisoners against an equal number of French: I should think we ought to have them without exchange.

If any suggestions have occurred which may be useful to me, I beg to be furnished with them as early as you can.

Perhaps it may be expedient that a meeting of the commanders-in-chief should take place at Cas-

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caes, when the ratification comes to be entered upon; and if the thing appears to you to be proper, I beg you will apprise me of it.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) GEO. MURRAY.

To the commander-in-chief of the British troops.

Menacing advance of the Portuguese.

The next evil was the result of the dissatisfaction of the Portuguese, in an advance which menaced the French army.

Lisbon, 26th Aug. 1808.

Sir,

Lieutenant-col.
Murray to sir
New Dalrymple

General Kellermann has just informed me, that a report has come in, that the Portuguese have advanced to Santarem, to the number of two thousand men; and as their doing so is not in conformity to the articles of agreement entered into on the 22d instant, the commander-in-chief of the French army requests that you will take such steps as may appear most likely to prevent their extending themselves beyond the line of demarcation fixed upon by the agreement above referred to.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) GEO. MURRAY.

Quarter-master-general.

Commander of the forces.

To these, the British commander-in-chief thus

replied; and, in the last sentence, exhibits his intention of more than compensating for his condescension in the first instance towards an inferior!

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Head-quarters, Ramalhal, 27th Aug. 1808.

Sir,

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 26th instant, and at the same time one from general Junot, which I enclose, which differs materially from that which you wrote to me. I should judge from the former, that the execution of any convention which may be agreed upon between general Kellermann and yourself, must depend upon the conclusion of an agreement between sir Charles Cotton and admiral Siniavin, which is entirely inconsistent with my intentions. I beg that you will prevail upon general Kellermann to explain general Junot's intentions on this point; and if they should not be conformable to mine, you will break up the negotiations, and come away as soon as possible.

Sir Hew Dal-
rymple to lieut.
col. Murray.

I have also to observe upon the expression used by general Junot, in his letter respecting the prolongation of the time of the suspension of hostilities, which must convey a different idea from that which you had given to him.

My intention is, and I hereby authorize you, to prolong, for 24 hours, the term of the suspension

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of hostilities, if you should find it necessary, in order to bring the negotiation to a conclusion, if general Junot, or general Kellermann for him, should explain, in a satisfactory manner, his sentiments on the point referred to in the first part of this letter ; but if he should not, you are, as above instructed, to break off the negotiation at once, and arrive here before the first term will be concluded.

I beg that you will peruse and give the enclosed letter to general Kellermann, to be delivered to general Junot, and inform his excellency, that as I have appointed you to conduct and conclude an important negotiation with him, it is desirable that *he should transmit through you any farther communications he may be desirous of making to me.*

(Signed)

H. W. DALRYMPLE,
Lieutenant-general.*Lieutenant-colonel Murray,**&c. &c. &c.*

The enclosed letter is as follows :

Head-quarters, Ramalhal, 27th Aug. 1808.

Sir,

Sir Hew Dal-
rymple to
general Junot.

I have received the honour of your excellency's letter on the subject of the negotiation for a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the army under your excellency's command, on which you have been pleased to authorize general Keller-

mann to treat with lieutenant-colonel Murray; and I have further the honour to inform your excellency, that I have sent lieutenant-colonel Murray instructions and full powers to conclude the preliminary arrangements to which your excellency alludes.

(Signed) H. W. DALRYMPLE,
Commander of the British forces
in Portugal.

To his excellency,

*The commander-in-chief of the
French army in Portugal.*

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1803.

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the convention
of Cintra.

The next letter of the same day is full of embarrassing recollections and errors.

Head-quarters, Ramalhal, 1 o'clock, 27th Aug.

My dear sir,

I have just received your's of yesterday from the outposts, but with no clear report how it came there.

Sir Hew Dalrymple to lieutenant-col. Murray.

I agree with you about the article respecting the crossing of the Tagus, and think a better arrangement may be devised; but we must have immediate possession of the Tagus, and every battery which bears on the passage up or the anchorage.

I think it an inadmissible pretension, the exchange of the Spanish prisoners; they ought to be immediately set free. *We should, in this matter,*

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consult not only interests but the feelings of the Spanish nation.

The Vasco de Gama, and the frigates, do not belong to the French; and, by the basis of this convention, they are *only to carry away what is their individual baggage.*

I see no occasion for the meeting of the chiefs to sign the ratification; at any rate, a secure position should, I think, previously be taken, and the place of meeting be neutral, if the measure is pushed.

Mr. Pinto, who was here some days from the Portuguese general, spoke as to many points which he thought his nation would expect, particularly that certain obnoxious individuals should be obliged to go away with the French; but I have no official written communication from the general upon this subject, although I have encouraged him to send one.

I have directed that the Portuguese troops shall keep within bounds,* and hope they will do so; but cannot positively affirm that such will be the case.

I wrote to you this morning at an early hour, by Lord Fitzroy Somerset.

(Signed) H. W. DALRYMPLE,
Lieutenant-general.

* Sir Hew Dalrymple on the same day writes to the Portuguese general the wishes of the French commander-in-chief, and adds, if not quiet, they will be attacked.

P.S. I enclose a copy of part of a letter I have this day received from sir Charles Cotton: the beginning does not signify. You may perhaps know what he means, and if he objects to any part of the basis, except that which he caused to be expunged.

Lieutenant-colonel Murray,

&c. &c. &c.

According to the following letter, the treaty is deemed complete.

Lisbon, 28th Aug. 1803.

My dear sir,

Although it appears to be more immediately my duty to carry the convention I have just signed to your head-quarters, to be submitted to your ratification, the knowledge I have of your sentiments on most of the points in question, and other circumstances that have occurred, induce me to prefer going in person to the admiral, and sending captain Dalrymple to Ramalhal.

Two copies of the convention have been made out in English, and two in French, in order that each party concerned may be possessed of an original in each language.

Captain Dalrymple is the bearer of a French copy to be ratified by you, should it meet your approbation, and I shall carry an English copy to the admiral for the same purpose. It is proposed that

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Lieutenant-col.
Murray to sir
Hew Dalrymple

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the two copies should be interchanged afterwards, in order that the signature wanting to each may be annexed.

It appears to me best, to exchange the ratified copies at this place, and I therefore propose to return from the fleet to-morrow for that purpose; and have to request that you will transmit to me as early as it can be done, the copy sent by captain Dalrymple. Having them both in my possession, I shall be guided according to circumstances.

If things come to an adjustment, I shall urge that the French troops should fall back immediately. The idea that has offered itself to me respecting the position that might be occupied by our troops, in the first instance is, that we should put our right into Cascaes and the forts near it, placing a strong corps at Cintra; and that a part of the army should be thrown towards the banks of the Tagus, above Lisbon; in that case, the principal part of the force would take the route of Mafra. So far as I have seen of the country, it is in that direction that cavalry could best act, should it become necessary. When matters are a little more advanced, I can, without impropriety, make more particular inquiries as to the convenience of subsistence and other circumstances. Believe me, my dear sir, &c.

(Signed) GEO. MURRAY.

Lieut. gen. sir Hew Dalrymple.

&c. &c. &c.

But the following communication exhibits some serious objections and difficulties, and great awkwardness of negotiation.

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1803.

Negotiation and execution of the convention of Cintra.

Head-quarters, Ramalhal, 29th Aug. 1808.

My dear sir,

In the first place I must tell you, that we have this day taken possession of Torres Vedras, on the grounds of the cessation of hostilities ceasing at twelve. We were so hampered and inconvenienced, that the measure was necessary. I must also tell you, that, last night, in consequence of a forward movement of sir Arthur Wellesley's column (within the line), the general commanding the outposts ignorantly included the village, which general Junot's aid-de-camp found, as they stopped him; this has given me great concern, and I beg you to say so to the general.

Sir Hew Dalrymple to lieutenant-col. Murray.

I enclose you the observations made on the treaty itself, at a meeting of the lieutenant-generals; they are of more or less consequence; but the possession of the Tagus, that is, of all the ports, is a *sine quâ non*, as you may be sure no British admiral will place any man-of-war at the mercy of batteries not his own, but manned by an enemy; besides which the great object, which is a safe anchorage for our ships, would be retarded *sine die*, and that at a very threatening season.

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Some articles I am supposed to answer for, which it is not positively in my power to fulfil; for instance, about the persons taken by the Spaniards; my acquiescence in that must therefore mean, my using all the influence I possess: I must add that I have no doubt of success.

Whatever regards enemy's ships, or any ships, the admiral must answer. Nothing afloat, except the Russian fleet and the transports, was mentioned in the basis.* I do not see that the seventeenth article bears the marks of being meant solely for Danish merchant-vessels; on the contrary, I think it scarcely applies thereto; if it does, it does not relate to me.

It certainly was necessary to modify these articles which regard the Portuguese government, not only as it will be independent of me when established, but also as the articles may involve questions which I do not understand.

The omission of the words "*a ses frais*," in the third article, is on account of the appearance the demand bears in that *form, not from any objection to the expense*. As to the embarking the horses, it is well the article should be granted as *a point of*

* This remark refers to another private communication from lieutenant-colonel Murray, stating a supposition, that, under the seventeenth article, the French meant to cover certain Danish vessels.

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honour; but, in *point of fact*, the thing is morally impossible, as we have no horse-transport *disposable*; and to fit a horse-transport is a work of time, even if the vessels could be found.

You perceive that most of the alterations explain themselves, and are in truth of inferior moment in comparison of opening the port: if the anchorage is not ours, the admiral will not enter it, consequently no embarkation can take place, and the whole arrangement must be at an end. We can stay no longer here—that is positive; I mean no longer than is necessary to give you time to conclude or break off the negotiation, and to join the army. Every postponement of our advance is very inconvenient. I mean to advance to-morrow, or even to-day: but, now, I beg that you may return, so as that the column may proceed at day-break on Wednesday, the 31st, that is, the day after to-morrow. March we must then; but, if the more material articles are assented to when you arrive, we may discuss the remainder in the position which may be named, and of which you can bring the notice; but, at all events, delay must be at an end, and the anchorage of the Tagus must be ours. General Junot probably knows that the anchorage he gives us by yielding Cascaes, &c. &c. is ours already, but is not worth much. It grieves me to place you in so embarrassing a situation, but I cannot help it. I

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am so confident that you will set out to join me before the hour I have named for our advance, that if I hear nothing from you, I shall be uneasy for you. If therefore for any reason you should be induced to remain, notwithstanding our advance, take care to send me in time one of the officers with you.

(Signed)

H. W. DALRYMPLE,
Lieutenant-general.

*Lieutenant-colonel Murray,
&c. &c. &c.*

Awkward rencontre of English and French at the outposts.

In the mean time, the French army which had been threatened by the Portuguese troops, for which there was certainly good reason on their part, became, it would appear, menaced by those of Great Britain, which could not be accounted for so easily.

Nor did the French commander fail to use this incident: in a letter of the 30th, on the subject, general Junot thus remarks:

General Junot's request that the officer commanding should be punished.

“The officer commanding my left posts at Mafra has acquainted me that the reconnoitring-party which he sent this morning by way of Torres Vedras, encountered a party of your excellency's troops which charged it. I cannot think, sir, that, at the moment when I was signing the ratification of a definitive convention for the evacuation of Portugal, of which the first guarantee was a suspension

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of arms, it was intended to break it in a manner so little conformable to the fidelity of character which distinguishes our two nations. I suppose then, general, that there has been some misunderstanding on the part of the officer commanding your excellency's troops; and it will doubtless appear to you necessary to *punish severely* a fault which might have compromised interests so important as those we discussed, and which, I hope, are now entirely arranged to the reciprocal honour of the two armies."

Whatever might be the opinion of the French general of the deserved punishment of the officer who had so inconsiderately broken the armistice, it appears that it did not draw down even the smallest reprehension; but that it was attributed to Portuguese deserters from Lisbon; and, if this was the case, however to be regretted, it certainly was not to be blamed.

The second paragraph of the following letter goes farther:

British head-quarters, August 31, 1808.

Sir,

Lieutenant-colonel lord Proby will have the honour of delivering to your excellency the articles of convention ratified by me. His lordship is also charged with instructions to carry the several pre-

Sir Hew Dalrymple to general Junot.

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liminary arrangements into effect, which the advanced period of the season renders of the utmost importance, particularly for the safety of the transports, and consequently the embarkation of the French troops.

Lord Proby will also explain to your excellency, that the irregularity of which you complain at your out-posts (and several others of the same description, which have, I fear, since happened) proceed from the desertion from Lisbon of large bodies of Portuguese cavalry, and that I am confident nothing improper has been done by any of the troops under my orders.

I have the honour to be,

With sentiments of the highest consideration,

(Signed)

H. W. DALRYMPLE.

*His excellency the commander-in-chief
of the French troops in Portugal.*

The causes of these eruptions of the Portuguese troops were sufficiently explained, however, as the armistice drew to a conclusion. In a letter of the 1st Sept. major Ayres Pinto de Souza, the officer who had been sent without avail to represent the Portuguese army in the negotiation, thus expresses himself to sir Hew Dalrymple:

“Yesterday, agreeably to your excellency’s orders, colonel Murray shewed me the articles of ca-

Major Ayres
Pinto de Souza
to sir Hew Dal-
rymple.

pitulation concluded between the British and French armies; on the same day, I also communicated them to the general-in-chief of the Portuguese army, and in consequence of my instructions, considering on one hand that the capitulation is definitively concluded, and on the other that general Friere was responsible in some manner to the provisional government of Portugal, if he should not strive to obtain for the people of this kingdom whatever could be useful and honourable to the state; and reflecting also that in the capitulation which your excellency has suffered them to see, there is not a single article in which the Portuguese army was considered; and that, notwithstanding, there is an article which guarantees to the French the restitution of their civil officers which the Portuguese army had made prisoners, I think it my duty, in virtue of the instructions which I have received, to present to your excellency the following questions:

“ 1. To what point does the guarantee offered to the French, on the subject of the restitution of civil officers who are in our power, extend?

“ 2. Should it occur, that the provisional government of Portugal, approving the conduct of general Friere for not having taken part in the arrangement entered into with the French, should order movements in advance, in combination with the Spanish

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army of Alentejo, whether the English army would not oppose them?

“ 3. If, by the arrangements entered into between the British and French armies, the honour and dignity of the Portuguese nation, and the authority of his royal highness the prince, should appear in some degree compromised, whether the English generals take upon themselves the responsibility?

“ I trust that your excellency will believe that no private motive has guided my pen; that I do justice to the sentiments of amity and fidelity of the British nation; and that, in my own person, I deem myself most highly honoured in the polite consideration with which your excellency received me. But your excellency must be aware that the public judges not from our private conduct, but from that which has an authentic character; and there will be no other means of avoiding the censure of the public than that of obtaining from your excellency such an answer as shall convince the Portuguese people that the general to whom they confided the direction of their forces has acceded only to the urgency of circumstances, and to the absolute necessity of not compromising the army under his command.”

The answer, addressed by sir Hew Dalrymple, would appear tolerably satisfactory, but for a future

communication of the 5th Sept. which exhibits a very different case.

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Head-quarters, Cintra, 2d Sept. 1808.

Sir,

I reply to your letter of yesterday's date, with which I am just now honoured, and beg to remind you, that, on the 23d of last month, I enclosed to general Bernardine Friere, a copy of the articles of the agreement for a suspension of hostilities between the hostile armies, which were to serve as a basis for the proposed convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army. In reply to the letter which adverted to these articles of agreement, the general might, as a matter of course, have made any observations, or recommended any stipulations he thought proper, and I am sure you will do me the justice to assure the general and the Portuguese government (if necessary) that I advised and even urged you to recommend it to his excellency, to favour me fully with his sentiments on the subject whilst the negotiations were in progress. As my wishes on this point were never acceded to, and as I never received one word of comment from general Friere, relative to the basis on which the present convention is founded, I hope I shall be excused in expressing some surprise at this late expostulation in terms fixed and agreed upon,

Sir Hew Dalrymple to major Ayres Pinto.

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and to which the honour of the commanders of the British army and fleet is pledged, in as far as their influence or power can be supposed to extend, by the common and known laws of war.

(Signed)

H. W. DALRYMPLE.

Major Ayres Pinto de Souza,

&c. &c. &c.

Multiplication
of evils from the
convention.

Evils now began to multiply, as will appear from two notes of the Portuguese general, same date.

Head-quarters at Encarnacao, Sept. 2, 1808.

Most illustrious and excellent sir,

General Friere
to sir Hew Dal-
rymple.

Having been informed by major Ayres Pinto de Souza, by means of a confidential communication of the articles of capitulation between the British and the French armies, which is said to be signed, but of which I have not hitherto received any official copy, although expected. And having heard that the articles do not differ substantially from those proposed in the armistice, respecting which the major made some representations to your excellency, verbally by my orders, and also some observations tending to save the honour, dignity, and interests, of the Portuguese nation,

It is my duty to declare to your excellency, that as I have not been consulted on, or privy, to this negotiation, in which I suppose this country is con-

cerned, I consider myself exempt from all responsibility which might have been imputed to me on this transaction.

The present situation of the army here, not admitting me to remain all the time necessary for the conclusion of the negotiation; and perceiving the English columns advancing, without my having any communications of their movements, or indication to co-operate towards entering the capital, I have to expect from your excellency an explanation on the subject for my guidance.

I must observe to your excellency, that, in said capitulation, there does not appear to be any notice taken of the troops commanded by Monteiro Mor do Runo, which are in Alentejo, nor of the Spanish army which marches in the same province, on the banks of the Tagus, as your excellency will perceive by the copy of a letter from their general,* which I transmit, and who came to assist this kingdom. It possibly may not be the intention to liberate the prisoners that still remain in the power of the French army.

God preserve your excellency, &c.

BERN. FRIERE DE ANDRADA.

Commander-in-chief of the British army.

* Don Joseph Galluza.

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Cintra.General Friere
to sir Hew Dal-
rymple.*Head-quarters at Encarnacao, Sept. 2, 1808.*

Illustrious and most excellent sir,

Having, according to your excellency's desire, left some small forces to continue to watch at Peniché, and having recommended to the officers at that place, that they should make the necessary appearances to impose on the enemy; and that they should also be prepared against the armistice being broken; and from the fear in which the said garrison was of being obliged to capitulate; I received information from the said officers that the garrison was disposed to comply, thinking it to be besieged by more superior forces; but from the communications made to me by major Ayres Pinto, respecting the signing of the capitulation concluded by your excellency, I directed a suspension of this negotiation, although losing (no doubt) by this circumstance the opportunity of getting possession of three or four hundred men, of whom that garrison was composed.

I am, &c.

BERNARDIN FRIERE DE ANDRADA.

Sir Hew Dalrymple, &c.

Sir Hew Dalrymple, however, rebuts both the evil complained of and the remonstrance for neglect of the Portuguese authorities, in a very cavalier manner.

Head-quarters, Cintra, Sept. 2, 1808.

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Sir Hew Dal-
rymple to
general Friere.

Sir,

I had the honour to transmit to your excellency, on the 23d of last month, the several articles agreed upon as the basis of a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army; and I now enclose a copy of the convention itself, as ratified by the French general-in-chief. I received the original of this paper, the day before yesterday, at an early hour; but as the French general had, accidentally, omitted to affix his signature to the convention itself, (it being only at the end of the additional articles,) I was obliged to send it back, in order to have that error rectified, which put it out of my power to transmit you the enclosed authenticated copy so early as I could have wished: I, however, lost no time in causing lieutenant-colonel Murray to make a confidential communication of the substance of the whole to major Ayres Pinto de Souza, who, doubtless, lost no time in communicating the same to your excellency. I shall be anxious to receive a communication from your excellency, as to the position you wish the Portuguese army to occupy, until the embarkation of the French troops; and there are now many details of importance to arrange, which I should be happy to confer with your excellency upon, when it may suit your convenience.

(Signed)

H. W. DALRYMPLE.

His excellency general Friere, &c. &c. &c.

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Cintra.General Friere
to Sir Hew Dal-
rymple.

In another hour follows information of the obnoxious conduct of the French army in Lisbon.

General Quarters at Encarnacao, Sept. 2, 1808.

Most illustrious and excellent sir,

I am informed that the French are practising in Lisbon a species of plunder on the public treasury, museum, arsenals, churches, library, as also the houses and stores of private persons, which it is my duty to communicate to your excellency information of, that you may take such measures as you may think proper.

God preserve your excellency,

Your excellency's

Most obedient

and obliged servant,

BERNARDIN FRIERE DE ANDRADA.

The general-in-chief of the British army.

This does not appear to be in any way satisfactorily answered, nor even considered, by the English general.

Head-quarters, Cintra, Sept. 3, 1808.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of yesterday's date, the one relating to the state of things at Peniché, the

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rymple to
general Friere.

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other communicating what you have heard respecting the conduct of the French, in Lisbon, since the signature of the convention: in regard to the latter object, I have only to observe, that I shall not fail to give due attention to whatever representations you may find it necessary to make, on any seeming infringement of the convention, on the part of the French, which may be reported to you; it being my intention to require a strict compliance with all the stipulations of that treaty. The copy of the convention, which I have had the honour to transmit to you, will have made you aware, that hostilities are to cease before all the places still remaining in the possession of the French troops; and I have to request you will lose no time in giving the necessary orders, to that effect, to the Portuguese army; and of causing the same to be intimated to the French commanders in the places referred to; in conformity to the 12th article of the convention, of the 30th instant.

(Signed) H. W. DALRYMPLE.

His excellency general Friere,

&c. &c. &c.

This was followed by a specific document and protest on the part of the Portuguese general.

Memorial on the principal Inconveniences which are found in the Convention agreed on between the

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English and French Armies for the Evacuation of Portugal, wherein is stated minutely those Circumstances of the worst Consequences to this Country.

Not any thing can be more favourable to the French, and, consequently, more prejudicial to the general cause of Europe, which the British government profess to aid, than to render the people mistrustful respecting the true motives which actuate that government.

The French will, on all occasions, exert means to excite suspicions against the views of the English government; the conduct of Spain, by having refused, hitherto, to admit, undefinedly, British troops into her dominions, notwithstanding the risk she run, proved highly her mistrust in that respect. Amongst ourselves the French partizans have secretly spread this want of confidence, with an intention that, during any moment of ferment, those who came as auxiliaries may be considered as oppressors. Under such circumstances, nothing can concur more to frustrate the intrigues of the French, as the most prompt declaration of the intentions of the British government, which we are well satisfied cannot be else than to restore complete, and entire, this country, and all its dependencies, to the prince regent of Portugal, their

faithful and antient ally, who has the unanimous voice of the people; and for whom they will expose themselves to all the evils which might attend this determination, in like manner as they did before they had any assistance from the English, and had no other than their own forces to contend against those of the enemy, their oppressors. But, at this moment, what is wanting, and particularly interesting, is a declaration of the intentions, which will prevent evil-designing persons from profiting by appearances, to impede the grand and noble designs of Great Britain. Permit me to say that, from the terms in which the treaty is conceived, it may draw into an error, not only the Portuguese, but the Spaniards, and produce the unfortunate and dreadful effect, which I have already pointed out; and for which purpose immediate measures should be taken to destroy such impressions.

The British army cannot, and should not, be considered in this country in any other light than an auxiliary army, and as such they were applied for, by the provisional government of this country; in like manner, it is necessary that it should be still considered, let its strength be what it will, to avoid exciting mistrust, which would impede its ulterior progress.

Under those circumstances, that any treaty,

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which was to be discussed with the French, should have been done in conjunction with the government of the same country, which called the British army to its assistance, or, at least, to have been done with its particular approbation, should the delicacy of the terms have prevented the arrangement being made public. Nothing of this has been done, but rather, on the contrary, stipulations are made, which never can be effected by military compulsion, and its authority, unless, in a conquered country, such as are contained in the articles 16 and 17, and in the 1st additional article, which stipulate that the garrisons of the sea-ports, the arsenals, and naval forces, belonging to the Portuguese, and in possession of the French, shall be delivered up to the British troops, without declaring, at the same time, that such surrender was provisional, and meant to be restored to their legitimate sovereign, nor was it expressed, in any part whatever, that the restoration of the government was the object in view.

Therefore, to avoid the mistrust which such appearances may excite, and which the French will not fail to promote, it appears to be highly necessary, that his excellency the commander-in-chief of the British army should declare, as soon as possible, that the occupying the garrisons, arsenals, and other public establishments, as also the naval

forces belonging to this kingdom, was solely a provisional measure, to avoid the contact of the Portuguese and French forces, for the purpose of preventing the effects of resentment, which might lead to acts endangering the fulfilment of the capitulation agreed on.—But that, on such danger ceasing, the said objects should be delivered up to the prince regent of Portugal, or to the government which represented him; and that they should be garrisoned by Portuguese troops, retaining only such English garrisons, as, with the general-in-chief, might be considered as proper for their better preservation, and the good order of the places, as might appear necessary.

As to the guaranteed stipulations, in the articles 16 and 17, it appears to be indispensable, that the said general-in-chief should declare, that it never was his intention to prevent or embarrass the taking all necessary measures of precaution against the individuals mentioned therein, to prevent such suspicious persons from prejudicing the public cause, whilst they remain here, and to punish, with the utmost severity of the law, such as might continue to betray this country.

As to the 1st additional article, the Portuguese general cannot avoid mentioning the impossibility of its execution, unless a just reciprocity shall be established.

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It is unavoidable to remind his excellency the general-in-chief of the British army, the necessity of establishing, during the delay of the French in Lisbon, some mode of inquiry on the conduct or actions of those same French, and to intimate to them, that for any violence committed by them during that time, against the inhabitants of this country, they would be made responsible.

An equal objection and protest appear to be necessary, and indispensably so, respecting the abuses which may take place in confidence of the articles, relative to the baggage, military chests, and the sales of private property, with which the said French may involve whatever they may think proper, should this article not be annulled, as a grand disadvantage to us in the capitulation.

I cannot omit remarking the risk to which the said French exposed themselves, and the danger to which the capital is subjected, as also the said French army, by their delay in Lisbon, during the evacuation, from the rancour with which they are looked on by the people of Lisbon; and the inferiority of their numbers may excite some incident, even through the people, which may create an insurrection, of a sanguinary nature, within the said capital, and much embarrassment to the English and Portuguese armies, bound on one side by the convention, and urged on the other at

seeing Portuguese subjects perish in their sight. To avoid this risk, it appears to be proper to propose that, whenever the first division of the French army may be embarked, the remainder shall proceed to Cascaes, where they can be embarked under the protection of an English division, which can interpose between the French and Lisbon. By which means this imminent danger will be avoided, the evacuation of Lisbon will be expedited, and, consequently, the robberies, and the complaints, which might take place, would be avoided;—but I submit to the government, as it appears proper to do so, in all respects.

(Signed) BERNARDIN FRIERE DE ANDRADA.

Head-quarters at Encarnacao, Sept. 3, 1808.

The protest was couched as follows;—

Head-quarters at Encarnacao, 4th Sept. 1808.

Protest which is made by Bernardin Friere de Andrada, General Commandant of the Portuguese Troops, against the Articles of Capitulation, conventioned and signed, between the English Army and that of France, for the Evacuation of Portugal.

I protest in general, for the want of contemplation in said treaty, of what interests his royal highness the prince regent, or the government which represents him, and against all that may in-

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terfere with the royal sovereignty, and its authority ; as also the independence of the said government ; against all that may be contrary to the honour, security, and interest, of the nation ; and he further protests particularly against the following articles.

Art. 1, 4, and 12.—In the part which determines the delivery up to the British forces, of the places, store-houses, or magazines, and the Portuguese ships, without declaring, in any mode, that such surrender is obligatory, as a temporary act, with an intent, immediately after, to restore them to the prince regent of Portugal, or to the government which represents him, to whom they belong, and whom the English forces came to assist.

Art. 16.—Against the part which permits to remain in Portugal the individuals therein-mentioned.

Art. 17.—Against that part, which restrains the government of this kingdom from inquiring into the conduct, and punishing, by any means, those individuals who have been scandalously disloyal to their prince, and their country, by serving the French party, and when, under the protection of the English army, they will be screened from the punishment which they deserve, and which would, in future, protect this country from a repetition of their treason.

Additional 1st Art.—Cannot, by any means, be obligatory to the government of this kingdom without a reciprocal clause, but which is not stipulated.

Finally, I protest against the omission of providing for the security of the inhabitants of the capital and its environs, that they should not be molested or vexed during the delay of the French amongst them, or at least a reciprocity, as inserted in the articles 16 and 17, in favour of the French and their followers; and I here limit my protest, to avoid augmenting a list of them, avoiding to make mention of other objects of less consideration, such as the cession of eight hundred horses, without attending to their having been nearly all seized by the French in Portugal, and, consequently, should not have been considered as French property; also the magazines of provisions, furnished at the cost of this country, although in their possession, they had no real right in, as being the unjust possessors of the country.

BERNARDIN FRIERE DE ANDRADA.

Major Ayres Pinto de Souza, who had been employed in stating, during the progress of the treaty, such objections as were most prominent on the part of Portugal, also addresses sir Hew Dalrymple in a manner, which completely brings them to an

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Major Ayres
Pinto's remon-
strance and dis-
approval of sir H.
Dalrymple's
statements.

issue, that produces a clear view of the character of the negotiation.

“A great defluxion of the eyes,” says he, “impeded me from acknowledging the letter of your excellency, of the 2d current. I could have wished that it had been possible for me to have rested there; but the desire to terminate honourably the commission with which I was charged, by general Bernardino Friere d’Andrada, places me under the necessity of continuing a correspondence, which the turn that affairs have taken appeared to have terminated. Your excellency will clearly perceive, that the answer to my letter of the 1st of this month, while it does not contain altogether a precise answer,* contains, nevertheless, a serious inculcation, which appears, in some degree, to throw on my general, whatever in the articles of capitulation concluded between your excellency and general Junot, may compromise the national honour and dignity, and above all, the authority of the prince regent, my master: an inculcation, which lastly falls entirely on me; seeing that I was commissioned, and furnished with powers to render your

* Sir Hew Dalrymple’s light treatment of the most serious topics is here, as before, noticed with a mildness and delicacy that is admirable, under the circumstances of the Portuguese army.

excellency sensible of the improprieties which the treaty of armistice contains. I desire that your excellency may permit me, then, to trace the affair from its commencement, and that your excellency may excuse me from entering into minute details, since they concern my honour, the only inheritance which I received from my ancestors, and which I ought to preserve in all its purity. Your excellency appears to complain that my general did not make the necessary observations on the different articles of the capitulation, at the time the affair was still in progress, and that, in consequence, your excellency believed yourself altogether relieved from all responsibility. On the 23d of August I received the order of my general to attend your excellency, and acquaint you with the evils that must result to this country, if the articles of the armistice concluded on the 22d August, received no modification. On the same day, I presented to your excellency the letter of my general, which authorized me to propose to your excellency, in his name, observations on the stipulations of the armistice, and which, in fact, I had the honour to make verbally, article by article, in a conference of nearly two hours, which your excellency accorded me. And it was at my solicitation, that your excellency, on the same day, sent to my general an official duplicate of the articles of the armistice, which the day before your

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excellency had confidently transmitted to him. Your excellency will no doubt remember my observing to you, that the Portuguese government and people were a little too cavalierly treated in the armistice, and that I strove as much as possible to make your excellency sensible of what would be the result, and that it was absolutely necessary that the Portuguese army and the government of the country should be considered in some degree, if it were only to bridle the false reports that the factious and the friends of the French would strive to propagate. I shewed to your excellency that the 3d and 4th articles of the armistice were nothing but a mere trick on the part of the French,* that they required a line of demarcation for the Portuguese armies, between Leyria and Thomar, when, at the same time, they well knew that the Portuguese armies formed a regular corps d'armée, and that this corps was already *seven leagues advanced beyond* the lines of demarcation which they proposed.

Your excellency will also remember the observations which I had the honour to make on the

* That this nevertheless was perfectly allowable on the part of the French diplomatists, cannot properly for a moment be doubted. It is only to be lamented that military diplomacy should have been so entirely neglected in the education of British officers.

5th article, that I did not believe the French to be in sufficient strength to merit so much consideration; and that, besides, we were in a condition to bring them to account for the robberies, rapine, depredations, assassinations, and sacrifices of every species committed in this kingdom, and against its inhabitants, and which demanded exemplary vengeance.

On the 6th article I observed to your excellency that it was rather an object of government than that of the generals of the army: but, that being sure that the intentions of true Portuguese were not to take vengeance upon traitors, but to use precaution against their machinations, provided it were stipulated that they should immediately quit the country, I should be satisfied. The verbal answers of your excellency, and which I immediately transmitted to my general, giving me room to believe that my observations had merited your excellency's consideration, made me hope for the most happy result to my commission. And it was this persuasion which made me judge it necessary to put my requisitions in writing, (the only impropriety of which I can be accused, and which I hope, nevertheless, that my sincerity, and the probity attached to the English name will excuse.)* This supposes

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* There is reason to fear that the official copy of the document from which this is translated has been incorrectly printed in this

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fied in favour of
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that your excellency gave yourself the trouble of comparing the 16th and 17th articles of the definitive treaty, and the 1st additional, with the preliminaries of the armistice, and I am sure that your excellency finds as well as me, that not one of the modifications which I proposed is adopted in the 16th and 17th articles; but, on the contrary, there is nothing but amplifications entirely to the advantage of the French, declaring the military chest, comprized in the 5th article of the armistice, as well as eight hundred horses; without regarding that the French army brought into Portugal only Napoleons d'or, of a base alloy, fabricated expressly to exchange them for Portuguese gold; and that the French horses were sold by auction, and their cavalry remounted at the expense of the public, and of the stables of his royal highness the prince regent: and that the 1st additional article is not only entirely new, but of such a nature, that general Friere could not even give his assent to it, without the express determination of government. Your excellency will also see that if the Portuguese army, government, and people, were, albeit, little considered in the basis of the treaty, in the definitive conclusion they are not mentioned at all!

instance, as well as some others of less importance, for the whole of this sentence is obscure in the apparent original.

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Your excellency will judge then how general Friere or myself, as the commissioner, could possibly make observations on objects which were not at all considered in the preliminaries; and I hope that your excellency will conclude that we can never conceive ourselves responsible for the conclusion of a matter to which the assent of the Portuguese appears to be demanded only as a form. I hope that your excellency's goodness will grant me an acknowledgement of this letter; and I make bold at the same time to request your permission to take all possible measures that my conduct in this affair may appear in the eyes of the Portuguese government and people such as it really is; and my honour, which I prize above every thing in the world, may in no way be attained.

AYRES PINTO DE SOUZA.

Head-quarters, Mafra, Sept. 2, 1808.

A few days after was added, through admiral Cotton, the following still more striking protest from the general of a Portuguese army, which deemed itself not unimportantly victorious. He at the same time requested an embargo on the transports till they should be divested of the plunder which the French army contrived to secrete.

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Protest of count
Monteiro Mor,
general of the
southern army
and member of
the regency.

Francis Mello del Cunha de Mendonca Menezes, Count of Castro, Marino Monteiro Mor of the Council of his Royal Highness, Gentleman of his Bed-chamber, of the Grand Cross of the Order of Christ, General-in-Chief of the Army of the South, Member of the Regency of Portugal, founded by the Prince Regent our Lord, President of the Supreme Junta of the Kingdom of Algarve, Governor and Captain-General of the said Kingdom.

In the name of the prince regent of Portugal, my master, and that of the nation, as general-in-chief of the army of the south, posted on the margin of the Tagus, and as a member of the regency formed by his royal highness the prince regent of Portugal, for directing and promoting the interests of the nation, I protest, in general, against the treaty definitively made between the English and French generals, without his royal highness or his government being consulted; and for the inattention which was paid me, being the commander of an army, which, without the aid of a foreign nation, since the memorable 19th June, in which the prince regent was proclaimed in Algarve, found means to drive the enemy from that kingdom, and to pursue him by passing into Alentejo, causing him to abandon all his posts, and march away until my army

took up their possession on the south banks of the Tagus; and therefore I protest against every thing that may be contrary to the honour, sovereignty, and independence, of the Portuguese nation.

Given at the head-quarters at Azeitao,

9th September, 1808.

(Signed) COUNT MONTEIRO MOR.

To his excellency sir Charles Cotton,

ôc. ôc. ôc.

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This was succeeded by the following paper on the part of the people.

“ Sir,

When a general calamity throws into consternation an entire kingdom, it is then that it becomes the grand tribunals which represent the whole nation to interpose their offices to obtain a remedy.

It is evident, that by means of an infamous artifice, under a proclamation of friendship, the French acquired the possession of Portugal, after which they practised scandalous barbarities against religion, against the august throne, against the public security and that of private individuals, and against the rights of nations.

The antient and faithful allies of Portugal came to her assistance, and vanquished and overthrew the intruding usurpers; and when we expected a

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complete satisfaction, it is rumoured that a convention is forming, but which we have barely any knowledge of, as the proclamation of the 10th September is not satisfactory to the public, and they only know that in the convention there is no mention made of the three states of this kingdom, that it leaves us without satisfaction for the crimes both against divine and human laws, and without indemnification for the murders, robberies, and all manner of crimes committed by the usurpers.

The proclamation promises to procure restoration of what has been confiscated or seized, but the insults perpetrated against the Portuguese religion, the majesty of the throne, the lives of her countrymen, who have been assassinated, remains unsatisfied by any means.

Our churches plundered of their ornaments, the royal palaces damaged, the royal treasury plundered, and, in fine, the people reduced to poverty and misery, so as to render the streets and squares of the capital impassable; nothing of this is taken into consideration, yet those objects are of high importance, as an example not to be passed with impunity, and most imminently so to the religion of the state. The safety of monarchies depends on not letting their rights be invaded without punishing the offender, and the consequence of permitting such crimes with impunity will occasion incalculable mis-

fortunes ; by this declaration, I discharge my duty with honour and faith to my sovereign, to which I am urged by the officers of this tribunal, imploring of you, in the name of all the people of this kingdom, that you will take them into consideration ; yet, at the same time, they declare their high gratitude to the generous allies who have liberated Portugal ; but they pray for a suspension of a convention so favourable to the French interest as it is said to be. The convention being entirely to the prejudice of our holy religion, without a single clause in its favour to bind. All which may be insisted to the prejudice of the crown, without being acted on by the legal representative, cannot take effect. Let those French treat with the victors of Vimiera, who will be indignant at their proposed terms.

The French cannot complain, as they usurped the sovereignty, and therefore they should restore it, as well as the damages, losses, and usurpations, against the sovereign ; they insulted our religion and attacked many of our clergy, whom they plundered ; and it is necessary that they should make proper restitution, with all damages and losses, independent of the losses of the dead, the absent, and of those whose misery is seen daily, occasioned by those perturbators of the world.

The convention must be invalid after a continu-

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ance of the abuses and hostilities committed in Almeida, by robbing and extorting a contribution to a considerable amount, &c. And that the high tribunals of this kingdom cannot consent to the return of the enemy to France, as they even now menace that they will return to destroy even what they leave here.

I am, with due respect,

JOZE DE ATREU CAMPOS,
Judge of the People.

The venerable bishop and provisional government of Oporto contented themselves with the following decree :

On the 5th day of the month of September, in the year 1808, in this city of Oporto, in full sessions of the provisional junta of the supreme government, in consequence of a communication from your excellency, the president of the general-in-chief, Dalrymple, of the British army, dated the 31st of last month, and of a despatch from the general of the Portuguese army, Bernardin Friere de Andrada, dated the 2d instant, the following was unanimously agreed on :

That the supreme junta of the government being ignorant of the powers which the generals of the English army have brought from his Britannic ma-

jesty, and also the uncertainty in which it is in re-
 specting the conditions of the convention lately
 concluded between the French commander-in-chief
 on the one part, and the admiral commanding the
 squadron of his Britannic majesty off the Tagus,
 and his excellency general Dalrymple, on the other
 part, the said junta has decreed, that they cannot
 by any means take into consideration, or positive
 discussion, matters of such magnitude, and of such
 serious consequence, as it would be a want of con-
 fidence of their most faithful ally, Great Britain, in
 attending to the rights of monarchy, and the in-
 terests of the nation; that it does not enter into
 the limits of the said junta to approve of any of
 the conditions of the aforementioned convention,
 which might be prejudicial to any of the said ob-
 jects; and that in conformity an answer be given
 to each of the said generals, transmitting to each
 of them a copy of this decree.

BISHOP, president governor.

MANUEL LÓPEZ LOUREIRO.

ANTONIO DA SILVA PINTO.

JOSEPH DE MELLO FREIRE.

A. MAT. FRIERE DE ANDRADA COUTTINHO.

JOSEPH DRAS DE OLIVEIRA.

FRAN. OSORIODA FORISCO.

LUIS DE SEQUIERA DA GAMA AYALA.

Porto, Sept. 5, 1808.

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To the first of these representations sir Hew Dalrymple returned an answer, which, though not entirely divested of the hauteur of many others, is more satisfactory.

Head-quarters, Cintra, Sept. 5, 1808.

Sir,

Sir Hew Dal-
rymple to
Major Pinto.

I have received the honour of your letter, and with pleasure render you due justice, in admitting that, to the best of my recollection, the verbal objections you made to the articles of agreement, for a suspension of arms, were exactly those you state; I must, however, at the same time observe, that I thought I had satisfied you relative to the impossibility of engaging the existing government of Portugal in a negotiation of a nature purely military, and in which no reference was had either to the government of England or France.

A strong endeavour was used more explicitly to detail the articles which the French army were not to carry off, but of course such a specification was extremely obnoxious to the French officers,* and in my own opinion needless, as, having once described what was to be removed, every other article whatever was excepted; and, in short, this treaty

* A similar one, however, was not deemed obnoxious to *British* officers in the capitulation even of lord Cornwallis.

could not, in this respect, have been completed on better terms. It is to be observed, however, as security against the consequences you anticipate, that the French general pledged his honour that no Portuguese property, public or private, should be carried off; and, secondly, that any article claimed as such should not be allowed to be carried on board.

As to the pardon of those who may have been guilty of political fault or crimes, it was natural for the French to demand such an indulgence; and it did not appear to me as likely to produce tranquillity or happiness in Portugal, to keep alive political animosity by the infliction of punishments, which this treaty affords so fair an occasion to remit; and there is little reason to suppose that those persons who have rendered themselves most obnoxious to their fellow subjects will venture to remain long after the departure of the French.

That the ultimate fate of all persons must rest with the government of the country, is a fact that cannot be doubted, either by the French general or myself; but it is to be presumed that the council of regency, which it is to be hoped will exist from the moment the French are completely removed, will feel themselves bound to abide by the terms under which the enemy was expelled from their country, and their sovereign restored to his rights. The future conduct of those delinquents will of

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course decide their future treatment; and no moderate precaution need be omitted to guard against the machinations of the suspected. Security for this result cannot be obtained, as the government I mention at this moment no where exists.

I have heard from so many quarters that the French are preparing to convey away plunder both public and private, that I have sent an additional commissioner merely to enforce that article of the treaty, and of course such attention will be paid as circumstances will allow, to every reclamation that seems founded on justice.

I beg to remind you, that I particularly remarked to you the impossibility of identifying money, or proving exactly from whom it was obtained; besides which, this description of property could never come under the provisions of the treaty in question.

With respect to the line of demarcation prescribed by the French for a certain corps of Portuguese troops, it is only necessary once more to state, that I have no reason to think that the movements of that corps were known in the British army when the suspension of arms was concluded, and, in point of fact, the said line was never observed by the corps in question.

I trust that this frank explanation of every point of importance will take from the disaffected the power of complaint, and convince persons of a con-

trary description, that every effort was used to obtain the immediate evacuation of the country, on terms as advantageous as possible.

I still think, if the general attached so much weight to objections you verbally urged, and which I endeavoured in the same manner to answer, that he should have complied with the wish I expressed, and put them in writing, which would then have become an official document, and precluded the possibility of that shade of misunderstanding which the verbal discussion has unfortunately produced.

I have the honour to enclose a letter for the bishop of Oporto, of the greatest consequence, and which I beg you to forward with the utmost expedition.

(Signed)

H. W. DALRYMPLE.

Major Ayres Pinto de Souza,

&c. &c. &c.

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With general Friere, however, sir Hew Dalrymple declines to enter into discussions which he says "I think it *only* incumbent on me to explain to the government of the country." And on the communications of the general of the southern army, *a member of that very government*, he is more abrupt. "I *do not* think," says sir Hew Dalrymple, "I owe any account to the count of Monteiro Mor, if prescribed in the sort of terms he has deemed it expe-

Singular hauteur towards the Portuguese.

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dient to adopt, as to the measures it may be fit to pursue."

Existing circumstances, however, particularly the necessity for watching the public tranquillity, produced conciliation, and the intercourse between the different authorities became, though not quite free from interruption, more subservient to the interests of the war.

Change of com-
missioners dis-
advantageous to
their labour.

It is now time to turn to the execution of the convention, as it had been definitively ratified, for which purpose, although general Kellermann still continued as negotiator on the part of the French, and new difficulties must be expected to arise from a change on that of the English, colonel Murray was withdrawn, and lord Proby was commissioned on the part of the allies, to whom was afterwards added major-general Beresford. And although after many testimonies of approbation, sir Hew Dalrymple finally censures them, it excites wonder how, *unprepared in every way*, they were enabled to conclude the charge confided to them so well.

For how difficulty accumulated upon difficulty, till the treaty had become nearly a nullity, and certainly was not fulfilled either on the one side or the other. The following documents will explain themselves on the subject. It may be just previously

observed that the evil of private stipulations is immediately apparent.

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Lisbon, Sept. 3, 1808.

Dear sir,

I request you will inform his excellency the commander-in-chief, that general Junot has desired me to communicate with general Kellermann upon all subjects relating to the execution of the convention. The first division of French troops is ready to embark, and I have thought it right to communicate this information without loss of time to the admiral, and without waiting for the detailed return which I have demanded, of the troops' artillery-horses and equipments of every description, which the French propose to embark. I have at the same time submitted to the admiral the propriety of sending a naval officer to superintend the embarkation, and to answer all the questions that are put upon that subject.

Lord Proby to
captain Dalrym-
ple.

I have pressed the immediate liberation of the Spanish prisoners; and I have been informed, by general Kellermann, that there is a private agreement between colonel Murray and him, not to disembark those troops upon the right bank of the Tagus, and also not to give them up till the entrance of the British troops into Lisbon. I request further instructions from his excellency upon this subject,

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and in the mean time I have requested the commissary to inquire what articles of equipment they stand in need of, and to make all other necessary arrangements for their march to Madrid, if that should be the point to which the commander-in-chief thinks proper to send them. I have not yet seen their commander, but general Kellermann has promised to send him to me immediately.

General Junot has desired to know from me, if he will be permitted to appropriate five Danish ships, now fitting in the river, for his personal effects. I conceive the decision of this question to belong more immediately to the navy; but, as far as the army is concerned, I have answered in the negative, because the only mention made in the convention of additional conveyance is in the fourth article, and I understand that to relate solely to horses. General Kellermann claims the benefit of a private agreement with colonel Murray on this question also.

As soon as his excellency has determined the day upon which the garrisons are to be relieved, I hope to be informed of it. Mr. Kennedy has taken upon him to make all necessary arrangements for their subsistence upon the march.

As soon as I have received the returns that have been promised of the French troops, I will transmit them for the information of the commander-in-

chief, forwarding a copy of them at the same time to the admiral.

General Kellermann has desired me to inform the commander-in-chief, that he feels great apprehension of the outrages that may be committed by the populace, upon the day that may be fixed for the embarkation of the second division of the French troops, and that he hopes the British troops who take possession of Lisbon will not be less than 10,000 men, and that they will enter the town before the French are on board.

I have been furnished with a copy of the treaty here.

I remain always,

My dear sir,

Very faithfully yours,

(Signed) PROBY,

Lieutenant-colonel.

Captain Dalrymple,

&c. &c. &c.

Head-quarters, Cintra, September 4th, 1808.

My lord,

I am directed by his excellency the commander of the forces, to acquaint you, that lieutenant-colonel Murray assured general Kellermann, that the British commanders would be disposed to shew every attention to the recommendation of the French commander, which assurance

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Capt. Dalrym-
ple to lord Pro-
by.

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your lordship may safely renew; but the question of the Danish ships is already decided, and he should suppose the allotting five of them to carry off any effects with the French army would be inadmissible for many reasons. Amongst others, it is stated by the Portuguese as a fact, that valuable public and private property is at this moment embarking on board the Danish ships, or exposed to sale by the French army; a calumny which if, groundless, it behoves both the French and British generals to repel. This matter was so strongly pressed upon the general yesterday, and the examples were stated to be so glaring, that, though he was not disposed to credit the facts, he sent general Beresford as your colleague, to ease you of at least part of the vexation and labour which must arise in pursuing the necessary means to prevent the possible existence of any grounds, true or false, in which such an assertion may in future be speciously advanced. In the communications your lordship may have with the French generals on this subject, the commander of the forces thinks you should observe, that there will be British transports sufficient to carry all the effects which the French officers propose (under the convention) to remove, the French remaining in possession of the post for a certain period, where the Spaniards are confined, creates some difficulty on this point; the general

will, however, consent to their occupying Aldea Gallega, or any convenient place on the left bank of the Tagus, provided they are immediately disembarked.

(Signed) A. J. DALRYMPLE,
Captain, military secretary.

Lord Proby.

If any thing were wanting at once decisively to prove the irregular and inefficient manner in which the treaty had been framed and conducted altogether, it would have been the following documents; from which also in the first sentence of the first letter it is evident that the orders to those who were to execute it, under circumstances of evidently accumulating difficulties, and with the dissatisfaction of the country before the eyes of the British commander, were precisely of the same character.

Lisbon, 4th September, 1808.

Sir,

Though *not furnished with any precise instructions*, yet as from the several communications we have been honoured with from you, and more particularly in the letter of this date to lieutenant-colonel lord Proby from your military secretary, it *appears you understand* that, according to the convention with the French for the evacuation of Portugal, *there are limitations* in the quantity and

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General Beresford to sir Hew Dalrymple.

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nature of baggage to be carried away by them ; and as *they appear to consider* that they have by the convention a right to carry off, and that we are to furnish them with the conveyance for, whatever was in their possession previous to the ratification of the convention on the 30th August, however come by, or to whom belonging, and as they may quote some articles of the treaty *rather strongly* in their favour, and do on all occasions that which states, that whenever a doubt arises it must be construed favourable for the French, we think it necessary to apply to you, to be informed of the description of public and private property which we may, in conformity to the treaty, object to their embarking or carrying away.

It will be right to inform your excellency, that, with the exception of the military and naval arsenals and ships, there is no species whatever of public property that the French commanders appear to have the least inclination to relinquish, and we must particularly remark, that all the valuables of his royal highness the prince regent, and the plunder collected from the churches, much of which we have reason to think is still here, and much of the property of individuals, is intended to be carried off or sold. That, likewise, very lately, the royal library, and most of the articles in the museum of natural history, has been packed up, with

the intention of being carried off, and that not further back than the 29th of August, to the amount of about £22,000. has been taken from what is called the *Deposito Publico*, which is in fact a robbery of individuals, as it is money held in deposit, belonging to individuals, until litigations concerning it shall be decided.*

Besides that we consider that it is contrary to the understood laws of nations, and rules of war, to appropriate, by private distribution to individuals, what is ever considered as public property, (there is not at present the least apparent intention to give the slightest account of any public money or property whatever), we particularly believe, that when the object treated for is not a partial acquisition of territory in any country, but the entire of a country, that then, during a truce, in which case it is inadmissible that any requisition, or forced, or extraordinary receipt of public moneys can be made, particularly by the party demanding such truce, as it must be considered, to all intents and purposes, a military operation, and for a military object, in case of the failure of the negotiations, or in prejudice to the interests of those who have granted the truce, should the negotiation terminate in the

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* It cannot be too soon impressed that this money was ultimately carried away without any compensation.

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abandonment of the country by those making the requisition; and it cannot in candour be supposed, that the party praying a truce would be granted it, on such unfavourable terms to the superior power.

These considerations, however, we think it right to submit to your excellency, that we may be assured, on making our objections, of the ground we go on; as though this day, in our interview with the general Kellermann, we avoided touching on those delicate subjects, from the evasions and objections we met with in very plain and almost indifferent ones, we have reason to apprehend the most positive and violent remonstrances to any objections we shall make to their carrying away whatever they denominate property of the army.

We have the honour to be,

Your excellency's

Most obedient humble servants,

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD,

Major-general.

PROBY,

Lieutenant-colonel.

His excellency lieut.-gen. sir Hew Dalrymple.

Lisbon, 5th September 1808.

Sir,

General Beresford to sir Hew Dalrymple.

We have the honour to communicate to your excellency, that, in our interview yesterday

with general Kellermann, on the subject of speedily carrying into execution the convention made between the two armies, he requested that we would submit to your excellency the desire of the French general-in-chief, that the reliefs for their several garrisons in the interior should be sent with as little delay as possible, that the French troops might be enabled to proceed to their several points of embarkation and with the expectation that those coming from the interior here might arrive and sail with the last division of the troops now here.

General Kellermann having consented that the Spanish prisoners on board the ships in the harbour should be delivered to us whenever we could receive them, pressed strongly, that your excellency would be pleased to write to Badajos, that such French prisoners as were there, or in that neighbourhood, whose case would fall under the construction of the 18th article, should be sent to join, and proceed to Lisbon with the garrison of Elvas; and that similarly you would apply, that those in Galicia should be sent to Almeida.* We think it

* Among the French prisoners here alluded to, were those of the staff mentioned in the following report.

Armée Française en Portugal.

Etat Nominatif des Individus Non Combattants faits prisonniers de Guerre en Portugal.

Noms.	Grades.	Observations.
Thépir.	Commissaire de Guerre.	Fait Prisonier à Faro.

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necessary to remark here, that general Kellermann understands to be comprehended under this article the French general and others taken at Oporto, *which not being according to the express wording of the article, we objected to.* He however asserts, that *your excellency so understands it*; and we told him, that in such case there would be no difficulty, but we must refer the case to your excellency.

Though we have most frequently applied for the states of the French to be embarked, as also of the

Barchou.	Ditto.	Ditto, à Santerem.
Lefebvre Montabor.	Ditto.	} Ditto, à Coimbro.
Sanger.	Ditto.	
Rouvierol.	Chirugien Aide Major.	}
Allain.	Chirugien sous Aide,	
Fotanes.	Ditto.	
Barry.	Pharmacion Aide Major.	
Demarierce.	Ditto. sous Aide.	} Ditto. à Faro.
Desaa.	Econome d'Hospital.	
Kenel.	Informier.	
Barraquet.	Ditto.	
Golopir.	Ditto.	}
Satung de Ferrol.	Inspecteur des vivres.	
	Fait Prisonier à Badjoas.	
Viviand { Hector } { Pierre. }	Employé de vivres.	Ditto. à Oporto.
Donguay.	Ditto.	Ditto. à Thomar.
Sanvinet.	Ditto.	Ditto. Ditto.
Delbair Paul.	Ditto.	Ditto. à Oporto.
Vigarosi.	Ditto.	Ditto. à Viana.
Loup.	Ditto.	Ditto. à Oporto.
Garnoir Leclerc.	Ditto.	} Ditto. à Santarem.
Bien Aime.	Ditto.	
Charles.	Employé des vivres.	}
Gunid.	Ditto.	
		Ditto. à Thomar.

number of the Spanish prisoners now here, we have not been able to obtain either; by what we have learnt it however appears, that, including the garrisons in the interior, the French will have nearly 27,000 persons to embark, of which it appears about 22,000 will be troops.

It also appears, that the Spanish prisoners in their possession are between three and four thousand. We are promised an interview this morning with some of their officers (which we have already much pressed to have, but ineffectually,) when we shall be enabled to make some regulation for them; but it will be necessary that some officer of the quarter-master-general's department, previous to their landing, should fix upon a place on the other side of the Tagus for them to encamp, and so that they should not be in the neighbourhood of the French troops; nor can they be landed until the commissary-general's department has arranged for their subsistence, and we have not yet been favoured with a sight of Mr. Kennedy.

General Kellermann reports the first division of French ready to embark; but it is *impossible for us to make any arrangements on this head, without having some naval officer to communicate with, and for which we this day write to sir Charles Cotton, requesting he will appoint some one for the*

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superintendence of the embarkation, to remain on the spot.

We have the honour to remain,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servants,

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD,

Major-general.

PROBY,

Lieutenant-colonel.

To his excellency

Lieut. gen. sir Hew Dalrymple,

&c. &c. &c.

Lisbon, September 5, 1808.

Sir,

General Beres-
ford &c. to sir
Hew Dalrymple.

Since writing our letter of yesterday, on the subject of the convention, it has come to our positive knowledge, that the French have continued since the convention, and are now *this day actually demanding and receiving the moneys arising from the revenues of the country.* The particular case that has come to our knowledge is a demand from the French intendant, of the revenue Dos Venbos, and which was due on the 1st of this month, but only to be paid to him this day, and which we think it necessary, not only for the particular case, but for general information upon these subjects to guide us, to communicate to your excellency. We

shall in the mean time remonstrate with the French commissioners on these subjects.

We have the honour to be,

Your excellency's most obedient humble servants,

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD,

Major-general.

PROBY,

Lieutenant-colonel.

His excellency sir Hew Dalrymple,

&c. &c. &c.

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Lisbon, 6th September, 1808.

Sir,

We have the honour in our letter of this date to inform your excellency of the intimations we had made to general Kellermann, and of which, from the message we had received from your excellency by captain Wynyard, we were aware to have stretched as far as we possibly could. Our reason, however, for making the demand for the eighty cantos de reis, about £22,000 was from an article in the decree of the French commander-in-chief for its extraction, clearly inconsistent with the truce then established; and we have the utmost satisfaction in communicating to your excellency, that, on every point of the two letters annexed, our reasoning has been, after a very long discussion, fully admitted, and every point ceded as

General Beresford, &c to sir Hew Dalrymple

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of right to us; and by which we have established, that, from the first day of the truce, we have a right to every thing existing, not being military baggage or private property, and that every removal or appropriation of public property since that period must be replaced. It has been agreed that returns, as demanded of the administrators or receivers of the civil revenues, shall be furnished, and that whatever existed in the treasury or other civil revenues, in coin or treasure of any species, we have clearly a right to.

It has been also agreed, that the eighty cantos of reis, taken from the Deposito Publico, are to be immediately replaced, and if not in bullion, in such manner as will fully satisfy the trustees of the Deposito; and, in short, we are only to be satisfied when they express their being content to us. The obligation of restoring what has been taken from the royal and public libraries and museums, is fully admitted by general Kellermann, and if insisted on will be complied with. He however wished us to submit to the commander-in-chief of the British forces, that as what had been extracted from the museum were all duplicates, and that they were wanting to the Parisian museum, they would wish to be permitted to carry them off on any terms that they might be able to agree upon, and which request we could not refuse to transmit to your excellency,

though *we* were convinced *nothing but the restitution of the articles* could be listened to. We wait however on this subject for your directions.

General Kellermann having, after this full agreement expressed to us, promised to write his answer to the same effect, we had hoped with the copies of our demand hereto annexed, to have transmitted it to your excellency; but it has not yet been received, though he has since informed us it is wrote; and we must do him the justice to say, that *his proceeding and conduct in the discussion has been most candid, honourable, and gentlemanly.**

We have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servants,

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD,

Major-general.

PROBY,

Lieutenant-colonel.

To his excellency

Lieut.-gen. sir Hew Dalrymple,

&c. &c. &c.

Some illustration of the present subject, and also

French military
diplomacy.

* This praise belongs equally to the writers, unless when they deem it necessary to compliment the commander-in-chief, and palliate his errors, being themselves uninformed of their diplomatic character.

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of the character of general Kellermann's negotiation, will be obtained from the translation of two short notes from him in this place, on the matter detailed in the letters of the British commissioners.

Lisbon, 6th September, 1808.

Gentlemen,

Gen. Keller-
mann to gen.
Beresford, &c.

I have received the note which you did me the honour to address to me this morning, acquainting me that you had been informed, that certain specimens of natural history, and interesting manuscripts, had been withdrawn from the public library, to be carried to France. I am ignorant of any such arrangement, and doubtless it has been made by M. Guiffroi, member of the institute, who must have conceived that these articles being long since chosen, there could be no impropriety in withdrawing them ; the more so, as they are in general duplicates. But your claim having foundation, I shall take care to give orders that they are neither embarked, nor disordered. At the same time, I am to observe, that the specimens being in general duplicates, and a most desirable acquisition to the sciences, which are of all countries, and which, far from engaging in war, should always seek communication ; we are desirous of being enabled to take amicably the rarities

of natural history, on making whatever compensation you may judge necessary.*

I have the honour to be,

Your most humble and most obedient servant,

KELLERMANN, general of division,

Commissioner, &c.

To gen. Beresford & lord Proby,

the English commissioners.

Gentlemen,

In answer to your letter of this morning, in which you require of me that the receivers of contributions should yield an account of their funds, and of their receipts, since the 31st of August, I have the honour to acquaint you that I shall desire M. Herman, minister of finance, to give necessary orders and to superintend them with you, to give you, in this respect, every satisfaction you can desire.

In regard to the second article, on the withdrawing asum of £22,000 from the public depot, which you claim to be re-instated, I am to say, that his excellency being in want of ready money to pay the workmen of the arsenal, and many urgent expenses relative to the Portuguese, he has found

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Gen. Keller-
mann to gen.
Beresford, &c.

* Had due caution been used in other respects, how delightful must have been an amicable arrangement in this case, which might have been highly advantageous to the world.

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it necessary to make use of this sum ; but I am authorised to say, that he will cause to be remitted into its coffers, public effects amounting to an equivalent sum, and that, if there should be any difference between cash and paper, it shall be provided that that difference be paid. This is also a matter which M. Herman can arrange, as within his character, or, if you prefer it, the agents of the depot.

I have the honour &c. &c.

KELLERMANN.

To these may be added the French general orders.

General Orders of the Army. No. 66.

Head-quarters, Lisbon, 6th September, 1808.

French general
orders.

In execution of the 15th article of the definitive convention, the general commanding-in-chief orders every individual forming a part of the army, or of the French administration, who may have taken any effects belonging to public establishments or private persons, to restore them within 24 hours, whether movables, or in the class of the arts.

THIEBAULT, General.

Order of the Army. No. 67.

Head-quarters, Lisbon, 7th September, 1808.

The lord duke of Abrantes again recommends

the strict execution of the general order of the army of the 6th instant, under the No. 66.

He directs, in consequence, the superior officers to observe, that, there be not embarked any thing proceeding from any royal palace whatever, not belonging to the baggage of corps.

His excellency forewarns the army, that, whoever infringes the present order, will be deprived of any benefit, as having broken the articles of the treaty of evacuation, and that it will be reported to his majesty the emperor.

This order to be twice read at the head of companies.

THIEBAULT, general,

Chief of the staff, major-general.

The transaction of the difficult affair is thus continued :

Lisbon, 6th September, 1808.

Sir,

We have the honour to annex for your excellency a representation received this day from the Portuguese merchants of Lisbon, and which being intended for your excellency, we do not propose taking any steps without your particular directions.

We have the honour to annex a paper that has been circulated here, which has caused very considerable sensation, the people remaining in doubt if it is an authentic publication, or one by the French to quiet the town, till they shall have carried off all their plunder : it is certainly anonymous.

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We have this day thought it expedient to require of general Kellermann, an account of what moneys or treasures remained of the revenues ordinary or extraordinary in the civil treasuries, as of what had been since received, and also to express a hope, that, on a review of the case, the general-in-chief of the French army would direct the restitution of the sum taken during the truce from the Deposito Publico. No answer has been yet received, nor can we look to any acquiescence on their part, when it is to disgorge their plunder; we will however more fully enter into this business when we receive an answer.

Having ascertained the articles extracted from the libraries and museum, we have thought right to apply generally to general Kellermann for their immediate restitution. A copy of our letter and the answer shall be sent when the latter is received.

We have the honour to remain,

Sir, your most obedient humble servants,

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD,

Major-general.

PROBY, lieutenant-colonel.

His excellency lieut.-gen. sir Hew Dalrymple,

&c. &c. &c.

Address of the
Lisbon mer-
chants on the
moneys extorted
from them by
the French army

Illustrious and excellent sir,

The merchants of the exchange of Lisbon,

undersigned, represent to your excellency that the general-in-chief of the French army, Junot, exacted from the petitioners a forced loan of two millions of crusadoes for the expenses of his aforesaid army. This debt must be paid from every principle of reason and justice. And effectually that same general promised that the payment thereof should be made out of the war-contribution of forty millions, which were imposed on this kingdom from principles of the purest despotism. Now, however, that general Junot retires from Lisbon, vanquished by the arms of his Britannic majesty, he does not attend to realize this promised payment. This new proof of despotism is singular, and whatever the military conventions may be, he cannot dispense himself from the necessary explanation thereon; and the petitioners demand of your excellency the performance of the agreement subsisting on this head. They, in like manner, require of your excellency, to direct, that the moneys withdrawn from the public deposit should be restored to it, for this plain reason, that they did not belong to the crown, but to the petitioners, to their absent partners, to widows, orphans, and captives; as the appolices (or public bonds and notes), substituted in their place, in the coffers, by the discredit (or discount) they lay under, do not suffice for their full payment, and also, because this property does not

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belong to the French. They moreover demand, that the civil servants employed in the army should give in accounts to the proper administrations (or boards) of the moneys received, in order that the petitioners may know the claims they may have to make; and finally, that the petitioners may have secured to them their ships and their cargoes, which have been unlawfully detained and sequestered, by mere force, in the maritime ports of France.

And that they may receive favour. Signed—

Mr de Souza, Friere & Ca,	Luis Cypriani Rabelho,
Francisco Ker da Mara,	Bugo Ant. per Pinto,
Antonio Estuas Porta,	José Gomez Ferr,
Pedro Joze da Silva,	Per Antonio Mey. Pedro & Ca,
Po Leandro Los Reyslarrill,	Francisco Abs. de la Vian,
Anadito de Silva,	José Percira Gune,
Jonó Gonçalves Marques,	Francisco Abs. de lea Vrian,
Isidoro de Monceyda,	Luise Cond ^d Marmelader,
José Glu. da Cruz,	Aetonio Pires Leal & Sebroz,
Vieuv Captista L. S.	Gregorio José da S ^a ,
Bernado José da Maxus,	Jonó Miz. Ferr & Ca,
Manuel José de Figuarduss,	Jonó Ant. de Nemin S ^a ,
Jonó Bonifacio pea Gumb,	Jonó Andz d' Am ^{de} , 1808,
Francisco Joize Roiz Aquiron,	José Abi Branus,
Jonó Lourenço da Cruz,	Dom. Gomez Lourg,
Ant ^e José Bapt ^a de Sales,	Joaquim Percira da Silva,
Jonó da Silva, Ribeira,	Gervazio Pirez S ^r ,
Cattano Martinez da Silva,	José Ant. Ferr. Vianna,
Francisco José Per ^e ,	Jonó du S ^a Braga d' Fromaq,
Domingo de Meira Torros,	Os. Endiros de José de la Bran-
José Antonio de Seg ^r Notre,	das,

Scuria Ningu,
Ant. Sem^{ty} Roncado,
Domingos Aris Bretimas,
José de la Plungerge,

Manuel José de S^a Servid,
José Nunes de Silvo,
Francisco Antononio Ferreira,
Barão d' Gentitta.

Head-quarters, Oeyras, Sept. 6th; 1808.

Gentlemen,

I affixed my signature yesterday to a paper drawn up by lieutenant-colonel Murray, which, I think, contains the most satisfactory proofs that the French have no right to carry off plunder of any sort, at least, while in its original form, and not converted into money; under that interpretation you are to act. I think my own honour, and that of the British nation, concerned that the convention should not be otherwise considered, and I will not listen to any proposal which can compromise either.

I have this day had a deputation from Lisbon, to complain of the depredations even lately committed, and the shameless and open manner in which public and private property is preparing for removal, and that the fermentation in the minds of the people is coming to the highest pitch of exaltation. I learn from many, and very respectable quarters, that from this, combined with the interpretation the French from their conduct affect to give the convention, *the popular rage is little less directed against the English than the French nation*, and I may find that the common measures of police, which the French generals themselves are anxious

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Sir Hew Dalrymple to general Beresford and lord Proby.

Too late decision of the British commander.

The English supposed defeated, or as compromising with the French

Consequent relations of the Portuguese and the English at this time.

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that I should pursue, may be considered as arrangements to secure to the French the fruits of those depredations we have sanctioned by treaty.*

Under these considerations, I think it right to suggest to you, the *probable expediency* of requiring the French to restore to their places forthwith, the objects of the arts, and other articles, whether of public or private property, which have been taken thence for the purpose of removal, by that means affording a proof to the Portuguese nation, that we, at least, act with good faith, and are therefore entitled to use the necessary measures, however vigorous, for the protection of those obnoxious persons for whose safety that faith is pledged.

I do not mean by this letter to over-rule those arrangements which, from your local information, and your own judgment, you may have seen cause to adopt: but you are authorized by it, if you see occasion so to do (clearly explaining the motive to the French general), to require the demonstration that the system of plunder is overruled and abandoned which I have here detailed.

(Signed) H. W. DALRYMPLE,
Lieutenant-general.

Major-general Beresford and lord Proby.

* How much the want of communication with the Portuguese authorities both civil and military, previous to the definitive convention, is here felt,—how lamentably does it prove the evil and absurdity of their exception. This letter is written with great sense and judgment, but it is exercised too late.

The following is the paper alluded to in the preceding letter.

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Head-quarters, Oeyras, 5th Sept. 1808.

The ground on which you have to go in regard to the property to be embarked by the French army is this :

The second article of the convention states, that the French army is to evacuate Portugal, with its arms and baggage, and is founded on the 5th article of the agreement for a suspension of hostilities.

Enclosure.

It is evident, that the words " the baggage of an army," or the private property of the individuals composing it, can never be construed to mean the valuables of his royal highness the prince regent, nor the plunder of churches, the royal library, nor the museum of natural history. And still less can the Deposito Publico, or any part of it, under the description you have given of that fund, be claimed by the French general, under either of the articles above-mentioned, or any others of the preliminary or definitive treaty.

Whatever is liberal on the part of one army to another, on the most fair construction of the articles of the convention, I am ready most willingly to fulfil, but I do not authorize you to go further.

The article specifying that where doubts arise, the matter will be explained favourably to the

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French army, must be considered as having reference to whatever regards its interest or its honour as an army, but can never be allowed to become a cloak to a system of plunder, to gratify either the avarice of individuals, or even that of the French government.

You should be aware that, in the course of the negotiations at Lisbon, an article was framed, specifying, in direct terms, that the property of churches, monasteries, galleries of painting, &c. should not be carried away. But this article was, at last, withdrawn, on the repeated representation of general Kellermann, that its being introduced into a public document, appeared so reproachful to the French army, that the commander-in-chief particularly wished it could be omitted. And that he was willing, on that condition, to pledge his word of honour, that nothing of the kind should be removed.

It was stated to lieutenant-colonel Murray, that there had been no plunder committed of the nature the proposed article seemed to imply. That a contribution had been regularly levied on the church for the public service, and that the produce of it had been expended, and, of course, we did not mean to re-demand that in which colonel Murray concurred. General Kellermann, however, disavowed all knowledge of the appropriation, by any

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individual, of any public or private property belonging to this country, with the sole exception of some horses and mules, taken for the service of the army, and some carriages, of no great value, left behind by the court.

The general disclaimed all idea of military men conducting themselves with such a spirit of individual rapacity as has been, in some instances, attributed to the French officers, and even expressed his hope that, if there were any such persons in the army, they might reap no benefit from their misconduct.

It is proper to add, in respect to that part of your letter of this day's date, which relates to the revenues of the country, that the French can have no manner of claim upon them after the date of the convention. And as to all arrears of requisitions or contributions, of whatever description, they are cancelled by an express article of the convention.

H. W. DALRYMPLE.

Major-general Beresford, &c. &c. &c.

Right hon. lieut.-col. lord Proby.

Head-quarters, Oeyras, 7th Sept. 1808.

Gentlemen,

After acknowledging your letters of yesterday, and expressing the obligation I feel to you, for the proper and firm manner in which

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rymple to gen.
Beresford, &c.

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you are executing your important mission, it remains for me to reply to general Kellermann's proposal, as to the duplicates extracted from the museum, which must be decidedly in the negative. Those articles *not being mine to dispose of*,* I will not allow them to be removed.

(Signed)

H. W. DALRYMPLE,
Lieutenant-general.Major-general Beresford.
and lord Proby.

Lisbon, 7th September, 1808.

Sir,

General Beresford to major Dalrymple.

We have the honour to state, that we had again this morning an audience of some hours with general Kellermann, on the subject of what related to the due execution of the treaty, and, except in what regarded the restitution of the silver, not coined into money, he acceded in the fullest manner, and has informed us, that the general-in-chief of the French army has issued an *ordre du jour*,† directing every person, having the private property, whether in pictures or other movables, immediately to restore them to the owners; and has informed us, that, in case any thing is detained,

* But general sir Hew Dalrymple *did* dispose of them, and did not deem their owners necessary to be provided for in his treaty.

† General orders—Order of a particular day.

the owners, on pointing out their property, shall have it restored.

In regard to the silver in bars and uncoined, we had a long, and sometimes warm, argument, and general Kellermann most strenuously insisted, that the convention *guaranteed to them whatever was in their possession previous to the first day of the truce*; and finally we parted, with his most positive declaration, that on this head they would not yield. We exposed to him our reasons for differing in opinion, founded on the article of the convention that restricts them to the carrying off other than military and personal baggage, and on the understanding between general Kellerman and lieutenant-colonel Murray; to which the former, though he assented to the substance of what lieutenant-colonel Murray states, declares it neither could nor was to have any reference to what had been received previous to the commencement of the truce. Not being, however, able to bring general Kellermann to assent to what appeared to us so clear and reasonable, we left him, with the declaration, that the British commander-in-chief would never consent to any other construction being put on the convention. I had partly wrote to your excellency what passed at our interview when general Kellermann was announced, and who stated, that he came from general Junot, who consented, that in

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regard to the complaints we made of the magazines of various kinds being disposed of in a manner very inconsistent with the treaty, they should be all put in the state they were on the commencement of the truce, making proper allowances for fair expenditure ; that every thing belonging to the royal houses, libraries, museums, and of what articles that had been taken from individuals, that yet remained in the country, should be restored ; and that, in respect to the church-plate in bars, though they would not acknowledge that, by the treaty, they were under any obligation, yet they consented not to take any out of the country ; that they would pay with it the debts of the army, for which purpose it had ever been expressly intended ; and that if, after they had paid their debts, any remained, it should be delivered up. To this we answered, that not being precisely what we were instructed to require, we could not give any answer to, but would transmit the proposal to your excellency, and which we have the honour of now doing ; and general Kellermann states, that, *if it is not acceded to, he will himself, to-morrow morning, proceed to your excellency's head-quarters.* We must acknowledge that *it appears to us, that by the convention we can scarcely require more ;* but in this we submit to your excellency, whose orders

on the subject we request, and have the honour to remain,

Your excellency's

most obedient humble servants,

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD, M. G.

PROBY, L. C.

A. J. Dalrymple, major and military secretary.

Head-quarters, Augras, Sept. 8, 1808.

Gentlemen,

According to lieutenant-colonel Murray's report, upon that part of the convention which relates to the bars, or ingots of silver, general Kellermann's offer seems fair, and may be acceded to.

Sir Hew Dalrymple to gen. Beresford, &c.

The order du jour of the commander-in-chief of the French army is also satisfactory, provided it is made public in Lisbon; but care must be taken, that the reclamations are backed by us, and that the claimants meet with redress, and are protected from insult.

Lieutenant-general Hope is gone or going into Lisbon; he will have full powers to do what may be needful, by persuasion, or force, to keep the public peace.

(Signed) H. W. DALRYMPLE.

Major-general Beresford and lord Proby.

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Gen. Beresford,
&c. to lieutenant-
general sir Hew
Dalrymple.

Lisbon, Sept. 8, 1808.

Sir,

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter, according to the proposition of the French general-in-chief, for the disposal of the remaining gold and silver, arising from the contributions on the country, and we have notified your excellency's consent to the French commissioners.

We had yesterday, immediately after writing to your excellency, required, by letter of general Kellermann, that the intention to make restitution of all private property, as of that from the royal and public libraries and museums, should be made public, and inviting him to point out how to fulfil this object with the least danger to the tranquillity of the town; and by his answer, received this morning, he thinks that the *ordre de jour* sufficient; but we have again enforced upon the general's observation, that both parties, not the French troops only, should be made acquainted with what they are equally concerned. The general-in-chief has repeated the prohibitions, in orders of which we now annex copies.

We have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD, M. G.

PROBY, Lieutenant-col.

His excellency lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple.

*Lisbon, Sept. 11, 1808.*BOOK II.
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Sir,

We have the honour to communicate to your excellency, that yesterday the committee for receiving reclamations commenced its sitting, and we have great satisfaction in informing you, with very considerable effect; and, we are informed, the measure gives pretty general satisfaction. We annex a publication that we thought fit to make; it has been, contrary to our intention, printed in English and Portuguese, the former from a rough copy, and with some of general Kellermann's amendments to it, and we had not taken the trouble to revise it, not expecting more than the translation to be printed.

In the course of the investigation of the committee, a question has arisen on which we had, with general Kellermann, a correspondence, and would this day, most probably, have had a very long argument, but we thought it better to put our sentiments on paper, and submit them to general Kellermann, which was done; and we transmit to your excellency a copy of what we signed before him; and we have to regret that he persists in his opposition to our first proposed manner of ascertaining property; and has declared, that he will rather prefer having the baggage searched. We transmit the correspondence we have had on this subject, and request your excellency's orders for our further direction.

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It having been agreed upon, that the royal stables were to be placed in precisely the same state as they were on the 30th June, we found it our duty to require all the horses taken from them since that period to be returned; and the only difficulty on this head is, about ten chesnut horses, that general Junot had, since then, ordered to be taken from the stables, and which have been embarked. These horses, general Kellermann informed us, general Junot had appropriated to himself many months previous to the convention; that they had been sometimes kept in the royal stables, and sometimes in general Junot's in town; and that their being in the former, on the 30th June, was merely accidental.

We did not find ourselves authorized to depart from the strict letter of the convention, and all horses and mules in the royal stables on the 30th, and which were really belonging to his royal highness that had been taken away, should be restored, but we determined to submit this particular case to your excellency.

We regret to say that general Kellermann has brought up to-day a new pretension, viz. besides the 800 horses admitted to be embarked for the troops and officers, they have a right to embark as many as they please belonging to the artillery, and that they do absolutely mean to embark 60. This, of course, was absolutely denied, but he still persisted, and said it could be so construed from the French

copy of the convention ; which, however, we have not seen. We had flattered ourselves that every possibility of misunderstanding the terms of the convention had been provided against by our late explanation, but we fear the ingenuity of man cannot provide against French cavil and ingenuity in misconstruction.

We certainly do not find concession is the likeliest expedient for avoiding new pretensions.

We have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD, M.G.

PROBY, lieut.-col.

P.S. General Kellermann's letter has been mislaid ; our answer is enclosed.

For the purpose of remedying as much as possible the evils which had accumulated upon the execution of the convention, the means were taken described in the following paper :

Proclamation by the British and French Commissioners for seeing carried into Effect the Convention agreed upon between the respective Commanders-in-Chief.

For the fulfilment of the stipulations made in the convention agreed upon for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army, that property of every kind, confiscated or seized from subjects, or other

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persons, residing in Portugal, whether from the royal palace, royal and public libraries, and museums, and from individuals, which is still existing and in Portugal, should be restored.

We, the commissioners for seeing carried into execution the said treaty, (his excellency the commander-in-chief of the French army having already notified to his army,) think it also right to make public the same for the information of all concerned; and to facilitate the restitution, or the receiving back such property, we have judged it expedient to appoint a committee of three persons; viz. lieutenant-colonel Frant, St. Antonio Rodrigues de Oliveira, and Mr. Dubliur, commissaire des guerres, to meet at Largo de Loretto, No. 8, who are appointed to receive, inquire into, and judge of all reclamations on this head; and whose orders for the restitution of property, to whomsoever addressed, are to be obeyed. And it is directed, that keepers shall have the charge of sequestered or seized property, in every house to which it may have been removed, to assure the conservation of object, or moveables, transported from royal or private houses to other, for the use or convenience of such general administrator, or other subjects of the French army. These keepers will mark the description of all meubles, with the name of the owners, and be accountable that whatever is therein, be delivered only on legal proof of ownership, to the possessor of such

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articles as above described, will transmit to this committee a return of what each may have in his possession of the property designated. And all persons may with safety apply to this tribunal.

We think it necessary, also, to make known, to whom it may concern, that any purchase made of articles taken from the public arsenals or stores, since the 30th of August, or whatever shall, on trial, be proved to have been illegally sold or disposed of, at any time previous to the 30th of August, shall be null and void, the articles seized, and the persons purchasing, subject to what the law may further direct.

The committee assembled to receive reclamations and facilitate the restitution of property hold its sittings at the house of St. Antonio Rodrigues de Oliviera, No. 8, Largo de Loretto.

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD, M.G.
PROBY, lieut.-col.

British commissioners.

Le gen. KELLERMANN,


Le commissaire Français pour l'exécution
de la convention du 30e Août.

Lisbon, Sept. 10, 1808.

Head-quarters, Ocyras, Sept. 12, 1808.

Gentlemen,

I enclose a letter from general Kellermann,

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to which, if you think proper, you may give the following reply.*

You may tell the general, that he does me justice in admitting that I have endeavoured to mark to him the personal esteem and consideration which I have felt, and which your testimony could not fail to increase, and of which I avail myself of this opportunity to renew the assurances; it is, nevertheless, my opinion, that the direct reference from him to me, contained in your letter of the 10th,† is not altogether in rule.

The general mistakes in supposing that I conceived any explanation of the article which has for its object the embarkation of baggage necessary, it was framed in its present form after much discussion, and is couched in terms, though studiously delicate, yet that admit of no misconception.

Upon that article no real doubts can arise; and I think it necessary, to the honour of both armies, that it be interpreted according to its plain and obvious meaning, and that no ground for suspicion be afforded; that the 14th article was inserted merely to supply an argument to cover a question, that it

* No copy of this letter was kept; the original was never returned.

Signed H. W. Dalrymple.

† This letter has not been kept.—H. W. D. It may be asked, Why not?

was foreseen by the French general must necessarily arise.

I am ready to admit, that general Kellermann is placed in a very painful predicament; but I am sorry he thought himself reduced to the necessity of using the argument which he founds on the decreasing strength of the French army, since the commencement of its embarkation. I think I gave him my sentiments with so much openness and candour, before that operation began, that I had precluded the possibility of any such remark.

I have nothing now to add, except that I enclosed your letter of yesterday to the admiral, from whom I have received the enclosed reply.

(Signed) H. W. DALRYMPLE.

Major-gen. Beresford and lieut.-col. lord Proby.

Lisbon, 12th September, 1808.

Sir,

Since writing our letter of yesterday, on the subject of the conference we had with general Kellermann, relative to the restitution of Portuguese or other seized property, captain Halkett, who is superintending the embarkation of the French, has communicated to us, that fifty-three boxes of indigo have been found on board the ship destined to receive the French general-in-

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Gen. Beresford,
&c. to lieut.-
gen. sir Hew
Dalrymple.

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chief's baggage; and which was embarked as a part of it. The value of this we understand to be about £ 5,000 original cost here. The French general-in-chief has since communicated to us the circumstance, disclaiming any knowledge of this transaction; and we have, without hesitation, assured him, that the general-in-chief of the British army, and every officer in it, would acquit him, personally, on this head, that it was impossible for him to inspect or to know what was to be done in his name; but we took the opportunity of remarking, that this transaction most clearly proved the necessity of the fullest investigation of what was embarked; and that, as they had refused our proposal of yesterday, we saw no other means than searching; and that we had reported to your excellency the case.

The thirteen ships which we mentioned to you yesterday, as appropriated to the "employs" of the army, and of which we inadvertently said, the cabins would be sufficient to accommodate, we still understand are considerably loaded, certainly much more than any personal baggage could occasion, and much is also in the Danish ships.

We have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD, M. G.

PROBY, lieutenant-col.

Lieut.-gen. sir Hew Dalrymple, &c. &c.

Lisbon, Sept. 12, 1808.

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Sir,

We have received a letter from general Kellermann, complaining of the publication of the proclamation informing the inhabitants of Lisbon of their right to claim the restoration of all property taken from them by the French, and still existing in their possession. We conceive the publication to have been made entirely with his concurrence; and we submit to your excellency the correspondence that has passed between us upon this subject.

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Gen. Beresford, &c. to lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple.

We have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) C. W. BERESFORD.

PROBY.

Sir Hew Dalrymple.

Head-quarters, 15th Sept. 1808.

Gentlemen,

I have received the honour of your letter, covering the enclosed paper, and beg you to signify to general Kellermann, that no article of the convention authorizes the general-in-chief of the French army to name a French consul at Lisbon; every thing connected with that question will naturally come under the consideration of the civil government of Portugal.

Gen. Beresford, &c. to sir Hew Dalrymple.

(Signed) H. W. DALRYMPLE.

Major-gen. Beresford and lord Proby.

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The enclosed paper was a simple appointment,
as follows :

We name M. Murer, French consul at Lisbon, commissioner charged with the interests of the French merchants in Portugal, after the departure of the army, in consequence of the 16th article of the definitive convention, concluded the 31st of August, 1808, between the two armies, French and English.

ABRANTES.

*At the Palace, head-quarters,
Lisbon, Sept. 4, 1808.*

Lisbon, Sept. 16, 1808.

Sir,

Gen. Beresford,
&c. to sir Hew
Dalrymple.

It having been agreed upon, between general Kellerman and us, that compensation shall be given by the French, for articles taken out of the public stores, in violation of the convention, we request that a person may be appointed to receive it, and ascertain that what is offered in compensation is equivalent to what has been purloined.

We have heard that large sums have been distributed to the French regiments, to carry off, in their regimental chests, in addition to the three months pay for the whole army in the general military chest; the 70th regiment, in particular, is

supposed to have with them a sum of 100,000 crowns; we submit whether it will not be proper to ascertain the truth of this information by search.

We have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD, M. G.

PROBY, lieutenant-col.

His excellency sir Hew Dalrymple, &c.

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After the various difficulties we have seen, the British commissioners were enabled to draw up the following report: and considering the talent evinced in a transaction of so complex a nature, and the energy displayed in the most ungracious offices, it is much to be lamented that such a document remains on record respecting them; or that they had not applied epithets and censures which are not becomingly introduced in a public instrument, to those whose want of judgement and energy permitted such a convention, rather than the *warrantable* finesse, and the cupidity of the French.

Lisbon, Sept. 18th, 1808.

The commissioners for executing the convention of the 30th August were informed, on their arrival in Lisbon, that individuals of the French army were selling, and preparing for embarkation, property to

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&c. to sir Hew
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a large amount, which had been plundered in the most singular manner, without the acknowledged permission from general Junot. They also received intelligence that church-plate, arising from the extraordinary contributions, to the amount of forty thousand pounds, had been melted into bars, and was still in the hands of different French administrators, apparently intended to be carried to France; that a sum of about twenty-five thousand pounds, taken from the Deposito Publico of the city of Lisbon, on the 29th of August, was placed the same day in the treasury of the kingdom, and removed from thence, on the 2d of September, in direct violation of the convention, for the purpose of being paid into the military chest of the army; and it was also proved, that, with a still more shameless disregard of the stipulations of the treaty, effects had been taken out of the public magazines for the equipment of the French troops, and for the payment of debts, by the express order of general Junot, subsequent to the ratification, to the amount, as was afterwards ascertained, of about sixteen thousand pounds.

Upon the question of the plundered property, the commissioners, after some discussion, persuaded general Kellermann to agree with them in thinking, that the restitution of all such effects was equally demanded by a due regard to the honour of both

armies, and by the spirit of the convention; and it was by his recommendation that the accompanying general orders were issued by general Junot to his army. These orders produced no effect whatever, although the reclamations of the inhabitants of Lisbon were hourly increasing, and many of those presented to the commissioners were for effects of very great value. Much correspondence took place with general Kellermann on this subject, both in interviews and by writing. All the communications of the general were marked by subterfuge and vain professing, and the commissioners were obliged at last to insist on the establishment of a committee, to inquire into all the claims presented to the Portuguese, and to be furnished, for that purpose, with full authority to summon persons, and to order restitution.

The city of Lisbon was informed of the institution of that committee, by the enclosed proclamation, signed by the commissioners on both sides. The labours of the committee have been attended with the best effects; they were continued till all the French had left the Tagus, and have obtained restitution of private and public property, to a very great amount, according to the report of the British member of the committee, lieutenant-colonel Trant, whose zeal and assiduity in this duty were most meritorious.

With respect to the church-plate, the commis-

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sioners found no article of the treaty which authorized them to claim it, but as the fifth article clearly defines what it is that the French army is allowed to carry off, and as silver, in bars, and even money to an unlimited amount, cannot fairly be said to be a military chest, they submitted their opinions upon this subject to head-quarters, on the fifth of Sept. and the enclosed letters, the one containing col. Murray's understanding of the convention, the other the instructions of the commander-in-chief, induced them to inform general Kellermann, that this silver could not be carried away in British vessels; but the convention not authorizing the commissioners to seize upon it, it was agreed it should be applied to the payment of debts contracted by the French army in Portugal; and this is the manner in which it has actually been disposed of; and by which the amount has been retained in Portugal, the object of the commissioners.

General Kellermann retracted the consent he gave in the first instance to the proposals made to him upon this subject: he appealed to the decision of the commander-in-chief of the British forces; and it was in consequence of this misunderstanding, and in the presence of his excellency and colonel Murray, that the enclosed explanation* of the

* See p. 367 for the paper mentioned in sir Hew Dalrymple's letter of the 6th Sept. drawn up by col. Murray.

convention was agreed to by both parties, at Oeras, on the 5th of September.

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The commissioners demanded the restitution of the £22,000 taken from the Deposito Publico, very soon after their arrival in Lisbon; they also required that complete satisfaction should be given to the directors of magazines, from which effects had been removed subsequent to the 30th of August. The justice of these demands was acknowledged, and promises of immediate payment were made, as early as the 7th of September: these promises, however, had not been fulfilled when general Junot went on board; and when he was called upon to execute them, it was represented by general Kellermann to the commissioners, that the sum of money remaining in the caisse militaire did not amount to the sixty thousand pounds which the explanation of the convention acknowledged to be a fair military-chest; and that, under these circumstances, he considered the agreement entered into to refund the sums extracted from the Deposito Publico, and to restore or give compensation for the articles extracted from the public magazines, as cancelled. The validity of this reasoning was, of course, not admitted; and the commissioners applied to admiral sir Charles Cotton to detain the second division of the French, as well as general Junot, until these points should be satisfactorily

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arranged. After much litigation and discussion, it was agreed, by general Kellermann, that the forty thousand pounds required for these two objects should be supplied from the *caisse militaire*. During the three last days that general Junot was in the river, orders were repeatedly given by general Kellermann, to the *payeur-général*, to this effect; but they were always evaded, under some frivolous pretext, by that gentleman; and the commissioners were obliged to order him on shore to the arsenal, with his chest, when the money was at length paid.

Some chests of natural history, taken from the royal museum, were restored without much difficulty, as were also a number of books, collected from public libraries, and from those of Anaia and Anjuja, for the private use of general Junot. A Bible, of great value, was repeatedly claimed; and it was asserted, by those in whose charge it had been, that it was certainly still within reach at the moment the commissioners demanded it. But they were not able to obtain its restitution; general Junot having authorized general Kellermann to give his honour, in writing, that it had been sent to France.

We will conclude this report by stating, that the conduct of the French has been marked by the most shameful disregard to honour and probity, publicly

evinced their intention of carrying off their plundered booty, and leaving acknowledged debts unpaid; and, finally, they have only paid what they were obliged to disgorge, and were not permitted to carry off, though the British commissioners represented to general Kellermann, that, whatsoever the words, it could never be the spirit of any convention, that an army should, as a military-chest, or otherwise, carry off public money, leaving public debts unpaid; and called upon him for the honour of the French army and nation, to act justly: and yet, unmindful of any tie of honour or of justice, the French army has taken away a considerable sum in the military chest, leaving its debts unpaid, to a very large amount.

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD, M. G.

PROBY, lieutenant-colonel.

His excellency, lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple.

Of this report, sir Hew Dalrymple was apparently ashamed, and with principle quite compatible with the remainder of his conduct on this disastrous business, when it afterwards came to be produced as a public instrument, before a military court, thus impugned the respectable persons whom he had burthened with such an obnoxious proceeding.

The general report of the proceedings of the

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commissioners, employed to carry into effect the provisions of the convention, was *made so late* that it was given to me as I was actually on the way to embark for England. *I was* as much *surprised* as the court probably will be, after having heard the correspondence read, that sums so considerable had been carried off, as the report states, because, *if that fact was known, it might have been prevented.*

H. W. DALRYMPLE, L. G.

To wind up the account of this eventful negotiation, there yet, strange to say, remains the following incidental communication, tending to shew how completely its embarrassments extended in every direction.

Head-quarters, Benefico, Sept. 30th.

Sir,

Sir Hew Dal-
rymple to gene-
ral Beresford.

It was certainly proper to do what we could to get Spanish horses for the troops that were detained, and had it been earlier adverted to, *it might have been well to stipulate in the convention for the restoration* of those horses that remained; but I cannot acknowledge the principle, that we are bound to give them horse for horse.

I have no objection to give the province of Ca-

talonia ninety thousand hard dollars for the remount of their cavalry, which comes nearly to the same thing; but I shall soon feel myself too far engaged in advances without specific authority.

If you can settle this with the consul-general, I will give the necessary authority : but if he demurs about the business, notwithstanding what I have said, the case must be re-considered.

(Signed) H. W. DALRYMPLE.

Lieutenant-gen.

To major-general Beresford.

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The British public, not prone to receive coolly any political injury, soon became a party to the rumours and recriminations of the commanders of the army; and consequently the public journals, those exact mirrors of the public mind, teemed with the most violent, and yet apparently discriminating, reprehension; new facts were daily produced, and the matter sifted by every means, according to the character of the journalist.

Effects of the convention on the public mind.

Whatever were the differences of opinion, in one thing they were all agreed,—the condemnation of the convention entirely.

The following is selected as a specimen of the warmth with which it was combatted, from the most respectable of the London morning papers.*

* The Times, 19th September, 1808.

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“The convention of Lisbon still continues to make every tongue eloquent, and every heart bleed, in those parts of the island where the Extraordinary Gazette has found its way ; and, as we farther learn, throughout the army of Portugal, whose labours have terminated so unsuccessfully. The honour of the country has been sacrificed, its fairest hopes blasted, the reputation of its arms tarnished, the resources of the enemy increased and concentrated, the plunder of our allies sanctioned, the pride of our invincible navy insulted, and the feelings of our gallant seamen injured and corroded beyond expression. One can feel, therefore, but little inclination to laugh at the authors of such wrongs. Who can think, without tears of rage and bitterness, of an English fleet at this moment employed in carrying home a well-appointed French army, along with their colours, arms, ammunition, baggage, and plunder, in order to unite in a fresh expedition against the liberties and honour of Spain. A curse, a deep curse, wring the heart and wither the hand that were base enough to devise and execute this cruel injury on their country's peace and honour. But all the world is now calling out, who gave Dalrymple, and Burrard, and Cotton, their appointments ? The country should have called out as loudly as we did, who gave Whitelocke his appointment, and then the occasion for clamouring now would have

been removed, — Dalrymple and Burrard would never have had their appointments. But why are these men to be singled out? they are not the only persons implicated in the mischief. Come forth, sir Arthur Wellesley! you are the man who first signed, in the fifth article of your treaty, ‘that the French army should in no case be considered as prisoners of war’ to the men who had the very day before conquered them: but, above all, you signed that article of an armistice, by which you agreed that an enemy’s fleet should ride in safety in the Tagus, “after our army and fleet had obtained possession of the town and port of Lisbon.” Human credulity can hardly believe that any thing so monstrously injurious to your country could have entered into the heart of the basest of her sons, and still less into yours, which we believe to be proud and imperious enough. You might as well have signed, that Portsmouth and Plymouth should be neutral ports for an enemy’s fleet to ride in. If the situation of your affairs had obliged you to stipulate for the safety of an enemy’s army, what obliged you to provide for the security of an enemy’s fleet? You might, without risk, have left that where you found it, and as you found it.

Let there be no procrastination in the punishment of delinquents who have grossly injured three kingdoms, England, Sweden, and Spain; and

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let us wipe off the imputation of treachery, under which we must most justly suffer with all our allies, if we do not take ample vengeance on those who have dared, by a shameful conventional arrangement, and in defiance of their country's most solemn obligations to assist Russia in manning her fleets against Sweden, and France, in augmenting her forces against Spain.

The following observations, intermingled with anecdote, which, if its authority be sufficient, deserves to increase the facts that have been assembled respecting the negotiation and execution of the convention, shew the temper of another, the most prominent, evening journal,* on the subject.

Speaking of the French negotiator, and chief of the cavalry staff, General Kellermann, the writer states as follows :

“ When he first embarked on board the *Africane*, to return to France, he said, that in less than six weeks he expected to be at Cadiz ; but his opinion afterwards altered, in consequence of some accounts reaching his ears, of the determined spirit of the Spaniards.—He does not expect to meet with a


* The Courier, November 1.

favourable reception in France, notwithstanding his character stands high as a brave and good officer, and his fame in the battles of Austerlitz and Marengo has never been tarnished; but he has been *guilty* of signing an instrument which has some marks of *justice* and *honesty* about it—for the appointment of a committee of officers to re-land the French baggage, and examine it for plunder. This is a *crime* about which he has some fear: for, as one of the French officers told general Beresford, “if you want to discover the plunder, general, begin with the commander-in-chief, and go down to the adjutant.” This honest hint was not disregarded,—and the next day £27,000 in money was landed, part of Junot’s, *alias* duke of Abrantes’s, baggage!—General Kellermann was the only French officer against whom crimes of the most sordid, avaricious, and diabolical kind, were not represented to the committee; there were two or three instances against him, but they were not worthy of marked reprehension. Junot, duke of Abrantes, and general Loison, were proved to be most ferocious and hard-hearted. The most valuable of the plunder was found in the officers’ baggage; the men, generally speaking, had little that was worth much. Kellermann never speaks of the battles of the 17th and 21st of August, but he is fond of talking of the convention, and takes

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great credit to himself for the terms he obtained. He would exonerate sir Hew Dalrymple from all blame; as nothing, it appeared to him, was done without the concurrence of sir Arthur Wellesley. But, he says, that general Beresford, in the affair of examining for plunder, shewed more shrewdness, but less liberality, than either; and he is happy in not having had to negotiate the terms of convention with him.

There were upwards of 200 sail of merchantmen, principally Danes, at Lisbon and St. Ubes, when Portugal was evacuated. When the Portuguese flag was re-hoisted on their forts, a royal salute was fired; the merchant ships did the same, and hoisted their colours.

General Kellermann was close to colonel Taylor, of the 20th Dragoons, when he was killed. He speaks of him as a very brave man; he says none but a truly brave man would have advanced as he did; and not having infantry to support him, the French cavalry surrounded him, and he lost his life in cutting his way through them. Kellermann had possession of his horse, but he handsomely gave it up to the regiment, in admiration of the owner of it. He says he does not understand why the people of England should be so dissatisfied with the convention; for, if the terms had not been agreed to, it was the intention of Junot to have

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gone into Lisbon, and after having burnt the place, to burn all the ships in the Tagus, pass over to Fort Elvas, and strongly fortify it, where they could have held out for nine months against an army of even 60,000 men."

The country prints were equally ready in their testimony of the dissatisfaction of the public with the convention of Cintra; and there was scarcely an individual in the country, who, *from the subsequent facts*, was not enabled, or supposed himself able, to argue on the insufficiency of our military affairs, regarding the diplomatic functions of the army.

The result, in a civil point of view, comes not farther within the limits of this work.* It is sufficiently known that the press continued to exercise its powers,—powers which, unimpaired by the *disadvantages* of licentiousness, long may it preserve for the conservation of British liberty!—till it had produced rational assemblies of the public (which, when sensibly conducted, were never formed in vain), for the purpose of an expression of the public feelings on the subject. The ministers of govern-

* The author of the digest of "The Military Law of England," which seems with its supplement, to comprise the whole British Military Code, has announced a second volume, treating on this subject, as well as military diplomacy in general; and what is no less important, the politico-military institutes on conquered countries.

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ment, with due attention to the occasion, though by no means neglectful of the military character, or the good result which confessedly under all its evils had been obtained from the evacuation of Portugal by the French, advised his majesty to order an investigation into the whole particulars.

Neither does it fall within the present limits to examine the propriety of the mode of this investigation, by an indefinite court of inquiry, a procedure which, according to the learned judge-advocate-general who conducted it,* was the second instance of the kind.

Of the evidence, irregular as was the whole procedure, it would be useless to give the minutes, particularly as any fact of important authority has been included in the preceding pages. The end desired in the warrant, however, ran thus: "That an inquiry should be made into the conditions of the said armistice and convention, and into all the causes and circumstances (whether arising from the previous

* The right hon. R. Ryder. The learned advocate considered general Whitelocke's *court-martial* as the first, than which nothing could more clearly shew the gross irregularity of such an institution in this or indeed any other possible case. For there was the oath administered; in the latter, it was not. With few exceptions, it resembles nothing beyond a coffee-room discussion, and is anything but a legitimate form within the administration of public or private justice. Here is no oath,—no arrangement,—but party-spirit awakened, and every one necessarily almost compelled to violate or silence truth.

operations of the British army (or otherwise) which led to them, and into the conduct, behaviour, and proceedings of the said lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple, and of any other officer or officers who may have held the command of our troops in Portugal, and of any other person or persons as far as the same were connected with the said armistice and convention, in order that the said general officers may report to us touching the matters aforesaid for our better information." "And also with their opinion *whether any and what farther proceedings should be had thereupon.*"

After various sittings, the following report was made, from which, however, such particulars as are unnecessary in the present instance are omitted.

May it please your majesty,

We, the under-written general-officers of the army, in obedience to your majesty's warrant, which bears date the 1st day of November, 1808, commanding us strictly to inquire into the conditions of a suspension of arms, concluded on the 22d of August, 1808, between your majesty's army in Portugal and the French force in that country, and also into a definite convention concluded with the French general commanding on the 31st of August following; also into all the causes and circumstances, whether arising from the previous operations of the British army or

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otherwise, which led to them; and into the conduct, behaviour, and proceedings, of lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple, and such other commander or commanders of your majesty's forces, in Portugal, and of any other person or persons, as far as the same was connected with the said armistice, suspension of arms, and convention, and to report to your majesty a statement thereof, as it shall appear, together with our opinion; and also our opinion whether any and what farther proceedings should be had thereupon.

We have, at several meetings, perused and considered your majesty's orders and instructions, as transmitted to us by the right honourable lord Castlereagh, your majesty's principal secretary of state, together with sundry letters and other papers therewith transmitted; and have heard and examined lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple, sir Harry Burrard, and sir Arthur Wellesley, and other principal officers employed on the said expedition, with such witnesses as any of them desired; and also such other persons as seemed most likely to give any material information; and, in order that your majesty may be fully possessed of every circumstance which has appeared in the course of this inquiry, we beg leave to lay before your majesty the whole of our examinations and proceeding to this our report annexed; and, upon the most dili-

gent and careful review of the whole matter, we do, in farther obedience to your royal command, most humbly report to your majesty that it appears, &c. &c.

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An account is then given of the several officers that succeeded in command.

(The report proceeds thus, after a description of the battle of Vimiera):

Soon after twelve the firing had ceased, and the enemy's cavalry were seen from our left in bodies of about two hundred by general Ferguson; and, about the same time, general Spencer saw a line formed about three miles in front of our centre. About half past twelve sir Arthur Wellesley proposed to sir Harry Burrard to advance from his right with three brigades upon Torres Vedras, and with the other five brigades to follow the enemy, who had been defeated by our left.

It appears that the situation of the army at this moment was;—on the right major-general Hill's brigade, which had not been engaged, was on the height behind Vimiera, and at a distance of above three miles from those of generals Ferguson and Nightingale to the left. In front of Vimiera and in the centre were the brigades of Anstruther and Fane, which had been warmly engaged. Brigadier-general Bowes's and Ackland's brigades were advanced on the heights towards the left in support

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of generals Ferguson and Nightingale. Brigadier-general Craufurd's was detached rather to the rear of the left, about half a mile from major-general Ferguson, to support the Portuguese troops, making our front in that direction. It appears that, although the enemy was completely repulsed, the degree of expedition with which a pursuit could be commenced, considering the extended position of the army at that time, and the precaution to be taken against the superior cavalry of the enemy, must have depended on various local circumstances, only to be calculated by those on the spot.

This very circumstance of a superior cavalry retarding our advance would allow the enemy's infantry, without any degree of risk, to continue their retreat in the most rapid manner till they should arrive at any given and advantageous point of rallying and formation; nor did sir A. Wellesley, on the 17th of August, when the enemy had not half the cavalry, as on the 21st, pursue a more inconsiderable and beaten army with any marked advantage.

(Here passages are quoted from sir A. Wellesley's despatches, in the Gazette, in support of this statement.)

It may also be considered that, as the attack on our centre had been repulsed long before that on our left, the attacking corps, which, as had been

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observed, was not pursued but by the 20th dragoons, not exceeding a hundred and fifty, had time (above an hour) to reassemble and to occupy such ground as might afterwards facilitate the retreat of their right, and that the enemy were actually and visibly formed in one or more lines at about three miles in front of the centre.

From these and other fair military grounds, as allowed by sir Arthur Wellesley,—from those that occurred in sir Harry Burrard's first interview with sir Arthur Wellesley,—from the almost certainty of the immediate arrival of sir John Moore's corps, which, if they had not stopped at Mondego-bay, would have been at Maceira on the 21st,—sir Harry Burrard declined making any farther pursuit that day, or ordering the army to march next morning early.

(In this opinion sir Harry Burrard states brigadier-general Clinton and colonel Murray concurred.)

(Here follows an account of the appointment of sir Hew Dalrymple, all the particulars of which are sufficiently known.)

It appears that, when the proposed treaty, ratified by general Junot, of the 28th of August, was brought, by captain Dalrymple, on the 29th, to head-quarters, at Ramalhal, all the lieutenant-generals Burrard, Moore, Hope, Fraser, and Wellesley,

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were present, lord Paget excepted, because not long previously summoned; the proposed treaty was not, however, formally discussed; minutes of proposed alterations were taken by sir Arthur Wellesley, as laid before the board, and the commander of the forces has no reason to believe that sir John Moore, or any of the lieutenant-generals that came with him, expressed any disapprobation of the state and terms of the negotiation.

The treaty, with the alterations proposed, were retransmitted to lieutenant-colonel Murray. It appears that, when the treaty concluded by lieutenant-colonel Murray, on the 30th, was brought by him to Torres Vedras, on the 31st, for ratification, the lieutenant-generals present were convened, and sir Arthur Wellesley was sent for; lord Paget, who was at a distance, did not come, nor did sir Arthur Wellesley, his corps having marched that morning. The other lieutenant generals met, (Burrard, Moore, Fraser, Hope); the alterations made by lieutenant-colonel Murray were approved, and the treaty then ratified by the commander of the forces, sir Hew Dalrymple, with the approbation of the lieutenant-generals present. Some of the articles of the treaty of the 28th, before objected to by the lieutenant-generals, were altered in that of the 30th, and some other good alterations had been inserted not before suggested: a comparison of the treaty

of the 28th and that ratified will shew the alterations. The meetings of the lieutenant-generals the commander of the forces did not call or consider as regular councils of war; he sought to benefit from their talents and experience by consulting them on exigent cases, and by pursuing the measure he might himself deem most advantageous for the good of your majesty's service, after availing himself of the advantage he might draw from their reasonings; and he does not recollect there were any dissentient opinion, on the 31st, as to the convention.

It appears that sir John Moore's corps, having arrived at Mondego-bay, on the 20th of August, began to disembark; that they re-embarked and arrived off Maceira-bay, on the 24th; that, from the 25th to the 29th, they landed under considerable difficulties, and successively joined the army at Torres Vedras.

It appears that some of the principal advantages to arise from the convention, in the contemplation of the generals, were—that it immediately liberated the kingdom of Portugal from the dominion of the French, thereby restoring to the inhabitants their capital and fortresses, their principal sea-ports, their personal liberty, property, religion, and established government;—that it relieved a great extent of Spanish frontier from all apprehensions of an ene-

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my, and the whole of Spain from that of having an enemy behind them, and allowed all parts of Spain to take more effective measures for its defence, as well as permitted Portugal immediately to contribute for their mutual support ;—that it enabled the British army immediately to enter Spain, if required, by central routes, while it transported the French force to a very distant part of their own coast, far removed from the Spanish frontier ;—that it immediately released 4000 Spanish soldiers, and sent them to the defence of Catalonia ;—it also released from the Portuguese frontier another body of 200 Spanish troops ; the Portuguese army became also disposable for the common cause. To the men of war and transports, which at this season of the year could with great difficulty keep their stations near the coast, and on whose presence the supplies and operations of the army depended, the opening of the Tagus afforded immediate shelter.

It is farther urged by the generals, as much more than probable, that if the enemy had been required to lay down their arms, and would surrender prisoners of war, they would not have complied, but, if driven to extremity, that they would have retired upon Lisbon, re-inforced by 6000 Russians, who must have been thus compelled to share their fate, and, in the temporary attack of the city,

much calamity and destruction must have ensued; also that, being masters of the Russian fleet and of boats and shipping in the Tagus, the passage to the river was ensured to them; that they could have defended for a considerable time its east bank, and prevented the occupation of the Tagus by our fleet; that, with the strong fortresses of Alentejo in their possession, they could have protracted a destructive war, to the great detriment of Portugal and the Spanish cause, by finding employment for the greater part of the British army for the remainder of the campaign, and whose difficulties and losses in such operation must have been very considerable.

It appears that the forts on the Tagus were taken possession of, on the 2d of September, by the British troops, and the port was then opened to our shipping.

That, on the 5th, the army had its right at St. Juliens and its left on the heights of Bellas :—that, on the 8th or 9th, British troops marched into Lisbon to insure the tranquillity of that city during the embarkation of the enemy, who were all sent off (except the last division, who were purposely detained,) before the end of the month, and part of the army was then actually on the route towards the Spanish frontier.

It appears that, during the discussion, and after-

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wards, during the execution of the convention, much firmness was shewn in resisting the pretensions and interpretations of the enemy,—every stipulation being restricted to its fair, honourable, and grammatical, meaning ; and the French not allowed to carry off but obliged to disgorge plunder which they affected to consider as private property. It appears that pains were taken to misrepresent and raise a clamour in Portugal against this convention, but, when it was generally known and its effects felt, the people of Lisbon and of the country seemed to have expressed their gratitude and thanks for the benefits attending it.

It has been urged by sir H. Dalrymple, and allowed by major-general Spencer, that in Egypt, in 1801, after the victory of the 21st of March, the French having thrown their whole force into Alexandria and Grand Cairo, 10,000 men in each place ; that at the siege of Alexandria, August, the country was in the full possession of the British and Turks. The garrison cut off from every possibility of relief, and could only have held out some days, when a capitulation was granted to it, September 2d, as favourable as the convention of Cintra to the army of Junot, (of 24,000 French and 6000 Russians,) and perfectly similar in all the chief articles of men, baggage, artillery, conveyance, &c. ; also, that the same terms had been previously granted

to the garrison of Cairo, under much the same circumstances. By these two conventions or capitulations, above 20,000 French evacuated Egypt, and the British army was left disposable for other purposes. On the whole, it appears, that the operations of the army under sir Arthur Wellesley, from his landing in Mondego-bay, the 1st of August, until the conclusion of the action of Vimeira, the 21st of August, were highly honourable and successful, and such as might be expected from a distinguished general at the head of a British army, of 13,000 men, augmented on the 20th and 31st to 17,000, deriving only some small aid from a Portuguese corps, (1600 men,) and against whom an enemy, not exceeding 14,000 men in the field, was opposed; and this before the arrival of a very considerable reinforcement from England, under lieutenant-general sir John Moore, which, however, did arrive and join the army, from the 25th to the 30th of August.

It appears a point on which no evidence adduced can enable the board to pronounce, with confidence, whether or not a pursuit, after the battle of the 21st, could have been efficacious, nor can the board feel confident to determine on the expediency of a forward movement to Torres Vedras, when sir Harry Burrard has stated weighty considerations against such a measure. Farther, it is to

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be observed, that so many collateral circumstances could not be known in the moment of the enemy's repulse, as afterwards became clear to the army, and have been represented to the board. And considering the extraordinary circumstances under which two commanding generals arrived from the ocean, and joined the army, (the one during, and the other immediately after, a battle, and those, successively, superceding each other, and both the original commanders, within the space of twenty-four hours,) it is not surprising that the army was not carried forward until the second day after the action, from the necessity of the generals being acquainted with the actual state of things and of their army, and proceeding accordingly.

It appears that the convention of Cintra in all its progress and conclusion, or at least all the principal articles of it, were not objected to by the five distinguished lieutenant-generals of that army; and other general officers who were on that service, whom we have had an opportunity to examine, have also concurred in the great advantages that were immediately gained to the country of Portugal, to the army and navy, and to the general service, by the conclusion of the convention at that time.

In consideration of all circumstances, as set forth in this report, we most humbly submit

our opinion, that no farther military proceeding is necessary on that subject. Because, however, some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the convention in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been exhibited by lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple, sir Harry Burrard, and sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that ardour and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiery on every occasion, during this expedition, have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on your majesty's arms; all which is most dutifully submitted.

(Signed) DAVID DUNDAS, General.

MOIRA, General.

HEATHFIELD, General.

PEMBROKE, Lieutenant-General.

G. NUGENT, Lieutenant-General.

O. NICOLLS, Lieutenant-General.

22d Dec. 1808.

Judge-advocate-general's Office, Dec. 27, 1808.

In consequence of the following letter from his royal highness the commander-in-chief, to general sir David Dundas, as president, viz.

Horse-Guards, Dec. 25, 1808.

Sir,

The judge-advocate-general having deli-

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vered to me, to be laid before his majesty, the several papers and documents, containing all the examinations and proceedings, taken before the board of inquiry, of which you are the president, together with your report and opinion, upon the whole of the late operations of his majesty's forces in Portugal, as connected with the armistice and subsequent convention of Cintra, I think it incumbent on me to state to you, that although your report is fully detailed, and perfectly explanatory of all the transactions as they appeared in evidence before you; yet, upon a due consideration of the whole matter, it certainly appears that your opinion upon the conditions of the armistice and convention, which the words of his majesty's warrant expressly enjoin should be strictly examined, inquired into, and reported upon, has been altogether omitted. I feel it my duty, therefore, to call your attention to these two principal features of this important case, the armistice and convention, and to desire that you may be pleased to take the same again into your most serious consideration, and subjoin to the opinion you have already given upon the other points submitted to your examination and inquiry, whether, upon all the circumstances which appears in evidence before you, on the relative situation of the two armies on the 22d of August, 1808, it is your opinion that an

armistice was advisable, and, if so, whether the terms of that armistice were such as ought to have been agreed upon; and whether, upon a like consideration of the relative situation of the two armies subsequent to the armistice, and when all the British forces were landed, it is your opinion that a convention was advisable, and, if so, whether the terms of that convention were such as ought to have been agreed upon.

I am the more desirous that you should resume the consideration of these two points, the armistice and convention, as it appears, upon the face of your report, that a difference of opinion exists among the members of the board, which may probably produce a dissent from the majority upon these very questions. You will be pleased, therefore, to desire such of the members, as may be of a different opinion from the majority upon these two questions, to record, upon the face of the proceedings, their reasons for such dissent.

I am, sir, your's,

FREDERICK,

Commander-in-chief.

General sir D. Dundas, K. B.

The board met this day, at the judge-advocate-general's office, when, the said letter being read, they agreed that the following questions should be put to each of the members of the board:

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Approve.

Lieut.-gen. Nicolls.

Lt.-gen. sir G. Nugent

Earl of Pembroke.

Lord Heathfield.

Gen. Craig.

Gen. sir D. Dundas.

Do you, or do

you not, approve

of the armistice as

concluded upon the

22d August, 1808,

in the relative situ-

ations of the two

armies?

Disapprove.

Earl of Moira.

Do you, or do

you not, approve

of the convention,

as concluded upon

the 31st of August,

1808, in the rela-

tive situation of the

two armies?

Lt.-gen. sir G. Nugent

Gen. lord Heathfield.

Gen. Craig.

Gen. sir D. Dundas.

Lt.-Gen. Nicolls

Earl of Moira.

Earl of Pembroke.

(Signed) DAVID DUNDAS, President.

My reason for considering the armistice as adviseable on the 22d of August was, because the enemy had been able to retire after the battle of the 21st, and taken up a strong defensive position.

OL. NICOLLS, Lieut.-general.

I think, considering the great increase of our force, from the first suspension of hostility to the definitive signing of the convention, added to the defeat the enemy had suffered, sir H. Dalrymple was fully entitled to have insisted upon more favourable terms.

OL. NICOLLS, Lieut.-general.

I approve of the armistice, after a due consi-

deration of the relative situations of the two armies, on the evening of the 22d of August, but I cannot fully of the whole of the convention, after a due consideration of the relative situation of the two armies at that time; because, it does not appear to me that, in the progress of the negotiation, sufficient stress was laid upon the great advantages which had resulted, or were likely to result, from the former successful operations of the British army in the field, from the considerable reinforcements which had joined it, subsequent to the commencement of the negotiation—from the cause in which the British army was engaged, being the cause of Portugal, which gave good reason to reckon upon the good-will, if not upon the active assistance, of the majority of the inhabitants; and also, from the unusual readiness which, as it appears to me, was manifested by general Junot to enter into negotiation, and, by the French negotiator, to accede to terms as they were proposed, and to such construction as lieutenant-general sir H. Dalrymple put upon them in some instances, where they might have borne a difference of interpretation: I therefore think it probable, for the above reasons, that, if less favourable terms to the French army had been insisted upon, they would have been acceded to.

PEMBROKE, Lieut.-general.

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I feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sentiments on the nature of the convention, because that I have already joined in the tribute of applause due, in other respects, to the officers concerned. My opinion, therefore, is only opposed to theirs on a question of judgement, where their talents are likely to have so much more weight, as to render the profession of my difference, even on that point however painful. The duty is, however, imperious on me not to disguise or qualify the deductions which I have made during this investigation. An armistice simply might not have been objectionable, because sir H. Dalrymple, expecting hourly the arrival of sir John Moore's division, might see more advantage for himself, in a short suspension of hostilities, than what the French could draw from it; but as the armistice involved, and, in fact, established the whole principal of the convention, I cannot separate it from the latter.

Sir Arthur Wellesley has stated that he considered this force at the commencement of the march from the Mondego river, as sufficient to drive the French from their positions on the Tagus. That force is subsequently joined by above 4000 British troops, under generals Anstruther and Ackland.—The French make an attack with their whole disposable strength, and are repulsed with heavy loss,

though but a part of the British army is brought into action.

It is difficult to conceive that the prospects which sir Arthur Wellesley entertained could be unfavourably altered by these events, even had not the certainty of speedy reinforcements to the British army existed.

It is urged that had the French been pushed to extremity, they would have crossed the Tagus and have protracted the campaign in such a manner as to have frustrated the more important view of the British generals, namely, sending succours into Spain.

This measure must have been equally feasible for the French, if no victory had been obtained over them; but I confess that the chance of such an attempt seems to me assumed against probability. Sir Hew Dalrymple notices what he calls—"the critical and embarrassed state of Junot," before that general has been pressed by the British army: and in explanation of that expression, observes, that the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spanish army in Andalusia, which cut off the retreat of the French in that direction, and the universal hostility of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot one of great distress. No temptation for the translation of the war into Alentejo presents itself from this picture; nor does any

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other representation give ground to suppose that Junot could have contemplated the measure as holding forth any prospect but ultimate ruin, after much preliminary distress and disgrace.

The strongest of all proofs as to Junot's opinion, arises from his sending, the very morning after the battle of Vimiera, to propose the evacuation of Portugal, a step which sufficiently indicated that he was satisfied that he could not only make no effectual defence, but would not even prolong the contest to take the chance of accidents : he seems, indeed, to have been without any real resource. It appears in evidence, that of the troops left by him in Lisbon and the forts, a considerable proportion were of very doubtful quality. Those troops on whose fidelity he could confide, had been dismayed by a signal defeat, and they were sensible that they had no succour to look to from abroad.

To the British generals it was known, when the armistice was granted, that 10,000 men, under sir J. Moore, as well as the 3d and 42d regiments of foot, with the 18th dragoons, might be immediately reckoned upon ; and although much advantage had not been drawn from the Portuguese troops, their support and the general violence of the country against the French, cannot be laid out of his calculation.

The disparity of force and of circumstances was,

then, such as could leave no doubt that the issue must be favourable to us. I do not omit advertence to the difficulties urged as possible to occur in furnishing the British army with bread. But putting aside the obvious solution, that such a temporary privation is not ruinous to an army where cattle can be procured in the country; this difficulty cannot be well pleaded, if admission is to be given to the speculation, that the heavy cannon necessary for battering forts St. Julien and Calcaes were to be got on shore in the bays of the rock of Lisbon. The question then comes to this: whether the convention did (as has been asserted) secure all the objects which were proposed in the expedition! If it did not, it was not what his majesty had a right to expect from the relative situation of the two armies.

I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the emancipation of Portugal from the French, as the sole or principal object of the expedition. Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it must be a prominent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting.

This seems to have been so little considered in the convention, that the terms appear to have extricated Junot's army from a situation of distress,

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in which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it, in a state of entire equipment, into immediate currency, in a quarter too where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns.

Had it been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an obligation not to serve for a specified time might have been insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been prescribed as the place at which they should be landed, in order to prevent the probability of their reinforcing (at least for a long time) the armies employed for the subjugation of Spain.

Perhaps a stronger consideration than the merit of these terms presents itself: opinion relative to the British arms was of the highest importance, as it might influence the confidence of the Spaniards, or invite the nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country, and to co-operate with it, for their deliverance.

The advantages ought, therefore, to have been more than usually great, which could be deemed sufficient to balance the objection of granting to a very inferior army, hopeless in circumstances and broken in spirit, such terms as might argue, that notwithstanding its disparity in numbers, it was still formidable to its victors. No advantages seemed to have been gained that could not have

equally followed from forcing the enemy to a marked submission. The gain of time, as to sending succours into Spain, cannot be admitted as a plea, because it appears that no arrangements for the reception of our troops in Spain had been undertaken previous to the convention; and this is without reasoning on subsequent facts.

The convention in Egypt, which has been advanced as a parallel case, appears to me inapplicable. No object beyond the dislodgement of the French from Egypt was there in question. In the present instance, the operation of the convention upon the affairs of Spain, was a consideration of primary interest, and in that view, the inevitable effect of some of the articles offers itself to my mind, as liable to material objection.

I trust that these reasons will vindicate me from the charge of presumption, in maintaining an opinion contradictory to that professed by so many most respectable officers; for, even if the reasons be essentially erroneous, if they are conclusive to my mind (as I most conscientiously affirm them to be) it is a necessary consequence that I must disapprove the convention.

MOIRA, General.

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Subsequent to the whole of these proceedings, the following formal declaration of his majesty's disapprobation of the armistice and convention in Portugal was officially communicated to sir Hew Dalrymple:

"The king has taken into his consideration the report of the board of inquiry, together with the documents and opinions thereunto annexed. While his majesty adopts the unanimous opinion of the board, that no further military proceedings is necessary to be had upon the transactions referred to their investigation, his majesty does not intend thereby to convey any expression of his majesty's satisfaction at the terms and conditions of the armistice and convention.

"When those instruments were first laid before his majesty, the king, reserving for investigation those parts of the definitive convention in which his majesty's immediate interests were concerned, caused it to be signified to sir Hew Dalrymple, by his majesty's secretary of state, that his majesty nevertheless, felt himself compelled at once to express his disapprobation of those articles, in which stipulations were made directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish or Portuguese nations.

"At the close of the inquiry, the king, abstaining from any observations upon any other parts of the

convention, repeats his disapprobation of those articles; his majesty deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorized admission into military conventions of articles of such a description, which, especially when incautiously framed, may lead to the most injurious consequences.

“ His majesty cannot forbear farther to observe, that lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple’s delaying to transmit, for his information, the armistice concluded on the 22d of August until the 4th of September, when he, at the same time, transmitted the ratified convention, was calculated to produce great public inconvenience, and that such inconvenience did in fact result therefrom.”

Of the proceedings, report, and final result of the court of inquiry, the following observations may be here permitted.

1st. That the principal object attained was a speedy and facile admission of the British force into the heart of Spain.*

2d. That the principal advantage obtained by the British, in the execution of the convention, was

* “ By central routes.” See p. 410.

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in violation of that article which enjoined every doubtful matter to be decided in favour of the French.*

3d. That the only qualities which presented themselves, (good, indeed, and indispensable to success in an army) were zeal and firmness, while judgement, vigilance, and ready intelligence, are no where appreciated.

4th. That notwithstanding the most positive injunctions on the part of his majesty's government for the conciliation of the allies on all occasions, the conduct of sir Hew Dalrymple towards them was generally the reverse. "In any arrangements that you may be called on to make with either nation, in the prosecution of the common cause," say the general orders, "you will act *with the utmost liberality and confidence.*" And in the supplementary letter of lord Castlereagh to sir Hew Dalrymple, of the 16th of August, 1808, it is specifically urged that the general is to consider himself in Portugal as "commander of a force acting in alliance with the sovereign of that country;" and it concludes with the following striking anticipation: "*Lest, however, in any line you may adopt with regard to CAPITULATION or booty, that circumstance should in any degree escape you, I think it right to point*

* "Firmness was shewn in resisting the pretensions and interpretations of the enemy." See p. 412.

your observation to it, *in order that all your measures may be taken under this impression.*" Yet nothing can be more opposite than the measures taken. And yet these measures in the first instance received marks of decided approbation.

And, lastly, That although the juridical proceeding which took place on the convention, with the exception perhaps alone of lord Moira's explanation of his motives and opinions on the subject, was loose and irregular,—though no evidence was given with the caution which required the solemnity of the oath; though the procedure itself indeed disavows any power or intention of punishment, yet sir Hew Dalrymple suffers in fact what is equal to one of the severest punishments which could be sustained by an honourable mind,—a reprimand from the stricter procedure of a general court-martial; and whatever the culpability which may even in these sheets appear to have marked the conduct of sir Hew Dalrymple, it cannot but be lamented that the procedure was not more regular or less vindictive. For though the temper of the public mind imperiously demanded an immolation; and though this was certainly the most lenient which could be made,—yet, in its wholesome forms and principles, the administration of military law should not be violated.—

Fiat justitia ruat cælum.

BOOK II.
CHAP. IV.

1808.

December.

BOOK II.
CHAP. IV.

1808.

December.

Such was the negotiation and execution of the convention of Cintra, the details of which, whatever its character, will afford a powerful lesson to the military diplomatist, and to the army in general.

They have been given at tolerable length also, that they may form a precedent for similar operations in future, to such as, unprepared, may be suddenly called either to negotiate or execute such transactions.

The observations which have occurred on its various stages, if they possess no novelty, are nevertheless new in the discussion; and although for themselves, or for an anonymous authority, they cannot be expected to claim much respect, yet they may lead the attention of the young partizan to those principles by which alone the real lustre of the most brilliant victory can be maintained; and which, in the most hopeless cause, may itself produce an important conquest.

The convention of Cintra will long be a beacon to the officers occupied in any occasion of military diplomacy; and, to avoid its evils, be necessary to all who would obtain the confidence either of a corps or an army.

CHAP. V.

THE RESTORATION OF THE KINGDOM OF PORTUGAL.

Declaration of the Authorities of the Kingdom.—

Provision of British Troops for its Defence.—

Preparations for the new Organization of the Portuguese Army.

WHATEVER the means by which it was obtained, the capital, as well as the whole kingdom, of Portugal being at length freed from the occupations and influence of the French armies, it became necessary to re-establish municipal regulations agreeable to its former government, and equally so to create a legitimate military force for its future preservation.

The provisional authorities, therefore, notwithstanding the warmth with which they had repelled the conduct of the British negotiation, with due patriotism, hastened to meet the commanders of an army which had effected so much for their country.

BOOK II.
CHAP. V.

1808.
September.

BOOK II.
CHAP. V.

1808.

Sept. 7.

Of this spirit, the following documents will afford sufficient examples :

Evora, at the Junta, 7th Sept. 1808.

Proclamation of
the provisional
authorities of
Portugal, on its
evacuation by
the French.

The British nation, always allied to Portugal, has now more than ever shewn her sentiments of generosity towards us ; for which reason this junta recognizes in your excellency one of its liberators. At a time when we saw, with dread, the important passes of Monta and Alda Galiga open, by which the enemy were advancing, cruelly to plunder this abandoned city, and which will feel the effects of their excesses for many years ; and for the purpose of averting similar misfortunes in future, we beg your excellency will take into consideration the state of the said passes, to enable us in this province to act as an important part of the monarchy, and shew our loyalty, as also our generosity, to a true friend to this nation, and to each of the provinces, more particularly to this, which is considered as greatly menaced.

God preserve, &c.

DON SEBAS. J. BARBOZA CORDOVILLE, *President.*

DON FRAN. MAN. CONCEIRO DA COSTA,

DON MAN. FRIERE DA COSTA,

DON JOAS. DA MOSQUITA PENENTI DA PAVIA.

DON ANT. MEXIA CONTO GALVAO PERORA.

DON SEBAS. AROZADO BANTESTA.

DON NEMO JOSE DOS SANTOS.

Beja, the 10th of Sept. 1808.

Most illustrious and excellent sir,
Commander-in-chief of the British army,

The supreme junta of this city and province recognize in your excellency all the qualities and virtues capable of supporting the character of a nation truly great, (to say generous England,) the true friend of our beloved sovereign, have the satisfaction of manifesting to your excellency, our most pure sentiments of friendship and of gratitude.

Hitherto, not any circumstance has disconcerted the patriotism of the city of Beja, or of the people of the environs, who have all, like herself, continued to be subordinate and united, to give the utmost proof of their love and fidelity to their legitimate sovereign, in whose heart the virtues dwell.

Every one knows of the assistance sent to us, by the great nation, (by the generous English) as also to our brotherly friends, the Spaniards.

Portugal has merited it; and the three nations united will protect religion, restore the sovereigns, and alleviate the sufferings of the country. And it is now for the oppressors to experience, not only what they merit as enemies, but still more so as delinquents. Your excellency knows that they were not simple intruders, but that their boundless

BOOK II.

CHAP. V.

1808.

Sept. 10.

Address of the
junta of Beja.

audacity was aimed against the dignity of the house of Braganza, which wounded the hearts of the Portuguese, and can only be cured by the destruction of those enemies. From their offences against his human majesty, they elevated their insults even against the Majesty Divine, whose altars they plundered. The Portuguese, faithful christians, and the province of Alentejo, proved as worthy men, unite with the supreme junta, being perfectly disposed to spill the last drop of their blood in defence of their religion, their sovereign, and their country. The people of Lisbon are the brethren of the people of Alentejo; and they will, in company with them, seek victory, or gloriously die in battle, against the vile enemy, who should not be permitted to leave the capital with impunity, where they, by their crimes, offended both religion and humanity.

The supreme junta are free in their sentiments, under the certainty that your excellency will receive them favourably, they being consonant with your own. Your excellency, who united with us to vanquish, also will unite to punish.

The supreme junta are sensible of the little use of life, were it not at some time to risk it, in defence of our religion, or our king. To die a martyr to religion, or patriotism, in either case, is to die with glory, when occasion requires it. And we

request that your excellency will permit us to embrace an opportunity of emulation worthy of the Portuguese nation.

BOOK II.
CHAP. V.

1808.

Sept. 10.

Address of the
junta of Beja.

This supreme junta loves, in the highest degree, the British nation; and for your excellency, its worthy general, they have the most high consideration.

(Signed)

S. JOAS JOZE MUSCARENHUS DE AZEVEDO.

DON SYLVESTRE DOS SANTOS CHAVES.

DON ANTO. JOAQUIM D'OLIVEIRA.

DON DIEGO DA BUENHA SOTTO, Major.

DON MANUEL DO CABO DE ARCEZ.

Lisbon, 23d Sept. 1808.

Most illustrious and excellent sir,

The Portuguese people, whom I represented as judge, and in whose name I this day appear in the presence of your excellency, have, for days past, given exterior proofs of their incomparable happiness, and causes their hearts to feel the happy restoration of their liberty, and the re-establishment of their legitimate government; which blessing the people know how to compare and contrast with the horrors which had surrounded them. They know that, after God, they owe it to the assistance of Great Britain, faithful to the antient

Address of the
judge of the
people.

BOOK II.
CHAP. V.

1808.

Sept. 23.

Address of the
judge of the
people.

ties of honourable and generous friendship, and now afforded by your excellency.

And now to your excellency, with justice, we address our thanks of pure gratitude, in the names of all the public; for whom I come to declare a faithful and eternal gratitude to your excellency, and to all Great Britain. For your excellency worthily are offered up the public vote of thanks, in which the whole nation participates; and in praises to the great and respectable king, who is truly worthy to enjoy the many titles which immortalize him; and to vanquish that person who called himself invincible; and to make known to those who prostituted the attributes of Omnipotence, that the true Omnipotent knew when to cast down, at Vimeira, those whom he permitted to exult at Austerlitz.

Illustrious sir, you have added to your number of virtues, by your kindness towards me and this people; for which the genius of Pope and Milton would not be sufficient to do justice.

We implore you to accept the thanks of a grateful people, whom you have restored from the dominion of lawless robbers; and which will give us force for demonstrating our farther gratitude.

We supplicate your excellency, that you will be pleased to communicate in your official despatches,

our sincere thanks, as well to the smallest village
as to the august throne of the immortal George.

God preserve your excellency.

JOZE DE ATREU CAMPOS,
Judge to the people.

BOOK II.
CHAP. V.

1808.
Sept. 24.

Camara, Arrayolles, 24th Sept. 1808.

In council of this town, and in the name
of all the people, who beg to send to your excel-
lency, and to all the army under your command,
this testimony of our gratitude, for all the means
exerted by you and them, to deliver us from the
worst of tyrants. And we much wish that his
Britannic majesty should know our sentiments
towards him.

Address from
the council of
Camara.

God preserve your excellency many years.

Given in council at Arrayolles, the 24th Septem-
ber, 1808, by me,

FRANS. MAN. PRATAS, Secretary to the Council.

MIG. MARTINO DE D'PERERA E MELO, Judge-
President.

D. ANTO JOZE DE MATTAS VIDE GAL,

SIMAS HON. LOBO CORTE REAL.

EUZEBIO NOTASCO PERCIRA LOBO.

JOZE VARELLA RAMALHO.

His excellency sir Hew Dalrymple,

BOOK II.
CHAP. V.1808.
Sept.Preparations for
the defence of
Portugal, and
prosecution of
the war in Spain.

While the good disposition of the principal constituted authorities of Portugal was thus manifested, and every means used on the part of the British commanders to remedy by the restoration of civil power to such authorities the evils which the kingdom had sustained; the prosecution of the successes which had been obtained by carrying the war into the interior of the peninsula, was not for a moment forgotten. The first step, however, was to establish a force for the protection of Portugal, out of the army which had by its victories restored the sovereignty, without injury to that which was to march into Spain.

Accordingly, as early as the 26th of September, arrangements being made to this effect, the following notification was issued by his royal highness the commander-in-chief to the general at that time commanding the forces in Portugal, whence sir Hew Dalrymple had been recalled for the purposes of inquiry into the convention of Cintra.

Horse-Guards, Sept. 26, 1808.

Sir,

Instructions of
the commander-
in-chief to sir
H. Burrard.

His majesty having been graciously pleased to appoint you to the command of the army intended to be left for the defence of Portugal, I have to acquaint you with the enclosed arrangements, and to desire that you will use your best efforts to carry them into immediate effect. His majesty having been also pleased to appoint lieutenant-ge-

neral sir John Moore to the command of a division of his army to be employed in Spain, I cannot better detail to you the corps and staff which are to compose this force, than by transmitting to you a copy of the instructions which I have given to sir John Moore.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK,
Commander-in-chief.

Lieut.-gen. sir Harry Burrard, bart.
&c. &c. &c.

Corps to remain in Portugal.

20th Light Dragoons, 4 troops	327
2d Foot	771
3d, 1st battalion	940
9th	925
—, 2d battalion	644
20th	578
29th	777
45th, 1st battalion	872
50th	937
82d	932
97th	695
1st line battalion, King's German Legion	930
2d	756
5th	745
7th	671
Garrison company	49

Corps selected
for the defence
of Portugal.

11,549

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1808.

Sept.

Corps selected
for the defence
of Portugal.

Staff of the Force to remain in Portugal.

Lieutenant-general sir Harry Burrard.

Major-general J. Murray.

————— J. R. Mackenzie.

Brigadier-general R. Stewart.

————— A. Cameron.

————— E. Langworth.

————— G. de Drieberg.

Adjutant-General's Department.

Lieutenant-colonel Carey, Guards.

Major Tedy, 14th Foot.

Lieutenant-colonel Darrock, 36th Foot.

Quarter-Master-General's Department.

Colonel Donkin,

Lieutenant-colonel De Lancey.

————— Offency.

————— D'Urban.

Captain Waller, 9th Garrison Battalion.

———— Harris, 72d Foot.

———— Kelly, 27th Foot.

Of this arrangement the local alterations were trifling, as will be perceived by the answer of the general commanding in chief.

Lisbon, October 8, 1808.

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1808.
Sept.

Arrangement of
sir H. Burrard.

Sir,

His majesty's commands, communicated to me in your royal highness's letter of the 26th ultimo, shall be most scrupulously obeyed.

In the trust of commanding the division of the army, destined for the defence of Portugal,* with

* From the manner in which the campaign under sir Arthur Wellesley necessarily commenced, the original formation of the army and dislocation of the troops, not being capable of being attended to, it was not given in the first chapter (its proper place), and is therefore here added for comparison with the present arrangements.

Original formation of the British army of the peninsula.

List of the several Corps; General and Staff Officers, composing a large Division of his Majesty's Army, to be employed upon a particular Service.

His majesty has been pleased to direct, that the under-mentioned corps should be united into one army, viz.

SIR JOHN MOORE'S CORPS.

3d light dragoons, King's German Legion	562
British Artillery	374
German ditto	320
* 4th Foot, 1st battalion	971
* 28th ditto	1020
52d ditto	951
* 79th ditto	995
* 92d ditto	934
95th, 3 companies	300
Royal Staff Corps	50

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1808.

Sept.

Original formation
of the British
army of the
peninsula.

which his majesty has been graciously pleased to honour me, I hope I shall acquit myself with credit, and it shall be my study so to do.

1st light battalion King's German Legion	907
2d ditto ditto	903
1st line battalion ditto	725
2d ditto	761
5th ditto	753
7th ditto	679
Garrison company	48

Total . . . 11,253

MAJOR-GENERAL SPENCER'S CORPS.

Royal Artillery	245
Royal Staff Corps	45
* 6th Foot, 1st battalion	946
29th ditto	806
* 32d ditto	874
* 50th ditto	948
* 82d ditto	929

Total . . 4,793

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY'S CORPS.

20th Light Dragoons	394
Royal Artillery	226
* 5th Foot, 1st battalion	990
9th ditto	833
* 36th ditto	591

Every effort I can make to complete the division of the army under the command of lieutenant-ge-

BOOK II
CHAP. V.

1808.
Sept.

Original formation of the British army of the peninsula.

* 38th ditto	957
* 40th ditto	926
* 45th ditto	670
60th, 5th ditto	936
* 71st, 1st ditto	905
* 91st ditto	917
95th, 4 companies	400
4th Royal Veteran Battalion	737

Total . . . 9,280

CORPS NOW EMBARKING.

18th Light Dragoons	640
British Artillery, 1 company	} No. not known.
King's German Legion, ditto	
2d Foot, or Queen's	731
9th, 2d battalion	633
20th, ditto	530
43d, ditto	721
52d, ditto	654
95th, 2 companies	200
97th	694

Total . . . 4,803

His majesty has been further pleased to command, that lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple shall have the chief command thereof, and that lieutenant-general sir Harry Burrard, bart. be second in command, and the staff of this army to consist as follows, viz.

neral sir John Moore shall be called into exertion;
and truly happy I am that opportunities will be

Original forma-
tion of the Bri-
tish army of the
peninsula.

Lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple, commander of the forces.

_____ sir Harry Burrard, bart. second in command.

_____ sir John Moore, K. B.

_____ honourable J. Hope.

_____ Mackenzie Frazer.

_____ lord Paget.

_____ sir Arthur Wellesley.

Major-general J. Murray.

_____ lord W. Bentinck.

_____ honourable E. Paget.

_____ Spencer.

_____ Hill.

_____ Ferguson.

Brigadier-general Ackland.

_____ Nightingale.

_____ R. Stewart.

_____ honourable C. Stewart.

_____ H. Fane.

_____ R. Anstruther.

_____ Catlin Craufurd.

_____ H. Clinton, 1st Foot Guards, adjutant-general.

Lieutenant-colonel Anderson, 60th Foot.

Bt. lieutenant-colonel Tucker, 50th Foot.

Major Arbuthnot, 5th West-India regiment, } Assistants ditto.

_____ Wilson, 97th Foot,

Lieutenant-colonel J. Bradford, 87th Foot,

Captain Bradford, 3d Foot Guards,

_____ Cooke, Coldstream Guards,

_____ honourable A. Gordon, 3d Guards,

_____ Le Mesurier, 21st Foot,

_____ South, 20th Foot,

_____ D. Gardner, 2d battalion 43d, } Deputy do. do.

presented to that gallant officer of demonstrating how equal he is to the command, and deserving of such an honour.

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- | | | |
|---|---|-------------------|
| — Colclough, 82d Foot, | } | Deputy do. do. |
| — Brown, 8th Garrison Battalion. | | |
| — M. Wynyard, Coldstream Guards, | | |
| — Elliott, 48th Foot, | | |
| — G. R. Jarvis, 36th Foot, | | |
| Lieutenant K. Osborne, 3d Dragoon Guards, | } | |
| Captain lord Burghurst, 3d Dragoon Guards, | | |
| — lord W. Somerset, 4th West-Indiart. | | |
| Lieutenant-colonel G. Murray, 3d Foot Guards, quar.-mas.-gen. | | |
| Lieutenant-col. lord Proby, 1st Guards, | } | Assistants ditto. |
| Bt. lieutenant-col. Bathurst, 60th Foot, | | |
| Lieutenant-col. De Lancey, | | |
| — Offeney, | | |
| Major Montalembert, | | |
| — Rainy, 82d Foot, | } | Deputy do. do. |
| Captain Hardinge, 57th Foot, | | |
| — Blaquiere, 48th ditto, | | |
| — Willermann, Royal Staff Corps, | | |
| — Mawe, 23d Foot, | | |
| — Langton, 61st ditto, | | |
| — Campbell, 10th ditto, | | |
| — Gomm, 9th ditto, | | |
| — Douglass, 45th ditto, | | |
| — Whittingham, 13th Dragoons, | | |
| — Scovell, 57th ditto, | | |
| Bt. lieut.-col. Torrens, 89th Foot, military secretary. | | |
| R. H. Kennedy, esq. deputy commissary-general. | | |
| P. Smith, esq. deputy paymaster-general. | | |
| Mr. M. Otley, assistant paymaster-general. | | |

Original formation of the British army of the peninsula.

BOOK II.
CHAP. V.

1808.

I have enclosed to the adjutant-general, for your highness's information, the alterations that we have

Original formation of the British army of the peninsula.

Reverend Mr. Mathews,
 ——— Mr. Ormesby,
 ——— Mr. Jones,
 ——— Mr. Dennis,

} Chaplains.

MEDICAL STAFF.

R. M. Shapter,
 James Frank,
 William Fergusson,
 Alexander Thompson,
 Dr. Deane,
 — J. Hume,
 — C. Larchin,
 — C. Tice,
 — A. Neale,
 Thomas Kidd,
 G. F. Nicolay,
 G. Montague,
 J. Lindsay,
 L. Krazieson,
 James Dineley,
 M. R. Morell,
 T. Ross,
 G. Crump,
 G. Gunning,
 E. Tegart,
 J. Anderson,
 G. H. Newton,
 John Burnall,
 J. Wimbridge,

} Inspectors of hospitals.

} Deputies ditto.

} Physicians.

} Surgeons to the forces.

} Apothecaries.
 Purveyor.

been obliged to make in the composition of sir John Moore's corps, and of the regiments that have been

BOOK II.
CHAP. V.
1808.

C. Maypothor,
J. Emerso
T. Gunston,

} Deputy purveyors.

Original formation of the British army of the peninsula.

32 Hospital Mates.

His majesty was further pleased to command, that the following should be the outline of the dislocation of the troops, subject to the discretion of the general commanding.

The reserve, under the command of lieutenant-general sir John Moore, K. B. and major-general the honourable G. Paget.

18th Light Dragoons	}	Brigadier-general the hon. C. Stewart.
20th		
3d German Lt. Drag.		
52d Foot, 1st bat. . .	}	Brigadier-general Anstruther.
52d, 2d bat.		
95th, 9 companies . .		
43d, 2d bat.	}	Brigadier-general R. Stewart.
60th, 5th do.		
1st German, lt. bat. .		
2d do.	}	Brigadier-general the hon. C. Stewart.
2d Foot		
4th, 1st bat.		
28th, do.	}	Lieut.-gen. J. Hope.
79th, do.		
91st, do.		
92d, do.	}	Brigadier-gen.
6th, do.		
29th, do.		
32d, do.	}	Major-general
5th, do.		
50th, do.		
2d, do.	}	Spencer,
	}	Lieut.-gen. Lord Paget
	}	Brigadier-gen.
	}	Nightingale.

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Sept.

given to it, to make up the deficiencies of number occasioned by the numerous sick; an arrangement which, I trust, will meet your royal highness's approbation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

HARRY BURRARD,

Lieutenant-general.

Field-marshal his royal highness the duke of York,

&c. &c. &c.

Particulars of
economy of the
British armies
in Spain and
Portugal.

The force, composing the army to be placed under the command of sir John Moore, will be described under its proper head. The military instructions of the commander-in-chief continued as before in the following particulars.

“ On all subjects relating to your command, you will please to correspond with me, and you will re-

Original forma-
tion of the Bri-
tish army of the
peninsula.

9th, do.	}	Major-general Hill,	}	Lieut.-gen. M. Fraser.
9th, 2d bat.				
40th, 1st do.				
36th, do.	}	Brigadier-gen. Fane.		
45th, do.				
97th do.				
20th, do.	}	Brigadier-gen. C. Craufurd.	}	Lieut.-gen. sir Arthur Wellesley.
38th, do.				
71st, do.				
4 battalions of Infan- try of the King's German Legion.	}	Major-general Murray.		

(Signed)

FREDERICK,
Commander-in-Chief

BOOK II.
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1808.

Instructions, &c.
for army of Portugal.

gularly communicate to me all military transactions, in which you may be engaged, reporting to me all vacancies that may occur in the troops under your command, and as the power of appointing to commissions is not vested in you, you will be pleased to recommend such officers as may appear to you most deserving of promotion, stating the special reasons, where such recommendations are not in the usual channel of seniority.

“As all the British regiments marked thus (*) under your command have second battalions attached to them, and which remain in this country, it is necessary that I should acquaint you, that the first battalions under your command, being composed exclusively of the senior officers of their respective ranks, such vacancies as may occur therein, by promotion or casualty, must unavoidably be supplied by officers from the second battalions, who will be ordered immediately to join, on such vacancies being made known to me.

“Should you have occasion to recommend any gentleman for an ensigncy, you will be pleased to make known his address, in order that, if his majesty should be pleased to confirm the recommendation, he may be directed to join the corps immediately on his appointment.

“You will transmit monthly returns of the troops under your command to the secretary-at-war, and

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1808.

Instructions, &c.
for army of Por-
tugal.

the adjutant-general, for my information, and you will strictly adhere to his majesty's regulations in regard to the pay, clothing, and appointments of the troops, and your special attention must necessarily be directed to their discipline, and to the interior economy of the different corps, which is so essential not only to the comforts of the soldier, but to the preservation of his health, under every change of climate to which he may be exposed.

“ Under the head of pay, I have to direct your attention to the instructions of the paymaster-generals and their deputies, respecting the usual stoppages being deducted from the pay of the several staff-officers, and to which you are requested to give the most punctual attention.

“ You will be vested with the usual powers of convening general courts-martial, upon which subject I have to observe, that as great inconvenience has arisen to the service from officers commanding on foreign stations having permitted prisoners to return to England, prior to the proceedings and opinion of the court-martial having been submitted to the king, I have to request, that in all cases where any person whatever may be tried by a general court-martial, and where your powers are not sufficient to decide finally upon the proceedings, opinion, and sentence of the court, that you do not permit the prisoner to return to England, until his

majesty's commands shall have been duly communicated to you, through the proper channel for that purpose.

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1808.

Instructions, &c.
for army of Portugal.

"I have likewise to acquaint you, that as many general officers, from the best motives, have taken upon themselves to commute sentences of capital punishment to transportation for a term of years, or for life, when it is found that no such power is delegated by his majesty, and, consequently, that the whole of the proceedings may be thereby rendered nugatory, it will be necessary that your particular attention should be given to the powers granted to you by his majesty's warrant on this subject, in order to prevent you from inadvertently falling into a similar irregularity.

"It is particularly desirable that the officer at the head of the quarter-master-general's staff should be directed to keep a journal, or other memorandum, descriptive of the movements of the troops, and occurrences in which they are engaged, as also that he should take and collect plans of the harbours, positions, or fortified places, in which the troops may be, for the purpose of being transmitted to me, and lodged in the military dépôt."

Nor were the defences of the Portuguese capital disregarded, as will appear from the following report.

BOOK II.
CHAP. V.

1808.

Report on de-
fences of Lis-
bon.*General Report of Fort St. Juliens, and the De-
fences of the Coast-line west of it, as far as the
Rock of Lisbon.**Lisbon, Sept. 28, 1808.*

FORT ST. JULIENS.

This work stands on a projecting part of the shore on the north side of the entrance of the Tagus, and co-operates with the town of Bugio, in the defence of the mouth of that river.

It is an irregular work, presenting towards the land a front of five hundred and thirty feet, and having a scarp-wall, forty-five feet in height, which is raised considerably above the sea-defences, in order to cover them against the reverse fire from a hill about five hundred and twenty yards north-north-east from the fortress, and the summit of which is upon a superior level to any part of the work. Before the land-front is a low ravelin. The land, and part of the left front, have galleries for counter-mines.

There are two entrances to the river, one between Fort St. Juliens and a ledge of rocks about six hundred yards from it, and the other between the same rocks and a sand on which the town of Bugio is built.

The northern passage is well defended, as ships must pass within a short range of the guns of the fort, and be exposed to them in various directions. In the southern channel, they may, I believe, pass at a more considerable range from either the fort or the town. The sea-defences at Fort St. Juliens, are well provided with furnaces for heating shot.

This work contains souterrains for about a thousand men, and barracks for five hundred. The case-mates are, however, not well aired, and were found by the French to be unhealthy. Many of them are not, I think, in their present state, proof against a heavy fire of large shells.

There are several extensive case-mated stores, and a magazine for about two thousand barrels, but which is said not to preserve powder in good order for any length of time.

There are five smaller magazines for the immediate use of the batteries, which may contain fifty or sixty rounds for each gun. The fort also contains case-mated tanks for about three thousand gallons of water.

The defences towards the sea are mounted with seventy-five pieces of artillery, in an upper and lower range of batteries; the latter having the guns en barbette, and being about forty feet above the level of high water.

In proceeding from Fort St. Juliens towards Cas-

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caes, the first work is a battery, at the distance of about two thousand yards, called Fort Jonquiere. This presents eight guns, which co-operate with St. Juliens, in defence of a fine sandy bay. It is (like most of the batteries on this coast) inclosed towards the rear, and has an arched barrack; but, in many of them, the guns and men would be very imperfectly covered against musketry from the ground near them. From Fort St. Juliens to the battery of Jónquieres is a continued parapet for small arms, well disposed, upon a broken line, and which, if occupied, would, with the works on its flanks, render a landing here altogether impracticable.

The next work towards Cascaes is Fort Antonio, at the distance of about two miles from Fort Jonquiere. This is a square work of about one hundred and seventy feet front, having a scarp nearly thirty feet high towards the land, which is well covered by a counterscarp; but its flanks are so small as to add little or nothing to its defence. It presents twelve guns in three tiers, en barbette, towards the sea; the lowest not less than sixty feet above high-water mark. This work contains case-mated cover for two hundred and fifty or three hundred men, with good stores, a magazine, and a cistern. It is not commanded within about a thousand yards, and though very small, it would not, I think, be taken if properly defended, without establishing

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some artillery against it. The coast-line, for some distance on each side of this work, is extremely rocky and difficult to ascend.

About nine hundred yards west of Fort Antonio is a small battery (No. 3, from St. Juliens) made to defend a little bay, in conjunction with another work, two hundred yards from it: they are now both abandoned.

The next battery (No. 5, from Fort St. Juliens) has a good platform for seven guns. It is about four hundred yards from No. 4.

No. 6, about two hundred yards from No. 5, is called Little St. Antony: it mounts four guns.— From No. 3 to No. 4, and from No. 5 to No. 6, is a line of musketry-parapet. From No. 6 to No. 7, is a distance of about two hundred yards. They are also connected by a line for small arms. No. 8 is about eleven hundred yards from No. 7, and commands one side of the bay of Cascaes: it mounts six guns through embrasures. There is another battery opposite to the town, called Fort St. Catharines, and which also assists in the defence of the bay: it has fourteen embrasures, but only five guns mounted. From No. 8 to this work, a distance of about four hundred yards, a musketry-parapet is continued. Upon the whole, considerable attention has been paid, by the erection of so many batteries, and by the construction of lines for small

arms, to the defence of the bay, formed by St. Juliens on one side, and the point of Cascaes on the other.

FORT OF CASCAES.

The Fort of Cascaes is an irregular square.—The length of the land-front is one hundred and sixty-nine yards, that of the left two hundred and forty-nine yards; the south side is one hundred and ninety yards in length, and the east one hundred and sixty-seven.

The work presents, towards the sea, on the east and south side, two parapet batteries; the former commanding the bay of Cascaes, and mounted with seventeen eighteen-pounders; and the latter looking towards the roadsted, or anchorage, and mounting twenty-six guns, thirty-six, twenty-four, and twelve-pounders. In the angle, formed by these sides, is a small work, called the Citadel, raised about twelve feet above the general level of the land defences, and about thirty above those towards the sea.

The fort is in an unfinished state; on the land-front scarcely any part of the rampart is found, and much remains to be done to it on the west-front, which, from its present state, and from some rising ground near it, is particularly weak.—The

land close to the defences is much embarrassed by buildings.

The work contains souterains for about a thousand men, some of which, however, do not appear to be proof against the repeated shocks of heavy shells. It has barracks, covered with a thin arch, for about eight hundred men, and case-mated stables for a hundred horses.

This fort has two principal magazines, the first of which will contain about three hundred, and the other two hundred, barrels of powder.—It has, also, two other magazines, which, together, might contain two hundred barrels.

From Cascaes, towards the west of the coast-line, is, for a considerable distance, rocky, and difficult to land a body of men.—There are, however, small batteries at certain distances, some of which are enclosed in the rear, and have arched barracks raised, to cover the guns against a reverse fire from the land. The first of these is about two hundred and fifty yards from Cascaes: it is called Fort St. Marta, and co-operates immediately in the defence of the bay and roadsted: it has, also, four guns bearing westward. The next battery is about a mile and a half from Cascaes, and is called Fort Guia: it is about sixty feet above the level of the sea, and contains four twelve-pounders, en barbette; near it is an open battery for two howit-

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zers and two mortars. About two thousand yards farther, west, is another enclosed battery, called Fort St. George; it is nearly square, and constructed for six guns, through embrasures.

Its height, above the sea, is about forty-five feet. Within about seven hundred yards is a commanding hill, or knoll, on which are some remains of an old work; but it is now only occupied as a signal post.—The coast-line, from Fort Guia to Fort St. George, continues rocky, and nearly impracticable to ascend, though it is somewhat lower than between the former and Cascaes. About two thousand yards from Fort St. George is another small work, called Fort St. Brasse, situated on Point Sanchette: it contains five guns, through embrasures, three to the front, and two to the flanks.—The coast-line, from Fort St. George to Point Sanchette, though low, is rocky and difficult.

Proceeding westward, the next enclosed battery is at the distance of about two miles, and is called Fort Guinche: it has embrasures for seven guns, but has only five mounted. Between this and Fort St. Brasse are three open batteries, without any guns mounted, two of which are intended to co-operate with Fort Guinche, in the defence of a sandy bay; on about seven hundred yards of which, I think, a landing might be effected, with

the wind off shore, or with very light winds from the sea.—This bay, and one smaller, to the east of it, and in the defence of which two of the batteries I have mentioned would act, are the only places between Cascaes and the rock of Lisbon, in which a debarkation, in force, would not be attended with extreme difficulty, even under the most favourable circumstances.

On a small ledge of rocks, a little below the Cabo de Roca, is an old battery, on which are eight dismantled, unserviceable, guns, and which is now abandoned.

The coast-line, from Fort Guinche to the battery of the rock, is mountainous, and very unfavourable to an attempt to land a body of men.

RICHARD FLETCHER,

Major, and commanding royal engineer.

His excellency lieut.-gen. sir Hew Dalrymple,

&c. &c. &c.

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The convention of Cintra requiring the presence of sir Harry Burrard in England, lieut.-general sir John Cradock was appointed to succeed him in the chief command of the force for the defence of Portugal, under an especial arrangement, to prevent any interference in the command of the army preparing to penetrate into Spain.

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While these measures were taking on the part of the British army, the venerable and patriotic bishop of Oporto prepared to second them, by an appropriation of whatever military resources remained to his unhappy country. The antient spirit of the Portuguese, requiring only to be fostered by a generous care and judicious cultivation, soon appeared with sufficient strength to induce the officers, deputed by the British government to that city, to recommend, and his majesty's ministers to promote, the formation of a Portuguese army under the direction, and, as far as expedient, under the command of British officers.

As early as the 22d of November, Mr. secretary Canning, in a despatch, addressed to the right honourable John Charles Villiers, observed, that it was extremely important that the levies of Portuguese force, if in other respects capable of being carried forward with advantage, should not stand still for want of immediate pecuniary assistance. "I am to direct you," says he, "in the event of your own opinion, and that of sir John Cradock's, concurring as to the utility of such a measure, to urge the Portuguese government to proceed, as rapidly as possible, to the augmentation of the army, and to engage, on his majesty's part, for the pay and clothing of a force of 10,000 men, stating, at the same time, that so soon as that amount of

force shall be reported here to be actually on foot, his majesty will be prepared to extend his engagements farther.”*

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And sir John Moore had scarcely assumed the command of the troops, destined for the Anglo-Spanish army, than he was applied to, by his majesty's government, for his opinion on the best modes of formation.

To this application sir John Moore, unhappily, beginning already to be impressed with that hopeless and querulous spirit which afterwards characterised every operation and every object of his campaign, returned in answer the following opinions :

“ I am not prepared, he says, at this moment to answer, minutely, your lordship's question respecting the defence of Portugal ; but I can say, generally, that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible against a superior force. The Portuguese are without a military force ; and, from the experience of their conduct, under sir Arthur Wellesley, *no dependence is to be placed on any aid they can give* : the British must in that event, I conceive, *immediately take steps to evacuate the country.*”†

* Correspondence relative to the maintenance of an army, &c. presented to parliament, in 1810.

† Letter of sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, from Salamanca, 25th November, 1808.

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Of the justice or prematurity of this opinion, the facts recorded in the ensuing divisions of this work will enable the reader to judge. As, however, nothing can be more interesting or important than the origin and progress of the re-organized Portuguese army, a slight view shall be taken of the state in which it was at the time when it thus attracted the attention of the British government.

When circumstances rendered it necessary, in 1762, for Joseph the First to give the command of his army to the count Schaumbourg Lippe, this officer found the troops in a most wretched state. The few that did exist were indeed an irregular, undisciplined, mob. The subaltern officers were appointed by the captains of companies; and the captains, although they received their commissions from the king, had not the rank of gentlemen. Such troops might add somewhat to the parade of regal state, but must have been of little avail as a defence to the throne.

The indefatigable exertions of Lippe brought the Portuguese army to a very respectable state of discipline and organization; but, when that officer was banished from the country by Monkish superstition and intrigue, things returned, in a great measure, to their former wretched condition.

Several attempts have been made, within the last twenty years, to re-organize this army upon Lippe's plan, particularly in 1793, when general Forbes took the field with 6000 men, chosen from the whole force of the kingdom, and, in 1802, when the country was invaded by the Prince of Peace. But, all these attempts, weak in themselves, ended in nothing. The duke D'Affonso, the marshal-general of the kingdom, was too old to attend to the regulation and management of the army himself, and too obstinate to admit of the interference of any other officer. When general Junot entered Lisbon with a French army, in November, 1807, I believe the whole effective force of Portugal would not have exceeded 10,000 men, though the amount of the army, upon paper, might have been nearly ten times that number: and yet, small as this number was, the French general appears to have been sufficiently jealous of their existence, as the whole were disbanded by an order of the marquis of Alorna, the inspector-general and commander-in-chief, dated the 5th of March, 1808.

Lord Wellington, who, with other qualities, which render him equal to any general of the present day, or perhaps of past ages, possesses such a knowledge of the human character as is rarely equalled, was soon convinced of the possibility of

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organising a native army, as also of the great importance of such an army in the peninsula campaigns.

The population of Portugal, calculated at one million two hundred and fifty thousand males, was capable of furnishing any number of recruits that could be required; but money to pay these recruits, and a general capable of putting the whole in motion, were not to be found in the peninsula. For these, the British government was applied to, and they were readily granted; a loan was negotiated, in England, for the prince Regent, and major-general Beresford, an officer, whose abilities were just beginning to be developed, was ultimately sent out to take the command of the Portuguese forces, with the local rank of lieutenant-general. He was afterwards appointed marshal and commander-in-chief of all the forces of Portugal, by the government of that country, and endowed with very full and extensive powers.

A number of British officers, of different ranks, were permitted at the same time to join the army of the prince Regent, and were presented by his royal highness with commissions, superior to those which they held in the British army.

When count Lippe was employed to organise the Portuguese forces, in 1762, he formed a code of

regulations, which were approved of by the king, and which have continued to be the standing law of the army.

When general Junot took possession of Portugal, in 1807, the regular military force of that kingdom consisted of four regiments of artillery, twelve regiments of cavalry, and twenty-four regiments of infantry; together with forty-three regiments of militia, 1500 light troops, and 1300 invalid artillery. When the returns of each corps were added together, they formed a respectable numerical force, upon paper. The system, however, upon which this army was formed, viz. for local and garrison duty, rendered it very unequal to active campaigns; and it would appear that the Portuguese government had become sensible of this, even before the kingdom was invaded by the French; for, we find some of the general officers, in 1806, writing on the best manner of forming an army for the defence of Portugal; as also the war-minister of that day organising and new-modelling the then existing forces. Previous to 1806, each corps was known by the city or district where it had been embodied, or by the name of the colonel who commanded; but at that period the regiments were regularly numbered. The whole

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army was divided into three grand divisions, each consisting of so many brigades of cavalry and infantry; and, although the regiments were allowed to retain their former uniforms, yet an addition was made of edging of a particular colour, which served to point out the division of the army to which each corps belonged: thus all the regiments, which compose the division of the north, have yellow edging; those of the centre division have white; and those of the southern division red. I have no hesitation in saying, that I think the author of these regulations has shewn a great deal of judgement, not only in the manner in which the army is divided and brigaded, but also in the minor details of uniforms, &c. The manner in which the rank of officers is pointed out by their uniform appears to me to be extremely good, and I think the difference between the uniform of the troops of the line and the militia is also proper. In the Portuguese army an ensign wears an epaulet of fringe upon the left shoulder; a lieutenant wears it upon the right shoulder; and a captain wears two fringe epaulets; a major wears a bullion epaulet upon the left shoulder, and a fringe one upon the right; a lieutenant-colonel wears the bullion epaulet upon the right shoulder, and the fringe upon the left; and a full colonel has two bullion epaulets: all of-

ficers, however, from the colonel downwards, wear scale epaulets; a brigadier-general wears two wrought bullion epaulets, with one star, his uniform is a plain blue coat, with broad gold lace on the collar and cuffs; the major-general has the same uniform, but the collar and cuffs of the coat are embrodered; the lieutenant-general has two rows of embroidery; and the marshal has the whole of the collar and cuffs covered with embroidery, and he also wears embrodered epaulets. These are the most obvious distinctions in the dress of the officers of the line. The officers of the militia are distinguished in the same manner, but, as the troops of the line have all gold mountings, and the militia silver, it is known at once to which service an officer belongs.

In forming the standing army of Portugal, count Lippe determined that there should be only twenty-four regiments of regular troops, called infantry of the line; and, in his book of regulations, he is at great pains to detail the effective strength of each corps and company. Every regiment was to consist of seven companies, the first company, being commanded by the colonel of the regiment, was to consist of 116 individuals. The second company was to be commanded by the lieutenant-colonel, the third by the major, and the

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other four by captains, and, with the exception of the first, as stated, were to consist of 114 individuals each, so that the effective strength of each regiment, including a staff of one adjutant, one quarter-master, one chaplain, one auditor, one surgeon, and six assistant surgeons, together with a drum-major, armourer, and hangman, would be 806, or of 23 regimental and 15 staff-officers, and of 768 non-commissioned officers and men.

Though this was considered the effective strength of a regiment, yet any number of officers, non-commissioned officers, or men, might be attached as *aggragadoes*. It is ordered, however, that all *aggragadoes* are to receive only the half of the pay and allowances received by effectives; and *aggragadoed* officers, although obliged to do the same duty as the effectives of the corps to which they are attached, are always the junior of their respective ranks. The effective strength of each regiment has been doubled since the days of Lippe, yet the system of *aggragadoes* still continues.

1st regiment.

The first regiment of infantry of the line was formed under the personal inspection of count Lippe, in 1762. It is still denominated his regiment. This corps was raised in Lisbon, and was always considered as holding a more respectable rank in the general line than any other regiment;

being considered, in a measure, the guards of the court, or household troops of the sovereign.

The second regiment of infantry of the line was raised in the small kingdom of Algarve, and embodied at Lagos. It forms one of the most efficient corps in the army.

The third, or Olivença, regiment of infantry of the line, though in good order, is not so complete as many of the other corps of the army; the district of the kingdom, from which it was recruited, is not so famed for producing good soldiers as many of the others. The men from the district of Lamego, of which this regiment was chiefly composed, were not so inured to hardships as those from the mountainous districts, and they have, therefore, suffered severely from sickness.

The fourth regiment of infantry of the line having been formed and commanded, for a great number of years, by Gomes Friere, one of the most distinguished officers in the service of Portugal, previous to the invasion of that kingdom by the French army, was always esteemed the first corps in the service. General Friere having been prevailed upon to enter the service of France, the greater part of his regiment left the peninsula with him.

The fifth is one of the best regiments of the

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6th regiment.

army, and, during the late active operations on the banks of the Guadiana, distinguished itself very particularly.

The sixth regiment of infantry of the line, or, as it was formerly called, the first Oporto regiment, is another distinguished corps.

7th regiment.

The seventh regiment of infantry of the line is also a very distinguished corps, and composed of a fine body of men, from the town and neighbourhood of St. Ubes.

8th regiment.

The eighth regiment of infantry of the line was in a wretched state.

9th regiment.

The ninth, or Viana regiment of infantry of the line, was very ineffective.

10th regiment.

The tenth regiment has been always known in the army as the proper Lisbon regiment. It is not composed of so fine a body of men as the fourth, but it has always been kept in equally good order.

11th regiment.

The eleventh, or Almeida regiment of infantry, was less effective.

12th regiment.

The twelfth, or Chaves regiment of infantry, is composed of a very fine body of men, but still not in a state to take the field.

13th regiment.

The thirteenth, or Peniche regiment of infantry of the line, is only distinguished by its laborious occupation in fortifications.

14th regiment.

The fourteenth regiment of infantry of the line

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was embodied at Tavira, in Algarve, and is, perhaps, taking it altogether, the finest regiment in the service. The men from Algarve appear in general to be much stronger, and a more martial race than the inhabitants of Portugal. They have more of the Spanish than Portuguese character, and, on that account, says Dr. Halliday, I think make better soldiers.*

The fifteenth regiment is called the second regiment of Olivença, and suffered much from sickness. 15th regiment.

The sixteenth, or regiment of Viera Tillis, is a corps much celebrated in the annals of the Portuguese army. It is one of those which were sent to France during the reign of general Junot; yet it was one of those first organised after the expulsion of that general. 16th regiment.

The seventeenth, or second Elvas regiment of infantry, has eminently distinguished itself. 17th regiment.

The eighteenth, or second Oporto regiment, is most certainly one of the finest regiments in the service, both as an effective corps, and as being composed of a fine body of men. 18th regiment.

The nineteenth, or Cascaes regiment, is also a fine corps. 19th regiment.

The twentieth, or Campo Maior regiment, is not inferior in character to any. 20th regiment.

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21st regiment.

22d regiment.

23d regiment.

The twenty-first, or Valença regiment, is not so effective as some of the other regiments; it is, however, in good order.

The twenty-second, or Sepa regiment, though composed chiefly of youths, is not inefficient.

The twenty-third, or Almeida regiment, is a very complete and well-organised corps, and is considered as one of the finest regiments in the service.

24th regiment.

The twenty-fourth regiment was embodied at Bragança.

Cavalry of the
line.

The regiments of Portuguese cavalry are twelve in number, and were in a very wretched state. The difficulty of procuring horses has rendered the extension of this force impossible.

In count Lippe's regulations for the cavalry, the regiments are formed upon a very low scale. Each troop was to consist of only three officers, five non-commissioned officers, a trumpeter, a farrier, and thirty men; and, as a regiment consisted of only eight troops, the effective strength of each corps was not more than thirty officers, non-commissioned officers, and 240 men. This establishment has been increased at different periods, and, when the whole were reduced in 1808, the effective strength of each regiment was 470. The

Portuguese, however, in the opinion of some military writers, are not calculated to excel in this species of service. The men are too indolent to attend to their horses, and the country certainly does not produce forage for any great number of cavalry. Gomes Freir de Andrade, whose book is considered an able production on the formation of an army for the defence of Portugal, though he admits the necessity of a considerable cavalry force, does not propose to form more than eleven regiments of native troops, of about 500 rank and file each.

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The first regiment of cavalry was formerly known, in the Portuguese army, by the name of the Alcantara Dragoons, from its being a Lisbon regiment, and almost always quartered in the barracks there, soon became very effective.

1st regiment.

The second, or Moura regiment of cavalry, deficient in horses, has not the order of the first regiment.

2d regiment.

The third, or Olivença regiment, is inefficient.

3d regiment.

The fourth, or regiment of Mecklenburg on the contrary, was amongst the first regiments able to take the field.

4th regiment.

The fifth, or Evora regiment, was soon completed, and able to take the field.

5th regiment.

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6th regiment.

7th regiment.

8th regiment.

9th regiment.

10th regiment.

11th regiment.

12th regiment.

Portuguese ar-
tillery.

The sixth, or Bragança regiment, has been very actively employed.

The seventh, or proper Lisbon regiment, is certainly one of the most complete regiments in the service, and in an excellent state of discipline.

The eighth, another very complete corps, was formerly known as the regiment of Elwas.

The ninth, or regiment of Chaves, is well adapted to garrison duty.

The tenth, or Santarem regiment, has been completely formed *de novo*.

The eleventh, or Almeida regiment, though not complete, has been a good deal employed.

The twelfth, or Miranda regiment, is less effective.

Count Lippe, considering the defence of Portugal to depend much more upon the strength of his frontier garrisons than the operations of a moveable army, was at great pains to organise a proper artillery-force. He formed the four regiments which still exist, as also the independent companies, which were stationary in their respective forts. In the organisation of this department of the army he was materially assisted by the French marshal Valleriois, and the English colonel, Ferriar; officers still remembered and respected in

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Portugal. The first, while governor of Elvas, constructed the famous bomb-proofs, called FORT LE LIPPE, and the second, while colonel of the regiment of artillery of Valença, was employed in arranging and forming the other three regiments, which were then embodied.

The first regiment of artillery, being considered the regiment of the court, was formed to garrison the castles and forts of the province of Estremadura. The head-quarters were stationary in Lisbon, as its duty was confined to the capital and sea-coasts adjacent.

In like manner the second regiment, which was formed in Algarve, had its head-quarters at Fara, and was entirely occupied in the defence of the castles and forts in that detached kingdom.

The third regiment of artillery had its head-quarters at Estremos, and was employed in the garrisons on the frontiers of Alentejo and Beira Baixa.

The fourth regiment was resident in the forts on the northern frontiers, and had its head-quarters at Oporto.

Besides these regular artillery regiments, there were also, as already observed, independent, or rather invalid, artillery-companies, which were always stationary in their several forts; for though the regiments were seldom moved from their dis-

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tricts, they might be moved at pleasure, from fort to fort.

It is probable that at the time the artillery-corps was first organised in Portugal, the British ordnance department was taken as a model. The artillery and engineers are under the same government, and are commanded by a general officer, who holds a rank in the state somewhat similar to that of our master-general of the ordnance.

Caçadores.

The importance of light troops, in the defence of Portugal, having been early ascertained. They were formed on the restoration of the kingdom, but were in a very inefficient state at the time the British officers entered the service. From its being a favourite service with the natives, and having been taken with the battalions in the first instance, their gallant conduct is less to be wondered at. The marquis of Alorna had a corps of light troops, which was called the Legion, previous to the arrival of the French army.

1st battalion.

The first battalion of the present Caçadores was formed at Castello de Vide, by colonel George d'Avelens, about the month of October, 1808; and has still remained under the command of this distinguished officer.

2d battalion.

The second battalion was embodied at Moura, by colonel Bilston; this corps is by no means in

such high order as some other battalions, and is very far behind in point of discipline.

The third battalion was embodied by a brother of the present general Silveira, at Villa Real, and as fine a body of light troops as exists in any country.

The fourth battalion was embodied at Visseu, by colonel Luis de Rigo. It is also a very fine corps, and in excellent order.

The fifth was embodied at Campo Maior, by a colonel Mozinho.

The sixth battalion was formed at Oporto. It is composed of a fine body of men.

Sir Robert Wilson being sent to Oporto, where the brave inhabitants had already revolted from the yoke of their lawless invader, and were rallying around the standard of their legitimate sovereign, was appointed to a command by the bishop of Oporto, and immediately set about organising this corps, which he denominated the Loyal Lusitanian Legion. Without pay and without resources, says Dr. Halliday, this legion was able to take the field, and to keep some of the best corps of the enemy's army in check, at a time too when even the British nation began to despond, and Spain and Portugal were given up as lost. Sir Robert Wilson marched with this corps to Ciudad Rodrigo in the latter end of 1808, and from thence to

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3d battalion.

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extending his excursions sometimes to Salamanca, he kept the enemy in continual alarm, and very often intercepted their convoys of money and supplies.

Of this corps a more just or interesting picture cannot possibly be given than that which commences the documents of colonel Mayne, who, whether considered as an officer or a scholar, claims the highest eulogy for the private communications of his campaigns, with which he has obliged his friends, and for which hereafter, among the best authenticated facts, the present work will have to apologize for owing many acknowledgements.

Colonel
Mayne's docu-
ments on the
Portuguese
army.

At Falmouth, says colonel Mayne, the end of September, 1808, I embarked to join the Loyal Lusitanian Legion in Portugal, raising by sir R. Wilson, under the auspices of the venerable bishop of Oporto, now patriarch of Portugal. I arrived at Lisbon in October, and I joined the Legion at Oporto, as colonel-commandant of the first battalion; in which rank I was confirmed by a commission from the regency of Portugal.

I was employed in organising the new levy of men until December, when, after a notice of only thirty-six hours, the Legion marched from Oporto, by order of lieutenant-general sir John Cradock, with the intention of proceeding to Villa Real, and defending (as far as this force might defend) the

approach to the northern provinces of Portugal.

At the time of this notice, the Legion had not one horse; not one mule, prepared for the artillery or light baggage. The heavy baggage was ordered to be left behind at Oporto.

The Legion then were between two and three thousand Portuguese, and they might have been extended to ten thousand or to more! but the finances of Portugal then shrunk from such increase. Numerous recruits were rejected daily! The British officers all, with me, must be liberal in this just praise of the men! No men could more deserve praise! by every good quality of recruits and soldiers, whether of diligence, obedience, &c. &c. to learn our discipline, or of zeal, spirit, &c. to exercise it when taught! For all this, several British generals bore them a public praise! Indeed, the Legion was considered as a model and spring by which a Portuguese army might regenerate. For there really was a fine enthusiasm, which ran, in rapid improvement, from man to man, from rank to rank, that the whole corps were soon ready for all the ulterior objects proposed from them by the British cabinet! who from these beginnings organised, thus proceeded so well into the successful augmentation of the force under marshal Beresford!

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army.The irregular
army of Portu-
gal.

The irregular force of Portugal is composed of the militia and ordenanza. The first is formed of the farmers and inhabitants of the country, capable of bearing arms in the field, and who can be removed from their districts with the least inconvenience to agriculture; while the last comprehends every male vassal who has reached the years of manhood, and is not a member of the church, the regular army, or the militia.

The militia.

At present there are forty-eight regiments of militia in existence; which, like the regular army, are divided into three grand divisions.

The first division consists of the regiments of Lagos, Tavira, Beja, Evora, Villa Viçosa, Portalegre, Castello Branco, Idanha, Covilhaô, Arganil, Tondella, Viseu, Lamego, Arouca, Trancoso, and Guarda.

The second division is formed of the four regiments raised in Lisbon and its suburbs, and the regiments of Torres, Santarem, Thomar, Lousaô, Setubal, Alcaçar, Leiria, Soure, Aveiro, Oliveiro d'Azeimis, Figueira, and Coimbra.

While the third and last division is formed of the regiments of Feira, Porto, Guimarens, Barto, Mayo, Penafiel, Braga, Villa de Conde, Barca, Barcellos, Arcos, Vianna, Chaves, Villa Real, Bragança, and Miranda.

The militia are governed upon the old system.—

Their gallant conduct, under brigadier-general Trant, in the re-taking of Coimbra, will be long remembered.

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gal.
The ordenanzas.

The ordenanzas, or armed peasantry, I have already observed, include the whole male population of the country, which is not connected with the church, the regular army, or the militia. This description of force is governed by laws peculiar to itself, and which have not been altered for a century.

The law directs that in every city, town, or village, where the lord of the manor resides upon the spot, he, by virtue of his rank in life, is captain-major of the armed inhabitants, or ordenanza, of that city, town, or village; and should the lord of the manor not reside upon his property, the chief magistrate of the city, town, or village, is obliged to act as captain-major, until the king shall appoint some person. The first duty of this officer is, to number the male inhabitants of his district, and to divide the whole into companies of 250 men each. As soon as the companies are numbered, the chief magistrates of the district are obliged to meet the captain-major in the public hall of the city, town, or village, which forms the district, and there elect the captains who are to command the companies, as also an officer with the rank of major, and who is styled "sargento mor," whose duty it is to su-

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perintend the organisation of the different companies under the captain-major, and to command the district in the absence of that officer. The captains of companies appoint their own subaltern officers, subject to the approval of the captain-major.

Before any captain-major can act as such, he is obliged to take an oath before the corregidor of the comarca, (a civil magistrate similar to the high sheriff of a county in England,) that as he has been elected by his sovereign captain-major of the district, and of the people which have been armed by his majesty for the defence of the same, that he will always have the inhabitants of the said district ready for the service of his majesty, and prepared to defend that district, city, town, or village. He is obliged to swear also, that he will at all times obey the orders of his prince, respect the laws of his country, and assist their execution, and that, with the people of his district, he will defend it, or make war in whatever manner the sovereign may direct; and that he never will employ the said inhabitants, either together or any part of them, in any particular service of his own, nor in the service of any of his relations, and that they shall only be commanded by him for the service of the king, and to guard, fulfil, and obey, whatever instructions or orders he may receive from the sovereign.

The captains of companies, on being elected, have

also to make oath before the captain-major, that they will always have the company under their command ready for the service of the king, and for the defence of the city, town, or village, to which it belongs; as also that they will obey the laws, and that they will not employ the people in their own private affairs.

Every person above sixty years of age is excused from serving in the companies of ordenanza, provided the captain-major thinks he is unable to carry arms. Every company is divided into squads of twenty-five men, and each squad is commanded by a corporal, who must be a man well acquainted with every individual of the twenty-five which he is appointed to govern. The corps, or brigade, as it is called, must consist of as many companies as the inhabitants of the district will make up; but the effective strength of every company is one captain, one ensign, one serjeant, an officer similar to an English bailiff, called in Portuguese "meirinho," a clerk, ten corporals, and 250 men. Every captain of a company has his own colours, and a drummer; and it is ordered, that as often as the company shall march out in battle-array, that the captain shall give the colours to the ensign; the captain is also allowed to make one of his own servants drummer, provided he has him properly instructed.

These companies are formed, it must be observed

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of the lower classes of the people ; the higher classes and all those who are able to keep a horse are formed into troops, and are called the mounted ordenanza. The troops and companies are trained to arms by their respective captains once or twice a month, and twice in every year, the whole force of the district is assembled by the captain-major, and inspected by him. The manner in which the ordenanza of the district are called together on an emergency, is somewhat similar to that used for the assembling of the clans in the Highlands of Scotland in feudal times.

Every man in the kingdom is a soldier of one sort or other, and obliged to have arms in his possession, either for the defence of the particular spot on which he exists, or of the state, of which he is a member ; those peasants who have not fire-arms have pikes, or a long pole with a bayonet fixed on one end.— Instances, says Dr. Halliday, of their cruelty are frequently repeated ; but if we consider for a moment the sufferings which they have undergone, the ruin which has been heaped upon them by the invading army, their conduct must cease to appear as cruel ; indeed I am more astonished at the very great moderation of the Portuguese peasantry.

The six grand divisions or provinces which compose the kingdom of Portugal, are subdivided into *Commarcas*, *Termas*, and *Fregusias* ; and these, in

a military point of view, are generally governed by the captain-majors, or captains of ordenanza, who are again immediately under the command of the general of the province. It is evident from the duties of those captains, already briefly detailed, that they must be perfectly acquainted with the number and description of the inhabitants of the district which they command. It is, therefore, a part of their duty to levy recruits for the regular army.—The verb *to recruit*, as understood in England, will not apply in Portugal; men are not levied there by bribes of money, and beat of drum,—the process is far more simple. The king ordains that the first regiment of the line shall consist of 2000 men; the colonel finds upon examining his returns that 700 men are wanted to complete that number; he states this to the general of the province, who immediately issues an order to the captain-major of the district from which the first regiment is recruited to send 700 young men to that corps; the captain-major, or his deputy, passes a review of the district, picks out 700 young men, sends them to prison for a few days to tame them, and, as soon as the whole are collected, marches them off under an escort of his ordenanza troops to the head-quarters of the first regiment. These lads, as soon as they join the regiment for which they were recruited, are divided among the several companies of the corps, and are

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immediately sworn in; they have no option but to take the oath, and if they leave the corps for four and twenty hours, after being sworn in, without leave, they are deserters, and as such they are liable to be shot!

Such is the manner in which the troops of the line are recruited. With respect to the militia, it is managed much in the same way; the government determines on the number of regiments, and the strength of each corps; the provinces are divided into as many districts as it is determined there shall be regiments; the gentleman who is appointed colonel of the corps, reviews his district, and having marked down the names of those he conceives necessary to complete his regiment, they are immediately called together, sworn in, and embodied; there is no excuse, no balloting, or bounty, the peasant is obliged not only to become a militia-man, but also to clothe himself, and in a great measure to support himself; for the militia have only half the allowance of pay and rations of the troops of the line, and that only when on duty out of their own district. The few old men and boys that remain in the district, after the regiments of the line and militia are completed, constitute the companies and corps of the ordenanza.

The articles of war of the Portuguese army are

twenty-nine in number, and as it is strictly ordered that every person connected with that army, of whatever rank or denomination, is to be guided and judged of by these articles, they are ordered to be read to the troops once in every five days, that is, on the days on which they receive their pay; for, instead of being paid weekly and in advance, as the British troops are, the Portuguese troops receive their pay every fifth day, but not till five days' pay is due; the auditor, a kind of judge-advocate, attached to each regiment, is bound not only to read but to explain the articles of war fully to every soldier in the ranks, and to every recruit on his joining the corps. It would be incompatible with this work to introduce them here; they are however interesting, and will, it is believed, be found abstracted in the work of Mr. Scott, on the British Military Code.

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Articles of war
of the Portugu-
guese army.

The kingdom of Portugal now restored to the legitimate sovereign, and the Portuguese people once more raised to their rank among the nations of Europe, the alliance between that country and Great Britain became naturally re-established on a firmer basis than ever.

Those doubts and difficulties which the state of

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the kingdom under the tyranny of an inveterate enemy had created, became quickly removed, and the re-organization of the Portuguese army, not only for the defence of its own country, but for aggression against the common enemy in Spain, afforded a glorious contrast between the insidious artifices which had been used to reduce Portugal to a state of entire vassalage under France, and the open generosity of the government of Great Britain.

It will be the purpose of the ensuing volume to shew the great effects of this ingenuous policy, even under circumstances the most disastrous, and to exhibit one of the most trying, yet interesting, campaigns that perhaps ever occurred in the military history of any nation.

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